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As Martin Jay notes in his Downcast Eyes, the optical mechanism of vision has been understood principally as a biological function, at least since the time of Kepler whose work was instrumental for establishing the modern laws of the biological physics of human seeing. According to these laws, we are able to see because light rays are transmitted through the cornea and the lenses of the eyeball to the rear of the retina. This visual information is then passed on to the human brain through the optical nerve. The brain then processes this information and produces an ‘image’, which we are able to see with the impression that the object in question is ‘in front of us’. Image, light, vision, perception. It’s a biological process like any other.
Science also reminds us that human vision is not always perfect. But nevertheless, the brain helps to overcome many of the gaps in vision (partial failures, things approaching but not including blindness) by coordinating the motoric movement of our eyes in order to produce a coherent image in front of us. Thanks to our brains we have the impression of a more or less perfect vision so that there are no blind spots. Even if we cannot ‘see’ properly, our brain will fill in the blanks, making it appear as if we are seeing, even when we are ‘actually’ not.

The perfection of our understanding of human vision has been, of course, science’s ambition for a long time. In the name of this project eyes have been dissected, brains cut open and other scientific experiments carried out. It seems that in order to perfect the vision of something, to improve understanding, one has to cut open, to dissect, to anatomise. We must ‘open up a few corpses’, as Foucault once noted. One has to look inside in order to get a grasp of how something works. To understand how human vision works, one has to cut open the eye in order to study its properties. ‘Cutting’, it seems, is a basic scientific tool.

But cutting does not always have to serve the project of Enlightenment. It can also simply shock. Cast light, but not enlighten in the sense that we expect it. When, for example, Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dalí shot their film *An Andalusian Dog* in 1929, they clearly were out to shock their audience. Very early on in the film a man strops an open razor until it is ‘razor sharp’. The man (in fact, it is Buñuel himself) takes the razor and slices through the eyeball of a woman. Shock, horror, disgust – these are probably the most common reactions to what has become one of the most famous scenes of surrealist cinema. When the film was first seen at the end of the 1920 and the early 1930s, many people simply walked out of cinemas.

While science ‘cuts’ in order to explain and understand, film and art use the technique of ‘cutting’ to shock an audience. It is a shock that aims to put taken-for-granted images of reality into doubt and cut open some possibilities for seeing different realities or different aspects of reality. According to Buñuel, the idea for the ‘sliced eyeball’ scene came from a ‘dream image’: “I have dreamt of my mother and of the moon, and of a cloud which crossed the moon, and then they tried to cut my mother’s eye” he once said. The whole idea of psychoanalysis is, of course, to show that reality is not that what it seems. Or better, to show that the way that reality seems (that is, its presentation to consciousness) is not the way that it seems. Following Lacan, the real is always already accompanied and subverted by the Real, those images that escape symbolisation. The Imaginary pretence of wholeness and unity is fractured by the Real, which contains images that do not ‘make sense’ to consciousness and hence call that unity into question. The Real cuts.

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Perhaps, what Buñuel and Dali’s film tries to do is to cut up the real in order to provide an access point to the Real, to the space that cannot be easily overlooked by the human eye. This is the image of the film that they construct for themselves (perhaps again the very real, yet competing reading, which notes the gendering of the figures that cut and get cut, and exposes the misogynistic violence being justified as art). Buñuel explanation misses this, somehow: “This film draws its inspiration from poetry, freed from reason and traditional morality. It has no intention of attracting or pleasing the spectator – indeed, on the contrary, it attacks him to a degree to which he belongs to a society with which surrealism is at war...this film is meant to explode in the hands of its enemies”.

Meaning is not the aim of *An Andalusian Dog*. It simply shocks its audience, a shock that might generate a new consciousness by connecting us to the blind side of reality, the ‘dark side of the moon’.

People are, understandably, afraid of losing their sight. Cutting through an eyeball is probably one of the most horrible things one could imagine. Instead of ‘cutting up’ reality, we are usually concerned to perfect our vision. Glasses and microscopes, for example, improve our ability to see the world. And scientific models and theories (even ‘theories of organization’) are tools for seeing, so we are told. But seeing is not simply an act that can be explained by biology and perfected by science. While science surely has its legitimacy, it seems important to see science as something that is a product of a particular ‘world-image’, something that aims to improve a particular view of the world. The science of organization, for example, is historically produced and puts forward a

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3 Buñuel, *ibid*. 
particular view of the organized world. What has become clear is that this view can be contested on various grounds.

The implications of seeing exceed biology, and can take us into the philosophical, as has been insisted by various philosophers. Perhaps this is reflective of a basic instability in vision. We see, but there is always the chance of seeing differently. And we can deal with this risk in a variety of ways. On the one hand, we can deal with the risk of having the wrong image by denying the validity of all others – this is absolutism. One the other hand, we can claim that any image is as good as any other, and that all images tell us something about the world. But perhaps this second, which is all the rage in certain circles today and claims for itself all of the virtues of democratisation, hides another variety of absolutism. An absolutism that tells us that we can see any old way we like, that we can change our mind with the weather and have the suppleness of youth when we change our minds. Anyone for real change?
Glass Palaces and Glass Cages: Organizations in Times of Flexible Work, Fragmented Consumption and Fragile Selves

Yiannis Gabriel

Abstract

Max Weber’s metaphor of ‘the iron cage’ has provided an abiding image of organizations during the high noon of modernity. But these organizations, rigid, rational and bureaucratic, may no longer be sustainable in our times. Instead of a pre-occupation with efficient production and rational administration, management today is increasingly turning to the consumer as the measure of all things, a consumer who seeks not merely the useful and the functional, but the magical, the fantastic and the alluring. Management of organizations thus finds itself increasingly preoccupied with the orchestration of collective fantasies and the venting of collective emotions through the power of image, in what Ritzer has named the cathedrals of consumption, such as shopping malls, tourist attractions, holiday resorts etc. The core thesis of this lecture is that the decline of Weber’s iron cage of rationality has exposed us neither to the freedom of a garden of earthly delights nor to the desolation of the law of the jungle. Instead, I shall propose that the new experiences of work and consumption allow for greater ambivalence and nuance, for which I shall offer the twin metaphors of ‘glass cages’ and ‘glass palaces’. As a material generating, distorting and disseminating images, glass seems uniquely able to evoke both the glitter and the fragility of organizations in late modernity.

As some of you know, this is my second stint at Imperial College. Way back in the 1970s, I came to this country straight out of Greek High School as an undergraduate in Mechanical Engineering. It was very gratifying to find myself thirty years later almost to the day, starting a second stint, as a Professor of Organizational Theory in the School of Management. My office on Princess Gate overlooks that mighty statement of the 1960s, the building which houses the Department of Mechanical Engineering, a building in which I had spent three formative years of my life as a student. This was the image that confronted me

* This is based on the author’s Inaugural Lecture at Imperial College, London, 12th March 2002.
when I arrived at College for my first day. That concrete block, inaugurated a few years
before my first arrival, had then looked to me supremely authoritative and imposing,
thoroughly modern. The building does not seem quite so modern any more. Some of the
shine may have gone from its tiled surfaces or, more likely, my eyes along with
everybody else’s are no longer so enamoured with modernity and its artifacts, the way
they used to be. But we needn’t worry! Even as I speak, a great project is afoot, one
which will not only see a magnificent tower rise next to the concrete block, but one
which, thanks to the vision of that most distinguished architect, Lord Foster, will see
this entire structure encased in a mighty, glittering shell of glass. I am confident that the
new glass structure will seem as authoritative in the twenty-first century as the concrete
one did in the twentieth century.

Glass is, of course, the signature material of our times, just as concrete was the signature
material of forty or fifty years ago. Concrete is a substance which preserves a distant
memory of its origin as fluid, yet, a substance which solidifies forever into a rigid and
immutable mass. Glass too may start its existence as fluid, but its defining property is
optical rather than static – its ability to allow light to pass through it, even as it reflects,
distorts or refracts it. It is a substance which generates changing images, a substance
whose mere presence leaves us in no doubt that what it encases is worthy of attention.
Glass then evokes image and movement, just as readily as concrete evokes structure and
stability. Glass will be a main feature of my presentation today. In this presentation, I
will examine some of the key social and organizational changes of the last half-century.
I will argue that during this period, Western society has moved from a society of
massive, concrete buildings and massive, concrete organizations to one of flexible but
fragile work arrangements and flexible but fragile organizations, from a society driven
by mechanism and production to a society preoccupied with spectacle, image and
consumption. I will then seek to show how the nature of demands made upon us by our
organizations has drastically changed over this period. The glass building, ambiguously
experienced, now as glittering palace, now as suffocating cage, will emerge as the guiding metaphor of my argument.

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A still earlier signature material, one that preceded both concrete and glass, and one forever identified with the great achievements of modernity, is iron. And iron is the starting point of my presentation today, and in particular one iron object which has a vibrant meaning for every student of organizations – the iron cage. The iron cage is an abiding image of modernity offered by one of its most eminent explorers, admirers and critics, the great German sociologist Max Weber. As his famous essay on the origins of modern capitalism, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, moves towards its momentous denouement, Weber reflected on the triumph of Puritan values of thrift, hard work, future orientation and unyielding control over the passions of the soul and the temptations of the body. These values, he argued, had revolutionized economic order, by providing the moral justification for capital accumulation and rational planning and fueling the growth of industrial capitalism. And yet, as the destination point of unparalleled economic and social progress, Weber envisaged an image so dreadful that it has haunted students of modernity ever since:

> The Puritan [in the 17th century] wanted to work for a calling; we [in the 20th] are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In Baxter’s view the care of the external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the ‘saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment’. But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage. (Weber, 1958: 181)

The image of the iron cage of modernity returns in another of Weber’s works, *Economy and Society*, in which he argues that bureaucratic rationalization instigates a system of controls that trap the individual within
an iron cage of subjugation and containment. (Weber, 1978). For Weber, it is instrumental rationality, accompanied by the rise of measurement and quantification, regulations and procedures, accounting, efficiency and the gradual displacement of spontaneous feeling by careful calculation of costs and benefits, that entraps us all, in a world of ever increasing material standards, but vanishing magic, fantasy, meaning and emotion. Eventually, we all become trapped in the bureaucratic mechanism which turns us into impersonal functionaries or cogs, passively following rules and procedures and relating to each other without feeling or passion. Its logic is as ineluctable as is its indifference to human feeling, suffering and desire. This mechanism, housed in solid concrete buildings, with partitioned offices, represents the hallmark of modernity, at least in the sphere of work and production. Within this bureaucratic mechanism

the performance of each individual is mathematically measured, each man becomes a little cog in the machine and, aware of this, his one preoccupation is whether he can become a bigger cog. (Mayer, 1956: 126)
How well does our society, dominated by information, mass media, spectacle and the cult of the consumer, fit the image of mechanized human automata envisaged by Weber? Not so well, argue many commentators. In contrast to modernity’s rationality and machine-like organization, many argue that we have entered a new historical period, post-modernity or late modernity. This transition is every bit as major as the transition from traditional to modern society and one which in many ways reverses some of the effects of modernity, by re-introducing feeling, emotion and fantasy in social life. In particular, within the sphere of consumption a dramatic re-enchantment of the world has been taking place, at least in the West, one in which consumers can indulge in diverse fancies and whims, collectively venting of emotions and seeking meaning and pleasure. Far from being exiled from contemporary culture by ever more rational processes, fantasy and emotion become the vital ingredients of a consumer-
driven capitalism, travelling across continents with the speed of electrons on the Internet. Indeed, fantasy and emotion have become driving forces in and out of organizations as individuals strive to attain precarious selfhoods in a society saturated with images, signs and information.

Organizations and management have undergone profound changes. The productivist orientation epitomized by Henry Ford’s famous dictum ‘They can have it any colour they like, as long as it is black’, has given way to a new attitude, where organizations seek to please and flatter their customers, stimulating their fantasies and pampering their every desire and whim. Instead of continuous runs of uniform products allowing consumers little choice, a bewildering array of products, many of them customized and unique is on offer. Image, glamour, uniqueness and the alignment with the changing whims of fashion, fancy and taste become all important for organizational success. Thus, flexibility, along with flux, fluidity and flow, has emerged as one of the much-vaunted qualities of our times. It applies to individuals, organizations and even entire societies, suggesting an ability and a willingness not merely to adapt and change but to radically redefine themselves, to metamorphose into new entities. Flexibility stands at the opposite end of rigidity, the chief quality of Weberian bureaucracy. The flexible organization (variously referred to as network, post-modern, post-Fordist, post-bureaucratic, shamrock etc.) has emerged as the antidote to Weberian bureaucracy, a concept of organization which does away with rigid hierarchies, procedures, products and boundaries, in favour of constant and continuous reinvention, redefinition and mobility. Success, for such organizations, is not a state of perfect stable equilibrium, but a process of irregularity, innovation and disorder, where temporary triumphs occur at the edge of the abyss and can never be regularized into blissful routine.

The flexible organization is currently hailed as an ideal organization type for today, as Weberian bureaucracy was held to be fifty years ago. Its characteristics are well described by Clegg:

Where the modernist organization was rigid, postmodern organization is flexible. Where modernist consumption was premised on mass forms, postmodernist consumption is premised on niches.… Where modernist organization and jobs were highly differentiated, demarcated and de-skilled, postmodernist organization and jobs are highly de-differentiated, de-demarcated and multiskilled. (1990: 181)

Many theorists have taken up the implications of flexible organizations for individuals at work. One of the most acute analyses has been offered by Richard Sennett (1998) in his book The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism. Sennett argues that new flexible work arrangements promote a short-term, opportunistic outlook among employees, one that undermines trust and loyalty. Insecurity and fear of being on the edge of losing control are endemic. Careers become
spasmodic and fragmented, their different steps failing to generate cohesive or integrated life-stories. Exposed to intrusive monitoring of performance, employees feel constantly on trial, yet they are never sure of the goals at which they are aiming. There are no objective measures of what it means to do a good job, and those celebrated for their achievements one day easily find themselves on the receiving end of redundancy packages the next. Showing eagerness, being willing to play any game by any rules, looking attractive and involved, while at the same time maintaining a psychological distance and looking for better prospects elsewhere, these are the chameleon-like qualities of the new economy. Constant job moves, preoccupation with image and the look of CVs, absence of commitments and sacrifices, these stand in opposition with traditional family values of duty, commitment, constancy and caring. The result is a corrosion of moral character, which in times past provided both a sense of continuity and constancy to the individual as well as anchoring him or her to a set of reciprocal relations of caring, obligation and interdependence. Dependence comes to be seen as shameful, evidence of personal failure, in a society where individuals need no one and are needed by no one.

Sennett illustrates his arguments with a few well-chosen case studies. Wherever he focuses, Sennett observes different elements of the same picture – flexibility, dictated by global markets and ever-changing technologies, promoting opportunism, short-termism and insecurity while destroying values, trust, community and caring. A deep anxiety and insecurity permeates workplaces. This, by itself is not new. Earlier generations of employees worried; they worried because of the vagaries of the labor markets, social injustice and lack of control over their fate. Today’s employees, however, perceive themselves as having choices, which can make the difference between success and
failure. “I make my own choices; I take full responsibility for moving around so much” (1998: 29), says one of his protagonists, who seems to abhor dependency above all else.

Sennett offers a perceptive account of Weber’s views on the Protestant work ethic, capturing the tragic predicament of its archetypal character – the ‘driven man’ engaged in a ceaseless, yet ultimately futile, struggle of proving his moral worth through hard work against the immutable rigor of predestination. Against this, he sets the superficiality of present-day workplaces, with teams of employees engaged in furtive pursuits of value through the power of images, signs and symbols. Salesmanship, showmanship and acting are the essential virtues of the flexible individual whose essential quality is to respond to the corporate call for flexibility by denying him/herself an inner core.

Sennett’s deeply pessimistic book does not offer any prescriptions for the future nor does it identify any dynamic for change. Yet the discontents which he describes, and in particular the chronic inability to form coherent identity narratives, are so profound that one wonders how societies, and especially North American society, have survived thus far without collapsing. George Ritzer’s latest thesis offers a clear answer to this question. Ritzer, well-known for his McDonaldization thesis, is, in Enchanting a Disenchanted World (1999), as single-mindedly focused on consumption as Sennett is on work. Consumption, argues Ritzer, plays an ever-increasing role in the lives of individuals, as a source of meaning, pleasure and identity. It takes place in settings that “allow, encourage, and even compel us to consume so many of those goods and services” (1999: 2). These settings, which include theme parks, cruise ships, casinos, tourist resorts, sports venues, theaters, hotels, restaurants and above all shopping malls, are referred to as ‘cathedrals of consumption’ to indicate their quasi-religious, enchanted qualities. They are part of a process called by some ‘Disneyization’. Thanks to TV and internet-shopping, this now extends to the home, which is converted from an arena of interpersonal relations into a highly privatized consumption outpost.
Ritzer’s central thesis is that today’s management sets its eyes firmly not on the toiling worker, but on the fantasizing consumer. What management does is to furnish, in a highly rationalized manner, an endless stream of consumable fantasies inviting consumers to pick and choose, thus creating the possibility of re-enchanting a disenchanted world through mass festivals in the new cathedrals of consumption. Ritzer offers prodigious illustrations of the ways in which consumption is constantly promoted, enhanced and controlled in these new settings, not so much through direct advertising, as through indirect means such as spatial arrangements, uses of language, images, signs, festivals, simulations and extravaganzas, as well as the cross-fertilization through merchandizing of products and images. Above all, consumption gradually colonizes every public and private domain of social life, which become saturated with fantasizing, spending and discarding opportunities. Even schools, universities and hospitals are converted from sober, utilitarian institutions into main terrains of consumption, treating their constituents as customers, offering them a profusion of merchandise and indulging their fantasies and caprices. Hyper-consumption is a state of affairs where every social experience is mediated by market mechanisms.

In a strange way particular work, oblivious to the workplace as does apparent consolations. But ultimately the by each author could complement each of the frustrations of contemporary flexible workplaces that individuals turn to consumption for meaning, identity and fulfillment. And it is because of the corrosion of character that a culture of narcissism dominated by image, fantasy and superficiality, is on the ascendant. Viewers of the award-winning film *American Beauty* will have no difficulty in recognizing both sides of the argument in the symbolically impoverished, image-dominated lives of its suburban characters. The film vividly portrays the precarious work identities of its adult protagonists, the generational gulf between parents and children, which is only transcended through sexual fantasy, as well as the universal obsessions with house interiors, video images and the physical body.

Where both approaches stop short is in recognizing forces that run counter to their main theses. Work flexibility (for which read insecurity and impoverishment) and hyper-consumption march on, uncontested, feeding off each other. The accounts of employees and consumers presented by both Sennett and Ritzer are thoroughly monochromatic, and the reader longs for a discussion of ambivalence, conflict, resistance and variation. Identity and character may be fashioned not only through submission to the dominant forces of the workplace or the shopping mall well described in these two books, but also in opposition to such forces. Today’s employees, like today’s consumers, may be managed, prodded, seduced and controlled. Yet, their response cannot be taken for granted. As Tim Lang and I have shown in *The Unmanageable Consumer*, consumers are unpredictable, contrary and inconsistent. They often follow fashion blindly, yet they also can and do, in every-day practices, dodge, subvert or evade the controlling
employees, for their part, display a bewildering range of responses to managerial calls for flexibility; at times they comply willingly or ritualistically, at other times fear and insecurity dominate their responses, but frequently they show ingenuity in supplanting and contesting management discourses, turning them into objects of amusement, cynicism or confrontation.

In contrast to Sennett’s view that today’s workplace denies employees a voice, that it simply mutes their hopes and their discontents depriving them of a life-story, an alternative approach would suggest that in spite of the forces intent on silencing them, individuals and groups in today’s organizations strive and eventually discover voices of their own. Using Hirschman’s (1970) concept of voice, Smelser (1998: 180) argues that individuals acknowledge the shortcomings and frustrations of such bonds, working out their ambivalence in public and trying to influence or change their environments, rather than chameleon-like adapting to them.

Voice ... is intermediate; some degree of loyalty is presupposed, and some degree of alienation and opposition – a wish to exit, as it were – is acknowledged. Some arena is established for ‘working out’ public ambivalence and conflict – with varying effectiveness – and ‘working it into’ institutional arrangements. (Smelser, 1998b: 188)

Voice, then, is not a consequence of dependence (as Sennett’s analysis might lead us to believe), but a means for expressing and working through ambivalence, and for instigating some social and organizational change. This may not be a confident voice narrating a simple tale of achievement, success, survival and sacrifice, but it is a voice which allows different constructions of identity to be experimented with, developed, modified, rejected and reconstructed.

To be sure, today’s organizations deploy more subtle, pervasive and invasive strategies of control than they did a generation ago. If those organizations relied on Weberian controls, i.e., bureaucratic rules and procedures, today’s organizations use cultural and emotional controls (emphasizing the importance of customer service, quality and image; affirming the business enterprise as an arena for heroic or spiritual accomplishments etc.), structural controls (continuous measurements and benchmarking, flatter organizational hierarchies etc.), technological (electronic surveillance of unimaginable sophistication), spatial controls (open-plan offices, controlled accesses) and so forth. Those influenced by the work of Foucault have developed the idea of social controls that operate through language, labelling, classification, and so forth, which are invisible, but far-reaching.

In spite of such controlling mechanisms, today’s workplace creates, if anything, even more possibilities of voice, with employees displaying a bewildering range of responses which qualify, subvert, disregard or resist managerial calls for flexibility; at times they comply willingly, grudgingly or ritualistically, at other times fear and insecurity dominate their responses, but frequently they show ingenuity in supplanting and
contesting management discourses, turning them into objects of amusement, cynicism or confrontation. At other times, they subvert organizational images and claims directly, for example by turning whistle-blowers or by using the organization’s own machinery against itself, for instance by spreading computer viruses or rumours. Thus within formal organizations, there are spaces which are hard to manage and control, spaces that are unmanaged and unmanageable; in these spaces, individuals can fashion identities, which may amount neither to conformity nor to rebellion, but are infinitely more complex and rich than those deriving from official organizational practices.

What we have here is a picture where traditional rational/bureaucratic controls, i.e., rigid and rational rules and procedures, are being replaced by an array of controls which operate through language, emotion, space and exposure. The demise of the iron cage of rationality can be seen as leading to a different form of entrapment, an entrapment not as rigid as that effected by traditional bureaucracy but one which affords greater ambiguity and irony, a glass cage perhaps, an enclosure which is characterized by total exposure to the eye of the customer, the fellow-employee, the manager.

