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exhibits

*Exhibiting*
Steffen Böhm and Campbell Jones

*Translating Silence/Traversing Death*
Marie-Thérèse Abdel-Messih

*Archives and Power*
Dag Petersson

*Gilles Deleuze and the Intensification of Social Theory*
Bent Meier Sørensen

*Mobile Mutations*
Sadie Plant and Chris Land

*Frontline(s)*
Sian Sullivan
Exhibiting

Steffen Böhm and Campbell Jones

The ephemeral image of harmony in which goodness basks only emphasizes more cruelly the irreconcilability that it foolishly denies. (Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*)

Definitions

Show us your words. What do you mean? Brush away your sandstorms. They will pass. Clarity is a virtue, after all.

To exhibit: from *exhibère*, from *ex-* and *hibère* (from *habère*). Meaning? To display, to show detail, particular features, to show publicly, to show a document or piece of art in an exhibition. Also: to hold up for inspection.

Exhibit, inhabit, ex-habit, ex-*habitus*: To go out of one’s house, to take something out of one’s house, to be thrown out of one’s house, show what you’ve got in your house, open your house for visitors (and inspectors).

*Habitus*: condition, appearance, attire, character, habit.

Habit:

1. Bearing, conduct, behaviour, normal procedure.
2. The prevailing disposition or character of a person’s thoughts and feelings, mental makeup.
3. The normal practice, behavioural pattern acquired by frequent repetition, a regularity.
4. Habitude, practice, usage, custom, use: these words, which are often celebrated today (i.e. this is how we do things around here), all have in common a sense of a way of behaving that has become more or less fixed.

In Latin exhibit, to show, to demonstrate, also means *monstrare*. Latin *monstrum*: evil, monster, monstrosity (probably from *monēre*, to remind, to warn). A monster warns us of something, it reminds us, it puts into question the natural and normal order of things.
Monster: one who shows a deviation from the normal in behaviour or character, animal like, a threatening force, an engulfing power. Monstrous: strange, unnatural, abnormal, also: prodigious, prodigy, proliferation. The monster as ex-habitation; the monster exhibits something unusual, unnatural.

An exhibition is not a representation – it is not the continuous representation of the normal, the habitual, the normal practice of being. Instead it is a re-presentation of something unusual, unnatural, deviant, subversive – a monstrous mutation.

Inhabit: to dwell, reside, have possession of, to have. The state of Being, the place where Being is at home. This is why Levinas has a problem with Heidegger: because the door to his dwelling is closed, or at least too closed for his liking – his dwelling is not becoming a monstrous mutation; his house is perhaps not mobile enough. (White trash Martin, not just strolling in the Black Forest, but in a caravan park, on the road again.)

Exhibit: to demonstrate something, to show how something works (or does not work). Exhibiting as de-monstration? De-monstrating: to show how something has become monstrous, to deface a monster. Make manifest. A manifestation.

Ex-habit: to leave the house and go demonstrating; to flee from the fixity of the dwelling and become more mobile. To demonstrate is to publicly protest against the couch potato in us all, a protest that might incite a revolt that exhibits (ex-habits) all that we take for granted in our own dwelling.

Problems

We say: Don’t destroy nature! Of course we have a responsibility to respect nature and to save our habitat. But what is it that we should save? The nature of our world, the nature of our Being? How natural is nature? Is it natural the way we are, the way we do things? Is there not a need to exhibit, that is to ex-habit, to go against the way things are, the way things are practiced today, to depart from what is regarded as normality, to demonstrate against our habitus?

Maybe the responsibility to take care of our habitat, the world, the natural, does not imply the representation of ‘the natural’, the habitus, as something fixed, eternal, given. Maybe our responsibility is to question our normal habits, our normal Being. Maybe the responsibility for our habitat implies the need to invite monsters into our house, be hospitable to monsters, invite the Other to have dinner with us, or to have us for dinner. Maybe this also includes a certain cannibalism – maybe it is natural to eat (with) others – this is the invitation of the monster into our body, the invitation to change our ‘natural’ bodies.

What is our habitus today? Nature, the human, the body, freedom, democracy, organization – this is natural for us, we normally don’t question these things. To exhibit could perhaps mean to question these very habits. Exhibit is ex-habit. To exhibit democracy is to put into question the way democracy is practiced today: to question the
normal ‘goings-on’ of democracy. To exhibit organisation is to put into question the
way we organise the world today, how social organisation has become an irresponsible
exhibitionism. To exhibit means to organise an encounter between democracy and its
monstrous double.

**Evil Intensities**

The monster is evil, it is said. The one we don’t understand, the one who is different is
evil. We are scared of the monstrous Other. But today the ‘axis of evil’ spins on its axis.

Baudelaire’s evil is different: he does not keep evil at bay but invites it into the ‘here
and now’. Hence ‘flowers of evil’. Evil becomes something beautiful, something
flowery, something natural; the ‘evil’ symbol encounters its monstrous double – the
flower. Blanchot writes in *Faux Pas* about Baudelaire’s *Flowers of Evil*: “it illustrates
the nature of an inspiration that does not pretend to come from anything, to need only
itself and to reject, as impure, study and meditation on already organized and thus
conventional forms.”

Baudelaire’s flowers do not pretend to be natural, in fact they are artificial, they are
made out of evil, monstrous material, material that is not conventional, material that has
not been organised. The ‘beautiful’ flowers Baudelaire exhibits are not from this world,
they are dead, undead. Vampires are intense, they are intensive suckers – they exhibit;
that is, they ex-habit beauty, they suck blood out of the beautiful profanity of Being. So
let us exhibit… Baudelaire.

You invaded my sorrowful heart
Like the sudden stroke of a blade;
Bold as a lunatic troupe
Of demons in drunken parade,

You in my mortified soul
Made your bed and your domain;
– Abhorrence, to whom I am bound
As the convict is to the chain,

As the drunkard is to the jug,
As the gambler to the game,
As to the vermin the corpse,
– I damn you, out of my shame!

And I prayed to the eager sword
To win my deliverance,
And have asked the perfidious vial
To redeem my cowardice.

Alas! the vial and the sword
Disdainfully said to me;
‘Your are not worthy to lift
From your wretched slavery,
Exhibits

You fool! – if from her command
Our efforts delivered you forth,
Your kisses would waken again
Your vampire lover’s corpse!’

Charles Baudelaire, ‘The Vampire’ in *Flowers of Evil*

Encounters

To exhibit, to write, to present or demonstrate something, is to bring about a certain death. It invites evil to one’s table. The writer as monster. To write is to suck blood out of that which we regard as natural and turn it into a mortified flower of evil. To exhibit something implies perhaps a certain monstrous friendship between the writer and evil: the writer invites the monster into the house – to make it ex-habitable, to turn it upside down, to change everything that has got its normal place, to ‘translate’ beauty into evilness. A writer can therefore never be alone. One cannot write for oneself. There is always the double of the writer’s self: the monstrous Other. The use of language is an invitation to evil to come into one’s house to destroy it. Language as an ex-hibition, that is, an ex-habitation.

When one says ‘I am alone in this world, I am the superpower, I can do whatever I like, I do not want to listen to anybody’ – then one does not only speak to one’s self but also to the Other. One could speculate: does the total disregard of the Other really keep evil at bay; is this disregard not a denial of the Other, a denial that is another face of evil?

War has begun. Death. Killing. But this is not an encounter with the Other. It is the denial of the Other. By both? It is the wrong step. The wrong no. *Le faux pas.* (We are mourning.) Where does humanity end and monstrosity begin?

Can we put this aside today and proceed with business as usual? Let us protest; that is, let us exhibit, but let us not forget the hegemony of economic organization. The other day the *Birmingham Post* ran a story with the title ‘First Casualty of War will be Tourism’. Without a hint of irony, the journalist John Cranage concluded that “Airlines and the tourism industry are likely to be the chief economic casualties of the looming war with Iraq, according to experts in the sector” (18 March 2003). The rush is on, then, to find out how the economy will fare in the face of this new threat. If we used to balance economics with human life, we might join Mr. Cranage and start counting the pain and injury that is clearly being felt by banknotes and gold reserves throughout the civilized world. Elsewhere, hang ‘em high.

Out

What is the wealth of our collections? Counting barrels of oil, counting (on) our ‘friends’ or allies, counting the war material in our archives? Perhaps these archives do not need to be counted but exhibited; that is, ex-habited, de-normalised, turned into the monsters that they are. The intended ‘life’ of the normal archive needs to be killed and turned into material that cannot simply be counted; its normal Being, its accounting
standard, need to be subjected to bombing raids. It is not our task to count life – our achievements, monuments, moral standards – as if life is an archive that provides all the answers for our Being. Exhibiting life means to destruct Being: excavate lost material, search for forgotten traces, encounter the dead. Such exhibition defies any ‘normal’ language, a house of symbols. Such exhibition is an ex-habitation, a destruction of the house that we call our archival home, our bunker, our cave, which artificially protects us from the ‘evil’ outside.

To exhibit an archive does not mean to count its contents, or to say something profound about it, but to show its material and make use of it (Benjamin). To show is to quote: to make use of quotations. To write does not mean to ‘make sense’ and ‘say’ something – would this not simply refer to our habits, the house of our common language? To write is to exhibit, to show and quote text, which is to be thought as the destruction of text: the tearing of passages of text out of their original context – the context is separated from the text. This is the death of the text as context, as homogeneous and organised archive. The archive’s Being becomes something different – a collection of unorganised material, constantly mutating to become something else.

Is it not our task to exhibit the archive of Organization Studies in the same way? Is it not our task to quote, instead of endlessly rehearsing a language that only seems to defend an archive of established symbols? Benjamin says in One-Way Street: “Quotations in my work are like wayside robbers who leap out, armed, and relieve the idle stroller of his conviction.” For him this killing of the text is the only way to redeem it, to save it from the linearity of ‘common sense’ history and make it available, as fragment, as dead material, to a project of re-reading time. In this sense one cannot say something about an author’s work, one can only pass through the fragments of someone’s text; one can only mention things in passing, as there is nothing essential or original to be uncovered about an author or a body of texts. One usually says: his body (perhaps Blanchot’s) might be dead but his texts will live forever. This is how historicity works. One tries to fix an event, a singularity, and save it for eternity. This is how we usually read. But to save history does not mean to preserve it; instead it implies the killing of an author’s work – to mortify its ‘reception’, to divide its body.

Mobile Divisions

This all calls up the prospects of separation, of division. Thinking, seeing, writing – this all implicates what Rolland Munro calls a ‘labour of division’. Such a phrase unsettles divisions in its very statement. In its exhibition, it remarks. Coming out of the house shows something about the state of dwelling within the divided house. This operates a critical function in two directions. First, through exposing the work that is done to construct the divisions that are already in place. Second, drawing us to the task of redividing, setting out the prospects for new divisions. Let us not think that a world without divisions would be possible. This is the dream of absolute integration that we also know as totalitarianism. But the critical task remains, which is one of staging a (re)division.
We are probably some way into the task of redividing Organization Studies. Its previous decisions laid out on the (kitchen) table; it is now Organization Studies that is ‘under the knife’ (cf. Karen Dale). These divisions are our problem, then, even if we know that divisionalisation is inescapable.

Let’s cut ourselves up then. In the past we had made a distinction between three genres of writing: *articles* (that perform scholarly arguments), *notes from the field* (that show what is ‘happening’ in various spaces of organization) and *reviews* (that summarize and scrutinize individual, or at best a group of, books or films). Let’s make a minor gesture, which is one of calling into question these divisions, even if we do this only momentarily in order to show what they conceal.

Could we imagine an argument that would scrutinize both the organized world and the organization of our discourses about it? Such would be neither empirical nor theoretical (as these terms are conventionally understood), neither comprehensive nor focused on a single source. Each of the exhibits that we have assembled in this issue might go somewhat toward showing how this might be possible. If it is. But this task does not imply an innocent dreaming (perhaps in the warmth of one’s bed). Instead it involves a doing, a taking out of the house. A demonstrating. A showing. A laying out of one’s hand. An ‘exhibiting’.
Translating Silence/Traversing Death

Marie-Thérèse Abdel-Messih

abstract

The Fayoum portraits, Egyptian icons from the Greco-Roman period, contest binary positions in viewing images from the past. Their execution had an aesthetic and ritual purpose, a paradoxical nature synchronizing sacred and profane, figurative and non-figurative languages, marking an intermarriage between Egyptian and Greek. Through excavation, the portraits have been ripped off their historical context, and thus silenced by colonial imperial powers and by reductive nationalistic claims founded on a politics of exclusion. Conversely, the portraits represent a site of multiple transformations in an early East/West cultural context tolerant of otherness. They signal the first move towards the representation of the plural/singular in the Egyptian visual language and raise questions pertaining to the One and the All. The translation of the layers of meaning embedded in the portraits engages us in crossing and re-crossing previously set demarcations dividing temporalities, historical locations and disciplines. As such, the translation of the silenced voices, becomes a postcolonial intervention in the established cultural and political systems. In addition, reading the portraits through a postcolonial translation is an intermediary strategy opening up a dialogue between different worlds. Such an activity becomes a re-enactment of the ancient’s attempt to traverse death, or non-existence, the purpose for which the portraits were originally executed, albeit death is now practiced under different modes of subjugation or exclusion. It may also reactivate an East/West dialogue, that would act as a stimulant for re-thinking standardized organizational activity set on an imperial construction of the world.

Introduction

The national and international image of Egypt is always ‘past’ without present, silenced pasts and a de-voiced present. Its multiple pasts have encouraged archaeologists, anthropologists, art historians, and philosophers, at home and abroad to lay authoritative claims on its visual and literary texts. Their attempts resulted in strict classifications, and misreading continuities and discontinuities, misrepresenting Egypt’s cultural identity, which has already suffered from the politics of exclusion, along a history of subjectification by different repressive powers. Although the histories of Egyptology, Greco-Roman studies, Coptology and Islamic art should be studied in continuum, they have always been considered as separate disciplines. Until this day, Greco-Roman and Coptic eras are not given much interest, and most Europeans do not acknowledge the

* The author would like to thank the editors of ephemera and two anonymous reviewers for an enriching discussion of an earlier draft of this paper.
Greco-Roman debt to ancient Egypt. The glorification of the Pharaonic era was part of the imperial politics to slight Muslims and Christian Copts, explicitly or implicitly denying modern Egypt’s relations to its pasts. In a Western imagination implemented by nineteenth century Egyptology, Egypt is a glorious past divorced from a degenerate present, an image lately fostered by the Egyptomania pervading the West. In response, nativist religious revivalism motivated by a politics of exclusion has developed to counter the image constructed by the West.

Furthermore, the reformist nationalist response to the colonial misrepresentations has also marginalised large sectors under the pretext of forming a unified national identity. The reformist claims are based on a transcendental history and determinate concepts of reality, to foster their power through knowledge. The alternative, in such a case, is to deconstruct a ‘reality’ constructed by Western liberalism, or nationalist essentialism through a postcolonial translation. The translator’s choice is determined by a historical crisis in the present, ensuing from rupture with the past, that may be mitigated through a translation process negotiating difference. In this paper I attempt a postcolonial translation of the Fayoum portraits (1st–5th century CE), Egyptian icons from the Greco-Roman period, executed at a transitional period in Egypt’s history, and therefore, subject to misreadings de-voicing them. The fact that these portraits were executed in anticipation of death may explain their silence. They are representations of silence and translating them may help in forming links with other realms, or traversing death. In this respect, my practice will be speculative and interventionist as it will attempt the


2 Homi Bhabha has pointed that “all forms of cultural meaning are open to translation” because they resist totalization. Homi Bhabha (ed.) (1990) ‘DissemiNation: time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation’, Nation and Narration. London: Routledge, p.314. Therefore, the term is used here in the sense of transportation between cultures, a metaphor to postcolonial writing, a writing of relocation. Maria Tymozco (1999) ‘Postcolonial writing and literary translation’, Post-Colonial Translation: Theory and Practice (eds.) Susan Bassnett & Harish Trivedi. London: Routledge, p.19-20. The ‘post’ in ‘postcolonial’ is not restricted to the temporal sense ‘after’, implying the end of colonialism. It has become a heterogeneous term of interdisciplinarity approach, that can be applied in a wide range of ‘colonial’ situations, since ‘colonialism’ is not only a foreign hegemony, but can be duplicated within the nation. Postcolonialism refers to an oppositional position, a resistance against colonising discourses by imperial powers and by nationalistic forces who have once struggled for decolonisation but have become sources of oppression after taking power. It generally refers to a structure of inequity, but is variable depending on the historical and geographical situation. Diasporic or displaced individuals or communities, living in-between two cultures, are also said to be living a postcolonial condition. This also applies to writers or creators from previously colonised nations, living in exile, mediating two cultures, and resisting both to find alternatives for established systems. For a detailed description of the postcolonial see, Ania Loomba (1998) Colonialism/Postcolonialism. London: Routledge, pp. 7-19.
As such, a postcolonial translation of the portraits may start new practices in reading tradition away from a conformist view, in order to locate it in a broader cultural context that safeguards it against death by a politics of exclusion.

The emerging interest recently taken in the Fayoum portraits in Egypt and worldwide urges us to reconsider methods of viewing images from the past, to reassess the historical location of Egypt, as a site of intervention, past and present. Historically and stylistically the portraits belong to a period of transition between the Pharaonic masque and the highly stylised Coptic icon. In the ritual context, the portraits express the religious syncretism prevalent in an open society whose natives intermarried with immigrants from east and west. There were different forms of exchange and superimposition between the Egyptian, Greek and Asiatic cults. The portraits challenge essentialist notions of identity as they hold a strategic position in a changing world. They are a translation of identity ‘under erasure’, a condition defined by Stuart Hall as questioning the key concepts about identity, not by replacing them by another closed definition, but by rethinking identity as operating in a different paradigm. The portraits are artefacts marking the interval between the reversal of the traditional Egyptian and the emergence of the new. They deconstruct the idea of a stable Egyptian identity recurring throughout a changing history, by representing a process of becoming, merging elements from multiple cultures.

The portraits like the texts dating from late Antiquity and Greek times are produced in a cultural milieu where elements from Egyptian theology, Stoicism, Neoplatonism and Asiatic learning overlap in verbal representations, as evident in the Corpus Hermeticum. The portraits excavated in Fayoum, are the first visual representations of the plural singular/individual in the history of Egyptian art, and raise questions around the One and All, a discourse that re-emerged in Western thought intermittently until the nineteenth century, under different ‘isms’. The translation of the layers of meaning embedded in the visual language of the portraits dislocates them from their ritual context, to relocate them in the profane world. Being dead and alive, and belonging to the past and the present, they are representations that go beyond representation. The translation of their visual context should proceed through a chain of transformations,

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4 *Fayoum Portraits Exhibition* (1999), Mohammad Mahmoud Said Museum, Giza, Cairo.


engaging us in crossing and re-crossing previously set demarcations, dividing temporalities, historical locations and disciplines.

The silent/silenced portraits communicate through in/visible language that calls for translation. Translation practised in this context differs from the traditional method used since the Renaissance, that considers translation as a transfer between linguistic texts. It is now agreed upon that translation as an activity mediating two code systems is not restricted to the linguistic level. This view stands against George Steiner’s who defines and characterises translation as,

*Intensely focused penetration, the establishment of mutual identity through confirmation, the heightening of a work’s existence when it is confronted and re-enacted by alternate versions of itself – these are the structural features of translation proper.*

Conversely, translation should move beyond the dichotomy source/target in order to find a third dimension where original and translation become donors and receivers.

The portraits are sites of competing languages that call for a postcolonial translation. The translator should move amidst different language codes to make imaginative connections between separate worlds, in changing temporalities. Although the Fayoum portraits represent a traumatic situation in the past, they bear close relations to the present and need to be reread by natives and non-natives alike. In so far as the portraits represent the process of multiple transformations in an early East West cultural contact, their translation may set sign posts helping in the formation of a global language – at present – where diverse systems merge in the national and international arena. As the local vernacular of the postcolonial world continues de-voiced, it remains subjected to the master language of the coloniser, and equality between centre and periphery will only be achieved through a dialogue based on a proper understanding or translation of the other. In that context, a postcolonial translation of the portraits’ in/visible language is an intervention in cultural and political systems, and in history.

‘Egyreek’ Creations

The Fayoum portraits, Greco-Egyptian artifacts of Roman times are not icons of worship, but still retain their hold on us as viewers. During the reign of Tiberius (14-37 CE), the three dimensional Egyptian funeral mask was replaced by painted portraits fitted on to the mummies. This came along with other aspects of intermingling Greek

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and Egyptian religions. As signs of the intermarriage between Egyptian and Greek art there is something in them beyond mimetic representations of the dead. By doubling the funerary art of Egypt and Greece they interrupt both traditions: the Egyptian abstract tradition and the mimetic, taking after the Alexandrian school based on Apelles’ naturalistic tradition. They are ‘Egreek’ creations that egyptianised the Greek and grecised the Egyptian. Arch-shaped gilt stucco frames forming garlands interrupted the illusion of depth. Unlike the Roman imperial portraits, the Egyptian portraits concentrated on the face. The Pompian portrait is a social representation addressed to a social group. The Fayoum portraits are surrogates to people living, or remembered alive, and who appear to exchange glances with the living, because in some way they are still alive. Their large eyes inspired by an Egyptian iconography replete with eyes – the eyes being the windows of the soul – adapted maximum expressiveness in minimal space. The alternation of their silent eyes between the fixed gaze and the silent glances has incited many to speak.

By being ripped off their mummies, the context of death, these portraits have not lost their aura, nor has their gaze lost its energy. Conversely, they have pluralised, since their reading needs a constant temporal and spatial movement. These portraits do not simply bridge the gap between two traditions, but also engage in past and present temporalities. They act as points of junction and disjunction; by doubling two traditions they rupture both. As such, visualising the portraits needs going beyond the mimetic or symbolic interpretation; they are aesthetic and non-aesthetic. The mimetic Greco-Roman tradition suggests a backward movement since it refers to a past temporality, a farewell, and a closure. The Egyptian funerary iconography refers to an inevitable rupture with the past, its abstract style a sign of non-closure, a passage to the beyond. As we read traces of Greek, in the portraits, the Egyptian is erased, and as we preserve the Egyptian, the Greek is transgressed. The translation of the portraits should be quadrupled because of the paradoxical nature of their visuality. They are Greco-Roman and Egyptian; they belong to the past and the present. Although they are meant to have a performative function in the ritual context, we are also interested in their extra-contextual performance at present.