The very visibility of the glass cage to the unforgiving gaze places severe limits to the overt control that managers are able to exercise, with employees frequently finding themselves in the position of children capable of embarrassing their parents in the presence of strangers. Why glass cage? Undoubtedly, the glass cage suggests the chief quality of Foucault’s Panopticon, that curious combination of Catholic obsession with the omnipotent eye of God and Protestant pre-occupation with clean efficiency. Like the Panopticon, the glass cage acts as a metaphor for the formidable machinery of contemporary surveillance, one which deploys all kinds of technologies, electronic, spatial, psychological and cultural. Appearances are paramount; image is what people
are constantly judged by. But unlike the Panopticon, it also suggests that the modern employee is part of a cast of actors exposed to the admiring and, occasionally, lustful gaze of the customer with all the kicks and excitements that this implies. Glass then turns the workplace into a show, evoking an element of exhibitionism and display, the employee becomes a part of the organizational brand on show, a brand that is easily tarnished or contaminated by the activities of a few whistle-blowers or disenchanted employees, but a brand which ennobles and uplifts all who are part of it. It also evokes the fundamental ambivalence in the nature of much contemporary work – an ambivalence between the anxiety of continuous exposure and the narcissistic self-satisfaction of being part of a winning team or formula. The glass cage, then, at times comes to be experienced as a shining container, conferring status, glamour and beauty to its inhabitants, whose smiling faces become a part of the organization’s image as the wide open spaces of its geography.
While formal rationality is the chief force behind Weber’s iron cage, the glass cage emphasizes the importance of emotional displays and appearances. In particular, it highlights the fact that much of the work being done is neither intellectual nor manual, but emotional and aesthetic. Impressing the customer or the casual on-looker requires more than solid service and impeccable competence. It requires the display of the right emotional attitude and the right appearance, the ‘smile’, the ‘look’, which have become part of the work of ever increasing segments of the workforce, from waiters and waitresses to shop-assistants, from social workers to nurses and from flight attendants to bank tellers (Hochschild, 1983). ‘Looking good and sounding right’ is something for which many employees are rewarded, especially in those places, like pizza parlours, bars, cafes etc. where the attractiveness of the employee and the attractiveness of the décor is more important than the attractiveness of the pizzas or the beverages.

The glass cage suggests both the rhetorical ‘transparency’ and ‘openness’ of the contemporary workplace and its open plan offices, but also the discretion and fragility of contemporary control systems. Unlike an iron cage which frustrates all attempts of escape with its brutish and inflexible force, a glass cage is discreet, unobtrusive, at times even invisible – it seeks to hide the reality of entrapment rather than display it, always inviting the idea or the fantasy that it may be breached, even if at the cost of serious potential injury. The image of such a cage suggests that it may not be a cage at all, but a wrapping box, a container aimed at highlighting the uniqueness of what it contains rather than constraining or oppressing it. A palace!
Smelser’s work also prefigures some of Ritzer’s arguments. Reading his essay ‘Collective myths and fantasies: The myth of the good life in California’ (1984, 1998a), one swiftly realizes that what Smelser calls ‘the myth of California’ has become a generic fantasy of consumer society. California, Smelser argues, represents a land to which people ‘escape’; it stands for what is new, for gold, for plenty, and the good life; like all myths, the myth of California is a collective fantasy, and a key feature of this fantasy (in contrast to the rigors of the old country, neediness, ugliness and hard work) is that California is a place where ‘success comes easy’ (Smelser, 1998a: 117). In California, success is no longer the product of hard work, achievement and heroism as it was for the Puritans; instead, success is brought by the magic of ‘being discovered’, which involves luck, self-presentation, image and finding oneself at the right place at the right time. This recalls the ‘chameleon-qualities’ highlighted by Sennett, only in reverse – where the chameleon blends with its environment, the star, like gold in the eye of the prospector, shines persistently. This dilemma between displaying chameleon-like flexibility (willingness to play any part, to do any job, to work any patch) while also boasting unique star qualities seems to define the predicament of the individual under the sway of the Hollywood myth.

This brings us exactly to Ritzer’s cathedrals of consumption, those glass palaces of fantasy, fun and display; California may have been their spiritual birthplace, but they are now ubiquitous globally. The palaces of consumption, like the workplace cages, are made of glass.
Glass is a hard and fragile medium, providing an invisible barrier to see outside and see inside. As we said earlier, it is also a distorting medium in which light is reflected and refracted, creating illusions and false images. Looking sometimes easy to reflection as the image. Finally, glass is a mere presence defines that which lies behind it as something worthy of attention, protection and display. The glass palace of consumption revolves around deliberate display; it is a place where the gaze of the prospector meets the look of the prospect. In this glass palace, new fashion trends can be spotted, new badges can be identified, new lifestyles can be explored and new identities can be experimented with. Within such palaces, there are subtle forms of coercion, enticement and control exercised over the consumer under the illusion of choice and freedom. Like the docile queues of Disneyland, once enticed into the cathedrals of consumption, consumers are captive. They have no choice but to observe, to look, to desire, to choose and to buy. As Ritzer argues, “people are lured to the cathedrals of consumption by the fantasies they promise to fulfill and then kept there by a variety of rewards and constraints” (1999: 28). Glass palaces of consumption can all too easily be mistaken for glass cages. Of course, glass cages look quite different to those outside; they look glamorous and full of enticing objects. Those denied access, through their lack of resources, mobility, looks or whatever, feel truly excommunicated. For those inside the glass, on the other hand, the hungry faces of those outside is a constant reminder that there are far worse places in which to be. Inside too, consumers are frequently separated from objects which they cherish by invisible barriers created by the limits of their buying powers – there are cages within the palaces and palaces within the cages.

The myth of California has become commodified, a managed fantasy, like those which Ritzer has highlighted in his work. But the hegemony of such fantasies is not unopposed. Once again, the concept of voice suggests a way of looking at the dynamics of the glass palaces of consumption in a richer light. The cathedrals of consumption are frequently defaced, modified, redefined or ignored just as workplaces are (de Certeau, 1984; Fiske, 1989; Gabriel & Lang, 1995). As my own work with Tim Lang highlights, consumers are becoming ever more unmanageable, eccentric and paradoxical. Casualization of work and career reinforces casualization of consumption. Consumers increasingly lead precarious and uneven existences, one day enjoying unexpected boons and the next sinking to bare subsistence. Consumption itself becomes fragmented, spasmodic and episodic.

The argument then is that, like today’s producers, today’s consumers do not find it easy to discover their voice; and when they discover it, it is often a voice that talks in paradoxes, ambiguities and contradictions. Their life-stories are not fixed (a constant
pilgrimage to the cathedrals of consumption) nor are they as simple as the California myth would have it. As Bauman has argued,

In the life-game of the postmodern consumers the rules of the game keep changing in the course of playing. The sensible strategy is therefore to keep each game short – so that a sensibly played game of life calls for the splitting of one big all-embracing game with huge stakes into a series of brief and narrow games with small ones…. To keep the game short means to beware long-term commitments. To refuse to be ‘fixed’ one way or the other. Not to get tied to the place. Not to wed one’s life to one vocation only. Not to swear consistency and loyalty to anything and anybody. Not to control the future, but to refuse to mortgage it: to take care that the consequences of the game do not outlive the past to bear on the present. (Bauman, 1996: 24)

This then seems to parallel the life-game of postmodern workers, whose strategies are summed up as entailing flexibility, reinvention and movement, in short as amounting to tactics. Tactics are not planned in advance, nor do they serve an overall design, but they unravel as life does, with its accidents, misfortunes, boons and breaks. It is out of such episodes that all of us construct and reconstruct our fragile selves, moving from glass palace to glass cage, at times feeling anxiously trapped by it, at others feeling energised and appreciated, and at others depressed and despondent.

This then is the argument. Using Sennett and Ritzer as our guides, we took two paths that deviate from long-standing Weberian themes. Sennett argues that the Protestant work ethic has dissolved under the regime of the flexible workplace with its demands for adaptable, quiescent employees, its replacement of visible, tangible work with manipulation of images and signs and its supplanting of traditional values of loyalty, sacrifice and long-term commitment. The result is a corrosion of character, with an attendant inability to construct meaningful life narratives and identities. Ritzer, for his part, highlights the continuous shift from work to consumption as a source of meaning and identity, identifying the cathedrals of consumption as spaces where consumers are lured and enticed with a profusion of well-orchestrated and minutely managed fantasies. He argues that this represents a re-enchantment of the world, thus undoing the disenchantment brought about by rationalizing modernity. This re-enchantment encourages individuals to express themselves by embracing life-styles, icons and signs. It is itself the product of rationalization, albeit one in which rational calculation and planning are applied to spectacle, image and experience. I argued that both of these approaches, compelling as they are, tend to present too monochromatic accounts of contemporary organizations and culture. Using the concepts of voice and ambivalence, as developed by Smelser, I argued that both flexible workplaces and
cathedrals of consumption represent more fragile, contestable and multi-valent terrains than anticipated. Using the twin metaphors of glass cage and glass palace, I suggested that both pose certain unique constraints (quite distinct from those we encounter at the high noon of modernity), generate a distinct malaise and afford certain unique consolations. They also present distinct possibilities of contestation and challenge. Shared features of glass cage and glass palace include an emphasis on display, an invisibility of constraints, a powerful illusion of choice, a glamorization of image and an ironic question-mark as to whether freedom lies this side or that side of the glass. Above all, there is an ambiguity as to whether the glass is a medium of entrapment or a beautifying frame and a constant reminder of the fragility and brittleness of all that surrounds us.

It is premature to argue that all of modernity’s iron cages have been dismantled and displaced by postmodern glass substitutes. For every celebrity trapped in a glass cage and for every employee dreaming of a glass palace, there are many people in every part of the globe struggle in sweat-shops, offices without air-conditioning and factories hidden from view. Yet, a video camera surreptitiously smuggled into a sweat-shop can shatter a company’s image and undo the work of millions of dollars worth of advertising, a leaked internal memo can virtually demolish a corporate colossus or a government, and a small band of environmental activists acting tactically in front of television cameras can bring a multinational corporation to its feet. When the goings-on in the Oval Office of the White House can be rehearsed in minuscule detail in front of an entire nation, it may well be that the era of the iron cage has finally given way to the era of glass.
This then is the message with which I would like to conclude my presentation – as we move from modernity into the great unknown that lies ahead, old prisons and old chimeras are losing their grip. Old forms of entrapment and suffering do not appear so threatening any more. But ambivalence, confusion and anxiety are features of our age as they have been of previous ones. In the last resort, the fragility of human experience is not the result of the flexible workplaces and fragmented consumptions of our age, but rather the product of its confrontation with different cages across historical eras.

references


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Images of Athena and Hera in Nike’s ‘Goddess’ Campaign

Ann Rippin

abstract

In 2002 Nike launched a new initiative, its ‘Goddess’ campaign in an attempt to overcome its historical inability to market effectively to women. The campaign sought to differentiate the physical space of its Niketown stores from a more feminine ‘Goddess’ inspired retail space. The perceived necessity of this campaign, along with the status of the Nike case as a management education classic, prompted a re-examination of the culture in the senior levels of the company. The lens through which this re-examination took place was a small quilt, which played with ideas about goddesses and gender, and which allowed a close critical reading of the coverage of the campaign in the media. Through the lens, a picture of Nike emerges which is hyper-masculine and which distorts images of the feminine to the point where it seems unlikely that the ‘Goddess’ initiative will have a great deal of lasting success.

About two years ago I was teaching an undergraduate module called ‘Managing Change’. We used two cases on the programme, Pepsi and Nike. Of the two, I found the Nike case the more interesting, and I began to scan newspapers and journals for material on the company that I could use to supplement the course material. One of the key questions on the module was about the impact of history on organisational ability to change, and it seemed from my reading of the case and the supplementary material that Nike had certain striking characteristics, almost all of them historical, that meant that it was extremely unlikely that it would be able to change radically. One article in particular caught my eye: ‘Nike Women’s Movement’ which appeared in Fast Company in August 2002. Fast Company is an American magazine which luxuriates, as its name suggests, in the discourse of rapid and discontinuous change. Protean, speed-driven change, often with a confrontational or even gladiatorial edge is celebrated in its articles. The cover of the issue in question, for example, featured headlines such as, ‘Why IBM wants to SMASH strategy’ and ‘Power Play: what women can teach men about business’. In the Nike article, Fara Warner set up a story about Nike, frustrated in its attempts to market to women, launching a new marketing campaign. In a brilliantly incisive headline to the article, Warner asked:
Can a famously high-testosterone company, built on brash ads and male athletic fantasies click with female customers? That’s the challenge behind Nike Goddess, whose goal is a once-for-all shift in how the company sells to, designs for and communicates with women. (Warner, 2002: 70)

This one elegantly concise headline seemed to me at once to pose and answer its own question. What follows here attempts to demonstrate why.

It is worth stating at the outset that the case that I was working with was what is sometimes euphemistically described as a ‘classic’. This inevitably means ‘old’ and this particular case dated from 1984 (Rikert and Christensen, 1984; Christensen and Rikert, 1984), although it had been revised in 1999. The merit of the case, however, was that it outlined the origins of the company, and had, presumably, been signed off by Nike as an accurate account of events. From my reading of the A case and the B case, a picture of a company emerged which I was able to triangulate through other published sources and a trip to Niketown in Oxford Circus, London. The cases established a truly ‘high-testosterone company’, in fact one which seemed to have emerged fully-formed from the Fraternity House. Thus:

Nike’s senior group was unique. In the words of one inside observer, ‘They are entrepreneurs - with a capital E.’ While many were athletes, or at least read the sports pages first, the strong bonds among them seemed to reflect a camaraderie based on deeper, shared values: a desire to accomplish something of value, a healthy cynicism, self-confidence, a willingness to be a part of a team. They were proud of their achievements, but most could step back and poke a little fun at themselves, too. (Christensen and Rikert, 1984: 3)

Applying to work with this senior group, also known as the ‘Friday Club’, must have been like trying out for the football team, and indeed the structure chart forming Exhibit two of the case showed no women in the company in its top five levels, and the only one in the chart was Mary Ann White as head of Design-Apparel. Bob Woodell, head of worldwide marketing, added to this macho image in his nostalgic description of the early days of the company:

Del Hayes [head of manufacturing and development] has an expression we quote a lot: ‘We like people who aren’t afraid to strap on a tin bill and pick s--- with the chickens.’ We really like that. One of my frustrations is that I don’t get to do anything anymore. I just talk – to people all the time. In the olden days, we had shipping problems once, and Hayes and Knight [founder and president] and I started going over to the warehouse to help ship shoes. We probably f---- up more orders than we got out, but we felt great – we were doing something about a problem. Actually we did get a few shoes out, and we had fun ourselves, and I think that sent a signal to some people. (Christensen and Rikert, 1984: 4)

Warner picks up the locker room mentality at the company in the Fast Company article:

For much of its history, Nike’s destiny was controlled by its founders, the running buddies who sold shoes out of their trunks, signed up athletes in locker rooms and made executive decisions at retreats called ‘Buttfaces’. (Warner, 2002: 72)

So a picture emerges of a bunch of guys ‘goofing around’ and having fun - if you are an insider, although the frat pack mentality seemed to have struck the case researchers forcibly. Christensen and Rikert felt moved to include the following in their preamble to the case:
One final note: the researchers found the NIKE language system studded with expletives. We have attempted in these pages to find that perhaps elusive line between scholarly accuracy and out-of-context impropriety. (Christensen and Rikert, 1984: 2)

The machismo of the company can also be glimpsed in Woodell’s account of decision making at the company:

[A]ll four of us look at different things from different points of view, too. We’re able to challenge each other and fight like hell. But there is never ever a doubt that you are arguing and fighting with one of the best friends you’ve got in the world, so the issue is not the friendship, not the human being. The issue is the issue. We just argue like hell, and have the ability to come to a common agreement, if that in fact is what’s required. (Christensen and Rikert, 1984: 4-5)

The model here is of decision making by endurance or by combat: the one who wins the fight gets his own way.

The hyper masculinity of the company was confirmed for me on my first visit to Niketown. Before I even entered the store I was struck by the hubris behind the name. The shop stands on one corner of Oxford Circus at one of the busiest intersections of some of the most famous streets in the world and yet the territory had been claimed for Nike, and indeed, by implication, one of the great cities of the world, London, colonised by the company. Inside the shop I was struck by two things, the design aesthetics and the corporate mythology. The building has the feel of a temple. It is approached under a cupola and the customer is invited to ascend to a platform which leads to a massive pillar which goes right to the roof, and, as our view is obscured, by implication, to the sky. There are a number of floors in the building with the merchandise carefully ranged around the outer circumference of the circular inner space. At intervals one can move along passages guarded by mannequins and approach the inner sanctuary of the central pillar. The pillar is encrusted with images of honed bodies engaged in vigorous athletic pursuits like a technicolor gymnasium. The invitation to encircle and mount the central column is extended through the baroque use of brightly coloured images which, combined with the loud rap music and brilliant lighting, assault and overwhelm the shopper/worshipper. Once inside the core there are relics to be admired from the early days of the company and wise words from Phil Knight’s mentor, Bill (‘Coach’) Bowerman. Bowerman was the co-founder of Nike with Phil Knight, and he is credited with inventing jogging through his co-authored book Jogging: A Physical Fitness Program for All Ages. Although Bowerman is no longer present, his influence lives on in the company. An advertisement included in the case has the headline: ‘The Spirit that Moves Us’ and opens with the following paragraph:

For 24 years at the University of Oregon, he never recruited. And when the athletes came to him, he put them to work in sawmills. Cut anyone who couldn’t keep up the grades. He knew more people succeed because of mental toughness than physical ability. (Christensen and Rikert, 1984: 21)

Thus Bowerman’s association with a macho image of development and coaching is ensured. This is not a business for wimps. The copy also contains another theme which is vital to the Nike culture:

Bill Bowerman. Stubborn, demanding. Given to sudden outbursts and moments of magical insight. (Christensen and Rikert, 1984: 21)
The theme of magic and the supernatural runs throughout Nike lore. It is not enough to be tough, one must be heroically tough in the manner of the Greek heroes. This is a theme which will be seen to be important later. To return to Niketown, Bowerman’s spirit infuses the core as legends such as the following are painted on the wall: ‘If you’re not training for match day, you’d better have a pole through your gut’ and ‘Taped nipples don’t chafe, they just hurt like bloody hell when the tape comes off’.

Speaking from a position of embodied knowledge and felt meaning, it seems to me that not only will this kind of discourse not attract women customers, it will actively alienate them, and a proportion of male ones too. With all this in mind, I began to reflect on this question of Nike and its Goddess campaign.

My own reflective practice contains an unusual element. I make textile pieces. I begin with a stimulus such as a case I have to teach or a quotation in something that I am reading that leaps out at me (such as Audre Lorde’s [1984] chilling analysis of so much that is undertaken in the name of organisational diversity: ‘The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house’). I let the text incubate for a while and make notes on it in a research diary. Making a note of ideas I have or letting them emerge during the writing, I then sit down at my sewing table and make a piece of work spontaneously which allows me to represent in non-verbal form my thoughts and feelings about the texts. When I have done this I put the piece on the wall or somewhere else where I can see it and ask it what it has to tell me. I carry on this dialogue through a research diary in which I begin writing and wait to see what emerges. None of this process is particularly easy to explain, but I believe that it accesses tacit or subconscious thoughts and ideas about the text based in my own experience.

I began to think about Nike and to play with ideas about it as a gendered entity. It seemed entirely appropriate to think in archetypes as the goddess is just such a notion. The corporate lore is also full of references to events given supernatural significance by
the language in which they are recorded and the reverence with which they are treated. An example is found in the following quotation from Ned Frederick, one of Nike’s R&D specialists:

> When we do it right, the shoe has magic. You pick it up and it glows with the concern that Nike has with the athlete, the care we take in designing and making the shoe. There is something in our shoe that is special. (Rickert and Christensen, 1984:13)

And the very name of the company, which began as Blue Ribbon Sports, and was to become Nike, came to the company’s first full-time employee, Jeff Johnson, “in a dream” (Rikert and Christensen, 1984: 8). One of the strongest and most enduring of Nike’s foundation myths is also recounted in these terms:

> Around that time [1972] Bowerman had an epiphany at the kitchen table while his wife was at church. He was staring at the waffle iron when the idea hit him so hard that he forgot to spray the inside of the family waffle iron with the greasy release compound he used to make his molds. He stuffed the waffle iron full of modeling clay, but he couldn’t get the clay out without a pliers [sic]. Then he drove to the store and came home with six new waffle irons, disappeared into his basement, and went to work. The result was a black, waffle shaped sole that made the new bright blue and yellow-Swooshed Nikes brought to market in 1977 feel like bedroom slippers. (Katz, 1994: 65; emphasis added)

The waffle iron story, which has the same momentous quality as Alfred burning the cakes, is retold often. In a children’s book about Nike and the value of partnership working, the story is told in similar terms:

> In 1972, Bill made what was probably his greatest contribution to Nike. While sitting at the breakfast table, he began eating waffles and thinking about sneaker soles. Suddenly he had an inspiration. He ran to the garage with the waffle iron and poured rubber on it. With that one idea, Bill created Nike’s now famous ‘waffle sole’. (Greenberg, 1994: 34-5)

The waffle iron story is retold in Niketown and at the time of writing the store was selling a shoe called ‘Waffle’. These moments of seemingly divine intervention, then, are central to Nike’s corporate culture. The company frames its origins in mythologised terms and seeks to promulgate them through the artefacts lovingly displayed in its London store at least, and in its nomenclature for its merchandise.
With this in mind, I decided to work with the idea of the goddess. I did some free association and the name of Sean O’Casey’s play, *Juno and the Paycock*, came to mind. But because Nike is a Greek goddess of victory, it seemed more fitting to think about Hera, the wife of Zeus and chief among the Greek female divinities. As I played with this idea, from somewhere I had the inspiration to make the body of the peacock a gigantic Nike swoosh. The swoosh is vital to Nike’s brand. Goldman and Papson, discussing the cultural significance of this trademark, state:

> We live in a cultural economy of signs and *Nike’s swoosh* is currently the most recognisable brand icon in that economy. *Nike’s swoosh* is a commercial symbol that has come to stand for athletic excellence, a spirit of determination, hip authenticity, and playful self-awareness. (Goldman and Papson, 1998: 1)

Other, less kind, responses are to call it the ‘swooshstika’ or the ‘fat check’. The quilt became titled, *Nike and the Swooshcock*.

I created the peacock tail from a piece of hand-dyed fabric and appliquéd the eyes in its tail from extreme close-ups of high-tech fibres, in this case a cagoule and a pair of swimming trunks creating a new fabric from a colour photocopy transferred to a laminate of PVA adhesive, which struck me as appropriate in a work about a company devoted to the technological excellence of its products. Around the eyes I worked chain stitch by hand with a heavy thread. The body of the peacock was made from gold lamé fabric which was quilted to suggest stylised feathers. When I had finished the piece I was slightly disappointed with it. It lacked the depth and ambivalence of some of my other pieces. It was too obvious and too clinical. It was too pat. It has never been one of my favourite pieces of work.
What was interesting about this piece, however, was its afterlife. I made it to take to a conference and showed it to a few interested people. Stating what I had missed, but what was absolutely directly in front of my eyes, an Australian man took one look and said, ‘That’s a great big golden erect penis’. And, of course, it is. This was my most interesting insight. Even when I, at a complete remove from the company, try to create something associating Nike with the feminine, something hyper-masculine emerges. I went back to the case. There, at the back of the A case, was an advertisement for a women’s shoe, the Aurora, part of the Columbia range. The copy was startling:

To be honest, our Columbia isn’t exactly like their Columbia. But talk about thrust. Wait until you’re atop that refined AirSole™. It’s not quite the same as 6.65 million pounds of rocket propellant. But it’s enough to move you about two percent faster, or two percent farther.... The Aurora. For women only. (Rikert and Christensen, 1984: 22, emphasis in original)

And the photograph was of a sports shoe blasting, entirely perpendicular, from the earth, propelled by two jets of flame. The phallic nature of the imagery was inescapable.