Now that the portraits are desacralised, secularised, by being excavated from the underworld, there are several possibilities of translating them. Visualising them needs a constant shift from the figurative/visible to non-figurative/invisible dimension within two cultures, along past and present temporalities. The backward forward movement pluralises the portraits, negotiating otherness by transgressing its fixation. They give room for the boundless experience of difference, and as such, their representation of death problematises their historical meaning, and our East/West historical location. A re-translation of the Fayoum portraits may re-evaluate the long held idea of the incompatibility of Egyptian and Greek/East and West.
Reading the Hieroglyph/Translating the Portrait

With Walter Benjamin’s postulation that: “(e)very expression of human mental life can be understood as a kind of language,” divisions between verbal and non-verbal language have been eclipsed by major questions waged by the indeterminacy of the visible and invisible. The translation of the hieroglyph or the portraits follows this approach. The hieroglyph, the Egyptian script, as visual/verbal representation cannot be expressed in any fixed sequence of words, and the message it bears, may only be reproduced via a process of enactment. Although the portraits are considered a rupture in Egyptian iconography, they bear several characteristics suturing the abstract and the mimetic.

However, at the time the portraits were executed, the hieroglyph, the script adapted for the requirements of a harmonious culture were in decline with the conquest of the last pharaohs who harmoniously combined political and religious power. Henceforth, the hieroglyph became the secret language of the priests, the custodians of a cultic tradition practised by an oppressed populace. The sacerdotal monopoly of the hieroglyph is held responsible for its decline. By making the script more intricate, the priests were practising a politics of exclusion safeguarding the hieroglyph against foreign invasion, while sustaining the myth of their professionalism, reinforcing their power among the practitioners of the old beliefs, the majority of the oppressed population (Iversen, 1993: 24). The transformations made in the hieroglyph bred false conceptions of its symbolic significance, attributing it to an obsolete tradition, stultifying its dynamic cultural role. Consequently, its reception in the Greek philosophic circles induced recurrent debates. Through Plotinus (204-270 CE) hieroglyphic studies were enmeshed with Neo-Platonism until the eighteenth century (Iversen, 1993: 45; Bernal, 1987: 163). Hieroglyphs were used by the Neo-Platonists to explain the allegorical nature of things, as they illustrated the relation between sign and meaning. This generated the notion of a symbolic system of writing expressing the abstract by means of concrete images or material objects (Iversen, 1993: 49). Eventually, the predominance of alphabetical writing set demarcations between word and image for several centuries. Mitchell propounds that the word/image divide only reflects the Western divide between spirit and body.

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14 I borrow ‘suture’ from Mitchell, who takes it after Lacan’s definition of the term as the “junction of the imaginary and the symbolic”, the process by which the subject (the ‘I’) is constituted both as a division and a unity. W.J.T. Mitchell (1994) Picture Theory Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 91-92.
Lately, with the deconstruction of the logos prevailing in Western thought since post-Platonic times, the hieroglyph has been re-evaluated by several thinkers, Jacques Derrida, Roger Cardinal, Martin Bernal, and Mario Perniola, among others. In his writings, Derrida praises the Egyptian hieroglyph on account that it is a form of writing, a muteness that replaces speech, in order to recapture presence, when speech threatens life (Derrida, 1974: 236). Derrida adds that as a design, the hieroglyph is closer to writing, not only because it traces a movement, but also because, “the signifier first signifies a signifier, and not the thing itself or a directly presented signified” (Derrida, 1974: 237). In my view, the pictorial turn from the hieroglyph to the portrait should be visualised as a sort of “picto-hieroglyph” (Derrida, 1974: 239) to expand on Derrida’s term in a different context, or a suturing of the image/word divide.

Perhaps the Fayoum portraits, in some sense, mark a Renaissance of the hieroglyph, at a time when sacerdotal fanaticism reduced the hieroglyph to the condition of the ‘logos’. The portraits have filled a gap the newly acquired alphabetical language has created, by its linearity, by its effacement of the visual incorporated in the hieroglyph. In the former times, the hieroglyphs transmitted the solemn proclamations of royalty to gods and men. As pictorial representations representing sacred, royal or mundane inscriptions they have acted as artistic representations following the Egyptian artistic canon with its tendency to abstraction, a style suited to represent the invisible divine. Hieroglyphs were called the “the writing of the divine word” (Daniels & Wright, 1996) and the Greeks called them ‘sacred letters’ (Iversen, 1993: 26; Daniels & Bright, 1996: 73). The visual language of the Fayoum portraits supplements the hieroglyph by representing the visible and invisible.

Accordingly, the Fayoum portraits often classified as mimetic need to be visualised from a different optics. Mimetic art tries to bridge the gap between reality and visual language, so that the most realistic portrait would be the most mimetically definitive, such that mimetic representation would stand for a pre-given reality. In a certain sense, the myth that mimetic representation is true to life claims a fixed mode of viewing that controls the future visuality. However, Derrida has already deconstructed the idea of a transparent reality, a transcendental signified available by representation, on account that the prefix ‘re’ does not mark a repetition, but refers to a presence that can “become-present”. As representations of the dead the Fayoum portraits are positioned in-between the definite mimetic and the indefinite hieroglyphic language. They simultaneously valorise the visible object while being aware of its indefinite essence. As such, they do not control future visuality by duplicity, by mere repetition, but render


18 Communication studies have proved that rational knowledge progresses through “a systematic shuttling between intuition and rationalization…according to the heuristic value of one method vis-à-vis the other” (Gagliardi, 1999: 323).

19 For the development of script in Egypt see (Daniels & Bright, 1996: pp. 73-78).

present what is absent, thus questioning the relationship between nature – the physical/metaphysical environment – and human existence.

Determinate concepts of representation assume a source/target definite translatability that has already been deconstructed. Derrida has interrogated the concept of inter/intra-linguistic/semiotic translation by relating it to representation, or the desire for a “representative content (that) would keep its inviolable identity”, despite the diversity of the uses of the same word…or context” (Derrida, 1982: 303). Likewise, a postcolonial translation does not seek to attribute a fixed identity or determinate meaning to the portraits, but to dislocate them from the world of the dead to re-cite/site them in the present, in order to further the understanding of the trauma in local/global relations. It is a translation that reads against colonial and essentialist signifying systems, in order to address ambivalence and difference in global/local discourses, a translation that becomes a practice of resistance. To translate the portraits away from an imperial/essentialist discourse dividing between sacred and profane, is to see them in their own context, while crossing beyond a confirmist reading of tradition, thus overpowering essentialist discourses.

Therefore, understanding the language of the portraits also needs a concept of translation founded on what Benjamin propounds as a “continuum of transformations” (Benjamin, 1978: 325) that can trace the “material community of things in their communication” (Benjamin, 1978: 330). For a proper reading of the portraits, they are to be visualised as points of accordance and discordance with the hieroglyph, before its decline. The hieroglyph proper bears semiotic elements, representing the world as an indivisible whole. Free from any message, it is the language of the secret knowledge, engaging the reader in reading what has never been written. Similarly, the portraits function in a double sense: as images that can be translated into communicable language; as well as images of “a non-sensuous similarity” that unfold mental meanings (Benjamin, 1978: 335), incommunicable in verbal language.

The portraits are not confined to the static aspect of the mimetic, but become a site for writing with a space for mobility. The viewer who enters the site of the image engages in the dialectic of the inexpressible expressed. This dialectic process re-enacts the act of representation and the generation of meaning in the image. In Derrida’s terms it becomes “a supplementary return toward a greater naturalness” (Derrida, 1974: 239) whose muteness brings it closer to death. The hieroglyph and the portraits are events, flowing over the borders of their limits, anticipating the after-life, and awaiting an encounter with death, inscribed in images.

Traces and Remains/Recollection and Repetition

The excavation of the solemn parade of portraits in the Fayoum district brings traces of the fable of eternal life inscribed in images of death. Fayoum is the historical location

where the portraits were executed and preserved. The mummies to which the portraits were attached were kept at home with their families for a generation or two until they passed out of memory. They were eventually sent to the cemetery when their memory ceased to have ties among the living. Still, the excavation and exhibition of the portraits in the present transforms them into a site of re-enactment that transgresses death as closure.

When buried, the portraits become mere figures of repetition, remains of the past. After being placed in the cemetery, the portraits are separated from their temporal environment, and their excavation augments their dislocation. As traces/images from the past, the act of seeing them is inscribed in recollection. Thus the figure of repetition escapes sameness or identification to become a point of departure. “Seeing the image, presupposes a distance, a separation that becomes an encounter.” The portraits intrigue us urging us to draw back only to recollect the remains of the past, which have left their traces in the present. Such an act of recollection resists the museufication of the portraits that would bring them to a standstill, as a mere act of repetition. Conversely, their excavation becomes an event mobilising a resistance to previous concepts of selfhood and history. The importance does not lie in the portraits or what they stand for but in their potential for translation.

The portraits represent those awaiting the unveiled secret and therefore abide in silence. They “touch the limits of truth”, as Derrida would have it. The portraits become a “hieroglyph of a biography,” an “allegory of the subject,” for they hold a past life, an existence and at the moment of being painted they become “a fugitive crossing the line, all lines.” in that sense, they are present and absent.

The absence/presence paradox has already been embedded in the mummies to which the portraits were attached. The mimetic features in the portraits simulate the presence of an absent, and mark the growing importance to the function of absence. The memory of the distant or dead conjures the image and places a great value on it. Absence raises the possibility for the portrait, that becomes the sign of an unspoken word, the silence of a voice. The Egyptians gave less concern to memory since death was an anticipation, a sojourn to the future; it, therefore, brought peace and resignation. For the Greeks, death meant residing in the darkness of Hades. The portraits mediate both concepts, at the point where the Egyptian vision of death picks up the thread that – out of despair – has already slipped off the Greek’s hands.

The Portraits as In-Between Location

The portraits occupy an in-between location, mediating Egypt and Greece, past and present, life and death. The in-between condition is represented in a three-figure shroud portraying the deceased, dressed in a Greek white tunic standing in a Greek posture, his weight on one foot signifying a forward step to the other world. While Osiris’s mummy is represented in a frontal position, on the figure’s left, Anubis receives him from a side posture, on the right. The three figures stand in a boat; that has landed at the threshold of a new world, marking the end/beginning of his journey.

The shroud represents the Greek secular world within a sacred Egyptian context, a chain linking existent and non-existent/visible and invisible. As such it fosters the silent language of the hieroglyph often abstracting what is beyond representation. The Egyptian gods are never visible to the living, and therefore represented in animal form, a sign of their difference; the animal form represents the visible part of the invisible. The unity of separate entities in the realm of the existent in Egyptian belief involves a duality. Egypt is the two lands, or ‘Upper and Lower Egypt’, and in the Moscow shroud, previously referred to, Osiris wears the crowns of both sites. In Egyptian

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ontology the nonexistent/invisible is not simply transformed into the existent/visible, and thus erased; both coexist together. By analogy, death and life, sun and moon, day and night co-exist, an expanse which makes it possible for Egypt and Greece to co-exist as well. The deceased is participating in the death ritual, while the viewer who exchanges asymmetrical glances with the deceased is also at the frontier, where in the act of re-reading the shroud, he translates the encounters between time present and past, thus stepping into the future, the time beyond.

The Moscow shroud, as all portraits, reveals something beyond representation, which makes it difficult for the beholder to translate. The portraits transgress demarcations of archaeological, aesthetic and symbolic. They are in this world, and in the other, linking both and participating in each. Their paradoxical nature needs a different expanse that transgresses surface viewing, in order to capture the evasive relation between visible and invisible. Only then can the viewer break away from fixed methods of seeing, determined by the principles of art history or archeology, in order to modify ways of visualizing conceptual and pictorial images. An appropriate reading needs to subvert the customary method of their viewing by dislocating and relocating them to syncretise sacred and profane spheres. This requires a translation that synchronizes the figurative and the non-figurative, in order to raise possibilities for re-presentation or making present.

By suturing sacred and profane, past and present the reading of the portraits cannot remain speculative. They require an intermediary strategy that reads them as ritually effective *ikons* at their time, as well as inexhaustible images with possibilities of representation or making present, such that a postcolonial translation of their quadruple dimension becomes the enactment of an event in our present history.

**Death as Passage**

You sleep that you may wake; you die that you may live. (Pyramid Text 1975b, Hornung, 1982: 155)

In Egyptian ontology life and death are not determinate opposites but ambivalent experiences. This does suggest the wholeness of living, as practice, while opening up potentialities for transformations and the transfer of centrality. Upon such terms, the process of life becomes an enactment of change, an alternation of the centres of activity, rather than triumph and conquest in a game of power. Aging is not a loss but a retreat from activity for the rejuvenation of the life energy. By analogy, the sun god retreats from his rule, leaving the space to the moon god Toth. For order to be established there must be an exchange of roles. A papyrus dating from the New Kingdom attributes to gods and kings a limited stretch of time, whereby the throne alternates from one to the other. Later, in the New Kingdom, not only kings become gods after death, but all

men, as well, which emphasizes the exchange of roles, the state of flux, death becoming a passage towards a future journey. Re-creation is not an elimination of the negative elements, but their incorporation within life.

Interconnections between life and death take a new form in the Fayoum portraits. They represent an abstraction of the life span captured at the instance of death, the time in-between, the present that articulates past and future, the threshold to the other life. As early as the Coffin Texts, the present is felt to be both an evil time and a time full of promise, in Egyptian culture (Hornung, 1982: 154) and embedded in the Moscow shroud. The shroud represents Osiris – whose death is archetypal – mumified, sunken in the past. His son Horus takes over his role as the sun god signifying ‘tomorrow’, and is represented by a sun disc on Anubis’s dog head. Anubis, the supervisor of mumification, who hosts the deceased in the world of death, holds also Ankh – the key for the future – in his hand. The sun’s rebirth in the morning is renewal, a repeated renewal occasioned at the beginning of creation. The beginning of the world cannot have happened without the existence of death; birth corresponds to death. The sun’s daily death and rebirth is a promise that the blessed will pass via death into a new life. By negotiating past and present, death and rebirth, repetition and renewal, the shroud becomes the intermediate site merging distant realms and changing temporalities.

The notion of renewal in time has gradually developed in the Nineteenth Dynasty Turin Canon of Kings. Time became fixed in the world of history thus grounding the notion of eternal recurrence in a historical location rather than myth. Since then, the god Toth, the archivist assigns a fixed life span to all creations (Hornung, 1982: 155). This concept is represented in the Moscow shroud, where the deceased holds a scroll in his hand, probably an archive of his doings in his assigned life span, his passport to the other life. Life is not an unchanging endlessness, a repetition, but a renewal. Meanwhile, the written scroll of life shows that the deceased does not master historical knowledge, and is estranged to his own existence. He has lived not knowing what is to come, and by death his past life belongs to him no more. It becomes a writing traced in a scroll for others to decipher. In a related context, Derrida remarks that Toth mediates writing and death.

In the after-life – the other life – that life will acquire another meaning, which remains invisible. Derrida’s postulation generates the idea of death and writing involving process and stasis, the timed and timelessness.

Death occurs in time, but for rejuvenation one must step – somehow – outside time. The deceased represented in the portraits sees her/himself at a time beyond the temporal. The coexistence of the temporal and atemporal corresponds to the visible/invisible duality. The moment of death is the juncture at which the deceased will envision the other, when s/he takes the challenge to embark on the journey. The deceased’s gaze of anticipation and challenge is the unspoken word that carries the viewer to the threshold of death as passage, rather than prohibition. It is the starting point for the viewer to transmute a static presentness long remaining identical with itself into an outward experience. Exchanging gazes with the portrait arouses an enigmatic experience that involves subjectivity and estrangement, rationalisation and divination. At the threshold,

the deceased’s anticipation arouses the viewer’s enthusiasm, as he stands at an intermediate space raising a latent historical problem between self and other/East and West. Hence, the portraits become a virtual space where the ability to die becomes a “pre-requisite of history”, in order to revive the memory of what has been long forgotten.

The mutual exchanges between viewer and viewed in the world of the living and the dead, past and present translates into a transfer of centres of activity, and a dislocation of the fixed gaze. It is not only the deceased represented in the portrait who is undergoing transformation, but the viewer as well. A postcolonial translation of the past involves an acceptance of difference opening up a dialogue with the other, guiding the viewer along her/his venture across the threshold, opening up to a local/global culture.

**Difference as Challenge**

The deceased represented in portraits are in anticipation of the event of dying, of seeing the invisible. Their proximity to death is an anticipation of the future life. Meanwhile, these portraits are images painted during a past life time, and kept as an inscription helping the spirit to identify the deceased before embarking on the voyage to the future life. Being is doubled, as that which is known in life and the unknown, the-would-be in death. The unknown is part of the nonexistent, which may be considered as the unconscious or the unarticulated unlimited, the limitless expanse in space and time that envelops creation. The encounter with the other self, the nonexistent means accepting the challenge of death. Most of the panels have ‘Good Luck’ written on them, as an amulet providing the moral support needed on such a hazardous voyage. Negation of existence is not only basic for rejuvenation, but for existence as a whole. Nonexistence is the complementary other of existence. Death alone reveals the ambivalence of the nonexistent.

The negative aspect of death is only experienced by the damned whose existence is extinguished after death. Negative elements in existence are a hostile challenge of constant duration. The damned, representing evil are expelled from existence but not eliminated; the existent cannot be totally released from imperfection. Transcendence is inconceivable, since it aims at total unity, an undifferentiated oneness, which in the Egyptian concept would be the condition of the world before creation. The creation of life means the birth of duality, a concept that accepts difference as complementarity. The starting point for the creator is generating the existence/nonexistence duality in order to diversify into a multiplicity. The Egyptian ontology is not founded on an abstract intellectual system, but generates concepts concurrent with everyday challenges. It is pragmatic in so far as it admits disorder, allows for reciprocal response between human and divine; the hieroglyph is the language that represents this system of thought. The silence of the hieroglyph in its incompleteness instigates an unmediated dialogue, an exchange with the other that re-starts as long as it is re-read.

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28 I am inspired here by Perniola (1995).
Such an exchange is also present in the Moscow shroud. It represents the deceased and the gods on equal par, their partnership engaging them in the maintenance of their existence. As such life/death, man/god are dependent for a living order that opens a space for diversified creative acts. Likewise, the other portraits represent the deceased’s equality with the gods, in terms of preserving their singularity. The unfixed gaze expresses their mutability, an anticipation of a would-be role in the after life. Though the portraits, in some sense, keep up the hieroglyph being aniconic or non-figurative, by touching the spiritual, their gaze speaks of a consciousness that is singular. Singularity as an aspect of solitude is unknown in the Egyptian tradition founded on the idea that individuality springs from an originally united nature (Hornung, 1982: 171). The one is incorporated in the All. At this point the portraits deviate from the hieroglyph, by becoming more expressive of their divine individuality, and man’s singularity becomes an attribute for his immortality. The portraits combine the moment of anticipation of the self as would be divine, with enlightened consciousness that already claims deity. Hence the portraits advance another challenge that contains the other by confirming its presence, not by transgressing it. As such, the portraits are considered an event in the visualization of the self with regards to deity and deification.

By preserving the self as ‘singular’, the portraits advance the concept of the ‘chosen’ that complies with the idea of ‘transcendence’, a later outcome of the cosmotheistic turn of the post-Amarna theology, that matured in Late Antiquity with related movements in Stoicism and Hermetism (Assmann, 1998: 142-144). The pre-Amarna traditional Egyptian religion does not provide texts defining absolute conceptual borders between high and low, true and false, believer and non-believer. Religious texts are concerned with ritual, what to recite not what to believe. They do not condemn other religions, nor censor deviations from accepted rites (Assmann, 1998: 131). It was Akhanyati who founded a new religion in the middle of the 14th century based on the idea of divine unity, praising the sun as the source of light and time. However the concept of the One, according to Akhanyati had a physical meaning; it was a cosmological discovery.

This concept gradually grows into an open monotheism as revealed in the Corpus Hermeticum. Speaking of the divine, it says that the divine has: “authority over the cosmos of mortals and unreasoning animals,” and that he displayed “to lower nature the fair form of god.” God gives birth to a man like himself and wants “a person who is mindful to recognize himself” (Hermetica, 1995: 5), in order to reach up to god. Hence god is transcendent, and to reach him one has to transcend “the material body” to rejoice the presence of the father,” for “(t)his is the final good for those who have received knowledge to be made god” (Hermetica, 1995: 6). Death for the chosen is another form of transcendence, and the anticipation of death is reaching the edge of transcendence. The earlier notion of the duality of existence and reciprocal exchanges within vital elements becomes at this stage an aspiration for identification with supreme power. Life’s challenge that has once been for difference and rejuvenation is transformed into a need for sameness and repetition.

Seeing the Other/Seeing Oneself

The portrait belongs partly to the hieroglyphic, partly to the mimetic. The face portrayed may be a hieroglyph of an existence, not a narrative biography. Nevertheless, the mimetic aspect in the portraits incorporates a polarity that forms a rupture in the aesthetics of the hieroglyph. The portraits represent a self that remains the other: the other that sees the face witnesses the unknown side of the self:

The seer is seen while he sees, and thus there is vision in things… painting you… I who am speaking, but also I am the one to whom one is at looks speaking, and someone about whom one is speaking.

Both painter/viewer and painted/viewed see, but remain mute, incapable of voicing what the other misses. Their silence involves a paradox: The reversibility of what is visible with what sees may either lead to a polytheistic experience or a monotheistic vision. The portraits are polytheistic to the extent that they combine different traditions. On the other hand, the mutual identification of seer and seen/self-and other lifts consciousness to a point of unification, a transcendence, concurring with a monotheistic vision. Awareness of the other as identity is in a sense, a negation of difference. Added to that, seeing the invisible as the singular individual entails isolation. As against the hieroglyph – the sign designed for re-composition, for re-integration – the portrait is a

30 A man, late Antonine – early Severan, c.180-211. Encaustic on panel, 43 x 22 cm x c.1.5 –2 mm. Cairo, Egyptian Museum, CG 33259 (Petrie excavation; acquired c.1889) (Doxiadis, 1995: 6).

rupture signaling the violent act of isolation. At this point, the portraits and the hieroglyph intersect.

The Egyptian masque or hieroglyph abstracted characteristic traits combining organic and inorganic in a combinatory system where places in life and the after life exchange and merge. This system has procured exchangeable locations enhancing the notion of co-existence. On the other hand, the Fayoum portraits witness a dislocation in place causing anxiety. An Egyptian ontology that has previously integrated soul and body, high an low, life and death is threatened to become a threshold to a divisive world dislocating the body and prioritizing soul. “The body mortal” can only soar when “the senses are restrained” (Hermetica, 1995: 3).