Over and above considerations of phallic imagery, it seemed to me that a critical examination of Nike’s notion of the goddess itself might bear further investigation. Hera was an obvious starting point given the quilt that I had made, but so also was Nike, or Nike Athena, herself.

Definitions of what the goddess might be tend to fall into two categories: the goddess as a bundle of cultural assumptions about femininity, and a representation of psychic energy. Thus, Woolger and Woolger, in their consideration of the sorts of goddess roles open to contemporary women, suggest:

By goddess we mean a psychological description of a complex female character type that we intuitively recognise both in ourselves and in the women around us, as well as in the images and icons that are everywhere in our culture. (Woolger and Woolger, 1987: 7)

Baring and Cashford add an evaluative element in their definition of the goddess as

the feminine principle, which manifests itself in mythological history as ‘the goddess’ and in cultural history as the values placed upon spontaneity, feeling, instinct and intuition. (Baring and Cashford, 1993: xii)

The insistence on the place of intuition in these two accounts is significant, as it is my feeling that the making of the quilt in a spontaneous way also allows me to work with my intuition about the company and the case. Finally, Bowles (1993), following Jung, suggests that both gods and goddesses represent transpersonal psychic energy through their manifestation as archetypes. This notion of an archetype, whether supernaturally or culturally produced, is important in understanding Nike’s relationship to the goddess.

What, then, do Hera and Nike Athena represent? Hera was the starting point for the quilt. Hera appears to have been an appropriation of a pre-existing Great Goddess archetype in the territories conquered by the Greeks (Baring and Cashford, 1993). In this incarnation she is the Queen of Heaven:

I sing of Hera on her golden throne:
immortal queen, daughter of Rhea,
Hera’s forced marriage to Zeus, however, is not a happy one, and the queen of heaven with her diadem, her pomegranate, symbol of conjugal love and fruitfulness, and her peacock, “whose spangled plumage reveals the stars in the vault of heaven” (Guirand, 1974: 106) is soon turned by her husband’s continual infidelities into the stereotypical nagging, scheming, shrewish wife. Her power has been taken from her through a campaign of ridicule, and, as Woolger and Woolger point out, she becomes largely male identified hanging onto what little power she has through the position of her husband. In this way she is the perfect embodiment of the voice in the controversial Nike advertising campaign in 1995 which centred on the line ‘If you let me play’. Goldman and Papson (1998) describe what they call the ‘spot’ which features a turn-taking of girls’ voices as they recite the long-term advantages in their lives if they play sports. Shown in tight facial close-ups, the young girls solemnly speak in soundbites that sound as if they have been scripted by social scientists and women’s health advocates. The encounter with children speaking adult thoughts is initially startling, as they stare into the camera and flatly intone:

If you let me play
If you let me play sports
I will like myself more.
I will have more self-confidence.
If you let me play sports,
If you let me play
If you let me play
I will be 60% less likely to get breast cancer
I will suffer less depression.
If you let me play sports
I will be more likely to leave a man who beats me.
If you let me play
I will be less likely to get pregnant before I want to.
I will learn
I will learn what it means to be strong
To be strong
If you let me play
Play sports
If you let me play sports.

Just do it
[Swoosh symbol] (Goldman and Papson, 1998: 132-133)

The advertisement caused controversy because of the dependent image of women it embodied. Its aim, according to Goldman and Papson, was to raise awareness and to be provocative, but if we consider it in the light of the Hera archetype, it is less convincing in its irony. Hera was beaten, the outcome of her pregnancies were not entirely successful (Woolger and Woolger, 1987), and she learned how to be strong in a very particular way. As Woolger and Woolger suggest, Hera-energy at its worst can be about
living under male jurisdiction and through male permission. This is more rather than less likely to lead to depression as Hera learns to deal with “the pain of powerlessness” (Woolger and Woolger, 1987: 200). The theme is echoed in Darcy Winslow’s conditions before she took on the role of head of Women’s Global Footwear:

I wanted men and women to be allies, not competitors… And I wanted a seat at the table. The women’s business had to be core to Nike. (Warner, 2002: 74)

The fact that she felt that she had to ask suggests the relationships were not in place.

If Hera is dependent for her power and influence on her husband, Zeus, Athena is dependent on him for her very existence. Athena is remarkable because she sprang, fully formed and armed, from the head of Zeus. Graves retells the story:

Zeus lusted after Metis the Titaness, who turned into many shapes to escape him until she was caught at last and got with child. An oracle of Mother Earth then declared that this would be a girl-child and that if Metis conceived again, she would bear a son who was fated to depose Zeus, just as Zeus had deposed Cronus, and Cronus had deposed Uranus. Therefore having coaxed Metis to a couch with honeyed words, Zeus suddenly opened his mouth and swallowed her, and that was the end of Metis, though he claimed afterwards that she gave him counsel from inside his belly. In due process of time, he was seized by a raging headache as he walked by the shores of Lake Triton, so that his skull seemed about to burst, and he howled for rage until the firmament echoed. Up ran Hermes, who at once divined the cause of Zeus’s discomfort. He persuaded Hephaestus, or some say Prometheus, to fetch his wedge and beetle and make a breach in Zeus’s skull, from which Athena sprang, fully armed, with a mighty shout. (Graves, 1955/1960: 46)

Graves suggests that one reading of this myth is as a “desperate theological expedient to rid her of her matriarchal conditions” (Harrison, cited in Graves, 1955/1960: 46) and the establishment of wisdom as a male attribute. Thus the myth of the birth of Athena can be seen as the appropriation of wisdom and the previously female prerogative of childbearing. Certainly Athena was “the most masculine of the ancient Greek goddesses” (Shepherd and Shepherd, 2002: 105). She is male-identified. She is one of the boys. She is on the side of men in just wars. She loves battle cries and the noise of war. She was “called the companion of heroes by the Greeks” (Woolger and Woolger, 1987: 45). She is associated with the metis, the mind, and the role of the mind in solving problems and unravelling dilemmas. Although she is also associated with ‘womanly’ crafts such as wool working and embroidery, as well as carpentry, the success of these crafts “depends upon holding in the mind an image of the end” (Baring and Cashford, 1993: 338). However, two things have happened to Athena by the time she comes to represent these qualities. The first is that her representation as a terrifying figure “wreathed in snakes” (Baring and Cashford, 1993: 332) and carrying the severed head of her enemy has disappeared. She wears the helmet of truth and intellect. The second is that her virginity is intact. Her temple on the Acropolis in Athens is called the Parthenon from parthenos meaning ‘virgin’. So while Athena is identified as the friend of heroes, the relationship is platonic. She is a mate, a friend, rather than a lover. The relationship is mental rather than inconveniently physical.

The final aspect of Athena as a Nike goddess is highlighted indirectly by Bowles. He quotes from Bolen; “The Goddess did not concern herself with asking, “Is it fair or is this moral?”(Bolen, 1989: 103). Bowles goes on:
Effectiveness is the only criterion for Athenian consciousness; there is little or no ethical dimension. This explains the capacity of organizations characterized by an Athenian consciousness to enter in areas of illegal and/or unethical action. (Bowles, 1993: 408)

Nike has not been short of critics of its business ethics (Carty, 1997; van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Beder, 2002; Skapinker, 2002, Ecologist, 2003). And it is deeply ironic that the company has frequently been criticised for its treatment of its female workers in the developing world. Boje has been one of its most vocal and sustained critics citing the abuse of women workers in several Asian locations:

There have been abundant reports of Nike corporal punishment: women in China being locked in cages for poor sewing (Chan, 1996), arrests of workers for organizing in Indonesia (Ballinger, 1997), seven toilets for ten thousand workers in Indonesia, forced marching while chanting corporate slogans like ‘Loyalty to your boss, loyalty to your boss’ (Manning, 1997), sexual abuse in Vietnam (Nguyen, 1996, 1997), and the ‘ophoi nang’ method of employee discipline (Manning, 1997). In Vietnamese, ophoi nang means sun-drying. (Boje, n.d: 3)

As Boje points out, Nike’s status as a virtual company which does not manufacture anything directly allows it to absolve itself of any misdoing. Female workers are abused by factory owners and supervisors who are not Nike employees.

To summarise the implications of this revisiting of the goddess archetypes that my intuition provided for reflection on Nike and its difficulties selling to women, we can see that the images of the feminine are impoverished and trivialised in some way. As Baring and Cashford suggest:

At a superficial glance, for instance, the great goddess Hera becomes a jealous vengeful wife… Athena, goddess of the snake and shield, becomes the masculinized daughter of intellect, born through the forehead of Zeus as though she were exclusively the product of his own creative mind. (Baring and Cashford, 1993: 302)

The goddesses are diminished, male-identified, and dependent on the patriarchy for their power.

How, then, does this fit with the thinking behind Nike Goddess? The point of the campaign was to create spaces in Nike stores that were more welcoming to women than the hyper-masculine stores described above. John Hoke, “star designer and Nike veteran” (Warner, 2002: 72), explains his vision:

‘I got used to hearing people describe us as brutal,’ says Hoke, the designer behind most Niketowns. ‘But that’s because our initial reaction to selling the Nike brand was to turn up the volume. Goddess is about turning the volume down. ‘I wanted people to come in and take a breath.’ (Warner, 2002: 74)

The diminution of the imagery or psychic energy available to women has begun before the first store is off the drawing board. Hoke looked for his inspiration to the 1950s designers and Palm Springs Modernism. He thought that this would capture everything that women would want in a shop:

‘Women weren’t comfortable in our stores’, he says. ‘So I figured out where they would be comfortable – most likely in their own homes. The store has more of a residential feel. I wanted it to have furnishings, not fixtures. Above all, I didn’t want it to be girly.’ (Warner, 2002: 74, emphasis added)
In this statement Hoke embeds two thousand years of misogyny beginning with the extraordinarily patriarchal culture of the Greeks. There is no question here of Nike transforming itself to achieve inclusiveness. If the girls don’t want to come and play in our space we will make them one of their own. And the space is that of Hera, the domestic interior. The choice becomes the home in a reinvention of the dualistic framing of the public for men and the private for women. Except here it is not even a real home, but an aspirational one of the TV makeover show, or glossy interior magazine:

It’s light blue and white, with dark wood floors. Milky white mannequins with muscles fill floor-to-ceiling windows. Shoes are displayed on tables or wooden shelves alongside pieces of Jonathon Adler pottery and white orchids. (Warner, 2002: 74)

There is Athena in the guise of a ‘milky white mannequin’, frozen, immobile, incarcerated in a male fantasy of a domestic interior, provided for her as the all-powerful alpha-male husband might provide for Hera. Other possibilities such as bars and cafes, or school playgrounds, do not seem to have been considered. Even this diminished vision of a woman’s space is further diluted:

Lady Foot Locker will incorporate part of Nike Goddess’s retail philosophy into its 600 stores. Nordstrom plans to take much of the Goddess look, shrink it, and install it in its highest traffic stores. Macy’s Herald Square, in New York is getting a smaller version of a Goddess store later this year. (Warner, 2002: 74)

But the most striking part of Hoke’s vision is that, ‘Above all, I didn’t want it to be girlie’. For Nike, the feminine is Athena: the battle ready, honed and toned friend of heroes who doesn’t bother the boys with all that leaking and oozing, messy ‘girlie’ stuff. The energy of Athena informs the initiative as a whole. Nike Goddess is a heroic, masculine project; this is one last titanic battle, one last push for victory, a “once-and-for-all shift” (Warner, 2002: 70). And it is Athena and Nike, rather than an elemental Mother Goddess or a distracting Aphrodite who are pressed into service to help.

As the quilt, *Nike and the Swooshcock*, suggests it is a fundamentally masculine energy which suffuses Nike and will continue to inform its relations with its female customers. The quilt is a lens which allows me to examine the case closely in order to make sense of it for myself, but it is also a receiving device which allows me to hear the intuitive signals from the case. And the method, embroidery and textile work, possibly allows me to reclaim some of Athena’s neglected feminine energy and reintegrate it into with my own Athena-identified life of the mind.

**references**


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Ann Rippin is a lecturer in management at the Management Research Centre at the University of Bristol. She has made quilts and other pieces of textile art for many years but has only recently turned to them as part of her academic work, and only even more recently begun to show them to a scholarly audience. She is fascinated by organisations which embed some sort of tension which can be explored by a three dimension tactile form. Companies she has made textile work on include Southwest Airlines, Marks and Spencer and Starbucks, as well as a number of pieces on Nike. The textiles serve as a means of engaging in critical reflection on organisations. This is a research practice informed by feminist methodology (as textile production has traditionally been largely female work, particularly in the case of embroidery), and a commitment to critical organisational studies and pedagogy. Her research interests centre largely on organisational aesthetics with particular concern to reclaim the historical dimension in this area.

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The Greek Square, or, The Normative Challenge of Aesthetics

Ole Fogh Kirkeby

abstract

The article claims that organising and art has a common core: The normativity of practise. This normativity is presented through ‘the Greek square’, the ‘geometrical axiology’ of the good, the just, the true and the beautiful under the hegemony of the good. Although both organising and art are performing through an immanence that seems to give the dimension of aesthetic experience a certain autonomy, this very immanence can only exist as an immanent transcendence by revealing its transcendental immanence: The imminent urge for freedom inherent in every organisational process where the tension between management and leadership is kept alive. The alternatives are corporate totalitarianism, democratic despotism or a bureaucratic apparatus as perpetuum mobile. The article explores Kant’s concept of the capacity of judgement as a way to move into the ‘problem-domain’ in which the normative transformation of thought into practise is at play, challenging both philosophy and organisational theory as the ghosts of post-rationalisation. Aristotle’s concept of deinôtes, the practical force of the good, seems of use here, in order to pose the question systematically: How can art contribute to the reflective approach towards a normative concept of organising, when organising is increasingly seen as an almost anonymous process cancelling any concept of the subject as the carrier of responsibility? The answer is given through an outline of a theory of creative virtues common to both organising and art. These virtues arise from ‘the Greek Square’, and they work through critical attitudes, readiness, and the quest for freedom.

On Organising, Managing and Leading in the Light of Some Images of Organisation

Since the Second World War the images of organisation have changed considerably. The strategic model as an image enriched by the new science of cybernetics, in combination with the ‘model-world’, or operational, ideals of planning, dominated for almost thirty years, until business economists began to realise that even if there was a war between corporate unities, the consumers could not be viewed as inhabitants in territories which had to be concurred. They had to realise that employees could not be viewed as soldiers of an army, willingly agreeing to supply rule-based acting with the selfish commitment of an uncompromising loyalty – to a cause often approaching the tragic-comical. Consumers had to be seduced, not conquered. The knowledge and capabilities of employees had to be respected, and the initiatives and tacit knowledge of these potentially very able employees had to be nurtured, put into fruitful frames, and
not restricted by rigid job-descriptions and rapidly outdated manuals. Hence the theatre came into play as a promising metaphor, yielding much more space to the investment of personal capacities, and even to improvisation, i.e. innovation, that at the same time gave back to the art of rhetoric its former dignity. Through this organisational image employees could be addressed more realistically as a combination of actors and audience, and the emphasis could be laid on symbolic action, on the creation of meaning, as a means to the strengthening of corporate power. However, both loyal actors and loyal audiences are much harder to find in a setting where the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is removed from the deadly serious sanctions of war-games to the excellence of performance and play.

Kazimir Malevich, *Black Square*, 1915

Hence, sporting came into the picture, because the life of sport opens to both legitimate aggressiveness, to severe sanctions on the disloyal individual, and to the possibilities of strong leadership. Coaching, the new answer to the old claims of Taylorism, as the basis of a hyper-individual, dialogically focussed, ‘dedicated’, control through self-control, seemed at first to open an easy path from management to leadership – recently, in the capacity of the new ‘wonder-technology’ of HRM, coaching appears far more problematic. Soeren Kierkegaard’s claim: ‘Get into possession of your own character!’, or Marcus Aurelius ‘Be the one you are!’, could create the operational contexts of the new HRM-strategies. However, the sporting world did not deliver sufficient impetus to unite *pathos*, *logos* and *ethos*. Either new and intellectually more refined images were needed, or, if old ones were the only option, they had to be more sophisticated.

Then, the image of the church and of the family were introduced, both utterly traditional images that in their very essence were moulded on the total absorption of individuality. However, intelligent employees would often find this new wine in old bottles a bit too bitter.
So, just now, another metaphor has been dominating for the last decade, and is still increasing: The image of the ‘state-society’. The organisation is a state with its own law, with its own ethos, and with both a pathos, and a logos, directed towards social responsibility in the capacity of the strategic platform for branding the corporate reputation. This is creating a corporate image that shall bind all stakeholders, and especially the most wanted ones: The intelligent employees, through the spirit of a competitive force softened and legitimised by its ability to appear through the discourses of ‘values’.

It is easy to see that management belongs to the ontological regions of strategy, whether they form the whole horizon of an organisation, or only fill in some pockets in its body. It is also obvious that leadership per se can be grasped both as the attempt to transform management into self-reflective, communicative action, and as an activity legitimised by its very ability to found its own discourse on normativity of some sort. If one does not delimit leadership to mean the set of activities related to the handling of problems peculiar to the ‘personal sphere’ of the employees only, it could be grasped as the meta-conceptual context of management. This means that the still necessary functions of management could be handled as possible tasks of genuine leadership, and that the difference between leadership and management could be a normative one. I shall argue from this platform.

From this perspective the ‘state-society’ image of the organisation and leadership belong to each other. The manager could be a leader, because he has the option to choose between two roles, pointed ironically out by Immanuel Kant in his pamphlet ‘Towards eternal peace’ (‘Zum ewigen Frieden’) from 1795: Between the ‘political moralist’ and the ‘moral politician’.

Now, however, we are increasingly witnessing the fact that even to be a moral politician does not suffice to be a genuine leader. A leader can only obtain leadership if he is able to organise. What does that mean? It means that leading must be a process of letting organising happen, so to speak, a process through which social relations of the firm are created in a flow (fluxus). In this context, ‘a flow’ can mean the following:

1. A spiral of transformations in the social relations of the organisation, moving through the election and destruction of structures, in which the knowledge of a certain normative goal is deepened, or even changed, through the processes in which it is realised.

2. The presence of a dynamical quasi-subject of transformation the character of which is relational, trans-personal, or even anonymous, and the identity of which cannot be interpreted, and hence, controlled, by any external authority. The individual actor is always an object here.

In the first case leadership appears as organising in the capacity of combining the original, double meaning of the word ‘to lead’ (leitha): To define the route taken by heading it, and to seek for the final goal. In this process organising can always be traced back to responsible individuals, in spite of the momentum.

In the second case the normativity of organising can never appear as such, it cannot smell of planning or of ‘structuring’, i.e., it must not show any trace of authority, not to
images

Ole Fogh Kirkeby

The Greek Square

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speak of power or control. It must present both structure and its permanent destruction in the image of an eternal, pseudo-Nietzschean postponing of normativity. It is forced to create social relations in the capacity of possible worlds of performance, and success must be the result of – what I once called – ‘self-cesseity’ of processes in which a dynamic immanence is constantly emerging from your very own doing in the shape of true images of the obvious. Creating must in the capacity of organising unite pathos, logos and ethos, i.e., produce commitment, trans-structural flows and personalities, without leaving any transcendental position from which this enterprise could be seen or (re-)called. The mechanisms of these processes are often routines, rhythms of quasi-controlled ‘intercourse’ that convey an invisible re-establishing of power through seemingly sovereign manifestations of tacit knowledge.

This is the Janus-face of organising: The clash between the elegance, if not grace, of the perpetual movement of the corporate worlds, in which plenty of room seems to be left to self-realisation, criticism and freedom, and the inner solidity of a normativity the true identity of which cannot be confronted. Thus, the dynamic anonymity of organising becomes the new physiognomy, the new sun-tanned skin of power. But underneath the skin of the promises of an organising that is able to postpone power, i.e., that is direct or authentic enough to invoke the utopia where this postponement has become superfluous, the immanent transcendence of empowerment, the real flesh of power hides itself: The strategic-totalitarian dystopia of a hyper-functional de-valuation of all values, the pink nightmare of self-creating, organisational evolution, the micro-fascism of the piece-meal. Many social theorists, and even philosophers, of obvious good will appear to miss the real sense of this predicament.

Again, it seems obvious, that the masters of ‘self-cesseity’, the artists, shall be the new counsellors, if not even the ‘dauphins’, of the would-be philosopher-kings of this pink, corporate polis, if we do not dare to confront art with its inherent tension between immanent transcendence and transcendent immanence, too. In the following I shall trace some ways in which art can be seen in the light of leadership in order to transform its very contribution to the processes of organising, ‘the performance’, into a social-critical guardian of a transcendent immanence.

Art must be able to devote itself with an uncompromising criticism to the organisational image of the ‘state-society’, to commit itself to freedom of the individual without being programmatic. Thus art could contribute to the creation of old roles in new bottles: To design the face of the trophé, the real leader of the organisation, the identity that releases a de-centred caring, and sets mutual empathy free – to use the concepts of Plato from the ‘Statesman’. An effort of organising that produces the creation of the social experience as transcendent immanence, as an urge towards normativity.

But like the artist, who can only fulfil his task through the creation of the phantasms of an immanent transcendence – or through the creation of phantasms of this phantasm – the leader can only be a real leader, if he is able to act through processes of organising that emerge in the quasi-autonomous momentum of the social relations. This means that the frame of norms, ideals, or values, in which he persists to act, has to be in a state of

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'possible transformability' into action, i.e., they have to be in a state of always being an 'auto-actualisation'.

Aristotle posed the problem in his *Nicomachean Ethics* when he said, that *phronesis*, (prudentia), ‘worldly wisdom’, does not suffice to produce the act itself. Something more is needed. He presented the force needed as a capacity in which the borderline – so terrible to philosophy to be its very cross – between theory and practise was already crossed. This capacity of having already crossed the borderline of thought and action he called *deinôtes*. In Greek it means terribleness, harshness, sternness, but also natural ability, cleverness. Hence, we can conceive of this complicated concept as either a referential term, denoting that an (after all, hypothetical) force has made something happen which is identical to the realisation of theory or thought in some media – or at least is able to be interpreted in this way. Or, that a process is going on just now, even by doing away with this very ‘now’, a process that has already absorbed the subjects of action, and hence abolished the very dichotomy of subject and object into its autonomous ‘becoming’.

The difference of management and leadership as intentional attitudes on the one side, and organising on the other, is *deinôtes*. But in organisations *deinôtes* must totally fuse into the invisible. It has to abolish itself as (strategic) effort, and disguise as ‘self-cessity’; i.e., it has to hide in the phenomenal world of direct experience, and in its interpretational contexts, as well. It has to be in the ontological realm of *aisthesis*, of the sense of the senses, it must appear as the immediately experienced result of our own actions. It must confront us as a personal art, as the results of our own *techné*, of our own capacities: Organising as the presence of leadership has to appear as individual competency, as that which I or we are doing.

That is where art comes in. When it succeeds, it is the mere presence of normativity beyond any representation, or demonstration. Art is the transformation of transcendental immanence into immanent transcendence. This transformation, the *deinôtes*, is the common core of the practises of performing art, and of organising leadership.

**Further Deliberations in Relation to Organising and Normativity**

I have now presented five senses of the term ‘organising’ in the light of normativity:

1. Organising refers to the *results* of managing, because most managerial activities produce organisational changes. To create new positions; to move a person from one position to another; to follow the steps of a marketing plan; etc. The results emerge as ‘structure’.

2. Organising refers to the *results* of leadership, because most activities in relation to leading imply organisational changes: To incorporate or exemplify a virtue; to act in an explicitly normative way. The results emerge as structure, or simulate it.

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2 Aristotle defines ‘*deinôtes*’ in Book VI, xii, 8-9.
3. Organising refers to a *genuine process*, to a state of being ‘always-already’ between theory and practise, thinking and acting. As such, it is a concept of superior range, because it covers both.

4. ‘Walking the talk’, a state of permanent creativity, that works through ‘self-cesseity’, and that characterises both successful leadership and management.

5. Organising can also mean a performance that is successful, but suppressive, i.e., ethically bad, and a performance that is liberating, and opening towards new horizons of individual and collective autonomy, i.e., ethically good.

When organising refers to a performance that creates organisational changes without the employees noticing it, then it is close to seduction, and ethically wrong. Often art is used to legitimate this practise, but art does prototypically refer to an epistemological ideal of being absorbed in what one does. Actually, the ethical genuine act is, in both the traditions of the Gnostics and of St. Paul, characterised as an act that has no second-order context what concerns the actor herself, i.e., an act that lies beyond the application of any law (the *nomos*), or which even is a genuine gesture of the first ‘institution’ of the norm. Hence, organising can only imitate the ‘self-cesseity’ of art, if it renders it possible to the employees to experience the normativity as an inherent basis, or ‘not compelling force’, of their own behaviour.

![Image](image)

*Josef Albers, Homage to the Square Into the Open, 1952*

But what is actually meant by the concept of *normativity*? It is complicated, indeed, because it often is used to refer exclusively to ethically genuine acting, and without any distinct marking of the epistemological or ontological context. But it would be too exclusive not to count criteria like ‘economic efficiency’ and ‘technical efficiency’ under the possible perspective of normativity – they certainly do not belong to the realm of the ethically neutral. But here I shall exclusively use the term ‘normativity’ to refer to criteria and hence to norms that are ethically good (a concept which, due to its nature, I won’t define but only approach indirectly in the following). My point is, then, that the
results of both management and leadership could be evaluated ethically, and so can organising, because any criterion can. But there is still a **quiditas** that severs organising from management and leadership in the very gesture through which it completes them, it is **creativity**, the real sense of **deinótes**, and, hence, of organising. I shall return to that in the next sections.

There are three ways in which organising can be grasped analytically in relation to criteria per se: As the creation of a social, a technical and an economic rationale of the actions inside the firm. The ideal organising creates a unique action that cannot be deciphered immediately by the mind. It pretends that the perfect union, or synthesis, of all the elements of production can be reached – and this counts for both the ethical sound organising, and for the strategic one, desirous of power. But it has to have a reserve.

Art, as the realisation in material media or in bodily gestures by hand of an ideal of a ‘supra-critical’ intentionality, will combine other types of knowledge interests in creating a surface of phenomena that cannot be penetrated by experience. The immediate connection between art and organising is this impenetrability. But aesthetics can neither hold down the reflective power of employees, nor of the educated public, for very long. So the aesthetic experience has to present itself as such. That is, it has to present itself as a second- or even third-order experience. Thus, both art and organising have to let thinking into their workshops and laboratories. They must join philosophy: They have to have a cause.

‘A cause’ means both the phenomenon’s reason for being at all, the union of necessary and sufficient causes, and a set of concepts to identify its ontological region. The cause of organisation must lay in a set of norms, and it has to be able to refer back to an ‘organism’, as well as to an **organon**, i.e., to both something natural and to something produced which, anyhow, can be the subject of analytical efforts. When organising is presented to its cause by a criticism with enough stamina, it shall present itself as either leadership or management. As management, if the cause is technical or economic. As leadership, if it is characterised by ethical normativity.

In line with this, art has its methods of retreat, too, but to both realms, that of organising and that of art, the final fortress on the road of retreat is normativity. Neither art nor organising can tolerate to be judged as merely ‘technically’ or merely ‘economically’ motivated. However, real organising is actualised normativity, i.e., the invisible presentation of norms through a performance that is experienced as nothing else but ‘living the norm’. It is obvious that there is an **aporia** inherent in organising as performance or as ‘self-cesseity’, because as long as the norm is good, the illusion is acceptable, but when the norms are bad we would immediately speak about ‘deception’, ‘seduction’ and ‘suppression’.

So, organising cannot be an ethically neutral concept, although it conjures up, or even lives by, the concept of **aisthesis**, of the impenetrability on the surface of experience. But neither can art. So the postulate here is the obviously contra-intuitive that the concepts of ‘good and bad’ cannot be territorialized by art at all, a fact that is reinforced, when art is related directly as a means to, or as an ideal of, organising.
Now it is time to give a picture of what could be meant by ‘ethical’ or ‘good’
normativity. The expression of ‘giving a picture’ should be taken literally, because
normativity can never be based on a waterproof axiology, it stays a hypothesis of the
universal framework on which the attitudes of genuine humanism is built.

The Greek Square

To make a demarcation between art and other social phenomena is increasingly
difficult. The same thing begins to happen to the practises of organising, and even to
their ethically more refined versions, as they are articulated through the concept of
‘leadership’. In this connection the question arises almost automatically: Has the good
got its own identity in art and organising? Much art is very eager to blur the difference
between aesthetic expressions and other semantic articulations of everyday life. And the
symbolic instruments of organising come increasingly close to the value-bound,
emotionally pronounced, communication of everyday-life.

In the Introduction to his Critique of Judgement (Kritik der Urteilskraft) Immanuel Kant
presents us to a set of methodological distinctions which could be of use in discussing
the issues here: The effort of demarcation, both what concerns art and organising. He
speaks of ‘a field’, which means an area of potential knowledge characterized by being
an area of possible, symbolic action. Such an area is able to be the target of concepts,
even if they shall never come to function in an epistemic context. This common sense
world includes both art and business science. In this field one will find – what Kant
names – ‘territories’, characterised by the fact that we are able to get knowledge related
to them. Music is such a territory, organisational science is another (Deleuze, I presume,
took his concept of territory from Kant’s book).

When it is possible to use concepts as constituting functions in a part of the territory,
and, hence, to work within a sound frame of epistemology, it is called ‘ein Gebiet’ (ditto
in Latin); ‘domain’ could be a proper translation. Probably P. Sraffa tried to establish a
domain within economics, and I think that both Hume and Smith tried – rather
unconscious – to construct one inside moral philosophy, but only Spinoza, Leibniz, and
Kant, succeeded properly here, because of their pronounced sense of the physiology of
the calculus, i.e., of the procedures of deduction. However, Nature as the subject of
science, and Freedom as the subject of reason, constitute the only proper domains in
Kant’s philosophy. It is obvious that we cannot any longer construct domains within the
social sciences, the last quasi-attempt was done by Jürgen Habermas in his Theory of
Communicative Action (Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns), and, it should be
added, not totally without success.

On the other hand, neither art nor management are canonical objects of empirical
science, due to many reasons, of which we only need to mention the ambiguity of the
sense of actions, the dominating role of the event, and the utterly significant role of the
‘context’, seen immanently as language game, and seen transcendentally as ‘everyday-
life’. We are forced into some sort of normativity, if we shall relate analytically to them:
We have to choose a perspective – that means, we have to be free enough to be critical.
We have to define some acts and products as art, and some actions as organising, and we are forced to make distinctions between good and bad art, and between organising per se and between its dual contexts, management and leadership.

We have only got territories, or, to use a concept from Edmund Husserl, ‘regional ontologies’. Therefore we must make some extraordinary techniques of de-territorialisations, namely by hand of crossing territories through normative concepts.

Let me call the frame of normativity that I think is indispensable in order to think a sustainable concept of the mutual interrelation between art and organising, ‘the Greek square’, because it is inspired by the way Greek thinking is able to unite the normative dimensions of reality, the good, the just, the true, and the beautiful. It is not, however, always that Greek philosophy succeeds in, or even wants to, realise this fusion. From Plato and onwards this type of concepts can be identified with Kant’s notion of ‘a regulative idea’. They are epistemic borderlines, and they neither appear directly as mental pictures of fully developed concepts, nor as operational definitions. They are neither transcendental nor fully immanent. One might use the term ‘condescendence’ in relation to them, i.e., they are a fusion of the transcendent immanence and the immanent transcendence without posing a third, i.e., an out-side.

The first corner of ‘the Greek square’ is agathon, bonus/bonum, or virtus, the good.\(^3\) The good exists as virtue, i.e., it has to be realised through managerial acts that are proper acts of genuine leadership, and art could be an instrument here in sharpening the imaginative forces needed to realise the good in different situations. Social responsibility, empathy, the ability to be present, care, awareness of others, and

\(^3\) As I am speaking about the ‘Greek square’, its corner-concepts will be given in the classical Greek terminology.
generosity, are leadership virtues of the good that demand aesthetic excellence to be implemented in the organisation.

The second corner of the square is the true, *he aletheia, veritas*. This concept is twisted into the institutions of science, and very complicated, but in relation to business science, generally, or to organising, specifically, it relates to far more than research knowledge of management and innovation, it is about the importance of every new type of commodity for the new type of society. Art is very important here in producing a new sensitivity to the possibilities of production technology and of human technology, i.e., a sensitivity to the new opportunities of organising, because of its unlimited right to imagine consequences.

The beautiful, *kalon, pulcher* in Latin, is the third corner of the square. Beauty can be defined in many ways, underlining the historical consistency of experience, the excellences of form, or the balance of form and content; but the point in this square is that beauty is a sort of empty place. It is nothing, if it is not filled in by the powerful content of one or more of the concepts in the other corners. As Plato states in *The Phaedrus*, the beautiful is the only level on which, or the only phenomenological form in which, the realm of ideas might manifest themselves. And this could be understood in a way that sees beauty as mere surface, as pure immanence, as the fusion of images and simulacra (of *eikon, eidolon, and phantasma* in the original Greek terminology), in the capacity of the only spontaneous side of experience.

The last corner of the square is justice, *dikaiosýne, justitia*. Justice is the core of genuine leadership and of the ethos of good organisations. It could actually be the driving force of organising, its *nisus*. It works through mutual relations like recognition, righteousness, equity, trust, and loyalty. It upholds a fruitful tension between right and duty. In art justice is often conceived of in a metaphysical or quasi-metaphysical setting, besides the masterpieces of social or even utopian indignation. But justice is also the twisted and infolded (*complicatum*) sense of the works of art that fraternize with the ugly, or exhibits art’s own destruction as form by denying the exclusive character of any experience of beauty – or, the beauty lies, like in many ‘installations’, in the tension between the power to destruct its own form, and its inability to accomplish it totally. The driving force of justice is *kritiké*, criticism. And criticism might be the common ground of art and organising what concerns the care for justice.

Finally, we might say that the centre of this square is *eleutheria, libertas*, freedom. We are able to imagine a situation of perfect balance in this square, with a circulation between all corners, but initiated and brought to rest through the hegemony of the Good. Here beauty will find its place, as a passage in a movement that makes us come increasingly close to freedom. However, we shall not forget that the classical Greek concept of freedom was far from the later concept of individual autonomy beyond the social community, even if versions of this thought figure began to emerge during Hellenism.

Now the question is how these normative anchorages can be seen as platforms of organisational action? How are we able to think the passage from theory to practise at the ethical level, and how is ethical knowledge transformed into an organising in which
the concrete demands of the situation and its contextual framework are reflected properly?

In Search of *deinotes* by Way of *Urteilskraft*

Now, let me put this question: Is there a common ground that might unite art and organising, i.e., that make use, not only of analogies, but of real conceptualisations, across the territories, appear as more than convention or a lucky punch? Let us look at one candidate for this common conceptual ground: the philosophical tradition of the already mentioned, epoch-making book from 1790, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, which set the agenda for hundreds of years to come, not only what concerns the thinking of the essence of art, but, paradoxically, also of the essence of communicative action.

The concept of *Urteilskraft*, or ‘the (critical) capacity of judgement’, is a complicated one, presupposing the distinction between three fundamental fields of practises possible to man: the ability to know, the ability to feel pleasure and pain, and the ability to desire. Science origins in the first capacity – knowledge; morals origins in the last one – desire; and aesthetics origins in the one in between – the ability to feel pleasure or pain. To these abilities, or capacities, there correspond three mental faculties: intelligence, reason, and the (critical) capacity of judgement. Their domains are nature, freedom and art. The capacities are totally separated from each other, which means that the capacity of judgement cannot contribute to knowledge or morals. However, the capacity of judgement is based on what Aristotle in *De anima* called *koinè aisthesis*, in the Latin translation, *sensus communis*, articulated through a ‘general voice’.

The origin of common sense, and hence, of the three critical functions of reason, autonomic thinking, empathy, and harmony with one-self, is aesthetic. This is the inherent *aporia* of Kant’s book. However, it might not be unwelcome information for us – even to the ones that are not social constructivists – because implicitly a strong band is tied between art and a general concept of social action. They have the same core.

The capacity of judgement is described by Kant as the ability to apply general principles on concrete cases, and vice versa, i.e., to infer general concepts from experience – the principle of both serious moral action and artistic performance. Here art is perhaps special in taking off from the concrete phenomenon reaching the general level through a displacement that is reinforced through a process of post-rationalising which might be totally legitimate, because it works. However, this ability to apply general concepts on events and acts comes close to the ability that Aristotle baptized *deinōtēs*, even if it does not reach it. For the capacity of judgement has to be applied too, in this linguistically anticipated movement oscillating from concept to action and back again, by creating

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4 I am tempted to translate *Urteilskraft* as ‘the critical capacity of judgement’, which would be, of course, an interpretation more than a direct translation.

5 The concept of *koinè aisthesis* shows the original meaning of *aisthesis*, i.e. ‘aesthetics’: Sense produced through the senses. Aristotle discusses whether there is one superior sense that unites all senses, or an *a posteriori* effectuated synthesis.
and destroying our boxes of sense. But deinôtes, this proto-dialectical dynamic, this conceptualising force, is the core of organising when it is seen as genuine actualisation.

It is thus very important to understand that organising cannot be seen as the species of the genus deinôtes, until something further has been included in the capacity of judgement. This ‘something’ is creativity. We owe much to Gilles Deleuze because of his emphasising of the trans-empirical, artistic core of thinking.

The capacity of judgement is the ability to detect the meaning that one self – in company with others - ascribes to the world. This condition of speech, of writing, and of thinking, the fact that we have to explore the meaning of our own activities by actualising them in some media, I have named ‘translocutionarity’. It is the ability to overcome the ‘natural alienation’ built into the use of language games and the use of medias by exploring it: That we must use a world of sense belonging to the others, in order to be able to think, act, and create. This is also the first principle of art: To make a perfect illusion within the ontic dimension, a soft self-betrayal through hardly distinguishable, ontological ‘scares’, in the perfect, and impenetrable surface of aesthesis, i.e., in the skin of ‘experience’.

But the point is also that the capacity of judgement can be developed into a normatively pronounced meta-concept of the ways in which we transform our systematic deliberations about our practise into concrete acts, but without the capacity to apply any rule-governed principles. The capacity of judgement becomes, in other words, the container for all the concepts that refer to our abilities beyond discursive articulation. Thus, it becomes the perfect ‘conceptual container’ of the plethora of practises that constitute organising.

Such concepts have been studied since the classical Greek era, but especially during Hellenism, and both in the art of rhetoric and in the art of poetic. Let me mention six

6 In Event and Body-Mind, op.cit.
concepts through which the critical capacity of judgement can be related to the vague domain of creativity, so important as a common domain for organising and art: *Euresis*, i.e., innovation; *euphysia*, (*ingenio*), i.e., genius; *dechomai*, (*recipio*, *suscipio* or *capacitas*), i.e., capacity; *phantasia*, (*imaginatio*), i.e., fantasy; *epibolé*, i.e., intuition; and *anchinoia*, (*acutezza*, or *argutezza*), i.e., acuteness of mind.

It must be evident that these mental capacities, so celebrated by business economics in the alienated form of ‘individual competencies’, have to be developed through some sort of synthetic effort, and in reference to some meta-concept – even if this cannot possibly have any a priori characteristics – in order to serve the claims of normativity.

To me it is obvious that the capacity of judgement is the capacity through which the basic essence of art and leadership can be developed, *if*, and only *if*, we emphasise the close relation between the pronounced aesthetic sense and the moral sense that Kant often hints at, but which he obviously does not want to fully conceptualise.

This is already done by Aristotle in his ethics, when he presents us to ‘the wise man’, that is able to invent the ethics out of which he is acting by using *deinótes*, the creative power of reason. But a concept of reason that is not instrumentally thwarted, but bound to the Greek original of the latin *ratio*, i.e., *logos*. *Logos* is a concept that is able to unite ‘the theoretical and practical reason’ of Kant beyond any dogmatic distinction in the art of rhetoric. One could say, and with right, that the syllogism of rhetoric, the *enthymema*, which C.S. Pierce later named ‘abduction’, and J.H. Newman bound to an ‘illative sense’, is the core capacity of the power of judgement, because you have to involve memory, create experience, manifest your character (ethos), and triumph in the use of logic in one and the same move. *Logos* is bound to experience and hence, it is in its essence ethical, because an *ethos* is the result of the active use of one’s experience in the service of doing the good.

The enthymemic quality of the critical capacity of judgement, the ability to use example and metaphor, is centred in the proto-practical capacity – which defer considerably from person to person – to use analogies. The capacity of analogy might be the starting point for a logical derivation of the common core between art and organising. We could name the capacity of making analogies as ‘the sensitivity to events’, or, in Greek *kairopathos*, namely a ‘kairo-pathetic attitude’, the sensitivity to *kairos*, i.e., ‘the right moment’. Behind this ability lies the Aristotelian *epagógethe*, the ability to make relevant generalisations.

It is important to relate the capacity of judgement to creativity and criticism, that is, to a concept of forces, to *deinótes*, and not to make a total reduction to the concept of *phronesis* (wisdom). This is because the relation to aesthetics is lost in the concept of *phronesis* (unless you press it) that does not underline the creative, transforming role of experience. Attention is due to an effort, the knowledge of which artists and leaders share. So, new leadership virtues like empathy, organisational fantasy, and value-directed imagination, might all be deduced from the capacity of judgement.

In order to conclude this part, the critical capacity of judgement can be seen as the quasi-epistemological core that unites art and organising in the image of leadership, and
hence makes the analysis of their practises worth a while. We must now dive into the
realm of creativity, in order to explore the intrinsic relations between art and organising
further.

**Art, Organising and Creativity**

The simplest way to define creativity in our line of thought is by saying: Creativity, at
any level and to any degree, is the direct result of the capacity of the person or the group
to conceive of, to actualise, and to administer freedom. By letting creativity relate to
freedom, the conclusion is already drawn that creativity in its essence is normative.
Normative attitudes drive the creative effort.

However, freedom cannot stand alone as the basic category, or *theorem*, through which
we deduce creativity per se, and its different, concrete forms of practises – whether they
are spontaneous or reflective – from the square. Two further categories are needed to
stop the inherent egoism or hedonism, as well as the attitudes of superiority and ruthless
autonomy, lying latent in freedom.

The first category is *criticism* (*kritikē*) as an attitude towards thoughts, terminologies,
methods and theories delivered to us from history. The second category is *readiness*
(*etheloduleia*) in relation to ones own body, to ones own mind, and to the forces of
eventING in organising. Finally, *deinōtes* is necessary as the category that functions as
the catalyst of these three capacities in transforming theory into practise, thinking into
acting. We could in this connection speak about ‘creative virtues’ as individual and
collective, sense-driving capacities of normative organising. A virtue can in this context
be seen as the centre, or inner hegemony, as the *hegemonikon* of the individual basket of
thematic capacities.

The investigations of the decisive factors of creativity made during the fifties and sixties
in California at the Institute for Personality Assessment and Research conducted by
D.W. Mac Kinnon using the experiences of leading artists and scientists, have supported
the view that creativity is very dependent on personality, character and individual
motivation, and much less on ‘general intelligence’. E.P. Torrence has in this context
isolated 84 qualities that characterise the personality of creative individuals. The
interests of official, educational systems in such operational categories that facilitate the
prediction of creative behaviour, and, hence, the choice of apt candidates, will more or
less coincide with the interests of private firms.

Besides ‘creative virtues’, concepts like ‘creative spaces’ and ‘creative media/materials’
could be introduced to analyse creativity as a mode of organising. I shall, however, not
concentrate on these aspects here, but let it be enough to mention six creative virtues
that in my opinion form the quasi-axiomatic frame of creativity, because they, on the
one hand, cannot be reduced to each other, and, on the other hand, cannot be reduced to
all the other conceptual options of the capacities or qualities of creativity.

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7 The concept of *etheloduleia* origins in the dialogue ‘Symposium’ (184 C) by Plato.
Because the concepts of these creative virtues have a pronounced epistemological context based on more than two thousand years of philosophical investigations and analysis – demonstrating the mastery of transforming experience into concepts through anticipation, analogy and almost mere *creatio ex nihilo* – they are able to transcend any empirical-psychological attempt to form theories of creativity, because these attempts are bound, not only to use them, but to draw their shallow gains of knowledge from their immense depths.

Each of the following concepts can, in so far as they are understood as virtues, refer to attitudes shaping the relation of a human being to herself and to the world. They are *not* operational, they are pre-operational, because they are normative. The claim here is, of course, that these creative virtues are common to organising and art:

*Acuteness* origins in the Greek *anchinoia*, but in Latin it has two different senses, the one *acutus*, in Italian *acutezza*, ‘pointing’, ‘cutting’, the metaphor of the spear (of Mentor?); and *argutus*, in Italian *argutezza*, the light tone, the *fulguratio* of Leibniz, the sudden, bright thought. Both senses are plaited into acuteness, the capacity to break with tradition – which it acknowledges to owe almost everything – in the very name of this tradition, transcending dogmatism, organisational totalitarianism, and the realm of the obvious, into freedom. Acuteness manifests itself through the logic that exploits the capacity to understand, attempt, or even create, the lacking premises of deductions. It elaborates on the enthymeme, the syllogism of rhetoric by – as I mentioned – developing ways of ratiocination called ‘abduction’ by Pierce, or ‘the illative sense’, by Newmann.