The portraits are material, and their very materiality reveals the soul, and the soul of the great gods is consciousness. The ongoing discourse that gradually overtakes restricts consciousness to a chosen few, whose mind can “contain so great a bounty… so the human mind shines with the light of consciousness… (and) never obstructed by darkness” (Hermetica, 1995: 77). The growth of such a divisive discourse places the One above the all, and breaks with an earlier Egyptian conception of the gods’ nature as limited in time, space, power and knowledge, and concomitant with the more general phenomenon of their diversity. This tenet fostering the notion that one is part of all, while difference is an attribute of the same, does not confer on the gods absolute qualities or absolute existence. Nonetheless, the portraits and the hieroglyph overlap in so far as they merge visible and invisible. Self-consciousness in the portraits is assertive, but their fixed gaze seems to be interrupted by some furtive glances exchanged with the viewer. By partaking in two realms, they are conjunctive and disjunctive sacred and profane. They are the gods that are scared of becoming, and by being apprehensive of the future, the beyond, they remain subject to an unpredictable present.

The Egyptian Turn in History

In the earlier Egyptian tradition, the hieroglyph remains anonymous, and the mask seeks a state of anonymity through the abstraction of singular features. The hieroglyph and the mask have an existence not situated in a fixed time, but in the present, a time that offers choices without expecting decisions. The viewer recognizes her/himself in the hieroglyph as the actor, as s/he takes part in completing that which remains unfinished in existence. This does not imply the impersonality or the dissolution of the self, but reveals the inexhaustibility of primal matter – or the non-existent – the life challenge germinating creativity. In fact, the incompleteness of the hieroglyph is derived from that same notion of the incompleteness of existence that calls for remodeling. The renewal continuum is not a repetitive procedure leading to a status quo, but a revolutionary process of rebirth. The notion of death as finality pertains to the nonexistent; what exists is always in motion (Hornung, 1982: 182-183). The portrait has made use of the invisible language of the hieroglyph to gain access to the invisible parts of the self, only to the extent that it retains the subject silent. Unlike the hieroglyph, the interpretation of the portrait’s silence may either induce the polarization or plurality of meanings.
In this respect, the Fayoum portraits represent the tempestuous collapse in an ambivalent present, or what Mario Perniola defines as the “Egyptian enigma”, a condition resulting from a confusing encounter between past and future (Perniola, 1995: viii). It is the point where two apparently inverse visualizations of life and death hybridize while opening up to different horizons. The portraits are positioned at a point of intersection, where the singular self becomes a site of contradiction; difference may be a privilege conferred upon the chosen, but the privilege of singularity risks the mutability and the unpredictability of history. The portrait unveils a joy and fear of death; death may be anonymity or oblivion. The portraits’ eyes shift between the ecstatic gaze and enthusiastic glances, such that the moment of death becomes the true moment of life. Eyes silently transfuse an existence in time, trodden paths leading to the final passage that should be traversed. There is an awareness that death is not a given but must be attained. If a decision regarding death must be taken, this entails a possibility of death, a resolution that needs consciousness. Such a resolution gives man the power of a maker, and death becomes a possibility for transcendence. Hence the avoidance of death as repetition is not by rebirth – as in Egyptian ontology – but by the singular/individual power to begin.

Consciousness of singularity, transcendence and power concur with the apprehension of death, and with the awakening of responsibility. Responsibility comes along with the consciousness of difference, the necessity to draw borderlines in concession to the Law, a submission to an absolute transcendent. Whether this transcendent force is transfigured as epistemology or divination, its language will replace the hieroglyph by the logos, eventually leading to Babel.

Notwithstanding, acts of resistance to portraiture as an art, and the portrait as the ultimate truth, appear in the third century CE. An Aedicula of a boy probably painted by an autodictat local painter frees itself from the Greek mimetic technique. It combines the Amarna exaggerated features with Indian or Persian styles. The distortion of the figure attributes to the portrait an animalistic savagery, nostalgic of an art merging the species, vibrant with vigour rather than simulating the actual. Deviations in the art of portraiture unveil more potentialities for reading the varied languages of the Fayoum portraits. As they bridge the gaps by partaking in two realms they can be viewed as an art of bricolage, a site synchronizing temporalities, and opening a space for resisting subjugation to the Law. Translating the portraits opens chances, possibilities to live the moment as actual but not final.


33 Aedicula of a boy, first half of the 3rd century. Tempera on panel, 38.6 x 24 x15 cm. Cairo, Egyptian Museum, CG 33269 (acquired 1894) (Doxiadis, 1995: 109).
In order to resume reading the other, a postcolonial translation should be re-invested with the strategies enabling it to read the invisible in language, hence reviving the hieroglyph. By operating a system of “transversal taxonomies”\(^\text{34}\), this may form junctures at points of disjunction. The Egyptian Greek/East West binary may be reassessed in the light of a new reading of the past image, a conceptual reassessment that may in turn remodel our standardized organizational activity that has inherited an imperial construction of the world. A postcolonial translation of the portraits shows possibilities of change beyond closed societies or globalism. It develops strategies of dialogue through translatability, an understanding of difference, and an ability to trace relations between the One and the All within a historical context. Such a dialogue may overpower the discourse of essentialism/modernity with its exclusive/imperial tendencies to naturalize power, a discourse that has effaced large sections of local/global history. The translation of the open-eyed portraits may transform them into channels, passages to sail through, away from the gaping abyss of the void, towards future possibilities.

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\(^{34}\) According to Perniola, this system is capable of uncovering affinities between apparently discordant aspects, while tracing oppositions among seemingly similar aspects. The inventory involves a conceptual and organizational activity that throws new light on the past (Perniola, 1995: 73).
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Archives and Power

Dag Petersson

abstract

This contribution is an experiment in ‘intensive socio-analysis,’ as Manuel De Landa might have put it. Its impetus is derived from the observation of a quite incongruous relationship between archives. There is an odd discordance between the archive systems that structure digital material in online environments and the reorganization of national archives and libraries when faced with the challenge of digitization. The gradual appearance of this problematic relationship is regarded here as an expression of the increasing importance tied to archival functions in the age of informationalized labour. The analysis of this relationship employs the terminology of Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault. Because Gilles Deleuze commenced his book on Foucault by saying that “a new archivist has been appointed,” this text can assume the responsibility and the liberty of expounding the digital vicar of that urban clerk in the shape of Deleuze himself, reading Foucault. As a piece of contemporary archaeology, it is played out in a grey zone where theory and empirical knowledge are inseparable, where everything is real and where the digital is not simply the virtual but that which actualizes its powers to the archive.

The method of Foucault is always opposed to methods of interpretation. Don’t ever interpret, experiment.

Two Irreducible Sciences

National archives and libraries around the world experience major organizational challenges with respect to their current adaptation to electronic services. Practical tasks of maintaining a major digitized collection – such as registration, cataloguing, preservation and public accessibility – confront contemporary archives and libraries with a new and quite difficult situation, and have therefore also become subjects of increased academic interest. But scholars of librarianship and archive sciences face the challenges of digitization not only within the institutional organization. They also recognize that digitally produced, reproduced, sampled and distributed material very


often escapes the existing strategies for archival acquisition and that a large part of our culture will therefore not be saved for tomorrow’s researchers. And the problem is not merely technological: the digital challenge that confront today’s archives are no less financial, spatial, juridical and in a sense, even ontological.

Now, even if the wealth of today’s scholarly work on digital libraries testifies to a highly complex and nuanced debate concerning these issues, it is to a researcher trained in a different field interesting to notice that there is a certain uniformity of direction in which these scholars target their inquiries. There are shared assumptions and collective agreements that seem neither dictated nor questioned but assumed as self-evident. It is as if a silent and quite powerful consensus aims towards a future goal where the archive is big enough, friendly enough and fast enough, both to house a steady increase of original and digitized artefacts and to provide these, instantaneously, to a global public. A recent realization of this collective dream has already been initiated by the Library of Congress: ‘The Global Gateway’ is the formation of a digital network of connected archives and libraries around the world, forming a kind of global super-archive with almost infinite hospitality to whatever needs for information may arise. The consistency of desires that informs these and similar projects might seem natural, but the cultural determinations that instruct that self-evidentness could and should perhaps be analyzed.

Although such an analysis will not be carried out here, it is nevertheless valuable to have noticed that this uniform desire does indeed exist, and that it has a certain influence on the formation of inquiries concerning the development of e-libraries and digitized archives. In this paper a quite different scenario will be sketched: one where the research production taking place within this realm of consentience is contrasted to another kind of science, an archaeology that for its object has a specific and limited set of cultural potentialities for producing knowledge – so called statements. Within this scenario, the latter science is irreducible to the former. It will be suggested here that from the point of view of this archaeology of statements, the problems that arise with digitizing archives reflect upon the question of how knowledge is produced in a global information society.

The purpose of this exposition is therefore to describe the rationale and the structure of this science as well as its close affinity to the concerns and problems raised with the technological reorganization of libraries and archives in the age of digital informationalization. Two concrete examples may at this point be useful in order to shed some introducing light on the difference between those ‘two sciences.’

3 There are, however, a few exceptions to the general paralysis in front of preserving digital material. One such exception is the joint effort by the Center for Research Libraries, four American universities and the Mellon Foundation Funding to archive the documents and messages disseminated via www by different NGO’s. Cf. the announcement of the “Political Web Archiving Investigation” available at: http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/announce/show.cgi?ID=132143; See also the “Wayback Machine” available at http://www.archive.org.

For the archaeology that is advocated here the problems of digitizing archives are not accounted for with proper analyses of administrative structure, technological solutions, strategies of accommodating to user behaviour, etc. It is not enough to have located and described the objects that are affected by the reorganization, because more is at stake than what is perceived and understood. Archaeology believes that collective orders of perception and understanding as such are historically unstable, and that it is their changing forms that ought to be targeted and described. In order to explain these changes, archaeology speaks of a realm of power, whose constellation of forces determines what is historically knowable. Social institutions assume power to a larger or smaller extent. In this paper, it will be suggested that a contemporary observation of our historical formation of understanding and perception is archaeologically possible by investigating how archives, considered in the widest possible sense as a function, is able to rearticulate its relation to power when interacting with a new kind of material technology. The statements thus invented to enable such expressions do not necessarily originate from librarians, managers or archive scholars. In fact, they are not uttered by anyone but can be heard in the anonymous mumble where the self-evident speaks, in something similar to what Wittgenstein once called a ‘language game.’ Statements do not form sentences. Instead they form linguistic apparatuses that produce the possible ways in which knowledge may be formed in a specific social structure at a specific time.

A second example concerns the understanding of where in the social body digital technology operates. Common for an objective approach is the general argument that digital technology will do for human informationalization what the conveyor belt once did for industry. As Douglas Engelbart once said:

> By ‘augmenting human intellect’ we mean increasing the capability of a man to approach a complex problem situation, to gain comprehension to suit his particular needs, and to derive solutions to problems.

Technology is here considered as increasingly more powerful tools in the hands of the men that use them, develop them, and study them so as to improve the results of their labour with social, cultural or natural objects. The question is how to make technology most advantageous for this labour. The focus of attention in archaeology is aimed elsewhere: towards a realm where the apparatuses of knowability take shape. Here technology is in no one’s hands but understood more as an autonomous relay between an abstract field of force constellations and its immanent formation into apparatuses, or producers of knowledge. The task of technology is to enable actualizations of virtual potentialities. Since the formation of apparatuses are depending on the changing, irreducible relation between these two structures – knowledge and power – technology is thought of as a relay that mediates, but never equals the tension; technology is therefore constantly met with new demands. Hence, digital technology is not considered a recent step in the progression of history but a producer of a radically different social formation that, among other things, requires a reformulation of history itself; neither evolutionary causality nor dialectical historicism is able to account for the attention to

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simultaneous irreducibilities that characterize the formation of knowledge in the age of digitization.

Philosophers like Maurizio Lazzarato, Félix Guattari, Giorgio Agamben, Manuel de Landa and many others have in different ways formulated architectures of thought akin to archaeology in order to consider contemporary knowledge production with regards to technology and power. In their work they have marked a radical shift away from a modern, self-reflective order configured around symmetrical relationships such as identity and equality, towards a non-linear order that is attentive to the potentialities of irreducibility and difference. There is also a political agenda involved here as many of these thinkers argue that modern rationality, with its demand for completion and symmetry, is at least partly responsible for legitimating both violence and legal restrictions. The modern order of thought (if there is one) tendentially excluded the realm of potentialities. Modernity has a hierarchization of value built into its system that corresponds to the necessity of purity and symmetry. Non-linear thinking attempts to substitute necessity for potentiality and in many cases it has assigned to the computer a potential capacity for affirming such an asymmetrical organization of social faculties; a capacity that exceeds the limits of technology reserved for the self-reflective, humanistic order as ostensibly defined by Kant, Marx or Freud. However, for the remainder of this present essay, an explicit argument for a non-linear understanding of the archive and digital technology will be exclusively retrieved from a specific philosophical meeting, that of Gilles Deleuze’s readings of his late friend and colleague Michel Foucault.

Two Irreducible Archives

What, then – given these introductory remarks – can be made of the tense relation between today’s major archives and libraries and the implementation of digital technology, once the perspective of an archaeology is assumed?

A primary observation can be made: the motivation for these new electronic libraries and archives are only in a very limited sense dictated from a political ‘above.’ Instead, the anonymity of this motivation has often been expressed in reports of digitization projects by various reiterations of the phrase ‘it has to be done because it is happening.’

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6 I am well aware that the use of the term ‘modern’ is inappropriate in this reduced sense. The sentence is not to be understood as a statement on modernity or modernism but merely as a provisional sketch of a tendential divide between two orders of thinking.


Thus, referring to Deleuze’s monograph on Foucault, it could well be argued that the anonymity of the ‘it’ that is happening indicates an influential source of power acting from elsewhere than the chief librarian’s office or the department of cultural affairs. The event ‘it’ is nothing but an indication of this strange new manner of speaking that at the same time produces the event of a new social knowability. Deleuze says of such an event that “it is the ‘One speaks;’ an anonymous murmur that takes different courses according to what corpus is considered. Here, one is enabled to extract statements from words, phrases and propositions which cannot be mixed up with them.”

“‘It,’ then, testifies to the possibility of extracting new statements from the movements of a certain corpus of knowability. That which determines the regularity of appearance and the order of actualization of these statements is what Michel Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* called the ‘archive.’

The archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events. But the archive is also that which determines that all these things said do not accumulate endlessly in an amorphous mass, nor are they inscribed in an unbroken linearity, nor do they disappear at the mercy of chance external accidents; but they are grouped together in distinct figures, composed together in accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurred in accordance with specific regularities; that which determine that they do not withdraw at the same pace in time, but shine, as it were, like stars, some that seem close to us shining brightly from afar off, while others that are in fact close to us are already growing pale. The archive is not that which, despite its immediate escape, safeguards the event of the statement, and preserves, for future memories, its status as an escapee; it is that which, at the very statement-event, and in that which embodies it, defines at the outset the system of its enunciability. Nor is the archive that which collects the dust of statements that have become inert once more, and which may make possible the miracle of their resurrection; it is that which defines the mode of occurrence of the statement-thing: it is the system of its functioning.

Foucault’s concept of the archive can be defined as the historical *a priori* of what is possible to know discursively. As a concept it must not be mistaken for the proper name of institutions that stores records, artefacts or specimens. The concept ‘archive’ defines the sayable. Yet to Deleuze this definition in the *Archaeology* is either too restrictive or too indiscriminate to Foucault’s own thought as developed later: the stars that are mentioned above as a metaphor do not belong to the discursive but to a non-discursive order of knowledge. “What *The Archaeology* recognized, but still only described negatively, as non-discursive environments, is given its positive form in *Discipline and Punish*, a form that haunted the whole of Foucault’s work: the form of the visible, as opposed to the form of whatever can be articulated.”

There are in fact two archives, two irreducible determinations of knowledge: the discursive, which determines knowledge in the form of language, and the non-discursive, which determines knowledge in the form of visuality. Pursuing the logic of this doubleness, Deleuze protests against another remark in the *Archaeology* that concerns its limitations: “it is

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11 Deleuze, *Foucault*. p. 32.
not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rules that we speak,” Foucault says. Deleuze replies:

> There is an archaeology of the present. Present or past, the visible is like the articulable: they are the object not of a phenomenology, but of an epistemology. What Foucault will reproach in *Madness and Civilization* is the desire to continue to invoke an experience lived as raw or savage, in the manner of the phenomenologists, or the eternal values of imagination, as in the case of Bachelard. But in fact there is nothing prior to knowledge, because knowledge, in Foucault’s new concept of it, is defined by the combinations of visible and articulable that are unique to each stratum or historical formulation.

It is possible, then, to define a limit of the archives in terms of phenomenal appearance. Statements and visibilities do not appear to an intending subject as linguistic or visual phenomena. But the limit towards phenomenality should not be understood as a border around the archive, but rather as defining a certain phenomenal modality of actualizing linguistic and visual potentiality. Unaffected by this modality, and regardless of past or present formations, statements exist as ‘realities’ and may be recognized by the immanent appropriation by which they actualize the potentialities of that specific corpus that forms the whole of speakable knowledge. The same holds true for visibilities. In order to discover a statement among words, phrases or propositions, or a visibility among figurations of light, each expression must be considered with regards to how it produces the monadic wholeness of either of the two historically stratified archives. This can neither be determined from exemplarity nor from exceptionality.

A statement is the precondition for linguistic articulation and a formation of language in which everything is said that can be said. It is a word or several words that are

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14 For a comment on *appropriation* as a strategy to actualize potentialities in Heidegger’s and Deleuze’s philosophy, see Giorgio Agamben (1999) *Potentialities*. Stanford, Stanford University Press. The affinity between Heidigger’s notion of appropriation and Deleuze’s understanding of actualization (which I believe also represents his reading of Foucault) can be shown by reading two segments from Agamben. On page 202 one may read: “If what human beings must appropriate here is not a hidden thing but the very fact of hiddenness, Dasein’s very impropriety and facticity, then ‘to appropriate it’ can only be to be properly improper, to abandon oneself to the inappropriable. Withdrawal, λēthē, must come to thinking as such; facticity must show itself in its concealment and opacity.” And on page 225: “Thus liquidating the values of consciousness, Deleuze carries out the gesture of a philosopher who, despite Deleuze’s lack of fondness for him, is certainly closer to Deleuze than is any other representative of phenomenology in the twentieth century: Heidegger […]. For Dasein, with its Being-in-the-world, is certainly not to be understood as an indissoluble relation between a subject – a consciousness – and its world; and ἀληθεία, whose center is ruled by darkness and λēthē, is the opposite of an intentional object or a world of pure ideas.”
15 Statements and visibilities are not parts of a whole in the sense that they would form blocks that in groups make up an apparatus and eventually the totality of an archive. With one visibility less, the visual archive would not be lacking; it would still be whole. Each statement and visibility produces the whole of what is speakable and visible at a given time. The language and the field of vision that they thus actualize are the linguistic and visual limit of what, at a given time, can be spoken and seen. Therefore the archives are wholes: in the sense of an order of statements or visibilities, it is irreducible to exemplarity, and the law that determines the appearance of statements and visibilities does not regulate their formation by means of exceptionality.
something more and other than signifiers or propositions: statements are positive, variable formations of language, arranging themselves not according to grammar but around singularities projected by hearths of power. Words that also are statements have the characteristic function of forming a serial multitude around a singularity. When the intensity of a hearth increases or decreases, or its force is shifted to another hearth, the corresponding singularities reorganize their statements and visibilities into new historical formations. Yet on the other hand, when the archive’s historical formation is changed, the strategies of power that legitimates knowledge are sometimes persuaded to restructure. Historical reorganizations of archives thus depend both on interior and exterior bifurcations among knowledge formations, as much as they depend on spontaneous changes in power.

One contemporary indication that such changes are happening is expressed with the mumble of ‘it is happening’ in reports of various digitization projects. It indicates that what has occurred during the past few decades, is a new stratification that allows, or rather demands a different formation of knowledge. As both speech and visuality are produced in this mumble, the task to describe it is quite difficult. But one can recognize the mumble in the extreme of our time’s knowledge formation: in the possibility of knowledge to consider itself as something different than a self. In Foucault’s archaeology, knowledge does not necessarily have a self, but a potentiality to actualize into different formations. And this, too, is the most remarkable feature of digital technology. Hence, the digitized archive does not gain its priority to illuminate our contemporary knowledge formations from sharing its proper name with Foucault’s concept but from its ability to cater for knowledge production without a proper notion of self. Today’s technological appropriation of archival functions in digital environments dissociates the archives’ classification system from its encyclopaedic logic and hence also from its hierarchical relation to catalogues and collections. The logic of digitized archives is not founded on the mirror-identity of ‘self’ but on a mobile exteriority with a capacity to spontaneously form new knowledge-strings. At its ontological limit, archival knowability is its relation to power as an ‘outerness’, rather than a reflectable self. Should a term be introduced in spite of Foucault’s explicit rejection, Deleuze would say that a new desire-assemblage has formed with the digital producibility of knowledge. A desire-assemblage, to Deleuze, is what performs the actualization of power relations: territorializing, deterritorializing and reterritorializing the strategies of power so as to affect the formability of a stratification of knowledge. It is to Deleuze what enables the conception of Foucault’s power as an immanent plane of consistency.

The digitized archive is therefore open for description on the level of its stratified statements and visibilities, what Deleuze calls its concrete machines. Hence, instead of defining national archives from their ‘selfhood’ (reflected either in an encyclopaedic logic, in their given assignment or in a vague idea of public serviceability), Deleuze argues that an institution is politically understandable only on the level of its formation of matter and function. “It is as if, finally, something new were emerging in the wake of...”

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Marx. It is as if a complicity about the State were finally broken. Even a ‘thing’ like a prison is seen as an environmental formation. Form here can have two meanings: it forms or organizes matter; or it forms and finalizes functions and gives them aim. As such, an institution is determined not by its position within the state but by its appropriation, or integration of power. Foucault “does not write a history of institutions but the conditions governing their integration of different relations between forces, at the limits of a social field.” As concrete machines, institutions integrate other, abstract machines in a social factory that produces habits, objects, subjects and ideas. This is true for a very generous understanding of the word ‘institutions’. All social production is enabled by interlacings of concrete machines, or apparatuses. Their form and their ability to produce are determined according to a certain matrix for how they integrate force. Power, as the relation of forces, is a determining precondition for social production but it does not reside on its outside. The immanent relay from pure force to machine production is a social desire, and this may be objectified as technology. Following the radical change in today’s social desire, the concrete machines are changing what is possible to do, to say, to see, to put together and to know. For these machines, there is no delimited inside and outside: there is only a topology of higher or lower integrations of force relations.

**Archives and the Nation**

For archaeology, it is not a sufficient explanation to declare that institutions like libraries and archives are forced to change because their external (political, technological, social, economical) circumstances have been altered. Instead another model becomes increasingly suggestible: that with the globalized topology that characterises today’s desire-assemblage, the concrete machines of libraries and archives have intensified their integration of power to a degree that threatens the functionality of the library’s previous form. Such intensification is indicated by the increased proliferation of archival functions that arrive with the informationalization of labour.