*Sovereignty* as a virtue is the happy ability to want to do that which you are able to, and to be able to do what you want to do. The Greeks called this capacity *euphyia*, in Latin *ingenium*, the natural gifts in combination with the ability to use them, in relation to obtain the good life. Sovereignty is about the ability to say both Yes!, and No! and
about doing the right things, at the right moment. Hence, sovereignty is related to the
capacity to understand and interpret the other person. It is bound to the imaginative
maieutics of Socrates, and far from traditional ‘therapeutic practises’. The sovereign
person creates the frames for human relations, stimulating the self-creation of other
people; and she is the master of congenial interpretations of faces, actions, shapes, and
texts. Only the sovereign is able to be a true emphatic organiser. The sovereign person
is, due to the nature of this virtue, a real humorist, because her direct access to
spontaneity, and her inspirational authority, need a gesture of distance to their most
successful expressions. Intensity has to be made relative: There must be a tiny patch on
the leg of the Armani-dress, and the supreme conductor must be dressed in a penguin’s
coat.

*Ideation* is a concept that is used in the discussions of developing basic concepts within
geometry, kinematics and dynamics. It refers to the role concise, conceptual images
play when we attempt to develop measurements of physical figures and processes. In
this connection, ideation can refer to the core of the processes of calibrating from which
innovation rise, and which are all characterised by anticipation. By ‘anticipation’ we
understand the visual capacity to imagine an object, a place, a person, or a situation, as
if it were experienced directly. In organising the so-called ‘visions’ and ‘missions’ of
organisations are examples of the attempt to conjure up ideation. Ideation refers to the
capacity to use social experimentation in organising, by taking advantage of the
unforeseen or spontaneous results that emerge from more deliberate sets of actions. The
experimental stuff of *ideation* is our own experience, the individual as well as the
collective. The phenomenon of ‘the thought experiment’ is a way of using *ideation*,
because it might demonstrate the fact that conceptualisation could be followed by the
creation of a method of actualisation. However, the ‘*ideator*’ must certainly know the
difference between the model and plan on the one side, and the forces of becoming on
the other, through the momentum of which organising as an intentional preparation can
be nothing but the hope of a little help from our friends.

*Deliberation* expresses the ability of a human being to view relations in a light that
transgresses the narrow-mindedness of corporate governance, the tepid reservations, the
exaggerated prudence, opportunism, and the blatant pragmatism of managerial practises.
Deliberation is the core of mental revolutions, even if it has an ear for the evolutionary
rhythm. The Greeks related one aspect of deliberation, *eubulia* (meaning literally ‘well-
advised’), to the ability to lead and organise at any level. Deliberation is the virtue of the
real organiser, of the philosopher-king. To deliberate is to think fundamentally
normatively, to think from the perspective of ends. Hence, deliberation might imagine
the good in the shape of the just, or the just in the shape of truth, or the true in the shape
of the beautiful, even if the good always must have the last word. Deliberation is a
creative virtue bound to the capacity to change normative perspective, it is able to be a
real conversion of the mind. Hence, it is forced to manifest itself as both self-guidance
and as pedagogy. Organising, then, becomes the changing of minds, but allied with
Concordia, not with bio-politics.

*Improvisation* is the strongest, most rule-governed one of the creative virtues. This is
because it is so close to the phenomenon of play. Play is a species of the genus ‘game’,
the differentia of which lies in its simplicity, in its unconstrained compulsion, in its
obvious, algorithmic character, in its both direct and indirect corporeality, in its
dissolving of a chronological-hegemonic time, in its anonymity of origin, in its weight
on community, in its principal freedom of finality (it can be repeated forever), in its
openness to negotiation, in its faithfulness to historical consistency (to the experiences
of the ones that played it before), in its intimate relation with laughter, and hence, in its
expressional register of happiness (not to be confused with humour or irony). But
improvisation is more than play, because they both compete about the right to be the
real organiser of the moment. They both claim that the moment has duration, that it
lasts, and that this lasting, this dia-stema, this ‘time-in-between’, is the play or the
improvisation itself.

When improvisations wins the game, the duratio is directed towards itself. It becomes
identical to the process in which it fulfils the task of creating its own form and content.
Improvisation can be organised or spontaneous, like Bach’s ‘Inventions’, or like the
momentary creating of a new tactic of battle. But real organising can never be the result
of organised improvisation. That is why the phenomenon of jazz does not suffice as the
image of the reservoir of improvisational practises. Real organising must destroy its
organisational improvisation through an emotional logistics. It must not be contend with
the ability to break up repetition inside the very patterns of repetitions themselves. It
must be a new beginning beyond beginning, i.e., something beyond the concept of being
finished.

Susceptibility, the active sensibility, is that principle of aesthetics bound to wondering –
the thaumazein of Aristoteles’ ‘Metaphysics’. It is the challenge to the intelligence of
the combined senses, to the sensus communis of De anima, to the ‘body-mind’. In
Greek the concept of dechomai covers the content of this term, and its complexity is
testified through the different Latin translations: recipio, suscipio and even capacitās –
my favourite word for ‘competency’, expressing the subject-object-play within any
ability: We are ‘worlded’ when we meet the world. The Platonic concept of eternal
‘place-ness’ and ‘space-ness’, chora, is characterised by dechomai, by its will to accept
the realm of phenomena, by its sensitivity to the regions of ontologies, and by its ability
to open to territories, as well as to de-territorialising, and to domains of thought. The
creative virtue of susceptibility is the capacity to keep ones identity by letting a project
obtain its identity through oneself. It’s the capacity of housing. This generosity is the
core of organising.

The following figure could, among many things, show that normative action in an
organisational setting easily can be related to modes of being a leader, and combined to
attitudes, that normally are ascribed to artists. Especially the vivid interplay between the
capacity of judgement and ‘readiness’ – that to such a high degree demonstrates the
unity between the cores of organising and art – is vital to the inner logical ‘flow’ of the
norms of ‘the square’ into the practises of organising. Etheloduleia, to be open to the
messages of ‘a god’, an expression used by Plato in the ‘Symposium’, points to the
readiness, to the ability to become an object herself, to be a part of the fluxus which she
initiates, so important in the organiser.

The creative virtues, in the capacity of normative attitudes, can be fit into the normative
framework in the following way:
If organising should be able to actualise normativity, i.e., to emerge from ‘the square’, creativity should be normative too, because organising does only use repetition in order to create difference: A world of differences already hostages in a future that is constructed through the act of setting them free. Being the centre of the square, freedom is the point zero in which every referential gesture ends, and from where every axiology goes into another loop. Freedom as an attitude releases us from the claims of sense, and hence from the supervision of deontology, deontologies that since long have been used to destroy the pathos-ethos-logos-unity that they always invoke with complacent spectacularity.

We might come to witness that the virtues of leadership little by little shall mutate into virtues of creativity sustaining an urge to genuine organising that in the performances and products of art was the lucky melting together of content and form. But this does certainly not mean that the ethical claims to leadership are transformed into ‘auto-aesthetic’ ones by creeping into the skin of organising. The *etho-poiesis* of individual leadership is transformed through organising, indeed, but only by this affirmation of the *ethos* through the ‘being-collective’, or even through the ‘being-anonymous’, that intense organising always accomplishes.

It is now time to cast a short glance on the types of art in order to develop a notion of the form under which art could exist, and relate to itself, and still be a paradigm of organising. After all, it must be evident that only art that relates to normativity in a pronounced way could thus function.
The Roles of Art as a Picture of the Relation of Organising to Itself

The systematic relation between art and business economics can be described in the following way, because inside art itself we are able to distinguish between four scenario that can be transformed into stages of development, without too much exaggeration:

1. Art operates within the traditional context, understanding itself as privileged domain with a set of languages, and hence, experiences, of its own.

2. Art sees itself as only a territory, or even a de-territorialized territory, which means that it has no privileged epistemological position, and hence, the realm of canonical aesthetics does not constitute a regional ontology. This means that the problem of form inside art is a phantasm – as underlined by Baudrillard, in theory, and by Andy Warhol, in practise.

3. Art sees itself as a discourse directed towards itself. This means that art can be conceived of as a meta-discourse, i.e., as a sort of philosophy – as Hegel once, and Arthur Danto recently, has claimed. Art is a way to pose philosophical problems outside philosophy.

4. Art is a communicative effort directed towards an articulation of the traditional conflicts between science and knowledge, economy and morals, individualism and social responsibility. Art is a discourse that is able to break through the ways in which capitalist society succeeds in expropriating almost any critical position towards it. The Frankfurt School underlined this through an often rather naïve epistemology. Suzy Gablik has stressed this attitude, recently, in opposition to Arthur Danto.

Now, on the first hand, we can distinguish by analogy the same four stages in the relation of the managerial sciences to themselves. Secondly, we can look at the interplay between art and organising from this perspective in relation to the problem: What can organising learn from the example of the relation of art to itself?

The traditionalist approach to organising as management will still exist in branches of this world, and hence, its opposition to the concept of organising as genuine leadership, be it as the ethical way to handle managerial tasks, be it as the side of organising that relate to human relations. But its importance will increasingly be reduced in the light of organisational challenges and the problems of recruiting and keeping a highly educated workforce.

The second way in which art relates to itself as a regional ontology will, if it is transformed to the realm of organising, mean the fare well to every scientific, yes, even every systematic, approach. The vocabulary that catches this gesture will be often moulded on post-modern concepts like de-centering, meson, the middle, the anonymous subject, the ‘rhizomic’, and so on. The focus will be on processes, i.e., on organising, not on structure. Or the focus will be on the Deleuzean version of the event as the place where the anarchical forces of sense shall meet the meaningless, but iron-hard, laws of
history, in the image of the *eventum tantum*: Organising as the fooling of non-sense by non-sense itself.

The problem here will be that responsibility in the capacity of *the* ethical challenge to organising must either be built automatically into such concepts from the beginning – which is not the case – or this capacity has to be present as a distinct way to use these concepts. Alternatively, new concepts and attitudes must be imported into this field, like the strained concept of the ‘multitude’ so foreign to any pragmatic perspective on the ‘hyper-modern’ organisation. The consequence is that any reference to the corners of ‘the Greek square’ must be given up in this context, and hence, a systematic politics of ethics.

If organising chooses the third alternative, to be kept in a painful condition of consciousness of its own form, it has to turn to philosophy. Not just the meta-science of management, but its very language, i.e., its ‘domain’, has to be philosophy. However, there are several versions of philosophy, as we all know.

Allied with constructivist thought, system science, or discourse analytics, the self-consciousness of organising might easily turn scholastic, self-righteous, or even strategic in a subtle way. Organising might turn to an existentialist version of philosophy, but this attitude can also all too easily be turned into an ideology of the supremacy and autonomous self-development of the manager in the capacity of the leader. Power is disguised between what is obviously both good will and what originally were serious promises.
Philosophical discourse is a Must if the role of aesthetics shall be judged properly, and art implemented in the practise of organising, but it cannot solely form the language in which organising speaks to itself, because the aim of philosophy can never be solely identified with the aim of the capitalist firm, be it ever so responsible, and its employees ever so critical. As we saw in ‘the Greek square’, this regulative normativity can only be the aim of an approximation on behalf of organising as leadership, but, on the other hand, it is a strict condition, if philosophy shall not turn into mere performance, to fill it up with these regulative norms.

So, the attempt to transform organising into philosophy must evade transforming it into a quasi-general sensus communis, into a new ‘lingua’ of hyper-self-conscious communicative action. Just as art, when it addresses its own regional ontology, and de-territorializes itself, must evade being transformed into just another, unspecific, communicative activity – even if, through the media it uses, it might have a surplus of sense in relation to the straight discourse.

The fourth road is the most important. It is able to absorb the third alternative, the philosophical discourse, but to integrate it in a social-critical perspective, too. It definitely is a philosophical way, because it aspires to operate at the utmost meta-level. But it tries to use the surplus of meaning inherent in the forms of art. That is, it does not focus on the formal aspects of art, because it is already able to evade the formalisms of thinking.

Of course it would be fatal to try to make programmatic art, but it would not be fatal to try to make programmatic organising, if it means organising with a special normative attitude. This could be done, by forcing art into ‘the Greek square’, and by forcing organising into this square too, in the capacity of an art, and hence, transform it into leadership by transgressing its strategically defined limits. Leadership will then, as a social practise, be integrated into knowledge and virtue.

Now the question remains, whether management can learn anything about this fourth road from art, i.e., from the way art tries to cope with it?

Some Final Remarks on the Concrete Relevance of Art to Organising

In this final remark I shall outline some common places where art and organising meet:

1. To practise art directly, be it as a conductor for an hour, or a one-day sculptor, can enrich the knowledge of the organiser in relation to her own experiences. This is the quickest and most effective way to confront the organiser with the normative aspects and the tacit dimensions of her own practise.

2. To consume art productively, i.e., to be a part of an active appropriation of an artwork – a very good example is the play Tamara Land described by David Boje.
3. To learn about art can, through the horizon of a general cultural capacity, enrich organising in ways neither surpassed by curricula or courses in business economics nor by consultancy.

A1. To practise art is to become involved in social actions of a prototypical kind that conjure up the mode of this practise, be it the place, the body, the flow, or the event; be it the relation to the concept of sense, as denotation, expression, or reflection; or be it the attitudes of speech, like the topoi of deliberation, the forensic and the epideictic, that form the *Art of Rhetoric* by Aristoteles. Art presents us with the core of communication, with the *ethos*, the *pathos*, and the *logos*, in an event-embodied way. Art is to *be evented*, and so is leadership.

A2. But art also confronts the person that implements it with a certain attitude towards attention, i.e., it is a new kind of making people present, and certainly oneself too. Art realises intensity as becoming. Organising actualises leadership as utopian.

A3. Art gives an alternative angle on strategy, because the goal here arises from the synthesis of the means. Art is a decentred or anonymous activity – or, even the strategic annihilation of strategy. Organising ought to be post-strategic.

A4. Art confronts us with a positive, non-subjective intentionality; it is ‘worlding’ us, so to speak. Art is in its essence, as writing or singing, chiastic; it is ‘reciprociti-zing’, or it is letting us practise the *dechomai*, the unstrategic strategy of receptivity as capacity. Hence, it prepares us for the essence of the social, or of intersubjectivity, the acceptance of being ‘capaciti-zed’.

A5. Art makes the play between *sarkos* and *soma*, between body and person, obvious, an insight so important to all organisers. The dimension of organising is time and flesh, allocating senses to identities, using the fuel of passion and hope to drive through the gates of concepts into the realm of ends.

But fore and foremost, doing art offers the possibility to understand how important normativity, be it reflectively stated or tacit, is to practise. However, this does not mean, of course, that the artist is morally superior. To understand normativity completely, one has to focus on the conceptual creativity of art, on its utopian epistemology. This means that art as *aisthesis* is a transformation of experience through the very gesture of reinforcing its capacities; through the richness of the alienated. Managerial practise might take this as a paradigm.
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Images of the Academy, or, Lenin in Seattle

André Spicer

I
I have just paid five dollars for a beer. I’m loitering in the Seattle conference center waiting for a friend from Australia to turn up at the appointed time. He is late as usual. This means I have to talk to an American doctoral student about network analysis. Now I’m talking to Patrizia. She tells me that there is a statue of Lenin in an inner suburb of Seattle. I mention that I saw an ex-Russian nuclear submarine positioned as a prime tourist attraction on the Seattle waterfront. Actually, the sign told me it was the ‘commie submarine’.

II
We picked our way through an inner suburb of Seattle, eventually coming over the top of the hill. We looked down onto the rapidly gentrifying shipping canal that connects Puget Sound to Lake Washington. What seemed so surprising was that the street grid just continued downwards with no nod to the lie of the land. Having grown up in New Zealand, I should be quite used to cities with grid street plans drawn up in office in London or Edinburgh without a thought given to the natural geology of a space. But the strict grid of suburban streets that fell off the hill in front of me was still befuddling.

III
To remove the bushes, to render the ground as smooth as a billiard table, is to enclose the land within a permanent ring of light. The open field is a rebuke to clouds or other evidence of primitive chiaroscuro: the colonists’ eagerness to remove every vestige of vegetation cannot be explained simply as a mistaken theory of agriculture; it expresses an overwhelming need to clear away doubt – not to make the land speak in accents all its own, but to silence the whispers, the inexplicable earth and sky tremors which always seemed to accompany colonization. Progress, it seems, stamps the earth flat, turning it into a passive planisphere.

IV

The USA is a country that needs no introduction – it’s so well known that even first
time visitors feel like they’ve been there before. It’s just like on TV, only more so.
There’s something very satisfying about seeing all those fast-food franchises, Coca-
Cola commercials and baseball caps in the place where they really belong. The biggest
surprise is the scale and extent of all Americana. You expect to see freeways, but the
spaghetti-like criss-crossing of a six-level interchange and the endless interstate
highways is still astonishing.

V

We drove into a suburb called Fremont, where hipsters and small time Internet
entrepreneurs live. The main street is populated by a few ‘canvases’ for a local NGO
called the Civic Defense Fund, locals strolling in the sun, a bookshop, and a few of
those shops which sell R. Crumb comics, Cramps tee-shirts and cock rings. We turned
the corner, and there he was – Vladimir Illich Lenin.

VI

Lenin appeared at the right time. It seemed appropriate that my five tangled days at the world’s largest meeting of management academics would be sutured by such a stare. Five days of buffet food, insights from Alabama, kooky mandalas, background muzak, conference coffee and business cards. Lenin’s iron stare reminded me exactly how plural America can be.

VII

There he stood, a seven ton state of Lenin. His new comrade was a Taco del Mar sign. This brother in arms was a neon sign advising passing citizens that an outlet of a chain of Taco store was open for business. In this store they may sample the wonders flexible specialisation – individually producing tacos that are made to meet the customers exacting requirements.

VIII

I felt like I had already been to the academy before. I had been regaled with stories of excess by seasoned travellers. I had learnt by heart how I would encounter the strange laws of dress – the PhD students would be carefully fitted out in a new suit, brown shoes and a perfect grin. The run of the mill male academic would be wearing a pair of boat shoes, chinos, a navy blazer, and a blue shirt (perhaps with a discrete Polo logo). The star professors would either not be there, or they would be flip-flopping across the floor in beach shorts and a particularly garish Hawaiian shirt. They would all have plenty of business cards to hand out to anyone.
IX

Democratic communities not only contain a large number of independent citizens, but are constantly filled with men who, having entered but yesterday upon their independent condition, are intoxicated with their new power. They entertain a presumptuous confidence in their own strength, and as they do not suppose that they can henceforward ever have occasion to claim the assistance of their fellow creatures, they do not show that they care for anybody but themselves.

X

I had one thought in mind when boarding the flight from Amsterdam to Seattle – self-preservation. I knew 60 percent of Americans are overweight and 20 percent are clinically obese. Given this was a flight to America it meant that about half the passengers would be Americans. This meant that about 30 percent of the seats would be occupied with flesh stuffed with lard and fruitie-os, and a whopping 10 percent of the seats would be receptacles for acres of sweaty skin. Would I be condemned to sit next to an overweight businessman with an expense account gut that would slowly ooze into my seat, crushing me against the opposite armrest? After settling down in my seat, I quickly arranged my props so I didn’t have to talk to my neighbours. I had half a book to read, which should keep me safely out of any conversation. I was pleased to discover I had a mildly chubby twelve year old ensconced in a game-boy to my left, and a seventeen year old girl to my right.

XI

In the traditional German lavatory, the hole in which shit disappears after we flush is way in front, so that the shit is first laid out for us to sniff at and inspect for traces of some illness; in the typical French lavatory, on the contrary the hole is in the back – that is the shit is supposed to disappear as soon as possible; finally the Anglo-Saxon (English or American) lavatory presents a kind of synthesis, a mediation between two opposed poles – the basin is full of water, so that the shit floats in it visible, but not to be inspected....Hegel was among the first to interpret the geographical triad of Germany-France-England as three different existential attitudes: German reflective thoroughness, French revolutionary hastiness and English moderate liberalism....The reference to lavatories enables us not only to discern the same triad in the most intimate domains of performing the excremental function, but also to generate the underlying mechanisms of this triad in the three different attitudes towards excremental excess: ambiguous contemplative fascination; the hasty attempt to get rid of the unpleasant excess as fast as possible; the pragmatic approach to treat the excess as an ordinary object to be disposed of in an appropriate way. So it is easy for an academic to claim at a round table that we live in a post-ideological universe – the moment he visits the restroom after the heated discussion, he is again knee deep in ideology.

XII

Perhaps Žižek is not quite the careful student of ideological symptoms that I thought he was. It seems to me that there is a fundamental difference between the English and North American toilet. The English toilet provides the prospective user with a modest few litres of water, however the North American toilet offers the washroom user gallons and gallons of crystalline water to pollute. This opposition seems to match the opposition between English understated pragmatism, and the excessive style of American pragmatism. Only a society who truly thought they have limitless resources to squander when they were pragmatically required (to wash away last nights dinner perhaps) could produce such massive toilet bowls.

XIII

The academy is excessive. There were thousands of attendants, 1197 official sessions, with 3153 papers and 539 symposia. There were thousands of participants. The conference was spread across thirteen venues in downtown Seattle. There were seventy eight exhibitors in the main room. The conference runs from 8.30am on Friday morning until 4.30pm on Tuesday afternoon. The cheapest room available in a recommend conference hotel is $US99 a night at the Sixth Avenue Inn. The most expensive single room is $US230 a night at the Sheraton.5

XIV

The Academy is a member of the global and pluralistic profession of management scholarship. Attention to global issues and concerns is encouraged among all members

of the Academy. The Academy fosters alliances with other international and country/region-specific associations that advance a variety of approaches to management scholarship. We value the contributions and multiple perspectives of members from all countries and regions.  

**XV**

It would take more than 230 days for the 23 percent of the world’s population who live on less than one dollar a day to afford a night in the Sheraton. It would take the average Tajikistanian professor sixteen and half months salary to pay for one night at the cheapest recommended conference accommodation. An entire months salary would pay for the average Russian professors room for one night in the cheapest accommodation.  

**XVI**

We seldom address publicly whether democracy has limits and what those might be. In the political arena, Western commentators often assume that more democracy is better. Note that above, we queried whether this assumption is thought to hold true in workplaces. In all cases, we need to ask whether assumptions regarding democracy rest on scientific theory and evidence as well as on values. Active experimentation with democracy goes on in organizations all the time via efforts at distributed decision making, information sharing, and experimental incentive systems mixing equity and equality or collective and individual rewards. Organizational researchers have a crucial role to play as public scholars to inform the discussion of democracy in a knowledge economy, whether it be manifest in workplaces, in marketplaces, or in the broader community.  

**XVII**

Whether there are limits to democracy’s benefits probably depends on the organizational and societal contexts in which democracy arises and whether the opportunity for democratic forms is growing, declining or in crisis. It may be that democracy and the values promoting it are less universal than we realize. Though democracy offers protection from abuse of power, there may be other means of organizing that provide similar protections. As scholars of organizations and organizing, who operate increasingly cross-nationally, we must give more attention to alternative means of protecting against abuse of power, addressing functional organizations underpinned by institutions that differ from those we typically study.

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9 Democracy in a Knowledge Economy [meetings.aomonline.org/2003/submissions/theme.html].  
10 *ibid.*
XVIII

In the face of the project for the reconstruction of a hierarchical society, the alternative of the left should consist of locating itself fully in the field of democratic revolution and expanding the chains of equivalence between the different struggles against oppression. 

The task of the left therefore cannot be to renounce liberal-democratic ideology, but on the contrary, to deepen and expand it in the direction of a radical and plural democracy.\textsuperscript{11}

XIX

During the conference there was limitless discussion of democracy. Some of these discussions included ‘corporate power and democracy’, ‘democracy and discourse’, ‘government and democracy’, ‘democracy at work: a debate’, ‘democracy and diversity’, ‘balancing security and freedom’, ‘democracies limits’, ‘workplace democracy’, ‘democratizing education’, and ‘workers, firms and democracy’. I felt like I had never talked so excessively about democracy in my life. I had never heard so many words. No wonder I wanted to participate in the solitary totalitarianism of drinking and lolling about in my overpriced hotel room twenty-eight floors above the greatest democracy on earth.

XX

Alone, at last! Not a sound to be heard but the rumbling of some belated and decrepit cabs. For a few hours I shall have silence, if not repose. At last the tyranny of the human face has disappeared, and I myself shall be the only cause of my sufferings. At last,

then, I am allowed to refresh myself in a bath of darkness! First of all, a double turn of the lock. It seems to me that this twist of the key will increase my solitude and fortify my barricades that at this instant separate me from the world.  

XXI

I always seemed to wake up at 5.00 am. A long shower and an hour of offensive news from CNN pass the time. I still cannot get over the number of pharmaceutical advertisements. I look forward to the orgy of consumer choices I will participate in during breakfast: coffee or juice, pink or blue artificial sweeteners, eggs or pancakes, butter or cream, maple syrup perhaps, hash browns? I am knee deep in ideology, even at breakfast. After my deliciously squanderous breakfast, I will step out onto the street to head to democracy.

XXII

Their story begins on ground level, with footsteps. They are myriad, but do not compose a series. They cannot be counted because each unit has a qualitative character: a style of tactile apprehension and kinesthetic appropriation. Their intertwined paths give their shape to spaces. They weave places together. In that respect, pedestrian movements form on of these ‘real systems whose existence in fact makes up the city’.  

XXIII

Is there space for everyone on these democratic streets? Even Lenin?

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Four Fold Guattari

Jeremy Hunsinger

review of:


Félix Guattari is relatively unknown in the study of organizations. Too few have read him as a valuable theorist unto himself, though many are familiar with his collaborations with Deleuze, Negri, and others. While Gary Genosko’s (2002) book *Félix Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction* is not specifically oriented toward any particular field, it does provide many important insights into Guattari’s thought, and allows us to extrapolate it as an important contribution to the critical study of organizations.

Guattari’s life and work can be described as constructive dissensus. He believed that cultural one-dimensionality and homogenisation toward monoculture could be avoided by recognising the value of disagreement. Yet, simple disagreement alone is not enough for Guattari; for him, there is room for consensus, but both dissensus and consensus must be related to the construction of the subject. Guattari emphasises subjectivity as the product of individuals, groups and institutions (Bogard, 1998: 56). It is in this light that his work becomes important for understanding organizations, their development, and their critique. The ability to disagree, to exist in a state of dissensus, yet to be able to act, is a key conception for understanding the possibilities of innovative organisational arrangements that do not contain fixed and hierarchical relations (Bogard, 1998: 56).
Born into the world in 1930, Pierre-Félix Guattari was a leading political figure in France, above and beyond his intellectual work. He was widely known as Mr. Anti in the French press for his stance on the direction politics in his country was taking, (Genosko, 2002: 2). However, Genosko is determined to dispute both this identity and the idea that Guattari is a postmodern theorist, an idea that Guattari himself rejects as, “the very paradigm of every sort of submission, every sort of compromise with the existing status quo” (Guattari, 1996a: 100). Guattari’s focus on transversality and dissensus is precisely an attempt to avoid the stagnancy of the status quo. Instead of the continual debates of postmodern theory, he prefers actions driven by theory; for example, in his political work, his work at Le Borde, and his written collaborations. His postmodern identity is easy to dismiss, because, while it is clear that Guattari is responding in some of his work to postmodernism, he clearly stands on a different platform than many so-called postmodern writers. This platform is constructed on ontological foundations that have political, aesthetic and ethical implications, as we will see in later sections of this paper. He sees postmodernism as quite the opposite of his position in some ways, lacking any foundation, politics and ethics. This is not to say, however, that he did not share interests with various postmodern thinkers. For instance, with Lyotard he clearly shares the concern with dissensus, but differs in what he thinks grounds this concern.

Parts of Guattari’s foundations originate in his education. He pursued education by other means than most people. He trained to become an analyst under Lacan, and after that joined the experimental clinic at Le Borde led by Jean Oury. These experiences provided Guattari with a sense of practice and theory that situated his thought. This situatedness enabled a militancy of thought and action that eventually brought about the title ‘Mr. Anti’, the reactive critic. It also gave him a firm foundation in Lacanian thought, which served him well throughout his work. Mr. Anti was political; he was subjective, but more than most, he was not reacting without reason; he had a foundation, he was looking for ways organizations and individuals can operate in society differently. He was working on a way of integrating his understanding of the mental
environment with a broader perspective, while still leaving space for independent action, disagreement and progress.

Guattari does not undermine grand narratives, he provides several of his own, and he sees that they play a part in consensual political arenas. However, to resist in those arenas, dissent must arise. This requires a positioning within the turbulent flows of these narratives. This positioning is necessary for resistance, dissent and ultimately, with the acquisition of knowledge of the position, critique. Dissensual politics is already a significant part of how organizations work. Dissensus transforms the relationships in any organization, altering the power relations involved, because it undermines the expectation that people will consent and fit in; it implies resistance, and with that new tactics and strategies to resist. These tactics and strategies create spaces, relations and functions that have different properties than grand narratives; one such property is transversality.

Transversality is one of the central themes in Guattari’s work: “it may be said that transversality belongs to the processual subject’s engendering of an existential territory and self-transportation beyond it” (Genosko, 2002: 55). In short, transversality deals in the mapping and occupation of subjective territory. It is a transsubjective concept of subject creation. The transsubjective emphasis is its extension, which goes beyond the individual subject; it allows for organizations to exist, and for people to act positively and negatively within them (ibid., 55). The subjective emphasis is interpretation, which goes beyond introspection, and looks at the lines of flight through which we come to understand our position in that territory (ibid., 59). This is beyond ‘the making sense of’ that territoriality; it is to understand the relationship to the other, usually the group, as either subject or subjugated (ibid., 60). This allows to form a position from which to dissent, based on the self-creation of a position and an understanding of that position, including an ability to express that position to others as its self-singularisation.

Transversality is also the topic of an extended essay at the end of The Three Ecologies. While these two essays have some overlap, the chapter in Genosko’s Aberrant Introduction is perhaps stronger because it fits in the context of the broader analysis of Guattari’s work and life that the book provides. This is because transversality is one of the concepts that Guattari develops throughout his lifework. Transversality as a concept begins as an evolution of Lacanian thought on Freud’s transference understood through
institutional psychiatry, and over time progresses to become a significant part of Guattari’s ontology (Genosko, 2002: 67). Later on ecology also becomes a tool for Guattari to analyse transversality, by looking at cross-ecological analyses.

It is in the latter stage of Guattari’s thought where Isabelle Stengers (2000) asserts that a meeting with Latour should have taken place because similarities between Latour’s actor network theory and Guattari’s transversality could have been explored, such as the relationship between the actant and Guattari’s institutional object. Neither is a pure objective thing, both are part of a collective form of subjectivity. Institutional objects are transversal partly because they relate to groups or arrangements. It is precisely these arrangements of quasi-subjects that allow for transversality to exist and operate in organizational systems. Guattari operated several organizational systems at Le Borde, manipulating institutional psychology to enable people to see, understand and move through that very institutionalised form of psychology and thus reconstituting it in the process. Existence within the system became a treatment, by a revealing of operations and organizational arrangements of that system.

Guattari also worked on ecological systems. Genosko (2002: 122) maintains that Japan was one of the sparks for Guattari’s latter period of thought, which deals heavily with ecology. It was Japan where Guattari filled in his political economic perspective on Integrated World Capitalism, which he worked on with Eric Alliez. Guattari considers the operation of dissensus on this level by considering the concept of a ‘humanist modernity’ as a ‘minor’ tradition within techno-scientific modernity. This is perhaps highlighted by the ‘dissensual, artist-driven culture’ which is contrary to the market-driven, techno-scientific postmodern condition (Genosko, 2002: 128). That there are ‘major’ and ‘minor’ traditions to consider, and that some provide more adequately for dissensus than others should be clear, but by highlighting this possibility, Guattari opens up the door for a broader set of concerns about subjectivity and world systems. This inverts the considerations of world systems from an external concern of organizations to an internal concern because it can be the basis for dissensual politics within organizations.

The ‘empire of signs’ is also a place of construction and thus an arena for dissent for Guattari. Building on Hjelmslevian glossematic theory, Guattari attempts to escape the Saussurean ‘isms’, as indicated by Genosko, to develop the concept of abstract machines of semiotisation. This semiotisation is developed as a tripartite division of a-
semiotic encodings, signifying semiotics, and a-signifying semiotics, all of which is illustrated along five arenas by an excellent diagram in Genosko (2002: 166). These processes build up through Piercean triangularisation to develop the theory of semiotic assemblages that is described in detail through its diagrammatics. These diagrammatics help us tease out the assemblage-fields of anti-binarist nature, completely complex in their levels and fields. With this understanding of the symbolic world one no longer is pressed into an either/or position, but can find alternatives and new possibilities to disagree. Although the model that Guattari provides is complex, perhaps unduly so, it is also systemic and resistant to the simplifications which often yield to nihilism. Instead, it attempts to provide for a rich symbolic world, which is full of meaning and interest. This work is foundational for *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) and *What is Philosophy?* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994), but also provides the foundational material for Guattari’s ontology as found in the book *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm* (Guattari, 1995a).

While semiotics is important for dissensus, Guattari bases his theory on an ontology that he developed out of the understanding of his own life. While this ontology is complex, it is also very useful for reconceptualising the methods through which we study human society, its institutions and organizations. In fact, it pushes us from the essence-based analysis of humans toward a complex flux influenced by many other factors, all of which are processual and thus constantly changing. This change of ontology allows us to reconsider science, and particularly the humanities and social sciences, less as a domain of history, leading to prediction or understanding, but more as a domain of simulation and concurrency where the past is a virtual construction that exist to inform the now, not to determine it. This shift is what allows us to understand the nature of the subject as incomplete and in flux, which is empowering because it allows people to change, much as they do in real life. Yet, this change does not simply ‘happen’; one has to take action in society, one has to foment change.

Genosko’s book is the best introduction and coverage of several topics in Guattari’s thought. It provides a firm foundation for considering the application of Guattari’s work to organizational theory, covering Guattari’s life in detail, and provides a basis for understanding how dissensus plays a part in Guattari’s theory.

While Genosko’s book is clearly the leading introduction to Guattari’s work, and it will surely stand extremely well against future texts in regards to his work and life, there are several edited volumes of Guattari’s work that embody significant parts of his work. In particular I want to bring to light three works; *Chaosophy* and *Soft Subversions* edited by Sylvère Lotringer and one I previously mentioned, *Three Ecologies* translated by Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton. All of these texts are accessible to any reader, though after reading *An Aberrant Introduction* new ideas come into focus. Between Genosko’s work and these three books, one will be well prepared to venture into the broader sets of work in which Guattari participates.

*Chaosophy* is a compilation of interviews and short writings by Guattari and occasionally Deleuze and Guattari. Of particular note is the interview ‘I am an Idea Thief’ in which Guattari explains his reading and appropriation of other authors. For example, he delves into his relationship with Freud and Marx, considering their
transdisciplinary applicability. This exemplifies what one can do in regard to building theory, utilising the works of others to generate a position of ones own by taking ideas, but not necessarily contexts. ‘Capitalism: a Very Special Delirium’ is an interview with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari about the ideology of capitalism and the functives of capitalism combined with foundations of schizo-analysis and the schizophrenic culture of capitalism. This foundation is built upon in ‘Balance Sheet Program for Desiring Machines’, which is appropriate to organizational theory in that it explores the machinisation of the body within the context of late capitalism, describing in part the origination of desiring machines and projective systems as analytical concepts. In particular, it looks at the aesthetics of organizations and their concretisation within the organization processes of ideation. It extends the analysis of subjectivity through these hermeneutic tools and, perhaps, provides for reconceptualising whole areas of traditional theories of subject/object or actor-system analyses. ‘Balance Sheet’ is presented as both a micro and macro analysis, some might find this confusing, but it allows a different kind of insight into human subjectivity in the context of a global system. It encourages one to note that there needs to be some dissensus in the economic and social systems for them to operate.

Soft Subversions begins with ‘Molecular Revolutions’; this was presented at the Schizo-Culture Conference in 1975 at Columbia University. It is an exemplary call for the study of the institutional structures and non-structures which infect society and bring about schizo- and micro-fascist cultures, such as those of capitalism, education, etc. It presents the case that there are certainly parts of our culture and institutions that are not worthy of support, and that uniting behind them would be no less than uniting as a fascist front bent on subjugating those institutions to the will of the group.

Soft Subversions also discusses minority politics. These essays entail some of the most important works for the study of organizations and institutions. In an interview with Sylvère Lotringer, ‘A New Alliance is Possible’, Guattari talks about the possibility of applying a tool box of theory, including that of Marxism, to a variety of problems. In Guattari’s view (1996a: 87), one can borrow or adapt tools as appropriate to any problem. In these terms, he asserts the existence of ‘the social’ and the applicability of social narratives to analysing society. In particular, he uses the Autonomist movement as an important example of generating theory from ‘the social’, but then he inverts their
concerns causing a flash of mobilisation with and outside that movement. He concludes that unionist systems may at some point provide some release from the schizo-culture of capitalism by enabling new forms of group action. These new forms of group action will form around the unities that arise in part out of disagreements. Within this section we find a precursor critique of the institutionalisation of medicalisation in terms of the drug or pill culture that many of us now suffer. In ‘Machinic Junkies’, Guattari metaphorically critiques this as a doping of culture, not just embodied in the drugs, but in the packaging of experiences and solutions as drugs. The packaging of vacations as times for release, the packaging of activities that one performs on vacation such as skiing, creates cultural expectations: for situation X you perform Y. In other words, you reduce your whole life to a set of machinic operations, predetermined by your own acceptance and consent to the norms.

In ‘Regimes, Pathways, Subjects’, Guattari provides the clearest conceptualisation of his post-Marxist transformation of a western history to a global history in terms of regimes. He also provides a strong foundation for the use of paths as analytical tools with paths of power, paths of knowledge, and paths of self-reflection being clearly delineated as tools for the schizo-analysis of these regimes. This analysis ties significantly to the concept of transversality, and generates connections that then allow us to see organizations in a different light. In particular, he presents an account of the collective mechanisms of subjectification of society (Guattari, 1996a: 113). With these, we can look for the generation of ‘groupuscles’, and their directions within organizations. This section provides significant additions to Genosko’s book in that it expands Guattari’s social theory and political.

This expansion of Guattari’s social theory also occurs in the final section of the book in which we find Guattari’s world systems theory of integrated world capitalism coming to the fore in ‘Capital as the Integral Form of Power Relations’. This essay is a post-Marxist expansion of political economy, deriving most of its power from an analysis of the contemporary conditions of production. It includes a significant analysis of alienation of labour and the creation of new subjectivities involved in that. It also deals with the concept of machinic enslavement, which in popular imagination might be seen as ‘the Matrix’. For Guattari, however, machinic enslavement is much more of an everyday life problem: how we conform to the norms built into the machinic environment and how our powers are thus confined. The paper ‘Systems, Structures, and Capitalist Processes’ completes this picture by providing ideas of how the institutions and structures of society might operate. However, I think that in these last two sections Guattari is not providing a canonical theory, but one that can be teased out and developed further by scholars. In short, Soft Subversions is one of the books one needs to have in hand to attempt to apply Guattarian theory to the critique of organizations and social organisation itself. It is clear that, besides analysing social and cultural forms, Guattari can also provide us with points of departure for generating new dissensual politics. By analysing and explaining capitalist realities, much like Marx, one can create new points of entry for not just agreement but disagreement with contemporary social organisation and its theorisation.

The Three Ecologies is comprised of an extended essay of less than 100 pages of the same name as the book, an extensive introduction, and a biographical essay on
Guattari’s concept of transversality and his movement toward ecosophy, written again by Gary Genosko. Guattari’s essay can be, perhaps, regarded as one of the most important social theoretical writings of his later work. In this essay, he describes three ecologies for analysis: a mental ecology, a social ecology, and an environmental ecology – which are all interrelated. In bringing an ecological praxis to the examination of these systems, Guattari highlights their constructed nature and the places where they break. In his view, all ecologies have break points. Guattari also examines the semiotic regimes surrounding these ecologies, envisioning the meaning transfers involved in stabilising and breaking them, whether ideological or physical systems. This book gives us something not found in the rest of the English translations of Guattari’s work, except *Chaosmosis*, and that is an extended account of his position. It is purely a critical position in the best use of those words. However, it is a complicated theory with differentiated positions that help to constitute the whole of his work. If one is interested in pursuing Guattari’s work in relation to the study of organization, using the theoretical positions in *Three Ecologies* as hermeneutics for future research can generate a range of interesting output.

Reading this primary material combined with Genosko’s *Aberrant Introduction* will provide the reader with an extensive understanding of Guattari’s life and work. It will expand the foundations of one’s own work and provide insight into our contemporary age. It shows us, perhaps, some of the errors of postmodernity and postmodernism and where to look for new possibilities of politics from within ecological means. But more than that, Guattari’s work is fascinating in its ability to grasp multiple levels of the same problem and its effects in society. It is this latter work and its complex foundations that make his work so important and useful for readers of this journal.

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Interrupted Happiness: Class Boundaries and the ‘Impossible Love’ in Turkish Melodrama

Barış Kılıçbay and Emine Onaran İncirlioğlu

abstract

Social classes in Turkey, the existence of which is often denied in dominant political discourses, are nevertheless apparent in a wide range of cultural forms including the cinema, particularly the melodrama of the 1960s and the 1970s. The specific nature of the Turkish melodrama puts this genre quite apart from other filmic genres existing in Turkish cinema. An axiomatic representation of love and the unchanging formulas typically exemplified in the classic Turkish melodrama have been so popular that even in the non-melodramatic genres this kind of romance was ubiquitous. Class difference between lovers is a typical melodramatic mode in Turkish film; classes constitute boundaries for love and they delay, interrupt or inhibit happiness. In these melodramas upper classes are typically portrayed by means of negative conventions (immorality, decadence, ruthlessness), while various positive qualities are attributed to the members of lower classes (innocence, altruism, humanism). In this paper, we explore the use of class phenomenon in the Turkish melodrama of the 1960s and the 1970s as a way of creating a societal background for the ‘impossible love’.

[T]he realism of Marx’s science is achieved through many of the same critical intentions and rhetorical effects it shares with melodramatic fiction. Just as Marx’s scientific and political aim wants to evoke in his readers intense emotions while inspiring new insights, so too the melodramatic arts of eighteenth-century musical theater, nineteenth-century mystery stories and spy novels, and even twentieth-century horror movies, romantic serials, and courtroom dramas have tried to present as graphically as possible the most compelling social realities in the most poignant way possible.

The very definition of melodrama is ambiguous. While, on the one hand, melodrama is considered “a particular, if mobile and fragmentary, genre, specialising in heterosexual

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and family relations” on the other, it may be conceived as the founding mode of Hollywood cinema that has influenced many national and local cinemas including those in Turkey. In this paper, following Peter Brooks who defined melodrama as a “central fact of modern sensibility” and proposed an extensive reading of melodramatic signs in modern society, we take melodrama as a mode that transcends a variety of genres ranging from literature to ‘scientific’ writing. In fact, Marx’s conceptualisation of classes as polar entities, ‘the villain’ (the exploiter) and ‘the victim’ (the exploited), resembles the moral polarities typical of melodramas. As Thomas M. Kemple asserts at another level of abstraction, “Marx’s text can...be read as a catastrophic melodrama that not only depicts the annihilation of capitalism but also expresses his own revolutionary impatience to see this system as the victim of its own self-destruction.”

If melodrama is a mode, rather than a genre, that has common threads in both Marx’s writing and Turkish films, then we cannot impose the sweeping generalisations that are usually attributed to the melodrama as a genre. This paper investigates the issue of cross-class love in eight Turkish films from the 1960s and the 70s. Reading the different ways within which class differences are tackled in these films, we discuss the melodramatic modes through the concepts of class consciousness, class mobility, morality of classes, (happy) endings and the ‘good cry’.

In earlier discussions of melodrama, there seems to be agreement among western researchers that it is “morally conservative and supportive of the political status quo” as well as ‘a failed tragedy’, ‘a fall from seriousness’, ‘dealing in stereotypes’, ‘overblown emotions’ and ‘moral schematisation’. A relatively recent tendency in both literary and film studies, however, takes the melodrama as a cultural form that has been crucial in shaping public sensibilities and discusses the melodrama’s political significance. Following this trend of identifying melodrama as an indispensable form in cinema and a fundamental mode of expression in modern society, this paper maintains that the melodrama as a modern mode is a recognisable cultural sign. As such, one may encounter melodrama both in a creative and narrativised form in cinema, and in the very

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4 Kemple, op.cit.
7 Gledhill, op.cit.
social organisation. For this line of argument, we rely on close readings of film melodramas as well as secondary literature.

**Melodrama in Turkish Cinema**

The over-arching phrase ‘Turkish cinema’ as a general trademark may be analytically meaningful for categorising all films produced in Turkey or by Turks, yet, there is no identifiable entity as ‘the’ Turkish Cinema, or any national cinema for that matter. A combination of many factors such as the director, producer, star system, and the particular historical conjuncture, as well as cultural, political, economic and ideological characteristics ensure a great deal of variation among Turkish films. Perhaps this is why Alim Şerif Onaran has stated that there are no Turkish films but only domestic ones. Nevertheless, we can identify certain patterns that are frequently used in Turkish films in directing, acting and editing, such as a preference for verbal rather than visual representation and a number of visual conventions that are communicated economically to the audience, making sense within that particular cultural context. Economic conditions necessitate other similarities between films that have determined the filmmaking tradition in Turkey: most are low-budget films based on chain production, though unlike in the United States, a centralised studio system does not exist.