It is arguable that an archival function such as the hospitality of classification systems is formalised into a statement of the digital age. As labour is increasingly informationalized, knowledge as remembered facts are less privileged than knowledge as a capacity to construct new relationships and connections. To know is not necessarily to have identified, once and for all, a place for something within a larger structure but to be able to find spaces that are hospitable to several incompatible and often mobile systems. To solve a problem is not necessarily to stabilize its inconceivability.

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18  Ibid. p. 31.
19  Ibid. p. 33.
20  Ibid. p. 116.
21  Classification theorist S. R. Ranganathan has shown that hospitality is the dominant functional force of the modern classification system. Cf. S. R. Ranganathan (1951) *Philosophy of Library Classification*. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard.
Contrarily, a solution may be a transposition or a reorganization; or even what Foucault calls a problematization. For such solutions is needed an extreme archival hospitality as it is undoubtedly imperative to our knowledge formation that space will always be made available for further knowledge production. Hence slogans such as ‘lifelong learning’ and ‘virtual space’ are statements of today. Apart from being slogans and propositions they produce new formations of discursive knowledge. However, their mode of actualization is less intense than the problematization of ‘indefinite hospitality.’

Let’s say that Windows is a visibility. Neither as exclusively owned and distributed by Microsoft Inc., nor as the predecessor that operated on Apple Computers such as LISA and Macintosh, but Windows as the potentiality of forming a visual multitude. As a visibility, its affinity to the interface program that translates between MS DOS and various applications and documents is merely a matter of potentiality. Windows as a visibility does not appear – it is a quasi-spontaneous machine that organizes the unfoldings of materialities (texts, images, but also bodies). Windows does no longer actualize as a grid: its form is that of a bifurcation between regularities of spontaneous movements. Windows organizes the limits of a multitude’s ability of becoming different: any multitude’s variations of possible trajectories may at any moment be visually bifurcated into a new set of possible trajectories. (The work of contemporary artists such as Matthew Barney, Fabian Marcaccio and the Atlas Group create, quite explicitly, bodies and informations in bifurcating moments). Like ‘indefinite hospitality’ is a spatial concept referring to the unfolding of functionality, Windows – as the bifurcation of regularities – is a temporal concept referring to the speed of material becoming: the digital machine of visuality crystallises time, as Maurizio Lazzarato has recently put it.

The operational intensity of these statements in a digitized archive explains its undeterminable relation to a formal outside – and hence its decreased reflectibility in a self. This is the transformation of an ordinary archive into an ‘interarchive.’ Its functions and materialities merge online with all the archival functions and materialities that are already there: on the Internet, in the chat rooms, the newsgroups, the mailboxes,

22 “I am not looking for an alternative; you can’t find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by another people. You see, what I want to do is not a history of solutions, and that’s the reason why I don’t accept the word alternative. I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of problematiques.” Michel Foucault (1984) ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: an Overview of Work in Progress’, in Paul Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon, p. 343.


the FAQs, etc. Similarly, in a digital world it is hard to say what does and what does not have the form of an archive. It seems that the archive’s functions have already laid claims to the technological shape of that which to many archive scholars form the negative cause for the archives’ alteration: the global network organisation. But the archive does not have a negative relation to the global society: the archive’s hospitality was always potentially global and now the world steps into its digital formation of knowledge. The network society is no outside to the archive. To it, a national archive is an oxymoron. The relation between archive institutions and knowledge formations is better described as a plane of immanence, where the archive machines are increasingly becoming hotbeds for social activity.

National archives today experience the necessity to restructure with an acute sense of ambivalence because on the one hand, ‘it’ is happening, but on the other hand the traditional demand for completeness that structure the archives’ ideal notion of self-identity leaves them little alternative but to understand this event as a threat towards their bodies. The process of digitization is therefore considered an extension of the archives’ already existing functions and materials into digital shape. Unfortunately, this kind of extension is often merely prosthetic, something in line with an objectified notion of media. But the archive is not necessarily the collective memory of the nation and digital technology is not necessarily reducible to McLuhan’s general understanding of media. On the contrary, since our contemporary desire-assemblage has dramatically increased the actualizing capacity of archival machines, what has become increasingly intensified is these institutions’ social range of affectivity. Instead of adding digitized old and new services to an already existing body, believing that it enhances its already existing functions, digitizing archives should perhaps focus more intensely on their functional and material level. For instance, national libraries and archives could find themselves increasingly active as an educational institution, perhaps to a degree that at present time is generally held unthinkable.

Whatever such speculations might yield in the future, it remains that most national archives and libraries do not yet experience their functional intensification. Something of a conservatism maintains their digitization efforts on a somewhat restricted level with much respect for traditional formal limits. And yet their archival potentialities are increasingly tied to flows that disregard those traditional borders. It is therefore not the politicians’ demand for increased digitization that poses the major challenge for librarians and archivists, it is the realization that the heightened intimacy between a global knowledge order and archival functions effaces the limits of the modern national archive structure and in its stead demands non-negative strategies and new concepts (some are as provocative as ‘diagonal classification’ or the ‘fabulation of the catalogue’). In other words, the real challenge does not come from the decrees of a political government but from the ability to imagine how and what to change when selfhood is increasingly irrelevant.

Since knowledge formations are historically stratified, a formation is never fixed for eternity but articulated and determined by an historical a priori – itself determined by the mobile organisation of power. The modern historical a priori is anything but valid for all times. As Foucault showed in The Order of Things, History appeared as an a priori form for knowledge only at the beginning of the modern age in the late 18th century. However, its appearance did not follow causally from the collapse of Representation, the a priori of the previous stratification. Representation disintegrated because the forces that sustained its operability in the Classical age were overpowered by another constellation of forces. History, as a new social knowability, is not caused by the disintegration of Representation but came about as an “affirmation of an impossibility,” as Foucault says. This notion of affirming an impossibility suggests that virtualities beyond anyone’s knowledge may be spontaneously actualized if a radical change of power-strategies so desires. The discursive and the visual archives will then produce new objects, subjects and concepts and their historical stratifications, spaces and formations are altogether reorganized. Around 1800, History became an empty form with a new capacity to fit any self-reflective spirit.

This formation of History coincides with the appearance of the national archive that we know today as a public machine for storing all transactions, correspondences and produced or acquired artefacts of a nation state. As the global desire arguably challenges the modern functions of the nation state (notions of war, sovereignty, diplomacy, labour, etc.), the institutions tied to its operations are also changing. Hence, national archives are under all circumstances likely to transform their functions – or have their functionality transformed. This is not a consequence of the changed nation state, but again, of the new globalizing integration-structure of power. From its role as a closed mnemonic institution in the self-reflective order of the modern state, the archive machine has with the global network order gone into overdrive – as if the nation that ostensibly fostered it really hampered its productivity. Hospitality is no longer interiorization but externalisation.

Crucial for any political assessment of this transformation is a recognition that with new kinds of productivity follows new possible forms of control. The inactuality in the global era of what Foucault analyzed as the disciplinary order has perhaps been most clearly described in analyses of media and international conflict. The powers that sustain the global order of control over the network information society hinges upon fast and accurate retrieval of relevant information. Here, the modern model, consisting of

29 Ibid. p. 246.
self-reflection of each social instance in a central organ, is far too slow. Instead, today’s control system employs a superficial and mobile network-archive to detect what movements are of potential risk. Thus a new correction system appears. Or in the words of James Der Derian: “overclassification and overcompartmentalization of information in the national security state can lead to a form of overdetermined decision-making with policy outcomes based on a surfeit of ‘deep,’ discrete sources that resist corrective feedback.”

In order to proceed towards an understanding of the possibilities and the limitations of the informationalized global society’s knowledge formation, a further extensive detour into Deleuze’s book on Foucault might prove a most productive exercise. It is also, at this point, an expressed hope that a closer reading of this exposition might help clarify some of the previously articulated suggestions and explanations.

The Relation Between the Two Archives

Of utmost importance to Deleuze with regards to Foucault’s philosophy are two things. First, that Foucault insists on the irreducibility of two formations of knowledge: knowledge as that which is sayable and knowledge as that which is visible; and second, that these are formations not of things said or seen but of conditions for speech and seeing. Foucault’s analysis is then for Deleuze always directed at these two mutually incompatible domains. These two archives are definable by the fact that they have form. And since they are the only domains of Foucault’s organization of faculties that are endowed with form, they are the only resource archaeology can have for empirical research. Hence what exists archaeologically are two historically stratified formations of positive knowabilities: one concerns what is sayable, and is expressed discursively through the statements of language as a whole; the other concerns orders of visibilities and is expressed non-discursively through organizations of light.

Even though these domains are irreducible, they tend to intersect: the two archives slide into each other, bump into each other or reject each other. So although Deleuze finds that there is an unbridgeable gulf between these two formations, they do make contact. (For example, in the modern age, the organization of the prison building is not entirely disconnected to the formal laws of the penal code; in the digital age, the visual hospitality is not dissociated from the perpetual production of more knowledge.) What is it that determines this tense relation? First, the discursive archive has a priority over the visual insofar as Foucault states that the discursive relation to the non-discursive is discursive. Second, and this follow from the first: while the statements of the discursive archive are spontaneous, the visibilities that populate the non-discursive archive are receptive. Statements determine the production of discursive knowledge; visibilities determine the knowledge of the environment in which discourse is produced. Third, both statements and visibilities are determined by the play of informal forces of

32 James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy. p. 33.
33 Deleuze, Foucault. p. 49.
power. A force is defined by its direction and amplitude, or in Deleuze’s terms, its function and matter. The function of the force makes it active, it affects other forces, while the matter of the force is reactive, it is what is affected. This forcefield is not above, under or beyond the stratified domains of knowledge, but immanent to them, on the same plane. But since the forces differ ontologically from the archives, they remain separated from the formal order of knowledge and reveal themselves only to an act of thinking. There is no concrete evidence of this power domain, but thought understands it as abstract.

In other words: although the archive complex is what determines what is knowable at a given time, it cannot determine its own act of determination and it does not know the history of its stratifications. There must be a different determinative order to account for it as knowledge. That it is impossible to know what determines the conditions for knowledge, just as it is impossible to see that which determines what is possible to see; this poses a challenge to thought. How, then – given the three principles for the relation between the two archives – is the complementary space between knowledge and power thinkable? And what problem does the relation between the sayable and the visible archives pose to this thought?

The perhaps most crucial work for Deleuze’s reading of Foucault, since it takes upon itself the responsibility to answer both of these questions, is *Discipline and Punish* from 1975. Since it is in this single volume that Deleuze finds Foucault engaged in the task of clarifying two of the perhaps most obscure aspects of his earlier work at the same time, it is important not to confuse them for each other. And Deleuze’s exposition of this issue demands careful reading. Even if the discursive realm is declared as being privileged over the visual, one must avoid a sneaking impression that, in Deleuze’s text on surveillance, it is visuality that in a more direct, or immediate way is related to power. Their common exteriority to the discursive archive should however not be taken as an advocacy for an ineffable immediacy: the Panopticon is not more directly an actualization of 19th century power-strategies than the penal code. Deleuze is instead occupied with the very different ways in which power and the visual archive respectively relate to the discursive archive. But even if these two relations are utterly different from each other it seems that they must be understood together, as woven into each other.

Hence, one might stop to notice again that the discursive archive has a privileged position over the visual. This is true also for the forcefields of power with regards to the archives. But again, one must not forget that despite this discursive privilege, the two archives are irreducible to each other. This also goes for the field of forces with regards to the archives – but in a different way and for other reasons. In both cases, however, the two irreducible domains depend on each other for their existence. There would be no relations of power if they could not be actualized into statements and visibilities, and, likewise, there would be neither formal language nor perception if there were no forces to determine them. Therefore, speech and perception as two kinds of formal knowledge are mutually dependent, yet hierarchical and irreducible to each other. But then again: what Foucault is dealing with are statements and visibilities: not words, architectures or paintings, and neither as examples nor as exceptions.
A word is a statement only with regards to the singularity that determines its form. “A statement always represents an emission of singularities, of singular points distributed in a corresponding space. [...] What counts is the regularity of the statement: it represents not the average, but a curve. In effect, the statement should not join up with the emission of singularities that it presupposes, but with the shape of the curve that passes in its vicinity, or more generally with the rules of the field where they are distributed and reproduced.”

Just like the statements in the discursive domain, the visibilities are shaped in configurations of lines and curves. From the classical age to the modern, the main visual formation alters its shape: from a spiral shell that revolves like a galaxy, determining a relative place for everything within an infinite horizon of representation to a grid-like shape that is laid down from above in order that visual objects may appear by an act of confinement within the grid. The modern visual grid is not only corresponding to analysis; it is a shape that enables new things to come into the light. As the new, modern, historical a priori for visual knowledge allows new phenomena, it explodes the flat, axiomatic and representative space of the Classical age and discovers a structural depth dimension. This is a radical change. Deleuze once wrote in a review of The Order of Things: “All knowledge, since Foucault, unfolds in a characteristical ‘space’. Foucault’s description of how those sick from the plague were ordered to the windows of their houses to be counted and seen, so that the disease could be disciplined under the grid that was laid down over the city is meant to show this grid as a spatial formation of visual knowability, a grid that also receives and organizes the prisoners in the Panopticon prison. As the grid is laid down, it cuts the spreading of the disease into segments just as it is supposed to cut criminals out of crime. New criminals and new diseases see the light and become describable.

Disciplinability of disease and crime with a grid is the visual means to protect life; and life is a wholly new concept of the 19th century. But before this visual disciplinability is possible, the concept of life must have been discursively isolated: natural history had to have become biology, analysis of wealth transformed into political economy and general grammar into philology. A discursive notion of self-reflection had to be

34 Ibid. p. 4. Translation modified.
35 “This spiral shell presents us with the entire cycle of representation: the gaze, the palette and brush, the canvas innocent of signs (these are the material tools of representation), the paintings, the reflections, the real man (the completed representation, but as it were freed from its illusory or truthful contents, which are juxtaposed to it); then the representation dissolves again: we can only see the frames, and the light that is flooding the pictures from outside, but that they, in return, must reconstitute in their own kind, as though it were coming from elsewhere, passing through the dark wooden frames. And we do, in fact, see this light on the painting, apparently welling out from the crack of the frame; and from there it moves over to touch the brow, the cheekbones, the eyes, the gaze of the painter, who is holding the palette in one hand and in the other a fine brush... And so the spiral is closed, or rather, by means of that light, is opened.” Foucault, The Order of Things. p. 11
38 “Man does not exist in the space of knowledge until after the moment has passed when the classical world of representation collapse in its turn, under the impact of non-representable and non-
formalized first, in order to then be transposed into the visual. Hence the human sciences inform the Panopticon. Yet as is the case with statements, the shape of visibilities is a configuration of lines in the vicinity of singularities emitted from power, but these visual forms are receptive rather than spontaneous. A visibility is a regularity of light comparable to a star constellation, whose visual lines do not follow between the millions of stars randomly but are chosen from the figures of mythological statements in the discursive field. The point is that discursive formations determine the relation between itself and the non-discursive by means of a selective principle. But why is the discursive selection necessary for the formation of a visual apparatus?

Part of the answer can be traced to what Deleuze calls “Foucault’s reaction towards phenomenology.” As has already been explained, neither statements nor visibilities are phenomena, as they do not appear to an intending subject or to a consciousness. (This reaction extends therefore also to a rejection of psychology and anthropology.) Hence Foucault has no more a need for an untamed, primary perception than for an oppositionary relationship between a perceiving subject and a perceived phenomenon, and his statements do not need the oppositionary relationship between a signifier and a signified. Man, subject, consciousness: these are all historically finite apparatuses of discursive practices that are necessary only within the specific order of stratification that appears at the beginning of the 19th century. Now, in order to avoid both consciousness and perception as a first source or first principle of knowledge – and this is necessary for thinking the positive potency of knowledge – Foucault creates a state of knowledge without knower and known as fundamental prerequisites. Knowing is a state of its own, it needs no knower (no primary consciousness) and no known (no primary perception): there is only knowing, or rather a double formation of knowledge in the discursive archive and in the visual. What is formed as knowable in each formation is a multitude of positive apparatuses of sayables and visibilities distributed in stratifications. These moving strata are the historical elements of a formation. The two archives are stratified or sedimentary like tectonic plates in the ground, but only in the sense that the moving layers determine the historical readability; not in the sense that the deeper you dig the

representative events. It is the appearance of the obscure, or of a depth dimension. But first it is necessary that biology is born, and political economy and philology: the conditions for the possibility of living are sought in life itself (Cuvier), the conditions for exchange and of profit are sought in the depth of work (Ricardo), the possibility of discourse and grammar is sought in the historical depth of languages, in the systems of conjugations, the series of suffixes and the modifications of root words (Grimm, Bopp).” Ibid. p. 33, author’s translation.

39 The selective principle is an ‘experiment’ of my own. Deleuze never explicitly mentions any such principle in his reading of Foucault (although it plays an important part in one of his accounts of Nietzsche); nevertheless it seems that such a principle must be extracted from what he calls the selection of material machines, which is the condition for technological assemblages – especially since this, in turn, is what justifies the battling problematics of visible and discursive formations. Cf. Deleuze, Foucault, p. 39-40. This theme will be returned to at the end of my paper.

40 Deleuze, Foucault. p. 49.


farther back in history you go. Rather, says Deleuze, the more mobile a *transversal* is
drawn as a diagonal within the strata, the more connections are retrievable for reading.
Only the statements can testify to these movements because language is a spontaneous
form while light is receptive. Only the statements may affirm the impossible because it
is only through language, or rather through the spontaneity of the statements, that
hitherto uncharted diagrams of power may be discovered and described.

This construction earned Foucault a reputation for having a close, yet ambiguous
relationship to structuralism, the perhaps hottest topic among French intellectuals in the
1960’s. It is as if the move away from phenomenology, anthropology, psychology and
existentialism would inevitably lend him this reputation, and indeed, time and again
Foucault both denounces and embraces it, and sometimes even questions its existence.
However, Foucault’s stratified archives belong as little within structuralism as within
phenomenology. One could suggest three reasons why. 1) As opposed to structuralistic
psychoanalysis in the Lacanian sense, the archives are not, like Lacan’s
unconsciousness, structured like a language: contrarily, the archives are formations that
are conditional for anything that could be called a structure of language. 2) The archives
consist of stratifications of apparatuses – condensations of statements or visibilities that
are indivisible into miniature bits and pieces, into Lévi-Straussian mythemes or
Saussurian phonemes or monemes. Analysis, as a scientific model, is one actualization
of many possible stemming from the archive, but is not applicable for a wholesale
comprehension of the archive itself. Archaeology does not divide and conquer. 3) There
is not enough stability in the archive to locate an Althusserian meta-structure, an
ideology, according to, or within which its movements would be regulated. The
emphasis on *movement* calls for that aspect of the archaeology that is called the
transversal and this is not regulating in the ideological sense.

If archaeology is neither a phenomenological, structuralistic, existentialistic nor a
psychoanalytical philosophy, then what is it? To Deleuze it is neo-Kantian. Deleuze
traces the statements’ role of *being determining* and the visibilities’ role of *being
determined* yet irreducible to what determines it, to Kant’s revolutionary break with
Descartes. “The form of determination (I think) does not rest on an undetermined
element (I am), but rather on the form of a pure determinable element (space-time).”
Even if Foucault himself had invited to this comparison in the essay *What is
Enlightenment?*, this link between Foucault and Kant is one of the most daring moves
on Deleuze’s part. But its ingenuity admits a description of the relation between the two

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43 Deleuze, *Foucault*. p. 60.
44 To a direct question on how he defines structuralism, Foucault once replied: “When you ask those
who are filed under the title ‘structuralists’, if you were to ask Lévi-Strauss, or Lacan, or Althusser,
or the linguists, etc., they would reply that they have nothing in common with each other, or very few
things in common with each other. Structuralism is a category that exists for the others, for those who
are not. It’s from the outside that one can say that so and so are the structuralists.” Foucault (2001)
‘Foucault répondre à Sartre.’ *Dits et écrits I*, p. 693. Author’s translation; Cf. also the final comments
in the preface to the English translation of *The Order of Things*, p. xiv.
45 Deleuze, *Foucault*. p. 61.
*Mishael Foucault: Ethics, the Subjectivity of Truth*, pp. 303-319.
archive-faculties without the dialectical type of priority that would reduce the visual realm to the discursive. If this irreducibility is what Foucault borrows from Kant, it is not, however, without restrictions. In Foucault, the archives concern real experience of the limits of what is possible and not every possible experience, and furthermore, these are located in stratified historical formations and not in a transcendental subject: Foucault’s a priori is historical. However, the neo-Kantian feature in Foucault inherits from understanding and sensuosity the spontaneity expressed by the discursive formations, and the receptivity of the visual. The relation between Foucault’s two archives may then be described, by way of Deleuze’s reference to the Kantian critique, as one where the discursive is determining since it, like the faculty of understanding for Kant, pronounces its judgements on the sensible – what for Foucault is the receptive domain of visuality. Furthermore, what is visible for Deleuze’s Foucault is irreducible to the discursive since the determinable form of the visible (il y a lumière – corresponding to space and time as the intuitive forms in Kant) is of a radically different order than the determining form (il y a langage – corresponding to the faculty of understanding). This division in Kant’s philosophy is bequeathed as the ‘Copernican’ turning away from Descartes, to whom the ‘I think’ could determine ‘I am’ since they both belonged to the same determinable order and the ‘I am’ was regarded as an undetermined proposition.

Deleuze reflects Foucault in Kant’s phenomenology and particularly in its realization that an order cannot determine itself without closing itself, and that therefore the form of determination, ‘I think,’ should not to be sought to correspond to that of an undetermined being, but to the pure possibility of determination given in a form of intuition: space and time. Kant showed that the problem of truth concerns the possibility of a conjunction between faculties of knowledge rather than the construction of an indubitable proposition from which to deduce a tree of knowledge. Foucault’s neo-Kantianism would, according to Deleuze, consist in taking up Kant’s organisation of determinations between irreducible faculties, yet to consider them not as belonging to a transcendental subject but to a historically changing reality’s two formations of knowledge, the sayable and the visible. Hence, truth for Foucault is not the conjunction between the two, but the dynamic disjunctions that produce and release new statements and visibilities. The precondition for truth is that the disjunctions between the sayable and the visible establish certain procedures as truth. This means that the principle of selection must therefore be brought into knowledge from another, determining order. Such a principle is a function of spontaneity, and hence, the principle of selection is also what determines the difference between the visible and the sayable. Selection comes ‘before’ any knowledge in the sense that it is part of producing it: a creative, positive and mobile producer of apparatuses. The relationship between the discursive and the visual archives is discursively problematic because the principle that determines it demands an originary bifurcation in order both for apparatuses to be produced and for power to become an act.