Between 1960 and 1980 the number of films produced annually in Turkey gradually increased from 68 to 298. This was partly a result of forced chain production, as Giovanni Scognamillo states and partly because of the changing place of cinema in Turkish popular culture. Thus, while ‘movie going’ had been one of the few available sources of mass entertainment in 1960s’ Turkey, the television started to replace it by the end of the 70s. The annual number of cinema-goers dropped from roughly 250 million in 1970, to about 40 million in 1986.

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10 Scognamillo, op.cit.
Melodrama has been a frequently used mode in Turkish film, especially in the 60s and the 70s. Muharrem Gürses is known as the director of the first Turkish melodramas in the early 1950s, with the films Kara Efe/Zeynebin Gözyaşları (‘Dark Efe/Zeynep’s Tears’, 1951-52) and Yaniş Ömer (‘Passionate Ömer’, 1952), when in fact the earliest films in Turkey that may be described as melodramatic were made during the silent era, in the early 1920s. The film İstanbul’da Bir Facia-i Aşk (‘A Love Disaster in Istanbul’) written and directed by Muhsin Ertuğrul in 1922 has certain melodramatic features. Ertuğrul is also the author of other melodramas including İstanbul Sokaklarında (‘In the Streets of Istanbul’, 1931), the first Turkish talkie, and Aysel Bataklı Damın Kızı (‘Aysel, the Girl from the Marsh Croft’, 1934) adapted from Selma Lagerlöf’s original. Gürses was influenced by Egyptian melodramas, very popular in 1940’s Turkey. Criticising the ‘invasion’ of ‘Arabic’ movies, he decided to replace them with ‘better’ productions. After the initial impact of Egyptian films, French literary melodramas of the 19th century and American melodramas also helped shape the Turkish melodrama, and the genre quickly gained its local characteristics in the 1960s particularly with the input of domestic literary sources. Since then, the melodrama has arguably been the dominant mode in popular Turkish cinema. The melodramatic mode has been employed not only by the films categorised under the term ‘melodrama’ as a genre, but also other genres and narratives, such as comedies, thrillers and political films.

Addressing Class Differences and Cross-Class Love

Class definition in Turkey is highly ambiguous. While evidence backed by in-depth research is necessary before any general statements can be made on the identification and perception of social classes and class differences, in Turkey the former seem to be typically defined in terms of wealth, rather than as a social category with their own cultural values. This makes class mobility relatively easy as it can be realised quickly;

12 The first Egyptian film to be shown in Turkey is Dome’al-hubb (‘Love’s Tears’, Muhammad Karim, 1936) and was quickly a box office hit in 1938; see Levent Cantek (2000) ‘Türkiye’de Misir Filmleri’, paper presented in 1st National Symposium on Communication, Ankara, May 3-5.
14 François Copée, Alexandre Dumas Fils, Pierre Decourcelles, Xavier de Montepin and Georges Ohnet are among the authors whose novels have been adapted to Turkish films during this period.
15 Three popular writers of the 1960s whose works were adapted to melodramatic films are Muazzez Tahsin Berkant (21 films), Kerime Nadir (17 films) and Eser Mahmut Karakurt (15 films). All these films were made between 1961 and 1972. See Giovanni Scognamillo (1998) Türk Sinema Tarihi, Kabalci, Istanbul, pp. 409-410.
simply by accumulating wealth. Rural-Urban migration and integration into the urban class structure are other circumstances of quick class mobility.\textsuperscript{16}

Marx never systematically defined the concept of class but his work puts the class analysis at the centre of his theorisation. For Marx, as in this paper, looking into class relations and differences is more significant as a unit of analysis than proposing a definition of classes. It is beyond the purposes and scope of this paper to delineate and analyse class structures in Turkey and their relevance in the organisation of collectivities and social structure. Moreover, we do not claim that the cinema mirrors contemporary politics and ideologies, or that the films can reflect any verifiable reality. We like to see the films analysed as fictive narratives feeding from popular sensibilities and reciprocally manipulating and shaping the audience’s sensibilities. Following Thomas Elsaesser who observes that melodramas have a myth-making function, we argue that they tend more to play on, and accentuate already existing perceptions of, reality than to offer a faithful representation of it. Therefore, analysing existing class structures in Turkey has no relevance in our study and we limit our understanding of classes to a moral polarity, already proposed in Marxian literature, so as to make sense of the melodramatic mode of the films that revolves around class differences. In the absence of an audience ethnography, we cannot back up diverse audience responses that we would believe to have existed. Based on the speculations of authorities on Turkish cinema, however, neither the content, nor the structural organisation of 60s and 70s films fit the overall social organisation. Our analysis omits the class diversity or even the basic three-class system in contemporary capitalist society, because the films analysed propose melodramatic visions of the society, reducing the social structure to the differences between upper and lower classes. Thus, classes are automatically defined in terms of economic wealth, which is why the two protagonists of the films are traditionally referred to as the ‘poor girl’ and the ‘rich boy’ or vice versa.

In \textit{Fakir Gençin Romanı} (‘The Story of a Poor Young Man’, Nuri Ergün, 1965), the two protagonists, Turgut and Filiz, are classmates at University. Turgut, a poor young man, lives with his mother in their modest house in an old Istanbul neighbourhood and works at a grocery store, while Filiz is the daughter of a wealthy industrialist. They somehow fall in love and start seeing each other outside the classes, yet, Filiz’s family does not approve of this relationship, as they do not belong to the same social class. During this love affair Turgut experiences humiliation and embarrassment several times and comes to the understanding that they belong to different worlds. The most powerful realisation comes to him during Filiz’s birthday party. Turgut goes to the party in formal attire, wearing a suit and a tie, leaving his sick mother alone at home, and takes Filiz a phonograph record as a gift. At the party he becomes the laughing stock of the other guests, all Filiz’s upper class friends, in trendy sportswear of the 60s. Turgut feels alienated in this loud crowd. As Filiz unwraps the gifts, including the record that she

\textsuperscript{16} In the early 1920s, when the Turkish Republic was established, only 20 per cent of the population lived in cities. By 1975 the percentage of urban population was over 40 per cent. That is, while 80 per cent of the population lived in agricultural villages in the 1920s, the percentage declined to less than 60 per cent by 1975 as a result of rural-urban migration that accelerated in the 1950s. These demographic changes are quite relevant in the ‘migration films’ trend and are best represented in Turkish cinema of the era.
puts on the floor without much enthusiasm, her father calls her out, to present his gift, a
brand new convertible sports car. The whole crowd rushes out in excitement and
Turgut’s record gets broken in the stampede. Turgut says; ‘I do not understand the
language of the rich’. He regrets that he has left his mother alone for this decadent
display and decides on the spot to break up with Filiz. After the break up, a ‘proper’
marrriage is arranged between Filiz and the son of another upper-class family. Turgut
graduates in honour’s degrees and pursues his advanced education in Europe. He returns
Istanbul as wealthy engineer, just as Filiz’s father goes bankrupt and her husband
abandons her. Turgut and Filiz meet again, this time in reversed positions. Filiz has a
son who gets along very well with Turgut and the former lovers get together frequently.
When Turgut refuses Filiz’s proposal to reunite, she commits suicide leaving her son
with Turgut. In the last sequence, the boy delivers a letter from Filiz where Turgut finds
that he himself is the father of the child.

Class issue is handled in three ways in the Turkish melodrama. In one group of films, as
in the example of Fakir Gencin Romanı, class differences are irreconcilable. In those
films, the two protagonists are unable to overcome their class boundaries, hindering a
‘happy end’. Such endings, although not in agreement with typical melodramatic
resolutions, nevertheless have the excessive qualities of the mode. For class differences
to be reconcilable, the typifying class indicators of the protagonists are expected to
change.

Thus, in a second group, class differences are either ignored or surpassed by the
‘personal development’ of the initially rich, snobbish and irresponsible partner
(predominantly but not exclusively the man), allowing a ‘happy end’. In fact, class
mobility in various forms is a frequent theme in Turkish melodrama. Upward or
downward social mobility is quite easy and common for a family or an individual based
on changes in income and/or education. In the film Mahalleye Gelen Gelin, ‘The New
Bride in the Neighbourhood’ (Osman Seden, 1961), the wealthy young woman, Belgin,
an aspiring writer, decides to impersonate a poor worker in her uncle’s factory, in order
to collect data for her novel. She moves into a poor neighbourhood with her old nanny
where she meets Orhan, a truck driver, and although she is already engaged to a wealthy
young man, Belgin and Orhan soon fall in love with one another. When the uncle
realises that Belgin is involved with an ‘improper’ man, he forces her to leave the
neighbourhood and quickly arranges a wedding for her and her fiance. At the time of the
wedding, however, Belgin and Orhan’s friends from the old neighbourhood come to her
rescue and ‘kidnap’ her, taking her to a ‘happy end’ with Orhan. Similarly, in Seninle
Ölmek İstiyorum, ‘I Want to Die With You’ (Lutfi Akad, 1968), the love between a
wealthy industrialist and a poor young woman is interrupted by the ‘villain’ who is
finally killed in a car accident so as to make possible this ‘impossible’ love.
A third type of films, sometimes overlapping with the previous group, involves twists and turns in the class definitions of the characters. A poor man may be mistaken as rich; may win the lottery or inherit a huge amount of money from a distant relative and become an overnight millionaire. Alternatively, as in Fakir Gencin Romani, a family may lose all their property as a result of bankruptcy and experience downward social mobility. In Seviştğımız Günler, ‘The Times We Used to Love Each Other’ (Halit Refig, 1961), for example, a mechanic introduces himself as a rich man to three young women from the upper classes. In the film Avare Mustafa, ‘Idle Mustafa’ (Memduh Un, 1962, adapted from Orhan Kemal’s novel Devlet Kuşu, ‘Sweet Bird of Fortune’), when Mustafa marries the daughter of an industrialist, his parents and sisters experience an upward social and economic mobility along with him. But Mustafa cannot take the lifestyle of the rich and misses his former sweetheart and good old idle days. In the director’s words, the film attempts to bring forth the idea that “people cannot be
purchased, happiness cannot be obtained by money, and upward class mobility is not that easy.\textsuperscript{17}

Screenshot from Sevistigimiz Günler (‘The Times We Used to Love Each Other’), Halit Refig, 1961. The mechanic (Mahir Gunsiray), who introduced himself as a rich man, is caught by one of the young women he had seduced.

Class and Morality: Siding with the Poor

In both literary and film studies, melodrama has been said to side with the powerless as an entertainment for the working class\textsuperscript{18}: “melodrama constantly attempts to give material existence to the repressed”\textsuperscript{19} and “has been historically a major site of the political struggles for the disempowered.”\textsuperscript{20}

One of the characteristic features of melodramas in general is that they concentrate on the point of view of the victim: what makes the films mentioned above exceptional is the way they manage to present all the characters convincingly as victims. The critique – the questions of ‘evil’, of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Cited in Scognamillo, op.cit. p.286, translation ours.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Jackie Byars (1991) \textit{All that Hollywood Allows: Re-reading Gender in 1950s Melodrama}. London: Routledge, p. 17.
\end{itemize}
responsibility – is firmly placed on a social and existential level, away from the arbitrary and finally obtuse logic of private motives and individualised psychology. This is why the melodrama, at its most accomplished, seems capable of reproducing more directly than other genres the patterns of domination and exploitation existing in a given society, especially the relation between psychology, morality, and class-consciousness, by emphasising so clearly an emotional dynamic whose social correlative is a network of external forces directed oppressingly inward, and with which the characters themselves unwittingly collude to become their agents.

According to Martha Vicinus, melodrama ‘sides with the powerless’, while evil is associated with ‘social power and station’. Christine Gledhill analyses innocence and villainy in relation to each other and to the logic of capitalism:

Through such ‘moral touchstones’ the contradictions of capitalism are negotiated: the apparently powerless, who by their persevering endurance win through, defeat the logic of capitalism, for reward comes through ‘wholly noncompetitive virtues and interests’. At the same time innocence and villainy construct each other: while the villain is necessary to the production and revelation of innocence, innocence defines the boundaries of the forbidden which the villain breaks. In this way melodrama’s affective and epistemological structures were deployed, within the constraints of dominant socio-economic frameworks, to embody the forces and desires set loose by, or resisting, the drives of capitalism.

We have observed that various Turkish melodramas portray lower class, ‘voiceless’ families and individuals in terms of positive conventions and thus, from the first instant, side with them. It is true that the plot structure in most melodramas is concerned with a coherently positive portrayal of the lower classes to the extent that upper-class individuals end up with a new sensibility under their positive influence. Yet, there is more to melodramas than simply siding with the powerless: a closer look into the narratives of these films may give us a complex, multifaceted picture. In what follows, we will discuss Turkish melodramas in terms of their relation to realism/reality and ideology, and then move to an evaluation of (happy) endings as well as the ‘involvement’ and the ‘resistance’ that these films allow.

(Happy) Endings, Class Consciousness and the ‘Good Cry’

One of the major criticisms of melodrama as a genre in the 1970s addresses its embeddedness in the bourgeois ideology. In the west, melodramatic film is agreed to stem from Victorian ethics and sentimentality, and the “welfare ethic of redistribution” making use of stylistic ‘excess’ in both gestures and visual clues.

22 Gledhill, op.cit, p. 21.
23 Gledhill, op.cit, p. 13.
Moreover, among English speaking academics, especially earlier feminists, melodrama was seen as confirming white, masculine, bourgeois ideology. Recent assessments of melodrama, however, analyse it as a mix of pleasure, fantasy and ideology. While many examples of melodrama side with the poor, in some other examples, the humility and innocence of the lower classes are not ‘rewarded’ by class rise through marriage but rather by class-consciousness. From a Marxist perspective, rewarding lower classes by upward mobility would be considered ‘false consciousness’, while maintaining their class positions might invoke class consciousness.

Class consciousness is an uneasy concept to handle. According to Erik Olin Wright, there are two distinct usages of this term in the Marxist tradition. For some, it is seen as “a counterfactual or imputed characteristic of classes as collective entities”, and for others it is “a concrete attribute of human individuals as members of classes.”

The first understanding is not useful for our argument since the melodramas that we analyse deal with individuals rather than collective entities, although in some cases, individuals may be stereotypical representatives of such entities. Identifying class consciousness as a particular aspect of an individual’s subjectivity, however, seems more appropriate for various narrative structures encountered in Turkish melodramas.

In film theory, especially in the 1970s, the relation of melodrama to realism has been widely discussed. It is often argued that what is called the ‘classical (Hollywood) film’ or ‘classic realist text’ presents:

> a coherent reality in which individual identity is unified and clear, and in which characters’ actions are goal-oriented, motivating a formulaic plot pattern. The exposition lays out the situation and primary conflict, showing psychologically defined individuals striving to solve problems or attain goals; the middle drives inexorably toward an absolute truth as the protagonist struggles with other individuals or with a hostile (often social) environment; and that absolute truth (the ‘truth’ of dominant ideologies) is revealed in the plot’s logical conclusion, the happy ending achieved through individual action.

Although this argument seems plausible, the supposed realism of the films needs a much more detailed analysis. As we argued above, it is difficult to claim that classic film texts invariably reflect the ‘truth’, and the ending is the ultimate moment of tension in which protagonists finally regain their secure positions and thus reproduce the dominant ideology. As our analysis shows, neither can films simply be seen as the mirror of the ‘social reality’, nor are the endings always the site of self-fulfilment. When an analysis is limited to traditional narrative devices, it becomes much easier to make sweeping generalisations. Bordwell reports that, in one hundred randomly selected Hollywood films, over sixty end “with a display of the united romantic couple.” However, insistence on the facts of ‘narrative strategies’ or ‘plot structures’ diverts attention from ideological analysis of other filmic elements. Defining melodrama in terms of two general plot lines, for instance, characterised by clear goals – namely, overcoming the hostile environment and the formation of a heterosexual couple – would

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be reductionism. Rather, a focus on both plot structure and the political significance of Turkish melodrama assists in the analysis of the cross-class love.

In more recent feminist discussions, according to Gledhill, the melodrama is considered a feminine film genre “where film theory saw in melodrama’s exposure of masculinity’s contradictions a threat to the unity of the (patriarchal) realist/narrative text, feminists found a genre distinguished by the large space it opened to female protagonist, the domestic sphere and socially mandated ‘feminine’ concerns.” Byars criticises the Marxist writings on melodrama in the late 1970s on the grounds that they undermine the political significance of the personal, as they argue that “melodrama tends to mystify social conflict by relegating it to the realm of the personal.”

Film melodramas, pejoratively called ‘weepies’ and ‘tear jerkers,’ are trivialised by traditional modernist and masculine perspectives, and, as Shattuc maintains, feminist analysis initially failed to credit the affective power of the melodramatic text by denigrating them as products of bourgeois and patriarchal ideologies. The argument that melodrama has a distancing effect on the audience not only undermined the agency of the audience but also failed to recognise the ‘good cry’ that the melodrama evokes. This ‘good cry’, according to Shattuc, “represents the potential for the disempowered to negotiate the difficult terrain between resistance and involvement.”

Avare Mustafa, for instance, may well illustrate “the potential for the disempowered to negotiate the difficult terrain between resistance and involvement” and the utopian ‘good cry’. Endings are important moments of a film to search for the ‘good cry’ because this is where the tension is expected to resolve. By a ‘happy end’ we refer to the traditional narrative closure: ‘they got married and lived happily ever after’. The ‘unhappy end’ ranges from separation to a number of tragic events including alcoholism, madness and suicide; or just unfortunate coincidences that the couple may happen to encounter, like a traffic accident or a fatal disease. There are, of course, examples where couples from different classes do get together, but these films are fewer in number, or the couple gets together as a result of class mobility – sometimes upwards, sometimes downwards. Geoffrey Nowell-Smith claims that a ‘happy end’ is impossible for the fact that the happiness couldn’t be anything but the repression of sentiments and the excess:

The tendency of melodramas to culminate in a happy end is not unopposed. The happy end is often impossible, and, what is more, the audience knows it is impossible. Furthermore, a ‘happy end’ which takes the form of an acceptance of castration is achieved only at the cost of the repression. The laying out of the problems ‘realistically’ always allows for the generating of an excess which cannot be accomodated. The more the plots press towards a resolution the harder it is to accommodate the excess. What is characteristic of the melodrama, both in its original sense and in the modern one, is the way the excess is siphoned out. […] In the melodrama, where there is

29 Gledhill, op.cit. p. 10.
30 Byars, op.cit. p. 16.
31 op.cit.
32 ibid., p. 154.
33 Elsaesser, op.cit., p. 65.
always material which cannot be expressed in discourse or in the actions of the characters furthering the designs of the plot, a conversation can take place into the body of the text.

The traditional ‘happy ending’ suggests that the heterosexual couple gets married. But, who is this couple? When we consider cross-class melodramas, the couple is often reunited as a consequence of upward social mobility or by ‘virtue’; that is the ‘re-education’ of the upper-class member who is typically portrayed as immoral, decadent and living in ‘false-consciousness’ and who is transformed. But things are not always that clear. In a number of films, one of the protagonists breaks up with a former ‘same-class’ lover for the sake of her/his ‘cross-class’ love. Then the protagonist from a lower class does not feel at home with the life-style and values of the ‘rich’, and decides to return to her/his sweetheart. In these cases, where the ‘happy ending’ exists, the ‘necessary’ marriage does not take place between cross-class partners but same-class partners. Hence, reference to the ‘happy ending’ is not adequate to elucidate the boundaries of the plot structure. Endings, Byars has argues, “always call attention to the overlay of narrative and social coding.” The endings of melodramas, in which the lovers are thwarted, demonstrate a number of different plot structures. In Fakir Gencin Romani, in which the bourgeois female protagonist ends up in a lower class and discovering the ‘truth’, the end is not a ‘happy’ one. In Arm Balım Peteğim (Muzaffer Aslan, 1970), the lower-class female protagonist has an affair with an upper-class playboy, but is never ‘accorded’ a marriage; she is content when the man finally adopts their son, although he doesn’t (and will never) know that he is the boy’s biological father. In Yarım Kalan Saadet, ‘Interrupted Happiness’ (Türker İnanoğlu, 1970), the male protagonist, Ekrem, a rich, handsome and famous musician, meets Fatoş, a poor nurse, during a fundraising concert at a nursing home. Although they fall in love at first sight and get married immediately, one tragedy follows the other and eventually they are separated. The key point in the film is that Fatoş never believes in the possibility of this love even during their short-lived marriage.

In Conclusion

Melodrama has been a frequently used mode throughout the evolution and development of ‘Turkish Cinema’; it has consistently portrayed, albeit with debatable ‘reality,’ class relations between lovers. No matter how the class issue is handled, it is significant in itself that class difference between lovers has been a typical melodramatic mode in Turkish film; classes constitute ‘boundaries’ for love and they delay, ‘interrupt’ or inhibit happiness. Moral attributes to classes typically polarise, in Turkish melodramatic films, altruistic, sensible, well-meaning men and women of the lower classes, on the one hand, and selfish, greedy, self-indulgent, arrogant persons of the upper classes on the other. This polarisation of ‘the villain’ and ‘the victim’ resembles Marx’s conceptualisation of classes as polar entities, whether in Feudalism or Capitalism. Although the five stock characters of traditional melodrama, comprising of the hero,

35 Byars, op.cit. p. 110.
heroine, aged parent, villain and comic servant/friend, defined simply by these roles and their class status, provide representation of class stereotypes, the polarisation of the male and female protagonists is striking in these films. It is tempting to note that the ambiguous concept of class is enthusiastically employed in the equally ambiguous melodramatic mode. These observations beg questions of reality, representation and consciousness.

Issues of class difference are resolved in different ways in the eight films we have reviewed for this study: there is no one pattern, or one typical scenario, or plot, that ‘the’ Turkish melodrama allows itself into. First and foremost, the diverse endings in similar scenarios may indicate that the ‘reality’ of these films come in different forms. In films where the class differences of the two protagonists are portrayed as irreconcilable, a ‘happy end’ is not allowed. This may be interpreted as one representation of class consciousness, as ‘the characters’, in Elsaesser’s words, “collude to become [the] agents” of their respective classes. In other words, although the characters cannot always be attributed class consciousness, at least the audience is not presented with the ‘myth’ of happiness, transgressing class boundaries. Offering neither a ‘happy end’ nor a myth, these films do not conform with the melodramatic formulas. In films where the class status of the characters changes, class consciousness may take the form of ‘class nostalgia’, marked with the return of the protagonists to their ‘true’ classes. Unlike the first group of films in which a ‘sad end’ may be associated with class consciousness, in this second group, an unease with upward social mobility – that may be indicative of class consciousness – leads to a same-class ‘happy end’. In films where the ‘happy end’ is afforded by cross-class love, class consciousness may still be argued for, by means of changes in class morality – ironically, upper classes losing their class consciousness, i.e., immorality, and acquiring lower class sensibilities. Although in Marxist literature class consciousness is associated with collisions between two classes and struggle rather than alliance, in these melodramatic narratives, it is represented through either alliance or rejection of alliance in the context of cross-class love.