47 Deleuze, Foucault. p. 60.
49 Ibid. p. 39.
The Relation Between Archives and Power

To Deleuze, this relation is a problem evoked by the question why, now that the visual and the discursive have been described in terms of faculties where one is determining the other’s determinable form, the discursive does not exhaust the visible. “How would the visible not slip away, as something eternally determinable, when statements can determine it ad infinitum?” Or in other words: what could explain the priority of the discursive while accounting for the fact that the visual remains as a determinable form? In order to answer this question, Deleuze returns again to Kant’s philosophy and specifically his need for a third instance that can mediate the irreconcilable relation between passive sensuousness and the active judgement of phenomena in the faculty of understanding. This mediating instance was for Kant the ‘mysterious’ realm of the imagination, or Einbildungskraft, which, as a mediator schematizes, that is, lays the conditional bridge of ordering that is necessary for the faculty of understanding to judge phenomenal appearances and legislate in the interest of knowledge. There is a concealed play of words here that highlights the notion of a mysterious field of forces already at play in Kant, for it is this Kantian -kraft that suggests the extra-archival relations as relations to power. Yet power, in the Foucauldian sense, does of course not account for a mysterious capacity within a transcendental subject to imagine and mediate a sensuous perception to a legislative, categorically based judgement. In Deleuze’s account, the immanent play of forces is what is integrated into knowledge:

50 Ibid. p. 68.

51 In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, the faculty of imagination synthesizes and schematizes so that through this activity, phenomena can be mediated from the receptive sensibility to the active faculty of legislative understanding. Deleuze describes this very clearly in his monograph on Kant: “We can now ask what the legislative understanding does with its concepts, or its unities of synthesis. It judges: ‘The only use which the understanding can make of these is to judge by means of them’. We can also ask: What does the imagination do with its synthesis? According to Kant’s famous answer, it schematizes. We should therefore not confuse synthesis and schema in the imagination. Schema presupposes synthesis. Synthesis is the determination of a certain space and a certain time by means of which diversity is related to the object in general, in conformity with the categories. But the schema is a spatio-temporal determination which itself corresponds to the category, everywhere and at all times: it does not consist in an image but in spatio-temporal relations which embody or realize relations which are in fact conceptual. The schema of the imagination is the condition under which the legislative understanding makes judgements with its concepts, judgements which will serve as principles for all knowledge of the manifold. [...] The fact that spatio-temporal relations can be adequate to conceptual relations (in spite of their difference in nature) is, Kant says, a deep mystery and a hidden art.” Gilles Deleuze (1984) Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. London: Athlone Press, pp. 17-18. The acts of synthesis in the faculties of understanding and imagination in Kant corresponds to the integrating battles between the visual and the discursive archives in Foucault that give way to the field of forces and the hearths of power that, like Kant’s schema’s realization of relations, produces statements and visibilities. Hence: “...in order to explain how passive sensibility accords with active understanding, Kant invokes the synthesis and the schematism of the imagination which is applicable a priori to the forms of sensibility in conformity with concepts. But in this way the problem is merely shifted: for the imagination and the understanding themselves differ in nature, and the accord between these two active faculties is no less ‘mysterious’ (likewise the accord between understanding and reason.)” Ibid. This corresponds to the relation between the realm of power and knowledge. The distinctive characteristics of these two relationships in Foucault is what motivates a neo-Kantian architecture of Foucault’s archaeology according to Deleuze.
not as a bridge, but as problems. Power is ontologically other to knowledge, what Deleuze calls an outer. While the two archives are merely external to each other, power is an outerness that affects knowledge by emerging as new singularities around which statements and visualities are formed. Yet, for all its abstract quality, power is still a political question. It belongs to the modern objectification of a political economy to conceive of power as democratically concentrated in the focal point of self-reflection by which a nation’s sovereign legitimates the right to rule. But this is a mere objectification. Power itself does not belong to anyone, it is not reducible to anything, and the forces at play within power are not aimed at any things or objects, but solely at other forces. Therefore, it would be a mistake to conceive of power exclusively in the violent sense, as exercised upon an object or a people, or from a definable place. Deleuze insists that power is not owned, it is exercised – and exercised by the dominant as much as by the dominated forces, and solely upon other forces. Power is neither restrictive nor in itself oppressive.

Although it is immanently present, power does not strictly belong to the domain of knowledge; understanding it is therefore a matter of thinking. The main difference between knowledge and power is that the archives and their apparatuses are formal while the fields of forces and their diagrams are informal. This is why the structure of the relation between the two formal archives cannot be directly transposed to the relation between the archives and power. Even though the dimension of power has a similar priority over the archives as the discursive archive has over the visual, spontaneity and receptivity in the realm of power have a very different meaning than in the realm of knowledge. Here it is a question of how the play of active and reactive forces within the horizon of power creates densities, raised intensities, verily hearths of power. These mutable hotbeds or power-zones are what secure, organize and even produce the selective structure of the relationship between the twin forms of knowledge. But power is not stratified like the archive: it is purely superficial. Hence the relations

52 Foucault’s rejection of Marxist political leftism has its background in Nietzschean ontology. Deleuze lists six Marxist postulates concerning the nature of power that Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* quite simply abandons. These postulates say: 1. That power is the property of a ruling class. 2. That power is located within the State apparatus. 3. That the power incarnated in the State is subordinated to a means of production which works like an infrastructure. 4. That the power is an essence that characterizes those who own it, and who are separated from those onto whom it is exercised. 5. That power is exercised through violence or ideology, and is primarily oppressive. 6. That the State power can be expressed as a law that can be understood either as a peace-condition that controls other, disruptive forces, or as a result of war. Against these six postulates, Deleuze argues that 1. Power is less a property than a strategy and is exercised before it is owned. 2. The State is a result of a specific constellation of hearths of power that enables it to appear; the disciplinary society is not a State apparatus but a type of power that permeates all institutions and apparatuses. 3. Economic power is not divided into super- and substructure that affect each other in a pyramidically shaped organization. Power is distributed on a field of immanence where it congests and spreads out in hearths and series. 4. Power has neither essence nor attributes; it is an operative relation passing through the dominant as much as the dominated singularities. 5. Rather than operating through ideology or as violence, which is power exercised on an object, power is operating on other powers, actions upon actions. Power produces reality before it oppresses. 6. Law is rather a distribution of, than the opposition to, illegals. Law is neither the result of war nor a condition of peace but is war itself, the exercise of a strategy. Cf. Deleuze, *Foucault*, pp. 25-30.

53 Ibid. p. 73.
between forces are differently organized than those between statements or visibilities in the archives.

Rather than a threefold spatial organisation that is subject to interdimensional variation, as is characteristic for the apparatuses of the archives, the forces have no other being than a relative variability. As the diagrams of force have no form, but are purely material and functional, their relations are on the one hand quite simple: they depend on a force’s ability to affect and its susceptibility to be affected. Though on the other hand it is quite complex: a relation of forces are actions and reactions involving not an object, but other forces, and is therefore expressible only as a group of variables, different modalities or directions of affecting action: it may for instance enable, enforce, provide for, disrupt or simplify another set of forces at the same time or successively and to various degrees. Deleuze says that the ability to affect is the function of the force, and the susceptibility to be affected is the matter of the force. These are the double abilities that define a diagram; the two coordinates of a map over social structures such as power affects their becoming. Hence the map, or the diagram is less to be considered a description or a representation than a productive, abstract machine. When archives formalize, it is the intensities within these two formless coordinates – function and matter – that are transposed into the domain of knowledge. The reason why this transposition is necessary is that the order of knowledge would not be able to compose new apparatuses had it not been determined by sheer power that is other than itself; a wholly different order, yet immanently permeating its own.

Now, returning to the question above, (why the visual archive is not exhausted by the discursive) the answer is found in the different modes of producing discursive and visual apparatuses. For the two archives to maintain their relation, and keep from running out of determinable variations between the visible and the sayable, the formalization of force into statements and visibilities must be conceived of as something else than an origin of knowledge or an invention: for Deleuze it may start with a bifurcation of force-relations – for example caused by an increased problematization of a desire-assemblage. This assemblage redirects the spontaneous order of force-relations and determines their new flows and congestions. Formalization of forces on the discursive side begins with a concentration of new hearths that become integrated as singularities, and which, by a repetitious tracing of their forces’ active functionality forms a multiplicity of formal statements. On the visual side, it consists of the appropriation of reactive matter, which is shaped into visibilities by the selective

54 This is a theme that due to lack of space is undeveloped in this essay. The three spatial determinations are very early in Foucault defined by Deleuze as the collateral space, formed by a neighbourhood of statements; the correlative space that is formed by a statement and the concepts, objects and subjects that it produces and finally the complementary space which is external and relates these two earlier spaces to extra-archival formations. Manuel De Landa has recently explicated these Deleuzian spaces as a space of variable dimensionality, influenced by Riemann’s geometry: “...the population of multiplicities would be dimensionally heterogeneous. Given that the plane of consistency must assemble multiplicities together by their differences, this ‘plane’ cannot be conceived as a two-dimensional surface but as a space of variable dimensionality, capable of bringing a dimensionally diverse population into coexistence.” Manuel De Landa (2002) Intensive Science, Virtual Philosophy. New York: Continuum, p. 112.

55 Deleuze, Foucault. pp. 71-72.
principle. Repetitiously traced, the diagrams thus actualise into concrete machines: apparatuses in the double domains of knowledge.

The diagram is no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography that is coextensive with the whole social field. It is an abstract machine. It is defined by its informal functions and matter and ignores every distinction of form between content and expression, between a discursive formation and a non-discursive formation. It is a machine that is almost blind and mute, even though it makes others see and speak.\textsuperscript{56}

The diagram does not have the formal qualities of the apparatuses it produces: there is no formal curve binding its multiplicities together and it has no determinable being; it is extremely, and exclusively creative. What it creates are new types of realities, new problem-zones for truth.

Lastly, every diagram is intersocial and in constant becoming. It never functions in order to represent a pre-existing world but produces a new kind of reality. It is neither the subject of history, nor does it survey history. It makes history by unmaking preceding realities and significations, constituting as many points of emergence or creativity as unexpected conjunctions or improbable continuums. It doubles history with a becoming.\textsuperscript{57}

How is this production of truth organised? This is not, and Deleuze points this out on a couple of occasions, a reiteration of the Marxist sub- and superstructure model, but a logic of production that follows what he calls an ‘immanent causality’. The immanence demands that the forces are not ‘outside’ the archives, but saturates them through and through, neither inside nor outside. The ‘causal’ productive relationship between diagrams and apparatuses is not, then, one of cause and effect, but of virtualities becoming actualized. Hence, this production does not have a history of successive beings but is itself a new creation of history doubled with its own becoming.

Deleuze explains how this production, or actualization has three different modes. The first kind of production is a spontaneous actualization proper of the multitudes of an abstract machine, effectuated by the formless multitudes themselves. Such spontaneous actualization determines the principle of selection. Secondly, the formal apparatuses of knowledge can integrate diagrams as subjects under its order of knowledge, as for example prisoners into prisons, children into schools, etc; this second mode of production, integration initiated by the archives, always aims at a global integration, or a homogenization of power. The third mode of production is a differentiation, or a bifurcation proper. The spontaneous actualization and the homogenizing integration can only take place, Deleuze writes, if multiplicities diverge into different paths, whereby the third mode of production also determines how they divide into, for example, oppositions and hierarchies. Moreover, it is because of this differentiating mode of production that active and reactive forces split up into two different kinds of formation, into the visible and the sayable, the non-discursive and the discursive.

Since it is the active \textit{functions} that are divided to become statements due to their ability to affect, and the reactive \textit{matter} that becomes visibilities due to its susceptibility to be

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. p. 34. Translation modified.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. p. 35. Translation modified.
affected, a gulf appears from the moment of their formalization. Even if the tension of this gulf can be increased or decreased, it can never be equalized. There would be no knowledge without power, since power conditions the relation between the two archives, and there would be no way for power to be actualized had there not been archives to integrate them into formal existence. This interdependence between archives and power is what motivates the inexhaustibility of the visual archive. Abstract machines produce concrete machines by way of differentiation and repetition. But what can be said about the principle of selection since it is what discursively determines the formation of visibilities? It is found to operate on another, technological threshold.

The abstract machines of power and the concrete machines of the two archives: these are all social before they are technological. Or, says Deleuze, one could also say that there is a ‘human technology’ prior to a material technology. Material technologies, on the other hand, can be exemplified with the Panopticon prison model, reinforced concrete or the computer. “No doubt the latter [material technology] develops its effects within the whole social field; but in order for it to be even possible, the tools or material machines have to be chosen first of all by a diagram and taken up by assemblages.” A new machine or a tool is selected as a composite in an assemblage by the diagram directly, and is then integrated as a more or less crucial part of an apparatus. For Deleuze, these assemblages function as coefficients for the actualization of the diagram; they determine to what extent an apparatus is relevant for the social field. It is in this sense that the principle of selection determine the ‘problematics’ of the dynamic relations between the visual and the discursive archive. The more an assemblage manages to actualize the diagram, the more does its technological functions and materialities permeate social practice. In this way, it is explainable how a technology can play a minor role for a longer period of time and then suddenly become an entire factory of statements and visibilities once a diagram has selected it as part of an assemblage with an increased coefficient rate to actualize that diagram.

Each assemblage therefore actualizes the diagram’s composition to a higher or lower degree. Equally, the same assemblage can be more or less capable of actualization in different social fields. The higher a degree of actualization, the more does its apparatus determine the social environment, the more permeating is its technology, and hence, the more variations does it implement onto other apparatuses. If the medical and punitive institutions are of particular interest for an archaeological investigation of the 19th and early 20th centuries, this is mainly because the assemblages of their apparatuses actualized that diagram to an extremely high degree.

The Mode of Actualization within Digital Libraries and Archives

It is in this sense that it was previously suggested, as a working hypothesis, that digitizing archives and libraries are institutions today whose assemblages to a very high degree actualize our diagram. When the apparatuses of hospitality, already functioning within modern library classification, had the opportunity to reassemble with the

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58 Ibid. p. 39.
technology of digital calculability, a completely new assemblage appeared. Not as an
invention in the ordinary sense: that is, as a new tool for solving a difficult problem, but
as a new machine for apparatic production and actualization of the virtual potentialities
of the new diagram. The extent to which the new technology is able to change our
knowledge formation is comparable to how internalization, as a new function, managed
to produce modern schools, hospitals and prisons.

The most commonly used metaphor today for expressing this new formation and how it
differs from the previous is probably the ‘network.’ As a proper name for a social
formation that expresses itself as able to route communication, transactions and all sorts
of affective mediations along paths that are independent of centralized, hierarchical
structures, this expression articulates also our desire for mobility and flexibility. The
tendency among archive scholars, by contrast, expresses a desire towards an increase of
spatial volume and temporal fragmentation. The archive is intended to be big, fast and
friendly enough to house such mobility. This is why it can be said that its function of
hospitality is still interpreted in traditional terms. The archives want to internalize
outside bodies by adding technological augmentations to its own. This is because their
interpretation of the digital environment has the disadvantage of not being able to affirm
the productive forces of our social diagram. Instead it inserts objections and hindrances,
as if the mobility that is part of our global knowledge production poses a threat to the
archive’s identity.

This contemporary desire to include the mobility, instead of affirming it, is comparable
to the well-known amusement – at any time – of considering the confusion in bygone
days of what to do with new technologies. Today we must laugh at ourselves. Because it
seems that the diagram has selected material machines for its actualization that are more
productive than the social formation of knowledge. Now, such situations have a
tendency to become politically dangerous. What has been referred to as a digital
prosthesis: the idea of augmenting existing functions and materials by adding new
digital services to an already existing body, is the result of an imagination whose
powers are today not as strong as they once were. What must instead be analyzed first is
what the assemblage of a digital library can do, what its limits are, and then how the
institution can affirm the capacities of the concrete and material machines thus
produced.

This paper is not the place to carry out such an analysis, but it may conclude by
mentioning a few possible ideas. Gilles Deleuze once described the new social
formation as a society of control.59 In a short, famous article named after this formation
he points out that while in the modern era of discipline one always had to start over
again, in the society of control one is never finished with anything. Discussing the
implications of this in an interview with Antonio Negri, Deleuze then suggested that
“one can imagine that education will be a less and less closed environment,
distinguished from professional environments as from other closed environments, but
that both of these will disappear to the benefit of a terrible, permanent formation where
continuous control is exercised over gymnasium teachers or university staff. One tries to

minuit, p. 240-247.
What is here referred to as ‘the liquidation’ of the school is not, of course, the end of education but, paradoxically its re-organization according to a new conditional power-strategy. If, as has been suggested above, education may become a new function of libraries and archives, then this must be understood in the sense of an affirmation of movement and flexibility. To not affirm it, but to add the techno-gadgets onto its existing body is dangerous – not because it perverts the body, but because such an extensive addition tends to create a new permanent control mechanism if appropriated within any institutional framework. If associated instead with an archive that affirms the abilities of our diagram it could enable an interdisciplinarity that would deserve its name, like a computer virus. This does neither imply education in front of computer screens, nor classroom education in libraries but a didactic model that emphasises archival hospitality in the sense of a mobile transversal that is connecting, disconnecting and reconnecting discrete and irreconcilable strings of knowledge. The participant of such hospitality is neither inside nor outside the library or the archive, but a mobile figure that maintains the openness of the bifurcations between a multitude of apparatuses. Hence the foundation of knowledge is no longer the complete accountability of neither a synthetic \textit{a priori}, nor speculative dialectics, but the problematic and creative relations between what is sayable and what is visible at a given time.

What perhaps ought to be changed is what Kant once referred to as the architectonics of knowledge. Or rather, since this alteration arguably already has taken place, what ought to be changed is the attitude towards its new capacities. Since archives and libraries are in a prime position to affirm the ability of this ‘network’ structure by actualizing the potentialities of what it can do, current research of these institution’s relation to digitization had better depart from an analysis of this architectonics than of how to enhance their traditional form by adapting to a new technology. Because only by thinking the relation between these institutions and the social production of knowledge is it possible to find a form where their potentialities are affirmed. Then, and only then, would archives and libraries know how to participate in the knowledge formation of the 21st century.

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Gilles Deleuze and the Intensification of Social Theory

Bent Meier Sørensen

Starting from the newly published book by Manuel DeLanda: Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, this exhibit explores the possibilities of reintroducing ontology into the social sciences: the postmodernisation of this particular if highly disparate academic field was to a high degree equivalent to an epistemologisation. Only statements and signs were deemed worthy of analysis and discourse analysis became the name of the game. The oeuvre of Gilles Deleuze posits a reintroduction of a new materialism into the field of study: a materialism which is also an empiricism, bringing into focus an expressive and constructive ontology of becoming, rather than that of being.

Together with Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault initiated in the 1970s a discussion on the role of the intellectual in post-war Europe and modern society in general. The discussion has by no means lost its relevance, as neo-liberals everywhere are targeting non-commodifiable knowledge, time consuming reflection and critique of power with a hatred and ressentiment few had imagined. Maybe Foucault also here had a foresight: while he definitely saw the threatening Fascism targeting intellectuals en bloc, which is the contemporary fashion, he carefully distinguished between the ‘universal intellectual’ and the ‘specific intellectual’. The former is as a role secured by and subjected to the state, frequently adored in the public, a sans souci producer of generalities, and the icon – very deliberate from Foucault’s side – of this was of course Jean-Paul Sartre. There is no need to go into the relation between Sartre and, say, the sorrows of Cambodia: the fact remains that the ‘universal and general truth’ has a sad history, typically related to the nation state and ‘state science’. Hence, Foucault points to another configuration of knowledge and power: the ‘specific intellectual’. Contrary to the universal intellectual, the specific intellectual is not necessarily protected by the state finances, does not seek to produce a totalising imaginary of her persona in the media, and does not propose

1 Cf. Michel Foucault (1977) Intellectuals and Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, which is an interview with Foucault and Deleuze.

2 In Denmark, as probably everywhere in the Americas, state-funded researchers have a media rating, displaying how much they personally are displayed and reproduced – since ‘cited’ wouldn’t really cover the process – in the media. An intense competition between these allegedly critical and
easy reproducible generalities, but works from time to time independent in different networks, shows up at unpredictable places, and commits herself to explore specific problems rather than strapping herself to the deliverance of universal solutions.

Manual DeLanda is such a ‘specific intellectual’. Born in the very territory embodying marginality, Mexico, his intellectual oeuvre of this day covers a wide range of issues and problems, typically connected to scientific concerns. As one of few philosophers he does not subject himself to the divide between social science and science propre, neither does he accept the silent (or silenced) war between continental and analytical philosophy. More specifically, he transgresses these dichotomies in truly original reconstructions of central concepts on both sides of this divide, leaving none of them unchanged. This happens via his engagement in experimental film, computer art and programming, chaos theory, war and AI amongst others. Moreover, DeLanda is a very frequent participant in different panels and conferences that bring together highly diverse groups of people, academic as well as non-academic, scientific as well as political interest groups. At the same time he, by way of his writing, probably plays a greater role in academia than do most of its full-time members, and he has in fact accepted to become Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. His earlier books, *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines* (1991) and *A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History* (1997), became bestsellers despite the fact that they are anything but mainstream. In *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines* he explores the importance of technology and different metals in the social setting of ‘war’ as when, say, Napoleon creates an army out of the materials at hand. The self-organisation of various systems, biological, geological and social is a key ingredient in the analysis. While this component is also prominent in more established system sciences, such as the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann’s work on autopoietic systems, DeLanda does not restrict his analysis to one single type of flow: in the case of Luhmann this flow is communication. But the world consists of many flows, in fact, in Deleuze and Guattari’s world the world consists of nothing but flows: flows of matter, flows of energy, flows of signs, flows of sperm, of blood, of anger. These flows are constantly connected, recorded or consumed by way of different ‘machinic agencies’, and the dynamic result of these machines are the heterogeneous ‘assemblages’, of which everything is a part.

These somewhat delirious concepts are much more prominent in *A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History* where DeLanda deploys a wide range of Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology, and also develops his original concept of those ‘meshworks’ that thrive within and outside hierarchies as organising principles of every possible assemblage.

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In his latest book, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*, DeLanda’s mission is different from that of his earlier writings: it is a special book, with a special task for a, according to the author, specific audience. First, on a most general level, DeLanda wants to transgress the division between analytical and continental philosophy. In the introduction to the book he proposes the community of analytical philosophers of science to be the primary audience (in the sense, one must assume, of an ‘implied reader’). Since his topic is the materialist ontology inherent in the writings of Gilles Deleuze, the task seems frightening: if there ever has been, to the analytical tradition, one intellectual in the hairy French postmodernism who embodied all that was despicable about postmodernism, Gilles Deleuze is the one. In what they consider to be an unbearable jargon loaded with neologisms, Deleuze (and Félix Guattari) represents the worst case in the flood of raving attacks on rationalism, the search for truth and the development of science in post-68 Europe.

This is where DeLanda’s take on Deleuze is both productive and provocative. Manuel DeLanda is in one sense not post-modern at all: he is a realist philosopher. But at the same time his mission is parallel to most of the post-modern projects: to counter reductionism, to attack determinism, to reject anthropomorphism. He finds, however and apropos the aforementioned paper, the social constructivists, to mention one branch of postmodernism, to be themselves reductionists, disregarding the emergent, self-organising forces of matter itself.

His main argument of the book, and it is an argument that he supports convincingly, is that Gilles Deleuze is no postmodernist in that sense: Deleuze is, ontologically speaking, a realist. In fact DeLanda, on the very first page of *Intensive Science*, goes as far as to state that “Deleuze has absolutely nothing in common with ...[the post-modern] tradition.” Clearly, this statement only makes sense if the tradition in question is reduced to a form of naive anti-realism, and only if one excludes at least Foucault, Derrida, Serres, Jameson and probably even Lyotard, all of which authorships are relatable to Deleuze’s own.

But let’s follow DeLanda on the core argument, rather than the ideological one: in the realist ontology of Deleuze, the world is not conditioned on perception or construction. Having made the analytical camp happy and – as indicated – offended the rest of us, DeLanda hurries on to dismiss the analytical idea of a stable, predictable world, where forms and essences – whose properties can be distilled via rigorous linguistic analysis – are guiding the principles of being and truth. Then the author in the rest of the book shows how Deleuze’s ontology explodes away the very notions of being, essence and truth. So, while he might have created some enemies in the epistemological branch of postmodernists, DeLanda takes pain in securing that he is making no friends amongst the analytical philosophers either.

Given the destruction of that stable world apparently so dear to our analytical friends, DeLanda replaces this false world picture with a Deleuzian notion of becoming. To

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6 DeLanda once gave a paper at Warwick University, UK, with the title ‘Kicking Social-Constructivist Ass’.
Deleuze, individuation, that is, how objects becomes objects or how matter receives its form, has nothing to do with essences (the tree’s relation to a tree *an sich*), but with the immanent forces and intense qualities of matter itself. These dynamic processes are then the subject of DeLanda’s reconstruction of Deleuze’s ontology, or really, the subject is a fundamental reconstruction of Deleuze’s *world*, a world of intensive fields of becomings, rather than of objective beings that are more or less successful copies of eternal forms.

*My* implied reader may ask how such a peculiar exercise could be relevant for the social sciences and, especially, an organisation theory which considers itself poststructuralist or equivalent. This leads to the sense in which Manuel DeLanda is a postmodernist. Whilst being a realist (albeit a special Trojan Horse sort of realist), DeLanda joins forces with the *intentions* of the post-moderns: to construct a relation with the world that rescues its radical openness, divergence and multiplicity. He strongly rejects the correspondence theory of truth, and seeks to retain the prominence of *difference* at the cost of *identity*. This explains his preoccupation with Deleuze, in which thinking truth is outperformed by relevance: what is true is still true, but more often than not also *trivial*. So, part of what Deleuze offers with DeLanda as the maieutic and necessary interface is to *give back* to the social sciences a creative and expressive and open ontology. Postmodernism was to a large extent an epistemological exercise where the magic notion was ‘the social’ and the consequences were the hidden import of anthropomorphism and a passive disrespect for ‘science’. Matter, inert and amorphous, as it was, didn’t really matter.

DeLanda argues that both naive realists and social constructivists adhere to what Deleuze calls the ‘hylomorphic schema’, where the forms of matter receive a source which remains ‘outside’, whether in the Platonic heaven, in God, or in cognitive schemata or social conventions. But the way out is, as it were, the way in: it is via a new, expressive ontology that the social sciences shall renew their power of enunciation.

Now, the founding difference in Deleuze’s ontology is the one between the virtual and the actual. It replaces the classical model of the possible and the real: here, realization is a loss in difference and the world is a faint copy of a rich, utopian world of possibilities. Apart from being the secure outset of ressentiment (confer for instance the whole theology of the loss of the halo in modernity), it is also a radical reduction of what is real. On the contrary with the Deleuzian world: the virtual, which is an intensive field of becomings consisting of different spatio-temporal processes, is *as real* as the actual: the virtual “is real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.”

The actual is only the latest result of these intensive processes, and the actual is what occupies us the most, with modern science and especially thermodynamics as the examples DeLanda offers. While being occupied with these actual results, their extensions and their qualities (structures of length, height, age), we lose sight of the intensive processes which gave rise to these qualities ‘prior’ to the results, namely intensive differences, for instance differences in temperature. DeLanda discusses the example of the creation of crystals,

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crystallization, where the crystal itself might have some ‘true’ characteristics: the number of atoms in the grid, the overall structure of the grid and the power relations which keep it in shape. But the really important or relevant issues, issues that are traditionally subordinated to the extensive qualities, are how the form of the crystal emerged from the flux of, say, the water that froze, and how an influx of energy (that is, intensity) will change the crystals again. If we add soap to water, bubbles might be created, and DeLanda argues that it is the same ‘endogenous topological form’ which is at work, namely the constrains that the molecules/atoms are endowed with, to move towards a situation in which a minimal portion of energy is required. This topological figure is nevertheless able to actualise a variety of forms.

The critique of science raised by Henri Bergson was initiated by what he saw as the inability of the 19th century scientists to think the truly novel, to keep the future open. If the future is only what is inherent in and determined by the past, the world is always already an iron cage. While at the time of Bergson (and Max Weber), science and bureaucracy were the threatening totalities, today the overall commodification and capitalist axiomatics seem to be the technologies of closure. A core theme of organisation theory: innovation and its management, is a critical case here. How would we, as organisation theorists (or disorganisation anarchists, pick your poison), think and conceptualise something new, which is not a new commodity?

Even if Intensive Science does indeed begin (and end) pretty much before this question can be raised in the social sciences, the book fills a blank spot on the map. As readers of Deleuze’s work, especially Difference & Repetition and Logic of Sense, will recognize, Deleuze in fact expects vast areas of mathematics and physics to be known on beforehand, and here DeLanda’s book comes in as a real eye-opener. The book is divided into four parts with an appendix attached. The first part, which the author generously offers the reader to skip on account of the extreme technicality of its content, is committed to the reconstruction of those mathematical resources which are necessary tools if one wants to think of the virtual field and the different non-linear causalities which guide it. In a sort of a ‘reverse Kantian’ fashion this mathematical part is followed by the two middle parts of the book, which explain how the virtual is actualised in space and in time, respectively.

These parts are much more inviting, as they also illustrate the production processes with examples like the abovementioned crystallisation. The schema of morphogenesis (transcendent forms imposed from the outside) and identity (with a presumed original) are replaced with a framework of intensive differences, which are in a constant process of actualisation, that is, acquiring extensions and qualities. There ‘is’, then, no space ‘before’ these singular states have been passed, by, say, the embryo of the chicken on its way to become a chicken: or more precisely, this space is non-metric and non-causal, it is a smooth space, as opposed to the metric and causal scheme dominant in the

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actualised space, the striated space. In the intensive field, the different migrations and foldings are extremely flexible, and the embryo can become every chicken, an openness and flexibility less pertinent in the actualised, metric space. The process of developing the embryo is a true multiplicity (or it is ‘pluripotent’ as DeLanda puts it), before it is actualised as that particular chicken. As Deleuze writes: “Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given.”

While an individual might have a fixed number of definite, extensive and qualitative properties (seen from the perspective of the metric space), it also possesses an indefinite number of yet unactualised capacities to affect and to be affected as well as unactualised tendencies (singularities with a non- or quasi-causal relation to the particular actualisation of the assemblage in question). The problem with science is its tendency to conceal what animates the intensive processes in the virtual – singularities and affects – under the extensive. What is needed (and DeLanda discusses in which instances it is in fact going on) is a science which does not cancel out the differences via homogenisation, and is able to “exhibit the open set of possibilities calling for an explanation in terms of the virtual.”

If this second part – of the four parts comprising the book – is committed to wrestle the world out of the dictatorship of the pre-given form and its imposed identity, by connecting its individuation to the space it develops, the next step is to wrestle it out of the timelessness of eternal forms, documenting the historicity of every multiplicity. The basic problem here is to conceive of a time which can transgress the extensive and metric, and work out a vocabulary of an ‘intensive time’ (Readers of Logic of Sense will be familiar with the notions that covers this conflict: Chronos and Aion. The time of the event and the singular is Aion. Deleuze is, evidently, also here inspired by Bergson’s durée). The time we normally (and to some extent phenomenologically) experience is a result of a metrization and quantization of time, ‘metric time’, and just as with space, these processes hide the intense, non-quantifiable flow of time needed to develop new forms. As well as the virtual needs its own space, it needs its own time:

Unlike a transcendent heaven inhabited by pure beings without becoming (unchanging essences or laws with a permanent identity) the virtual needs to be populated exclusively with pure becomings.

Consider, which DeLanda does after this quote, the unactualised event of 0°C that marks a point where water neither freezes nor melts. This event can be seen from the point of view of the virtual to be a pure becoming, which is an event that involves both directions at once: “a melting-freezing event which never actually occurs.” It is, as

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11 Difference and Repetition, p.222.

12 Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, p.62.

13 Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, p.65.

Deleuze puts it “always forthcoming and already past.” This time is the time of the event: “a dead time; it is there where nothing takes place, an infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, awaiting and reserve.” It is Shakespeare’s time out of joint, which is where “time itself unfolds...instead of things unfolding within it.”

This discussion leads DeLanda to a final encounter with, if you allow, State science and its generalities in the fourth and last part of the book: Virtuality and the laws of physics. DeLanda situates his discussion within the standing debate on science and technology, and points out the main advantage of the Deleuzian approach to science: it is problematic rather than axiomatic. As DeLanda puts it: “[...] problems are not reducible to their solutions but rather are defined by their distribution: a given distribution of the singular and the ordinary, the important and the unimportant.”

Rather than solving problems by way of clear and distinct solutions, problems must be seen as ‘obscure yet distinct’, and only attaining clarity during the phases where intuition partakes in specifying concrete yet unanticipated solutions. Problems are a matter of a nomadic distribution of singularities as opposed to matters of essence or inherent truth: in Anti-Oedipus – a work which, it must be said, DeLanda almost completely leaves out of his discussion except for the ‘appendix’ to which I will return – Deleuze and Guattari excavate the depressing history of solutions presupposing their problems. The worst case being psychoanalysis: whatever the problem was, the solution is the triangle, the ‘dirty little secret’, Mommy-Daddy-Me. Whichever is produced by the factory of the unconscious, it is problematized as a ‘theatre’, and its alleged ‘meaning’ is extracted. But since the whole script was prescribed by Oedipus, the analysis is eating its own tail: Oedipus is always territorialising, Oedipalising. And that is the problem, not the solution.

This is why, in Deleuze’s thinking, the ‘problematic’ is always regarded to be prior to the ‘solution’, which is a category of the already closed case, since a solution always has the truth it deserves according to the problem to which is a response, and the problem always has the solution it deserves in proportion to its own truth or falsity – in other words, in proportion to its sense.

The solution is confined to the empirical, historical determinations of its actualisation, and in a certain sense the solution is not interesting, it is not ‘inter-esse’, between being, but is already esse(nce). At the same time as the solution is the actual event, the problem to which it ‘is a solution’, must be retained as virtual, in a perpetual state of becoming, that is, becoming actualised. In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the abilities of, respectively, philosophy, art and science, to ‘counter-actualise’ the actual in

15 The Logic of Sense, p.80.
16 What Is Philosophy?, p.158.
17 Difference and Repetition, p.88. Some of these quotes appear in the extensive and extremely informative notes to the main text of Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy.
18 Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, p.176.
19 Difference and Repetition, p.159.
order to let their intensive properties emerge: whereas science is committed to the actual state of affairs (and one must add that in this formulation science almost by definition becomes ‘State science’), art is able to recompose an intensive field because of its ability to mesh together heterogeneous multiplicities. Philosophy, finally, is able to plunge everything all the way back into the virtual.

At this point, Manuel DeLanda makes an important contribution: he shows in detail why Deleuze’s view on science is not adequate and really outdated. He – Deleuze – is stuck in a view on science which was created by Anglo-American philosophers of science in the first half of the 20th century, and he does not really incorporate the development within advanced thermodynamics and system sciences throughout the entire century. That is why Deleuze’s ‘science’ runs the risk of being captured by ‘State science’, that is, a form of science blind to the virtual and intensive fields of becomings of a ‘nomad science’, and preoccupied with the actual extensities and qualities.

One of DeLanda’s contributions is to reimpart a nomadic or ‘smooth space’, within the laws and ‘striations’ of established science: he shows that nomadic or intensive science is immanent to science propre seen from the point of view of analytical philosophy.

This important distinction between nomadic and State science functions in the writings of Deleuze and Guattari’s as a continuous organizing principle in the form of the contested relation between ‘striated space’, that is metric, domesticated and law abiding space (State science, the city) and ‘smooth space’, which is non-metric, nomadic and meshed with immanent strategies (nomad science, the desert). It also reappears, I suggest, as the difference between Foucault’s ‘universal intellectual’ and ‘specific intellectual’ with which I began this exhibit. In Deleuze’s discussion of the history of ideas – which is a discussion that runs like a virtual thread throughout his oeuvre – he dismisses the traditional heroes from Plato to Hegel, and brings to the forefront illegitimate philosophers like Spinoza, Leibniz and Bergson. Hegel is the prime State philosopher: whereas the State military and administrative machinery striates the smooth areas with roads, cities and channels of goods and capital, the State philosopher carries on this striation in the mental spaces of the people.

In DeLanda’s discussion, however, there is also a certain striation going on, which he more or less admits. When quoting, for instance, A Thousand Plateaus or What is Philosophy?, we are, strictly speaking, dealing with texts by both Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. But DeLanda tries, to use his own words, to ‘wrench’ Deleuze out of the collaboration with Guattari. Let me quote in extenso from the famous opening of A Thousand Plateaus:

The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd. [...] We have assigned clever pseudonyms to prevent recognition. Why have we kept our

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20 In What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari describe how science occupies itself with ‘functives’. Even if it is very hard to get a grip on what ‘functives’ are, its reductionist stance – not least contrasted philosophy and art – is clear. We might say with an important expression from Difference and Repetition, that Deleuze and Guattari’s reductive thinking on the issue of hard science is guided – or rather restricted – by well known ‘images of thought’.
own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit. [...] To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I.  

As Deleuze explicitly pointed out the important effect joining forces with Félix Guattari had on his work, especially in regard to its social and political implications, however implicit they may be, it is even more important to remember (a fact that DeLanda does emphasise) that in *Intensive Science* he does not interpret Deleuze’s words, but reconstructs his world. In a sense we are here faced with a virtual Gilles Deleuze, because there is a point in the fact that Deleuze is not the author of *Intensive Science*: for Deleuze, a construction of an ontology might be ‘true’, but cannot in itself be relevant without the lines of flight that motivates his pen, the search, not for hope, but for new weapons in the tightening war against History, Interpretation, State violence and everyday Fascism. Naturally, not least to the ‘non-analytical’ reader, this certainly does take away some of the real edges and provocations of Deleuze and Guattari’s work: DeLanda, not only in this book, but in his writings more generally, seems strangely a-political, in my view in stark contrast to the sources of his analysis. However, one should bear in mind that a-political is not the same as un-critical, and we might think of DeLanda as a paradoxical a-political revolutionary.

Given these precautions, Manuel DeLanda’s extremely scholared and informative book is highly recommended for a much broader audience than the one he constructs in the introduction. On top of that, both new readers of Deleuze (and Guattari and their joint crowd) and more experienced ones will benefit from the Appendix, where different concepts are reconstructed and slightly changed through their different books: for instance, the ‘quasi-causal operator’ in *Difference and Repetition* has a counterpart in the ‘abstract machines’ of *A Thousand Plateaus*.

The social sciences, and not least its more or less illegitimate offspring, organisation studies, became boring to the degree of paralysis in the second half of the 20th century. There is no hope of salvation in the war machines released by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, but they have already shown ability to intensify what has become dull, move what has become static, and transform what has become rigid and trapped in self indulgence and *acedia* into flows and desire.

Manuel DeLanda remains one of the most powerful relays in this transformation.

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**the author**

Bent Meier Sørensen has, since his last appearance in *ephemera*, maintained his interest for marshal arts and he is – haphazardly ignoring his obvious lack of bodily as well as mental flexibility – currently heading for brown belt graduation. In between, he is working the nightshift at the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark. Don’t do this magnificent city without mailing meier@cbs.dk.

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21 *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, p.3.
Mobile Mutations
Sadie Plant and Chris Land

abstract
Between May 2002 and March 2003, Chris Land conducted an email conversation with Sadie Plant, in which they discussed topics ranging from life and work outside the institutions of academia to the future of the human species. Along the way, this virtual conversation ranges across neuro-pharmacology, the Situationiste Internationale, mobile telephony and the characterisation of the current global situation by a paradoxical conjunction of increasing mobility and tightly policed immobility. Through a series of engagements the general question is posed as to whether mobility itself is an increasingly fundamental arena for the contemporary exercise of power and what this conception of mobility might mean in an age of pervasive information technologies. Where mobility and communication are increasingly intertwined both issues need to be increasingly interrogated in relation to the transformations or mutations that they perform.

Chris Land: Your research covers a wide range of topics, from the relationships between the Situationiste Internationale and postmodernism, gender and IT, drugs, writing and international political economy, and more recently, the mobile phone and patterns of social behaviour. Do you see a particular thread of concerns linking these varied research agendas, and where do you see this developing? What are you currently working on?

Sadie Plant: These various themes may appear to have little in common, but they are all closely entangled in my mind! In some ways all my work involves digging just below the surface of orthodox histories and ideas and seeking out their neglected elements and influences – the impact of the situationists on so much subsequent philosophy, for example, or the extent to which psychoactive substances have intervened in a culture which would rather not acknowledge them. Even mobile phones, amazingly enough, have received very little intellectual attention, even though they are having a profound effect on parts of the world which have previously had little or no access to telecommunications of any kind. I am especially interested in technological changes, and the differences they can make not only to the ways in which people live and behave, but also to the ways in which we think and perceive ourselves. And while Zeros and Ones deals with technologies in the orthodox sense, I am also interested in a looser conception of technical processes – one that would, for example, include drugs as a kind of internal technology, changing the perceptual apparatus, just as digital technologies
change our outside world. I am also always keen to demonstrate something about, for want of a better phrase, the interconnectedness of things – I hope this comes out within each book as well as across all my work.

More generally, like many writers, I tend to write about the things I want to think through and explore myself – at the moment I’m working on some ideas around mobility, in relation to movements of people as well as those of goods, information, commodities. While I was researching the impact of the mobile phone last year, I began to think that its phenomenal popularity is due, in part, to a far more general rise in mobility of many kinds all across the world.

CL: I am intrigued by your idea of a ‘general rise in mobility.’ In what ways to you see this general mobility manifesting itself? It seems that we can hardly switch on the television or open a newspaper these days without seeing something about the illegal mobility of bodies across borders (most recently with asylum seekers for example), or the mass mobilisation of armies in the war against terrorism. These examples seem to be indicative of two sides of the same process. On the one hand an increasingly fluid mobility as borders are challenged and boundaries transgressed, but on the other hand a countermovement, where forces are mobilised to police these borders and protect the traditional order. I guess that my question relates to how you see these two movements as being interrelated, and whether you are suggesting that the increasingly uncontrolled and uncontrollable flows of commodities, capital, bodies and information is indicative of a general deterritorialization that is making architectural and geographically based power increasingly redundant?

SP: Many factors are contributing to the sense that we live in an increasingly mobile world, not least the spread of new and increasingly affordable technologies of travel and communication. Such developments make movement more possible, but they don’t wipe out borders or the interests they protect.

I am both fascinated and disturbed by the enormous discrepancy that now exists between movements of people, which remain highly restricted in most cases, and those of goods, capital, and information, which tend to be promoted, at least in principle (even though none of these movements are really quite as free as the rhetoric of globalisation might lead us to believe). That there are demands for the free(er) movement of people is clear, not only when one sees hundreds of thousands of people risking their lives in search of better prospects everyday, but also when one looks at the demographic crises about to hit much of the Western world.

On the more abstract question of mobility, it seems there is more of it on all sides: terrorism and state attempts to counter it have become more mobile, just as markets and corporate attempts to channel them have both become more mobile too. In this sense, mobility is being used in support of established geopolitical interests: its rise may pose a significant challenge to geographical borders and power bases, but while the latter may be withering on some theoretical vine, they are still very much in practical place. Even so, I would say that there is a general deterritorialization underway; that territorialized interests are forced to react and respond to it; and that they do so with increasing
difficulty. But movements of people (and other movements too) clearly can be blocked and channelled in the short term, and the short term can last for a very long time.

CL: In *Writing on Drugs* you point to the centrality of anti-drug legislation in the formation of international law, and the economic interests invested in restricting the movement of certain drugs around the globe. On the other hand, however, you also note the centrality of the opium trade to the formation of a worldwide capitalist system. How do you see these two drives working themselves out, and how do they relate to the point you raised earlier concerning the effects of drug on the body of the human organism – “a kind of internal technology, changing the perceptual apparatus”?

SP: Drugs have indeed been historically important to the development of capitalism and international law: the opiates can be seen as vanguard commodities, establishing markets and trade routes on which other goods would later circulate, and legislation to control their production, distribution, and consumption was at the heart of the earliest international laws. But I would describe these two drives in different terms – the issue is not about capitalism on the one hand and laws and regulations on the other, but rather markets and their regulation as two sides of the same capitalist coin. Capitalism is not about free markets and unregulated trade, but rather the harnessing and control of would-be free markets by states, corporations and various other formations designed to take advantage and control of market activity which serves them only insofar as it does not exceed their interests. The history of the drugs trade is indeed a fascinating demonstration of the extremes to which these two sides of capitalism – free markets and state regulation – can go. The drugs trade represents the freest of markets, operating, as it does, quite outside the law, and distributing commodities which in many senses are an ideal kind of merchandise: as Burroughs said of heroin, it needs no advertising, guarantees that the customer comes back for more, and is therefore a model to which all other commodities aspire. At the same time, drugs also circulate on the most regulated and constrained of markets: no other trade or industry has ever been subject to such strong and all-encompassing laws. And for the last hundred years or so, each side of this dynamic has constantly excited the other to new extremes: the more rampant the trade, the more determined the interdictions, even to the point of declarations of a war on drugs which has, in turn, done more to stimulate than stem the trade.

It is almost as though the effects that psychoactive substances have on the individual body are reproduced at these larger scales: they stimulate, soothe, deceive, and hook both global capitalism and the individual user – and, indeed, many other kinds and scales of organic and non-organic systems. This is, perhaps, to be expected: it is the volatility, the active nature of these substances, that makes them – and attempts to control them – so effective, distinctive, and influential. It seems that they change the nature of all the systems – from the neurochemical to the macroeconomic – in which they intervene.