Audience ethnography, a strong suggestion for future research in Turkey, would reveal how these plots could be associated with class-consciousness or false consciousness by the audience, the extent of its identification with the films, and whether the ‘cry’instigated by the melodrama is a ‘good’ one or not. What if it is so hard for lovers of different classes to get together, or in cases they do, to live ‘happily ever after’? If melodrama as a modern mode is, indeed, a recognizable cultural sign that can be traced in both cinema and social organisation, there are bound to be links between the social class structure and the films that represent cultural forms of class conceptualisation among the audience. After all, ‘cross-class love’ can best be handled in ‘real life’ by means of the melodramatic mode.

36 Elsaesser, op.cit., p. 65.
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Contested and Monstrous Bodies

Torkild Thanem

Following a series of complaints against the lack of embodiment and body research in the social sciences (e.g. Turner, 1992, 1996; Leder, 1990; Shilling, 1993), the past decade has seen an exploding interest in the body, exceeding the boroughs of feminist scholarship and expanding even into the tracts of management departments and business schools (see e.g. Barry and Hazen, 1996; Hassard et al., 2000; Dale, 2001). In this respect, former complainants, some of whom (especially Turner and Shilling) have risen to a certain prominence in the social sciences, have been quite successful in overturning a sorry state of affairs. However, as a majority of this often mainstream work has emphasized ways in which bodies are organized, regulated and normalized – so as to enable, maintain and solidify what (in social constructionist terms) may be regarded a dominant social order – the excess forces of bodies ‘more than normal’ – who resist and disrupt hegemonic social patterns – have been pushed into a minor, peripheral Hintergrund. Moreover, as pointed out by some critics (e.g. Williams and Bendelow, 1998; Dale, 2001), much of this research remains disembodied, as scholars typically approach the body as a research object like any other rather than critically reflecting on it in relation to their own embodiment. Interestingly, two recent books may be seen to contradict this trend: (i) the anthology Contested Bodies (2001), edited by the cultural theorist Ruth Holliday and the organization theorist John Hassard, and (ii) the research monograph Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self (2002), written by Holliday’s Staffordshire University colleague, Margrit Shildrick. Although neither book is easily folded into the field of management and organization studies, Contested Bodies (which is dominated by cultural studies people, but includes

* The author wishes to thank the editors of ephemera for their critical and constructive comments. Of course, the views presented as well as any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.
Holliday and Hassard open *Contested Bodies* (henceforth *CB*) by pointing to two problems in body research. First, the scant visibility (in theory) of the material elements that make up the body, and second, the challenge of writing about the body: “How we write about the body, which bodies we write about, and whose body does the writing” (*CB*, 1). In my view, these problems are much related to the title of the book and what the editors highlight as the “[lacking] consensus on what the body is and what constitutes it” (Cream, cited in *ibid.*). In relation to Holliday and Hassard’s second point, the body is contested because academics work from different perspectives that fail to agree on what the body is. Questions of how to conceive and define the body are contested and depend on whose bodies do the writing and which bodies we write about.

And in relation to Holliday and Hassard’s first point, one could make the argument (which they do not explicitly do) that bodily materiality gets less attention both because the material multiplicity of bodies further contests what the body is and because some social scientists mistakenly confuse the study of bodily materiality with bodily essentialism or foundationalism. Ironically, in an attempt to warn against essentialism, they quote a conference paper by Cream (1994), who commits exactly this error. But in all due respect, they also reiterate the crucial point that those often regarded as more embodied than others (e.g. women, blacks, homosexuals and working-class people) are refused the opportunity to write about the body because “their work is seen as compromised by their very embodiment” (*CB*, 2). Indeed, it is ‘the more embodied’ who constitute the contested bodies dealt with by the contributors to this volume. The notion of ‘being more embodied than others’ is by no means unproblematic, and, drawing attention to the Cartesian organization of thought and knowledge through which healthy, white men have come to be associated with a rational mind while everybody else (especially women) have been seen primarily through their so-called irrational, abnormal bodies, Holliday and Hassard show the representational and constructed (rather than natural) basis of such claims. Bodies are not naturally given as normal or abnormal, as more or less fleshy and embodied. Rather, the (mis)understanding of embodiment in such terms is produced by the labours of (often competing) knowledge regimes, labours that in a Foucauldian sense have material effects on the bodies scrutinized, which is *not* to say, they add, that these constitute the materiality of bodies. While Holliday and Hassard deserve praise for offering more thought to the notion of materiality than most social and organizational studies of the body, this is pretty much all they say about the issue, and, claiming that conflicting discourses turn the body into a contested terrain, they remain silent about the multiplicity of pre-discursive bodily matter (e.g. desire, illness, micro-organisms, accidents) through which bodily materiality as well as discourses of embodiment are contested and destabilized. In that sense, their editorial carries a bias that is fairly representative of the twelve contributions appearing in this anthology.

The anthology is divided into three sections (‘Pariah Bodies’, ‘Bodies in Space’ and ‘Techno-Bodies’), each comprising of four chapters. On the whole, ‘Pariah Bodies’,...
deals with what the editors call ‘othered’ bodies, which frequently provoke ‘disgust and dread’. Students of organization should find much of this interesting. For example, Collier’s chapter, which disassembles the dominant view of young male offenders as masculine (and therefore as dangerous monsters), makes the point that the debate on juvenile delinquency extrapolates regimes of organization and subjects of disorganization, regulation and resistance. The problem of boy offenders is often seen in terms of vermin, disorder and disorganization and met by calls for intensified organized police efforts to restore law and order. In a different context of organization, concerned with the problem of workplace discrimination, Bhattacharyya speculates that the home and work from home may offer a way to relearn our humanity and social selves and – it seems – re-evaluate bodily materiality in ways that put more stress on flesh (which she associates with muscles, work and agency) and less on skin (which she deems superficial). Indeed, this distinction calls inside-outside boundaries into question, a theme that during the past few decades has attracted considerable interest in critical organization theory (e.g. Cooper 1986; Cooper and Burrell 1988). Focusing on the (in)stability of bodily and architectural boundaries, Eadie continues this concern in his analysis of David Cronenberg’s film *Shivers*. In this film, humans are attacked by artificially manufactured brown parasites that enter the body through any opening available. Interestingly, the human victims are all white and they all live in a private neighbourhood of posh tower blocks guarded by security personnel and located in island isolation. Drawing attention to ways in which the whiteness of buildings and bodies in the film is associated with order and hygiene, Eadie emphasizes how parasite invasion transforms previously overcivilized and desexualized white ‘victims’ into sexually promiscuous perpetrators and conspicuous consumers. Not unlike Bhattacharyya, Eadie argues that this may be seen as a bodily revolt against a repressive materiality. Mark Featherstone’s chapter stands out somewhat from the rest in this section and will therefore be addressed below.

The interest in corporeal, organizational and spatial boundaries is maintained in section two, ‘Bodies in Space’. Sally Munt questions the presumably fixed identity of the stone butcher by pointing to the desire and subjectivity that is excluded in the process of constructing a rock hard, untouchable and hermetic sense of self, sexuality and embodiment. Robyn Longhurst examines how pregnant bodies provoke dread in public places by breaking a number of corporeal boundaries (between inside and outside, self and other, one and two, mother and foetus, subject and object). Via Kristeva and Grosz, this is discussed through the notions of abjection and leakiness (e.g. waters breaking, vomiting and saggy breasts). Leslie Moran’s chapter highlights the spatial boundaries at work in the cartographically based police surveillance of London public bathrooms. As Moran indicates, police surveillance protects the boundaries of public space to the extent that it prevents the occurrence of gay sex in these facilities. Through an account of the Bakhtinian carnivalesque, Moran also shows how the boundaries between gay perpetrators and police officers are blurred as the latter (outsiders) need to pass as the former (insiders). In order to make arrests, police officers provoke gay men to effectively break the law. In a chapter more explicitly tied to management and organization, Ruth Holliday and Graham Thompson examine how boundaries between work and play, the public and the private are confused in the case of the office party, which takes place inside work space but outside working hours and which, they say, often comes with much sexual, alcoholic and violent behaviour. Also, the authors argue
that this is the work event through which the embodiment of workers becomes most apparent, highlighting the clash between forces of regulation and “an always potentially intransigent and re-embodied worker” (CB, 117). Like Moran, but in a more thorough and convincing way, they turn to Bakhtin and the carnevalesque. This is complemented by a discussion of Weber on asceticism to problematize the public-private and mind-body distinctions. According to Holliday and Thompson, contemporary working life is characterized by a combination of the carnevalesque and asceticism in a ‘work hard-play hard’ work ethic that typically privileges straight, white men; office parties retain strong misogynist aspects that both commodify women and enable straight men to define themselves as the ‘natural’ opposite of the ‘unnatural’ homosexual body.

Allocating chapters to sections is often an arbitrary but no less difficult process. This is apparent in section three, ‘Techno-Bodies’, where Karen Stevenson’s opening chapter on hairstyling clearly overlaps with previous discussions of sexualized space. Both Munt and Moran examine public bathrooms as sexualized space, and Holliday and Thompson employ this trope in their investigation of the office outside working hours. Similarly, Stevenson, while acknowledging a certain prevalence of androgynous haircuts and unisex hair salons, makes a convincing description of the female hair salon as a sexually defined (if not eroticized) space. That hairstyling implies a gendered symbolism, which works to shape body and identity, also ties in with Munt’s destabilizing of butch identity, Moran’s problematizing of police officer subjectivity, and Longhurst’s discussion of maternal identity. Moreover, her treatment of black hairstyling (which often signifies strive towards whiteness) overlaps somewhat with Bhattacharyya’s discussion of race, skin and workplace discrimination and Eadie’s analysis of whiteness in Shivers. The problem of allocating chapters is perhaps more pressing with respect to Mark Featherstone’s discussion of alien mythologies in the age of US atomic bombing and space exploration, which might have fitted better into section three than section one. Central to Featherstone is Walter Benjamin’s idea that technological reproduction gives more death (without decay), more alienation and more uncanny alien monsters. Interestingly, this enables Featherstone to show how the US, after the Second World War, constructed itself not unlike the uncanny alien techno-bodies of science fiction that it claimed to prepare itself against. Again, issues of subjectivity and objectivity are radically twisted.

In some contrast to Featherstone, Stephen Whittle’s and David Bell’s chapters (which are included in section three) consider the enabling impact of cyberspace technology. Whittle discusses how cyberspace has been utilized by transsexuals and cross-dressers in community development, activism and the creation and promotion of transgendered as a new self-identification category; Bell explores the coalescence in contemporary society of the initially divergent subcultures of cyberpunk and body modification (e.g. piercing and tattooing). For both, issues of identity are at the forefront, and Whittle relates identity to power by examining the hierarchy of passing, which, dominating early transsexual activism, has led to emphasis being put on privacy rights and relationship rights rather than the right of transgendered people to be protected from violence and discrimination. This has privileged the interests of those who easily pass above the rights of those who don’t. Whittle includes a discussion of employment protection for transgendered people, which also may be promoted through cyberspace
activism, and this is an area that ought to attract the attention of future organizational research beyond mainstream studies of diversity management.

Hilary Swank as Brandon Teena in the film *Boys Don’t Cry*.

The female-to-male transsexual and transactivist Leslie Feinberg.

Lars Tatjana: The 75-year old Norwegian artist Lars Kristian Guldbrandsen who identifies as the 23-year old woman Tatjana L. K.

If only implicitly, Bell’s discussion of cyberpunk and body modification subcultures also connects with the construction and materiality of transgenderism. Whereas cyberpunk subcultures seek to leave the flesh behind and subcultures of body modification imply a nostalgic re-embodiment that nonetheless points to the body’s malleability, transgendered people may, on the one hand, feel less restricted by the biological body in cyberspace than in the ‘real’ world, yet, on the other, not find that this satisfies the desire to live as transgendered in the material world. Similarly, Bell shows that neither subcultures of cyberpunk and body modification pursue a one-sided relationship to technology. Even pierced, scarified, branded or tattooed bodies that initially seek to deny technology are caught up in technological relations. And to many (male) participants in cybersex chat-rooms it is the real bodies and genders of fellow participants that matters.

The final chapter by John O’Neill, which is a revision of his earlier piece in Crary and Kwinter’s (1992) almost cult anthology *Incorporations*, is perhaps the most extraordinary contribution to *Contested Bodies*. O’Neill depicts the trajectories of aid and Aids through the exchange of milk and blood: Western countries exporting – in colonialist fashion – bottled baby milk that spreads disease in developing countries, and the gift of blood that turns developing countries into Societies with Aids. Both ‘gifts’ pose a *horror autotoxicus*, a “catastrophe of lethal fluids” that “deals death rather than
life to its trusting recipients” (CB, 182). O’Neill provides a thought-provoking and seductive account of the unintended consequences of medical technology, but despite his efforts to revise the argument one hopes that relationships merely touched upon here will be examined more systematically elsewhere.

Overall, *Contested Bodies* has all the good intentions of addressing the construction and experience of ‘othered’ bodies that often disrupt boundaries of organization, and many of the topics discussed should interest organizational researchers and other social scientists concerned with the body. Some of the ideas and arguments proposed are quite intriguing, but as they are presented within the boundaries of rather short contributions they could have been highly improved had they been developed in greater depth and length. While length is never a guarantee for theoretical scrutiny or sophistication, lengthier chapters may have been able to offer more in-depth, critical and theorized analyses. Anyway, it is problematic that some of the concepts employed (e.g. space) by various contributors appear thrown in rather than critically analyzed. For example, Collier’s references to ontology, the social and otherness are superficial and contribute little to the argument as such, and Bell’s chapter does not provide a critical analysis of the hype-terminology used by the cyberpunk subculture itself and its academic commentators. Although some will find Bhattacharyya’s personal, narrative prose attractive, the shortage of scholarly references and discussion is glaring. Featherstone’s introductory account of Freudian metaphysics and Eadie’s otherwise convincing and well-written reading of *Shivers* are overly descriptive. Indeed, Eadie’s chapter may have been more obviously relevant to students of management and organization had its conceptual analysis of boundaries been developed in more detail. A similar objection could be made against Whittle’s chapter, which is highly atheoretical. However, potential readers, who undoubtedly will benefit from Whittle’s inside knowledge of the transgender community, should be more wary of out-of-date factual details.

Deficient theoretical scrutiny is perhaps a more relevant critique of Munt’s and Stevenson’s chapters. Further theorization may have helped Stevenson avoid the conclusion that female dominance of high consumption “marks the important (re)entry of women into the previously male-dominated public sphere” (CB, 149). This is problematic, not least because female dominance of high consumption can hardly be seen to have empowered women and because the public sphere ought to include more than undeniably private department stores and shopping malls. Similarly, more care by Munt would have, perhaps, avoided reducing the disabled public bathroom to a desexualized space; as a butch lesbian, she finds the ‘ladies’ a sexualized space that she is uncomfortable using. Yet, by admitting to prefer the ‘disabled’, she desexualizes not only this space but also the people it is primarily designed to cater for. Most problematic is the shortage of theorization in Longhurst’s chapter. Particularly, Longhurst tends to jump to conclusions rather than thoroughly examine the implications of interviewee responses or carefully explaining the use of complex terminology. Even if I tend to agree with Longhurst’s argument, this is – in scholarly terms – a weakness. The chapter is highly descriptive and would have had so much more to offer had it theorized the many themes of boundary transgression that Longhurst actually identifies and that are

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1 It is a pity that several details have not been updated since this research was presented at a Keele workshop some years ago (see Whittle, 1996).
worthy of investigation in their own right. This may also have helped Longhurst avoid or at least problematize the simultaneous rejection and use of dualisms and the dubious argument that pregnant women effectively resist by withdrawing from public space. Fortunately, Holliday and Thompson’s chapter and Holliday and Hassard’s editorial do a much better job on a theoretical level. In addition to offer discussions of obvious relevance to management and organization studies, they demonstrate a good sense of scholarly rigour.

Shildrick’s *Embodying the Monster (EM)* continues the emphasis on bodily otherness and the problematization of bodily boundaries and identity by examining historical and contemporary responses to bodies deemed monstrous in medicine, theology, science and everyday culture and by rethinking monstrous embodiment along feminist and post-structuralist lines of thought. While the monstrous keeps provoking fascination as well as dread, attempts to exclude it from discourses of normality and realize an invulnerable, autonomous and stable human self are futile, according Shildrick. The human self is vulnerable in itself, and it is vulnerable to the monstrous through the monsters surrounding us and the monsters that live inside of us. Since monsters are uncontainable and unknowable, their exclusion beyond the necessarily precarious boundaries of the self is also impossible. Following discussions of hybrid creatures, maternal imagination, malformed babies, and the monstrosity of motherhood (the symbiotic or parasite relationship between mother and foetus) in chapters one to three, Shildrick examines the paradigm of contagious monstrosity in chapter four (‘Contagious Encounters and the Ethics of Risk’), which culminated with the genocides of the Second World War. Under the belief that unusual physiognomy, chronic illness and disability are contagious, societies have isolated or even exterminated people with such conditions. Shildrick shows particular interest in the construction of disability as inherently vulnerable, helpless and monstrous, but via Freud, Lacan, Kristeva and Derrida she re-emphasizes the vulnerable nature of human subjectivity and the fear of monsters that haunt us by stirring recognition within: disease, disability, bodily fluids, etc.

The conjoined twins Maria Teresa and Maria de Jesus Quiej-Alvarez.

Disabled Children Skiing: These children were born without developed arms due to the drug thalidomide, which was given to their mothers during pregnancy.
In chapter five, this leads her to explore the vulnerable becoming of the human subject through a fairly detailed but critical reading of Levinas’ Self-Other relation. Here Shildrick makes the assumption that ontology (and becoming) – which is always relational – is also “always intrinsically ethical” \textit{(EM, 88)}. It is what Levinas calls pre-ontological face-to-face encounters with the Other that places human subjects in a situation of vulnerability \textit{and} self-consciousness and freedom, which necessitates response and responsibility. The uniqueness of the face (your own and that of the Other) requires us to recognize the uniqueness of and take responsibility for the Other. According to Levinas, this gift of responsibility is non-reciprocal (expectations of return would imply a post-ethical economy of exchange), but, like Derrida and Irigaray, Shildrick finds this untenable. She also finds his neglect of sexual difference, the feminine, the body and relations between others highly problematic, but this does not inhibit her from taking on board the fundamentals of the Levinasian Self-Other encounter as a way to theorize vulnerability and \textit{mutual} self-other becoming. The self-other relationship is then taken further in chapter six, where, by critically engaging with the ideas of Irigaray and Merleau-Ponty in particular, Shildrick views the ‘touch’ as something that disrupts the distinction between the self and the other and makes us “come face to face with our [monstrous] other selves” \textit{(EM, 107)}. Interestingly, this may be seen as a nod towards Levinas’ analysis of the caress,\textsuperscript{2} but Shildrick makes no explicit reference to the caress throughout. The skin is more an organ of communication than a boundary, which again reinforces the openness and vulnerability of the human body. In her final chapter, ‘Welcoming the Monstrous \textit{Arrivant}’, Shildrick insists on a positive posthumanist attitude rather than the “putative negativity of anti-humanism” \textit{(EM, 120)}. This view is developed through an endorsement of Haraway’s celebration of techno-scientific, cyborg monsters, who are seen to disrupt boundaries between humans and machines.

For Shildrick, Haraway’s work also poses an ethical message by highlighting the mixed up, impure and monstrous history of human biology. Again, monsters are not oppositional others, but part of us. Thus, she ends with a return to Derrida and his prophecy for a monstrous future where the monstrous \textit{arrivant} – who is both awaited and unexpected – can no longer be kept apart but will cast radical doubt on one’s own identity and vulnerability. The only ones who need fear this monstrous arrivant, she says, are “those who have no wish to cede the authority and power that they hold under the sign of modernism” \textit{(EM, 133)}.

Given the pejorative, degrading and violent responses to monstrous bodies across Western history, Shildrick does an important job in rethinking monstrous embodiment in positive terms. The argument that the monstrous other is and stirs recognition inside

\textsuperscript{2} I am grateful to Campbell Jones for making this suggestion.
of us is an effective way to humanize the monstrous and question the stability and homogeneity of human subjectivity. Shildrick’s examples from medicine, science, theology and everyday culture (historical and current) are fascinating and her theoretical discussion of some fairly complex ideas is adept and systematic. Overall, Shildrick presents a convincing and important argument that ought to be taken seriously not only by cultural studies people, but by organizational researchers and other social scientists.

This is not to say that some of her takes on things are not deeply problematic. In addition to an at times pretentious style, her explicit embracing of postmodernism – a label to which the works of scholars such as Derrida, Irigaray, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty should not be reduced – seems at odds with her pursuit of an ethics of responsibility for the monstrous other, a theme with which the same scholars may indeed be associated. It is however consistent with Shildrick’s questionable view that a monstrous borderland is a place where all distinctions are undone (EM, 126) – surely, even monstrous borderlands with disrupted borders presume borders of some sort. Further, it is quite paradoxical that chapter three (‘The Self’s Clean and Proper Body’) deals very little with issues of hygiene and cleanliness, that chapter four (‘Contagious Encounters and the Ethics of Risk’) largely ignores existing debates in the social sciences on risk (e.g. Beck 1992), and that chapter five (‘Levinas and Vulnerable Becoming’) makes almost no effort to theoretically analyze the concept of becoming. Moreover, Levinas’ anthropomorphic notion of face-to-face encounters as pre-ontological is far more problematic than Shildrick’s discussion indicates.

Throughout, Shildrick keeps referring to Elizabeth Grosz as ‘Liz Grosz’, suggesting a personal relationship to this cutting edge feminist philosopher. But nowhere does she acknowledge one of Grosz’s main sources of inspiration: Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) biophilosophy and its materialist thinking of embodiment. Perhaps this explains her attack on what she misconstrues as a version of the “Deleuzian body-without-organs”, which she argues “has too often been taken to figure a being free of the restraints of physicality” signalling “corporeal mastery” (EM, 125, 126). Ironically, it may be more fitting to describe Haraway’s cyborg – which Shildrick openly endorses – in such terms. Anyway, Shildrick’s partial reading of Grosz, which helps her steer clear of any Deleuzian (or DeleuzoGuattarian) materialism, is in line with her rejection of any pre-discursive embodiment, even though this undermines her view of monstrous embodiment as unknowable. It is therefore reason to ask whether other philosophical figures than Derrida, whose work operates primarily (though, I admit, not solely) on a disembodied, textual level, and to whom Shildrick constantly returns, would more adequately lend themselves to embodying the monster.

On the whole, Contested Bodies and Embodying the Monster provide two refreshing inputs to social science research on the body by making some first steps towards thinking embodiment beyond organization, regulation and normality. But, regardless of
other objections presented here, a fundamental problem is that neither of them goes far enough. As pointed out, *Embodying the Monster* avoids any discussion of pre-discursive materiality, but even *Contested Bodies* largely contains matters within a discursive level of analysis. Both are therefore unable to effectively address the material forces of contested or monstrous bodies that may seriously contest and ‘monstruct’ the organization of embodiment. In my view, a materialist turn is necessary if organizational research is to incorporate – but not eat, chew, swallow and excrete – the other.

**references**


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