CL: The image that I get from the way you talk about drugs having parallel effects at different scales reminds me of some ideas from chaos and complexity theory. There is an almost fractal replication of specific patterns or effects at different scales, even if this is not precisely a repetition of the same. In 1998 you also seemed to suggest that there is a significant degree of systemic lock-in with drugs. Because of the interdependency of
the different scales upon which their effects manifest themselves, any move to liberalise
drug controls at one level will inevitably have repercussions at manifold others so that
legalisation would not only affect the bodies of the users and the wider culture, but
would unsettle the balance of global political-economy. In light of this, how do you see
current experiments and moves within parts of the UK to decriminalise and reclassify
certain types of drug?

SP: Unfortunately, I think the current reclassifications are so minor that they have little
bearing on the larger issues of the systemic functioning of psychoactive drugs. Although
there are more significant moves afoot in other European countries – Portugal, for
example, where all drugs have effectively been decriminalised – it seems to me that the
broad dynamic would only change if there was a major, international shift in policy – a
true end to the war on drugs, in other words. And the likelihood of this happening seems
to me remote: as you say, it would indeed unsettle the geo-political balance, not least
because some of the poorest countries at present – including Colombia, Burma, and
Afghanistan – would suddenly find themselves sitting on a legitimate source of highly
profitable income. Even more dramatically, an illegal trade that is now said to constitute
some 10% of the global economy would be wiped out, and the implications of such a
shift are almost impossible to compute. The current relaxations of the law are merely
tinkering with a machinery which would need a concerted global change of heart to
change, and – especially now that the US has, so to speak, other fish to fry – it seems
unlikely that anything more significant will happen for some time. Having said all this, I
do think that even subtle shifts in the legal situation tend to have equally subtle ef fects
on individual users and drug cultures. I now spend a lot of time in Switzerland, where
there is a slightly different policy in place, and this does seem to produce a different
cultural atmosphere and rather more relaxed individual attitudes to the use of certain
drugs as well.

CL: You mention Afghanistan here in relation to drugs, a linkage that is currently quite
prominent in the news, but I find it interesting that you also recently used Afghanistan
as an example of the emancipatory promise held out by new technologies like the
mobile phone (‘on the mobile’, p. 75). In the same context, you also discuss the role of
the mobile in ‘mobilising’ mass movement, such as anti-capitalist protest. Can this kind
of technology really make a difference in such contexts, or is it more like the tinkering
with drug laws?

SP: It is worth pointing out that the links between Afghanistan and the opium trade are
not just prominent in the news – they are prominent in reality too, and have been for
many years. In relation to your main question, however, there is a qualitative difference
between the kind of tinkering one sees in terms of legislation and policy, and the small
scale technological tinkering involved in the introduction of a basic technology such as
the mobile phone. The extension of telecommunications to regions of the world and
communities for which access to technology of any kind has been scant in the past is the
kind of change that really does make a tangible, practical difference to people’s
everyday social and economic lives. It is not the result of policy decisions – indeed, the
spread of such technologies is more likely to happen in spite of such moves rather than
because of them. The availability of cheap mobile phones has, I am sure, done far more
than any political attempts to extend access to telecoms to some of the poorest people in
the world. The introduction of a mobile phone may seem to make only a small difference to, for example, a rural community without telephone lines, but its actual impact can be profound. And I am convinced that it is with such small, local, material developments that the most effective and long-lasting changes are really made. Like the adoption of the mobile across the developing world, its use by increasingly mobile protesters is an example of the way in which technologies are so often used in unexpected ways and with unintended consequences. The mobile was for years promoted as a tool for jet-setting business travellers and executives of various kinds, but it has no shortage of other uses now.

By the way, you may feel that I mention Afghanistan too much – if I do, it is only because I feel I learnt so much while living in an Afghan community in Peshawar two years ago.

CL: I can certainly see how in the West the mobile has been taken up in some rather novel and quite unintended ways. Not only do we find ‘mobile monkey’ competition scams running overpriced call-charges, but we also see the possibility of new forms of organization, as witnessed both by managerial rhetoric about virtual organization and the new forms of resistance exemplified by anti-capitalist protest. On the other hand, the sheer uptake of mobile phones and related information technologies seems to point to a very specific production of desire. In effect, like the car, doesn’t the mobile point to the production of a kind of ‘automobile subject’? Someone who is characterised by a propensity toward self-direction and a belief in autonomy? It is almost as if the mobile plays out, and produces, a desire for a disembodied existence where movement approaches instantaneity as the speed of mobile communications accelerates connectivity and makes the body redundant?

Of course the paradox is that this automobility is always entirely social and material. The infrastructure supporting both the car and the mobile costs a huge amount of money to set up; diesel powered remote mobile masts for example, which need to be installed and regularly serviced. On top of this there is the labour involved in producing the machines themselves, often involving prolonged contact with physically dangerous chemicals and undertaken by poorly paid female workers in developing countries. How do you see these two sides of automobility fitting together; the material, embodied production of mobility on the one hand, and its apparently autonomous consumption on the other?

SP: First of all, I don’t accept that the mobile makes the body redundant, or has anything to do with a disembodied existence – it seems to me that one might just as well see the mobile as continuous with the individual body (I don’t want to use the McLuhanite language of extension, but I do think of the mobile in such material terms) – and indeed with the social body, as an additional network which doesn’t dematerialise, but instead connects. In individual terms, the mobile is probably the first piece of digital technology which directly and more or less constantly changes people’s intimate experience of their bodies, their senses of their capacities, the possibilities of the everyday, on the street, material self. And while it may seem that the mobile appeals to an increasing sense of autonomy and individuality in more social terms, I came across almost the opposite response in the course of my research on mobile use around
the world: in America, for example, people spoke of their reluctance to use mobiles precisely because they saw them compromising their personal space, invading their boundaries, violating their privacy, and actually diminishing their autonomy by, for example, putting them in a position of continual dependency on other people (always able to call for help, advice, etc.). By contrast, people in societies which I would characterise as rather more collective and interconnected – China, Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, for example – see the mobile in exactly the converse way: as a means of continuing already existing social networks; a way to extend a sense of social interconnectivity. I began to think that although there are some technical and economic reasons for the relatively slow take-up of the mobile in the US, what one might call the ‘automobility’ of American society underwrites a cultural reason for American reluctance to become integrated with mobile technologies. On the questions of production: yes, mobile masts cost money – and may have other costs as well – but they don’t cost anything like the kind of money one needs in order to install the infrastructure of fixed-line telephones. Low-paid female workers: yes, indeed. The light at the end of this particular tunnel is, however, that those low-paid female workers are both producers and consumers of this particular technology – and if not direct consumers, they are certainly likely to be beneficiaries of a technology which brings unprecedented access to telecommunications to even the most remote and, perhaps, surprising parts of the world. Indeed, it seems to me that the unintended consequences of mobile technology are far greater and far more positive in the developing world than in the west, where the mobile merely adds another telecoms technology to an already wide range of means of communication.

CL: I am curious both about your time in Afghanistan and also your decision to leave academic life to pursue a career as an independent researcher. Perhaps you could tell us a little bit about what you were doing whilst in Afghanistan and how this relates to your current life as a researcher outside the university system. How do you fund your research and conferences, for example, and how has this effected the direction that your interests have taken?

SP: I wasn’t in Afghanistan itself, but in Peshawar, a city in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan which, at the time, was something of a capital in exile for about a million Afghan refugees. My time there had far more to do with personal connections than any clear intellectual trajectory, although it was a great opportunity for me to explore issues and ideas with which I would never have come into contact otherwise. I learnt a lot about Afghan culture, Islamic mysticism, Arabic and Persian literature, and countless unidentifiable themes which I suppose have now become integral to my own history and thinking – to shop in Afghan bazaars, to jump off moving buses without losing your veil, to live with the rules of sexual segregation, to sleep in temperatures above 40 degrees centigrade... Of course this is the kind of sojourn one can only make when working independently – even the most liberal academy might balk at funding an apparently fruitless life in a 2 room concrete house in a back alley of Peshawar! – so in that sense, my decision to leave the university has made an enormous difference to my life: it has made this and many other journeys and adventures possible, and it has enabled me to think without an agenda governed by departmental interests, academic consistency, theoretical lines and positions and so on. All this I value this extremely highly. On the other hand, the independent life can be very demanding – there are, for
example, both psychological and economic pressures from which one is relieved by a more institutional career. But I have always enjoyed working on my own, and I don't find it too difficult to make a living from writing, presentations, research, this and that... it is risky, of course, but I find it a far more satisfying way to live than when I’m in receipt of a salary.

CL: Whilst I recognise the limits that you are talking about in relation to systems of academic governance, even whilst working within the system, you seemed to be able to find some interesting spaces for transgression. I am thinking particularly of the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit (CCRU) at Warwick University, of which you were research director for a while, I believe. Could you perhaps talk a little bit about the ideas behind that project and what came out of it?

SP: You're right, I’ve always been extremely fortunate in finding interesting spaces within the academic system – even as a graduate student, I was moving between philosophy and several related disciplines, and to me these in-between areas are the most productive, albeit sometimes problematic, zones in which to work. The CCRU came together as a consequence of so many brilliant graduate students developing ideas which, although they were various and distinct, asked some common questions about the relationships between culture and technologies, both used in their widest senses. Many of them were interested in cybernetics, the work of philosophers such as Deleuze and Guattari, Irigaray, and Foucault, and the philosophical implications of various cultural tendencies in, for example, music and the arts. There was a feeling at the time that much of the existing work in this field had been looking through McLuhan’s famous ‘rear-view mirror’, tending to overlook the more extreme and fascinating implications of technological change for social, economic, and political relations, and also for philosophy itself, and I suppose the immediate goals of the CCRU were to come at these issues with some fresh and original perspectives. As for what came out of it – well, certainly some wonderful discussions and research. Perhaps like many of the best projects, the CCRU was short-lived, but it certainly had its moment and made an impact at the time.

CL: Why was this project so short lived? Do you think it is difficult to maintain the momentum for this kind of research in academia, and how did this relate to your own career decisions after the CCRU?

SP: For me personally, I suppose it was difficult to maintain the momentum – but I’m sure it is possible: there are plenty of people who love the academic environment and are able to do some great work within it – I suppose its just not my favourite world. In terms of the CCRU itself, I had hoped that the unit was established enough to survive my own departure; unfortunately this turned out not to be the case. In relation to my subsequent choices and directions, I suppose I now aim at variety, and try to avoid long-term or far-reaching commitments with any of the institutions with which I deal. Of course the danger here, as with any self-employed person, is that one ends up with a hundred different bosses instead of just one!

CL: To come back to your current research, one of the main concerns around mobile phones is, of course, the dangers of microwave radiation, both from masts and from the
phones themselves. How does this fit with the more positive perspective that you take on these technologies? I ask because this reminds me of the later sections of Zeros and Ones when you discuss “the greatest pollution crisis the earth has ever known” – the increased levels of oxygen in the earth’s atmosphere resulting from global cooling and the effect that this had on the dominant like form of the time, prokaryotes. Although catastrophic at one level, this led to a massive complexification of life through parasitic and symbiotic relations. There seem to be parallels with, and perhaps an implicit critique of, some contemporary environmental movements in this idea – a certain tendency to privilege certain orders of purity and deem all contamination and mutation to be a bad thing. What is your own take on the ecological movement, and the contemporary crises of pollution associated with technologies of mobility – both as radiation and car exhaust/global warming?

SP: Zeros and Ones is a polemical and provocative book, and it does indeed have a go at all notions of the natural, in terms of social orders, individual identities, and environmental stability, largely by questioning the whole notion of what is natural in the first place. My misgivings about environmentalism relate to the fact that attempts to preserve the environment so often find themselves allied to more negative and potentially dangerous forms of protectionism, hostility to trade, urban life, migration, etc. I’m not suggesting that there’s an inevitable slippery slope to fascism here, but I do think we have to be careful not to go too far down this road. The oxygen revolution discussed in Zeros and Ones is, because of its immense scale, a fascinating example of the ambiguity of pollution, although this would of course be no consolation if one belonged to the anaerobic world. But it does serve to remind us that we are not always, if ever, in a position to know what’s going on and where the developments with which we live will lead. Of course there are extremely negative effects associated with mobility – the consequences of our rampant burning of fossil fuels seem clear, and although I am genuinely uncertain about the implications of mobile phone and mast radiation, there may well be some serious issues here as well. And I’m by no means saying that all pollution is good pollution – this would be as ridiculous as the assertion that what we consider natural should remain so for all time. But I would still maintain that even global warming, which seems, from our perspective, to be such a devastating phenomenon, may look very different further down the line.

CL: Does this indicate some kind of shift in perspective akin to the famous revolutions of Copernicus, Darwin and Freud? Each of these thinkers served to decentre the human in some way, whether by refuting the idea that the Earth is the centre of the universe; that humans are separate from the animal world; or that the rational ego is at the centre of human existence. What you seem to be suggesting here is a complete break with the human as a foundation for perception. Whilst from a fixed, human perspective global warming might seem terrible, from a more abstract perspective – perhaps focused on life itself – this may not be nearly so disastrous. My question would be: what does this mean for the formulation of ethical and environmental concerns? Is it possible to have an a-human ethics, for example, or is the ethical project itself bound to a kind of humanism that is unable to cope with radical change and difference?

SP: My own thinking on these themes is sadly very tentative – but they are certainly urgent questions, and they are, perhaps, difficult to answer in anything but humanist
terms. Foucault, of course, made gallant efforts to develop an antihumanist ethic, but I suspect that one has to climb back inside the human, as it were, to deal with questions of how humans should behave. Having said this, I do feel that all our ethical and political questions would be greatly aided by an awareness of how small our own lives really are.

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Frontline(s)

Sian Sullivan

abstract

The challenge of theorising and analysing socio-political phenomena can feel overwhelming given today’s somewhat threatening realpolitik (9/11, US-led wars on Afghanistan, Iraq and now, perhaps, Syria) and the rapid pace with which (dis)information is received, digested and discarded. Through an act of ‘literary montage’ construction, and prefaced by some interpretation of my own, I offer this ‘exhibit’ as an attempt to highlight this sense of dislocation whilst simultaneously ‘building a picture’. A specific concern is to problematise the notion of ‘the frontline’. Given blatant military and economic imperialism by the US, underscored by the construction and fetishising of the rational subject under modernity and the social democratic state, I suggest that frontlines are located in any public or private space where the legitimacy of these interests and categories is questioned. Expressions of difference, including peace activism, thus become “proliferating illegitimacies” and are policed as such. Against this context, the texts positioned here tell of growing realisation and fear of the coldness and instrumentalism at the heart of empire-building, of which both the horrific violence currently inflicted on Iraqi people, and the discounting and suppression of dissent to war worldwide, are part. For a global anti-capitalist/pro-justice movement that recognises trade in arms as a core constraint on human potential, reaching beyond this fear – retaining the hope of the ‘politics of possibility’ with which this ‘movement of movements’ has come to be identified – emerges as a latent and essential challenge.

“Mο’ntage n...(production of) composite whole from juxtaposed pieces....”

Preface

Visit the MoveOn peace campaign’s website and enter a world of tenaciously flickering candle flames: the candles are lit as people commit to, wait for, and try to construct peace. Click on a location on the interactive world map and find yourself transported to a constantly shifting collage of images of people – young and old, women, men and children, ‘black’ and ‘white’ – holding the flame for peace. Overlain

on these images are statements from a multitude of individuals all over the world, each themselves flickering like a candle flame as they appear on the screen...

Motohiko Sato, Tokyo, Japan: “Dear Bush, do not kill them! You should [be] thinking about peaceful solution!...Please!”; Ranajit Dastidar, Chittagong, Bangladesh: “Please stop [the] Bush Administration from its belligerent move to invade and occupy Iraq...”; Anna Parker, Christchurch, New Zealand: “Please engage in your humanity and go down in history as those who were courageous enough to make a stand for peace.”; Roberta Thomas, Ambler, PA, United States of America: “Please help my country avoid a terrible mistake.”

“Our main presidential palace, a great rampart of a building 20 storeys high, simply exploded in front of me – a cauldron of fire, a 100ft sheet of flame and a sound that had my ears singing for an hour after....Then four more cruise missiles came in....To my right, the Ministry of Armaments Procurement...coughed fire as five missiles crashed into the concrete.”

Images of fire – the terrifying fire that consumes and destroys, and the subtle, flickering fire that sustains. As Pinkola Estes describes, “[t]here’s burning that goes with joy, and there’s burning that goes with annihilation. One is the fire of transformation, the other is the fire of decimation only. It is the fire of transformation we want.”

Will the fires in Baghdad emerge as a positively transformative force? Or will they go down in history as signalling the actions of an unflexible imperial power at the beginning of a campaign for purification and destruction of all that obstructs its hunger for power and profit? Will the candles lit by participants of a burgeoning, diverse and increasingly global peace and justice movement come to symbolise a psycho-societal, as well as political and economic, ‘system shift’, the form of which will only be clarified in hindsight? To what extent does this cohere and coalesce with the questioning of what it means to be human articulated by those identifying themselves as part of the ‘movement of movements’ that is variously anti-global corporate capitalism, and pro-justice, democracy, autonomy and self-determination? Are we witnessing (and participating in?) the emergence of a cultural presence around the globe that knows that power ≠ bombs, that violence and conflict are not necessary outcomes of being human, and that diversity not homogeneity, and co-existence not domination, potentiates the resilience and evolution of all living systems? If “the purpose of accepting authority is to learn to

outgrow authority”\(^8\), then is this ‘culture’ outgrowing aspects of state authority that are perceived to be constraining and stultifying, not least because of their collusion in the systemic inequalities and violence perpetuated to sustain a world order of US-led corporate capitalism?\(^9\). And are we also witnessing a conservative backlash to this of which the attack on Iraq, and the discounting of public opinion against war (not to mention Iraqi lives), is only one part? Or, as Bunzl, following Kohr, argues, are we merely watching the inevitable “propensity to abusive aggression and war” that arises once a socio-political unit gains enough stick-wielding power to ensure immunity from retaliation?\(^10\) precipitating a seemingly impossible repeating (or reversion?\(^11\)) of history?

Watch, read, hear the news and it is easy to absorb a discourse that recent/current events – 9/11/01, war on Afghanistan, war on Iraq – comprise the frontline of Samuel Huntington’s predicted clash of cultures between ‘the West’ and Islam.\(^2\) But look, experience and think beyond this discourse and frontlines are everywhere. Within both west and east, they are present wherever and whenever people live – maintain lifeworlds – that are different to and resist the dysfunctional fetishising of rationality and instrumentalism comprising a state-centric and imperialist modernity. Rejecting the de/sub-humanisation of non-rational aspects of ‘being human’; embracing the contributions of emotion, creativity, psyche and spirit to subjectivity\(^2\) – a common sense and practice – of ‘unity in diversity’, in contrast to a culturally and historically located, not to mention gendered and racist, universalising rationalism: these are frontlines embodied in vernacular knowledges and multifaceted experience – in the everyday life of what Negri frames as the irreducible multitude.\(^13\) They exist in relation to, and in the context of, an ascendant nexus of surveillance, policing and violence, not to mention the purification of difference, the

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imprisonment of dissenters, the self-censorship of panoptic society, that are systemic to the functioning of modernity and the social democratic state. Am I paranoid or perceptive? Depressed or suppressed? Or am I simply waking up to the closing off of possibilities for a nuanced and human conversation beyond that dictated by the arbiters of Empire—today embodied by the capitalist, patriarchal, unilateralist and imperialist military machine and neo-conservative ideology that is the Bush(+Blair) administration?

As I grope my way through this rapidly shifting terrain to see what, if any, patterns emerge – the closure of analysis, the certainty of ‘research findings’, feel inappropriate and unfeasible. My approach, then, is neither the hard linear logic of reason, nor some impossible and undesirable attempt at cold objectivity. Instead, I offer an exhibition of textual images – a ‘literary montage’ – as an attempt to juxtapose issues and themes that seem to me to be of immense and perhaps predictive significance. When guts literally are being spilled by the cabal of men-in-suits and uniforms that are running the world’s largest ‘democracies’ and weapons arsenals – when this is objectified and rationalised as ‘collateral damage’ – then an attempt at a subjective and anti-rationalist gut reaction seems wholly and intellectually justifiable. Thus, my methods are the tears of grief and outrage that well-up when reading some of the texts that appear here; my frustration at witnessing the closing in of a Kafkaesque state-bureaucratic web of citizen surveillance, suppression of dissent, and violence towards those who ask questions; my joy at the sense of carnival and community, and of creativity and humour – the multifaceted humanity – that infuses the peace and anti-capitalist/global justice protests; and my fear at seeing those batons raised and at being hemmed in by people (men mainly) who become indistinguishable as individual humans once the riot uniforms go on. I follow Böhm in his similar exploration, via literary montage, of the significances of the protest and policing events that took place in London on Mayday 2001: quotations minus quotation marks and myself present as ‘guest in my own text’. Space constraints and an attempt to maintain some focus have meant editing where I have felt it appropriate, and this is signalled as conventional throughout.

Frontline(s)

As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world’s preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge:...Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests? We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration’s success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully

promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities.19

…advanced forms of biological warfare that can “target” specific genotypes may transform biological warfare from the realm of terror to a politically useful tool.20

Throughout his journal...Columbus spoke of the native Americans with...admiring awe: “They are the best people in the world and above all the gentlest – without knowledge of what is evil – nor do they murder or steal...they love their neighbors as themselves and they have the sweetest talk in the world...always laughing.”...But then, in the midst of all this...Columbus writes: “They would make fine servants. With fifty men we could subjugate them all and make them do whatever we want.” And what did Columbus want? This is not hard to determine. In the first two weeks of his journal entries, there is one word that recurs 75 times: GOLD...He ordered the natives to find a certain amount of gold within a certain period of time. And if they did not meet their quota, their arms were hacked off....In the [first] Gulf War...[w]hen Colin Powell was asked about Iraqi casualties he said that was “really not a matter I am terribly interested in.”21

When two brutal regimes clash, they always need as much human cannon fodder as possible. Saddam’s policy is to keep his loyal Republican Guards close to him, to protect him from the US/UK invaders...[w]hile he puts poorly-equipped conscripts as cannon fodder to face US/UK forces in the desert, and threatens them with torture of their families should they desert the frontlines. The US has a different arm-twisting technique – to dangle offers of skills training, free college education and health care in the faces of poor Americans in order to get them to sign up...The sad result is a disproportionate number of ‘people of colour’ on the US frontlines in the Gulf. During the first Gulf War, over 50 percent of front-line troops were non-white, although people of colour only make up around 10 percent of the overall population. Over 30 percent of US troops are non-white but they make up only 12 percent of officers.22

In the summer [of 1999]...Katherine Harris who was both co-chair of Dubya’s presidential campaign and Florida’s secretary of state responsible for elections employed a firm of consultants with strong Republican ties, Database Technologies, to clean up the state’s electoral rolls. This included removing anyone “suspected” of being an ex-felon, who cannot vote in Florida. That meant that the 31 per cent of all black...
men who have a past felony on their records were prevented from voting. The fact that most black Florida residents vote Democrat – 90 percent of those who were allowed to vote in 2000 voted for Al Gore – was pure coincidence.

US soldiers in Iraq are being asked to pray for President George W Bush. Thousands of marines have been given a pamphlet called “A Christian’s Duty,” a mini prayer book which includes a tear-out section to be mailed to the White House pledging the soldier who sends it in has been praying for Bush...The pamphlet, produced by a group called In Touch Ministries, offers a daily prayer to be made for the US president, a born-again Christian who likes to invoke his God in speeches....Monday’s reads “Pray that the President and his advisers will be strong and courageous to do what is right regardless of critics”.

B-52 Stratofortress Bombers:
Crew: Five
Load: 51 x 500 lb (227 kg) bombs, 30 cluster bombs, or 20 cruise missiles
Max speed: 650 mph (1,046 km/h)
Range: approx. 8,800 miles (14,160 km)

[Friday, 21 March] Eight American B-52 bombers took off from a UK airbase. Peace protesters wept, held placards and said they felt “sickened” as the B-52 bombers took to the skies. A small group of aircraft enthusiasts also gathered around the base as the B-52s took off.

Many Iraqis had watched as I had television film of those ominous B-52 bombers taking off from Britain only six hours earlier. Like me, they had noted the time, added three hours for Iraqi time in front of London and guessed that, at around 9pm, the terror would begin. The B-52s, almost certainly firing from outside Iraqi airspace, were dead on time.

[Tuesday, 25 March] Three people died yesterday in the farmhouse which was bombed at Diailla, including the young wife, Nahda, who was missing in the rubble. She, along with Zahra, the eight year old daughter and her aunt, Hana, were buried this morning...the couple had been married just one week...and a neighbour showed us a flouncy pink invitation to the wedding festival. Omar, the bridegroom, sat silently crying on the floor in the hospital corridor, leaning on the wall, body bent, head in his hands....Ration sacks were piled in the kitchen and there was a bowl of green beans which looked as if they were being prepared for an evening meal. Two or three of the

neighbours invited us to eat in their homes. Humbling seems too small a word for the experience of being invited to share food and hospitality, by people with so little, while crouching in the rubble of their friends’ and neighbours’ home which was obliterated, with several lives, by my country, only the previous day....

[Wednesday, 26 March] Another farming community in Al Doraal also reported an attack by Apache helicopters at 4pm on Saturday. Atta Jassim died when a missile hit his house. Moen, his eight-year-old son had multiple bowel and intestinal injuries from shrapnel: part of his intestine had been removed. His six-year-old brother Ali and mother Hana were also injured by shrapnel.... “Is this democracy?” the men demanded to know.... “Is this what America is bringing to Iraq?” At 9 this morning a group of caravans was hit with cluster bombs, according to the doctors. A tiny boy lay in terrible pain in the hospital, a tube draining blood from his chest, which was pierced by shrapnel...I’m not sure whether he knew yet, or could understand, that his mother was killed instantly and his five sisters and two brothers were not yet found....Farms are not a legitimate target...You cannot bomb an area of civilian houses knowing that people in the vicinity are likely to be hurt by flying glass and shrapnel. More than that though, more than the illegality of it, this is wrong. It’s desperately, horrifyingly, achingly wrong.

Traumatic experience leads us to experience our own body as ‘foreign’, in its spontaneous impulses to surrender and flow: if it feels vital to suppress feeling and emotional expression, then this can only be achieved by alienating ourselves from our own bodies.

This is our moment, our time to take the stage and play our part, not in a theater or a club, or our living room, but out in the open. We party people, old hippies with cobwebs on our dreams, mums and dads, global citizens. What is the way forward?... If this thing goes off, there will be nowhere to hide. Turn off the TV come and dance with your neighbours, you teachers, your law enforcement – our community – lets get to know each other while we still can. War is only one conversation, one possibility – Peace is mine! “we are the powers that be” Let us create a new conversation. “our new world order is love” There is nothing left to lose now, lets pull out all the stops and go for it. “party for peace” everyone, in every town and city in this world, 24 hours a day, taking to the streets and partying for peace – no aggro in the face of whatever – Love and respect for all including the cops who are all just caught up in it like we are.

Our humanity is stronger than all your weaponry!
Well I might as well be in jail. Impotence, you’d have thought, would be the one affliction that Western Man had truly conquered. I can’t check e-mail without being offered cut-price Viagra, and the phenomenal rise in web-based porn means I’m lucky—or unlucky, perhaps—to get through a day without being treated to sights that would have probably made me faint when I was 14. Mind you, I nearly fell off my chair yesterday, and I’m ashamed to admit it was the result of surfing to an X-rated picture featuring a child. But before you phone the Vice Squad, or gather a few neighbours for a lynchin’, I’d better explain that she wasn’t being abused. Well no, that’s not right—she WAS being abused. The picture purported to have been taken in Basra, on March 23 2003, and I’ve no reason to doubt that claim. The scene, a low pile of bodies—indistinguishable individually, just an outstretched, pale arm here or a stiff leg there. The reason you couldn’t make out too much of the background was the bloke, heavily bearded and with a turban, standing in front of this impromptu mortuary. He was stooped by the weight of the young girl cradled in his arms, her head resting on his right forearm and her shattered legs dangling over his left. Her right foot was destroyed, a wreck of flesh dangling by a flap of skin and only recognisable in context. Her clothes—modern, colourful—spotted with blood and what might have been shrapnel entries. Her face was pale, eyes closed and mouth a thin line. Of course, I’ve seen grotesque things before. That film of the South Vietnamese general shooting that VC kid in the head. The photograph of the Iraqi soldier, burnt to death at the wheel of his vehicle on the Basra Road in Gulf War 1. And, of course, I’ve seen plenty of photographs of mutilated civilians, because war is never very far away when the Internet spans the globe. The thing that made this picture so different, the thing that won’t go away now, was that she really could have been my daughter. Oh, sure, my daughter’s maybe a year or two younger, and her hair’s fairer, and, and, and. But she would have chosen comfortable, pull-on leggings just like those, and a feathery boa-like wrap just like that one. And if she’d been where this girl was, she’d be just as... well, there’s the other thing. You can’t tell for sure whether the girl’s still alive. It doesn’t look like it, more as if the man—her father, maybe, or just a stranger—has picked her up from the pile of corpses behind him, unable to leave her there like a bright flower amongst the drab clothes and pallid flesh. But maybe she’s just unconscious, as if that would make everything alright. A million people in Basra are without clean water or electricity, and the entire Country is under a ferocious attack, so what would her chances of surviving be? So, that’s where I am: sitting in a room, writing to try and get the pain out. But that won’t happen, because I’m completely impotent. I can’t do any of the things that I so desperately want to do; I might as well be in jail. I never could have prevented her from being horrifically maimed or killed, and I can’t prevent it from happening again, and again, and again. And each time, it’ll be my daughter. Harry, UK, 25 March 2003.

The relevance of Freud to our time is largely his insight and, to a very considerable extent, his demonstration that the ordinary person is a shrivelled, desiccated fragment of what a person can be. As adults, we have forgotten most of our childhood, not only its contents but its flavour; as men of the world, we hardly know of the existence of the inner world: we barely remember our dreams, and make little sense of them when we

do...Our capacity to think, except in the service of what we are dangerously deluded in supposing is our self-interest…is pitifully limited: our capacity even to see, hear, touch, taste and smell is so shrouded in veils of mystification that an intensive discipline of un-learning is necessary for anyone before one can begin to experience the world afresh, with innocence, truth and love…This state of affairs represents an almost unbelievable devastation of our experience.

The night started peacefully enough. People with candles. The usual stuff….However, turn the corner into Park Street, onto College Green, opposite the Council House, and a very different sight would have met you. A thousand-strong crowd at that stage chanting, singing and vibrating with the sound: “Stop the war!” It felt like the sight could have been an inspirational scene, something to tell your grandkids, something that stood for liberation and freedom. Until the luminous coats, like a chain of nightflies, came running from all sides around the crowd and into the throng. And not only on foot and not only on horseback, but with barking dogs and riot shields, like a bright nightmare, shouting in language that is unrepeatable. Helicopters, umpteen police vans and armed officers accompanied the protesters every way...And I also was mishandled by three officers in riot gear. I was put in an arm-lock not once, but twice…But maybe the officer who answered my purposefully inane question as I left the dwindled crowd at Hotwells Road gives a better idea of why the world has allowed this war to take place. He said: “We’ve had some angry drivers tonight and we can’t upset them, can we? After all we’re all going somewhere, whether it’s right or wrong.”

Just in case you are unclear about this war. A warmonger explains war to a peacenik:

PeaceNik: Why did you say we are invading Iraq?
WarMonger: We are invading Iraq because it is in violation of security council resolution 1441. A country cannot be allowed to violate security council resolutions.
PN: But I thought many of our allies, including Israel & Turkey, were in violation of more security council resolutions than Iraq.
WM: It’s not just about UN resolutions. The main point is that Iraq could have weapons of mass destruction, and the first sign of a smoking gun could well be a mushroom cloud over NY.
PN: Mushroom cloud? But I thought the weapons inspectors said Iraq had no nuclear weapons.
WM: Yes, but biological and chemical weapons are the issue.
PN: But I thought Iraq did not have any long range missiles for attacking us or our allies with such weapons.
WM: The risk is not Iraq directly attacking us, but rather terrorist networks that Iraq could sell the weapons to.
PN: But couldn’t virtually any country sell chemical or biological materials? We sold quite a bit to Iraq in the eighties ourselves, didn’t we?

WM: That’s ancient history. Look, Saddam Hussein is an evil man that has an undeniable track record of repressing his own people since the early eighties. He gasses his enemies. Everyone agrees that he is a power-hungry lunatic murderer.

PN: We sold chemical and biological materials to a power-hungry lunatic murderer?

The multitude is a whole of singularities. On these premises we can immediately begin to trace an ontological definition of what is left of reality once the concept of the people is freed from transcendence. The way in which the concept of the people took shape within the hegemonic tradition of modernity is well known. Hobbes, Rousseau and Hegel have, each for his own part and in different ways, produced a concept of the people starting from sovereign transcendence: in those authors’ minds the multitude was regarded as chaos and war. The thought of Modernity operates in a twofold manner on these grounds: on the one hand, it abstracts the multiplicity of singularities and, in a transcendental manner, unifies it in the concept of the people; on the other hand, it dissolves the whole of singularities (that constitute the multitude) into a mass of individuals. The modern theory of natural right, whether of empirical or idealist origin, is a theory of transcendence and of dissolution of the plane of immanence all the same. On the contrary, the theory of the multitude requires that the subjects speak for themselves, and that what is dealt with are unrepresentable singularities rather than individual proprietors.

Did you know…A British nuclear-powered Trident submarine is out on patrol ready, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, to fire sixteen nuclear-armed missiles. Each submarine carries 48 independently-targeted nuclear warheads. Each warhead has seven times the explosive power of the first atomic bomb...[t]he atomic bomb that was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, killing 140,000 civilians. It costs us £1.5 billion every year.

Special stop and search powers under anti-terrorism laws are in force in Wiltshire and Gloucestershire. A police spokeswoman said the powers had been introduced to enhance security around RAF Fairford [where American B-52 bomber planes are stationed]. “The order covers the counties of Gloucestershire and Wiltshire and gives police the power to stop and search persons and vehicles in order to prevent terrorism.”

Schizophrenia is a diagnosis, a label applied by some people to others...[it establishes] as a social fact that the person labelled is one of Them. It is easy to forget that the process is a hypothesis, to assume that it is a fact, then to pass the judgement that it is biologically maladaptive and, as such, pathological. But social adaptation to a


dysfunctional society may be very dangerous. The perfectly adjusted bomber pilot may be a greater threat to species survival than the schizophrenic deluded that the Bomb is inside him.  

In response to plans for a demonstration at Vandenberg Air Force base in central California this weekend, officials warned that anyone found trespassing would be subject to a new shoot-to-kill policy.

On Wednesday, signs were attached to the perimeter fence [at RAF/USAF Fairford] which warned: “Use of deadly force authorised”.

Dear Pledger, As I’m sure you’re aware ‘Shock and Awe’ has now begun...Needless to say, now is the time to redouble our efforts rather than fall into despondency and despair. Acts of nonviolent civil disobedience have been taking place around the country throughout the week: On Monday over 20 ‘die-ins’ took place around the country, the MoD was smeared with fake blood, a vicar helped to blockade an RAF base, and 20 peaceful anti-war protestors stopped the trading at the International Petroleum Exchange in London for several hours. On Tuesday Britain’s military nerve-centre at Northwood was blockaded for 25 minutes, two Oxford-based activists were arrested for trying to get into USAF Fairford to disarm one of the B52 bombers currently stationed there, and several hundred protestors took over the road outside Parliament during the vote in the Commons. On Wednesday protestors held-up Jack Straw by 1/2 an hour when they turned up and died-in outside his London residence just after 7am, Northwood was again blockaded (this time for half an hour) and thousands of school children walked out – and in one case occupied the road outside Parliament – to protest the war.... Gabriel, ARROW

[Thursday, 27 March] London. £25,000 Anti-War Protest: 12 noon, Downing Street: Nabil Shaban, disabled actor, writer and film-maker – and star of ‘Dr Who’ and ‘City of Joy’ – will return £25,000 that his film company Sirius Pictures received from the Department for Works and Pensions in protest over the war. Shaban: ‘I do not believe this Government is sincere in its [sic] support of the spirit behind the European Year of

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41 ‘Resistance Roundup #1’, email to those supporting ARROW’s (Active Resistance to the Roots of War, http://www.j-n-v.org/ARROW_briefings.htm) Pledge of Resistance, 22 March 2003. The author of this email, Gabriel Carlyle, was one of 5 peace activists arrested for highway obstruction during a non-violent direct action blockade at Northwood military HQ on 6 April 2003. This was one of over fifteen anti-war actions in the UK taking place as part of a Reclaim the Bases weekend (http://www.reclainthebases.org.uk/ last visited on 9 April 2003).
Disabled People (EYDP). Instead, this Government is only really interested in supporting the “American-Anglo Year for DISABLING People.”

The second convoy (since this phase of the war against Iraq started) from Welford Munitions Dump to Fairford was halted on the A419 on its [sic] way to Fairford, yesterday (Mon 25th March) at about 9.50am. The blockade consisted of one car which was driven from a cross road into the middle of the very slowly driven convoy, by our heroic driver Ambuka. Unfortunately, because of where we intercepted the convoy (on a crossroads) the bomb-laden trucks were, after 3 or 4 minutes, able to go round the blockage. Meanwhile, the Police wrestled four of the protesters, including myself to the ground. At the moment that the convoy stopped, three other activists miraculously appeared at the rear of the convoy and lay in the road, joined together with arm tubes. The police identified a car as belonging to the protesters at the rear of the convoy, when this was denied the rear window was smashed – um…this was [not] their car, so if you live on A419, near Fairford and had your car window smashed, the perpetrator were officers from the Thames Valley Police. Believe it or not, the police didn’t detain us. Our car was searched under the Terrorism Act (2000) and the driver was given a producer. That was it, apart from the police stealing our car key and snapping the SIM card in our mobile. RESISTANCE MUST CONTINUE. If you’re running out of motivation read Jo Wilding’s Iraq Diaries.

Protesters turned out in much greater numbers than expected on Saturday for the largest demonstration against a war in progress in British history.

[Saturday, 22 March] The day started well, a bright March sunshine warmed us as we got onto the coaches at Euston. There were about 200 of us, including IndyMedia reporters and an independent film maker. Making good time, we received news as we approached the Fairford area that the cops were stopping and searching coaches….We were searched one by one under Section 60 (for drugs, offensive weapons and items which might conceal our identities). Almost all our white overalls were seized…They then seized most of our helmets, shields and padding (which were designed to fend off attacks by guard dogs and batons). In an Orwellian 1984-style inversion of the truth, these obviously defensive items were classified by the cops as “offensive weapons”. Some scarves were stolen too…We were then informed…that because they had found certain items (the shields and helmets etc) they believed we intended to cause a breach of the peace at the air base, and that we would be escorted back to the motorway…Instead of being only escorted to the motorway, the cops escorted us all the way back into central London, blocking all possible exits from the motorway and refusing to let us stop at service stations for toilet breaks. Several people had to use

42 Email received from Pledge of Resistance, 25 March 2003, [http://www.peacepledge.org](http://www.peacepledge.org).
whatever containers they could find to relieve themselves. Then we heard from contacts in London that there were at least 10 vans full of riot police waiting for us at Euston...as we got to the Shepherds Bush area of west London, a lucky pause at some traffic lights allowed the vast majority of those on board the three coaches to jump off and make a run for it....Personally, I’m not going to whine about civil liberties being infringed because I don’t believe they have any relevance in a terror state like Britain. We can’t expect anything other than harassment, malicious arrest, surveillance and obstruction from a system that feeds off of oppression and violence....The struggle continues: determination and solidarity are our weapons.

Many commentators dismiss anarchism as utopian, formless, primitive, or otherwise incompatible with the realities of a complex society. One might, however, argue rather differently: that at every stage of history our concern must be to dismantle those forms of authority and oppression that survive from an era when they might have been justified in terms of need for security or survival or economic development, but that now contribute to – rather than alleviate – material and cultural deficit.

[19:50, Sunday, 23 March] London. 200 people sitting down on Park Lane near Hyde Park. Riot police moving people off central reservation. Protesters are completely surrounded, chanting “no war”. 30 police vans present. 21:00 ITV news, BBC News, Sky News....Apparently there were some people shouting a bit in London...Some of them were ‘Socialists’ There were one or two middle aged ladies who were a bit emotional. Well, what do these people expect, there’s a war on after all. And there was NOTHING Precisely NOTHING. About the protests in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Menwith, Fairford or any of the other protests large OR small that took place across the country, and in Europe, America and all across the globe....That’s NOTHING at all about traffic being disrupted in city centres. That’s NOTHING at all about 200 people being shunted back down to London, under police escort, closing off sections of the motorway because their hats and scarves might cause serious offence. That’s NOTHING at all about the Black Hawk helicopters on the fenceline at Fairford. That’s NOTHING at all about the signs on fences warning that “use of lethal force has been authorised”. What’s this? Ignore the peasants and they’ ll go away? After all, we don’t need their votes, we can suspend elections until after the war. Well fuck you Blair. Fuck you Hoon. And fuck you too Straw. One way or another you are going to reap what you have sown.... As for you Bush? Well, fuck you too. One way or another you were going to have this fucking war. If you had the mental capacity to understand the damage that you’ve caused with ‘preemptive defensive strikes’ and your bloody murderous invasion to liberate people I’d feel sorry for you. Because at least I’d know that, at nights, you sit thinking about what you’ve done...Fuck you Bush. Daddies friends put you where you are, and you can bet your bottom dollar that they’ll get shot of you just as easily. And I hope that from now until that final day, you see each and every mother’s child that you have killed.


maimed or scarred and that you feel every last bit of suffering you have caused. Fuck you Bush. Fuck YOU.

[Friday, 28 March] Baghdad. Two British soldiers lie dead on a Basra roadway, a small Iraqi girl – victim of a US/UK airstrike – is brought to hospital with her intestines spilling out of her stomach, a terribly wounded woman screams in agony as doctors try to take off her black dress. The short sequence of the dead British soldiers for the public showing of which Tony Blair expressed such horror yesterday – is little different from dozens of similar clips of dead Iraqi soldiers shown on British television over the past 12 years, pictures which never drew any expressions of condemnation from the British prime minister.

Banned on Wall Street and wiped off the Internet, Arab news channel al-Jazeera defended its controversial coverage of the Iraq war on Wednesday and demanded the United States come to its aid in the name of a free press.

The spectacle is the existing order’s uninterrupted discourse about itself, its laudatory monologue. It is the self-portrait of power in the epoch of its totalitarian management of the conditions of existence. The fetishistic, purely objective appearance of spectacular relations conceals the fact that they are relations among men (sic) and classes.

Peace activists are currently imprisoned for their anti-war actions and likely will remain so for the duration of the war. We’re sure that they would appreciate postcards of support:

– Margaret Jones and Paul Miller. Disabled thirty support vehicles which service, refuel, and load bombs onto US B-52 bombers. Contact David Mackenzie on 0870 458 3117. Send cards to: Margaret Jones, KV5877, HMP Holloway, 1X Parkhurst Road, Holloway, London N7 ONU & Paul Miller, JT5092, HMP Gloucester, Barrack Square, Gloucester, GL1 2JN.

– Toby Olditch and Phillip Pritchard. Attempted to disarm a B-52 bomber. Contact 01865 423 200. Send cards to: Toby Olditch/ Phil Pritchard, HMP Gloucester, Barrack Square, Gloucester GL1 2JN.

– Ulla Roder. Caused an estimated £25 million worth of damage to a Tornado jet. Contact Jane Tallents 0845 458 8367. Send cards to: Ulla Roder, HMP Cornton Vale, Corthon Road, Stirling, FK9 5NY.

– Angie Zelter. Trespassing onto a US air force base near nuclear capable F-15 Strike Eagle aircraft. Contact Davida on 01508 550 446. Send cards to: Angie Zelter, HR4725, HMP Highpoint, Stradishall, Newmarket, Suffolk, CB8

47 Posting from Ken to the Mark Thomas mailing list, 23 March 2003.


Imagine a country where…

- The government can outlaw an organisation without proving a case against it in court, criminalising not only membership of the organisation but also public protest in support of the organisation and where even wearing clothing making the authorities suspicious you may be a member or supporter of the organisation could be enough to send you to jail.
- Where the right to peaceful protest has been so severely undermined as to not exist, legally speaking, at all.
- Where the legal definition of terrorism covers such acts of civil disobedience as tearing up genetically modified crops or organising a mass emailing of an organisation.
- The government has the legal power to intercept and read all your electronic communications whether or not you’re under suspicion for a crime.
- For various crimes, the defendant has to prove his innocence.
- Where people can be banned from travelling without having been convicted of any crime.
- If you’re arrested for a crime you may be denied access to a solicitor and denied the right to notify someone of your arrest for up to 48 hours, and may be held without charge for up to a week.
- Where your silence whilst being questioned or whilst in court may be used against you.
- Where although there are laws to protect your human rights, they cannot override legislation enacted by the national parliament.


Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience then? I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume, is to do at any time what I think right...Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice.

Functionalism, or the assumption that society should be understood in terms of its reproduction, inevitably imposes a closure upon thought. In Marxist functionalism, the
possibility of a different type of society is not excluded, but it is relegated to a different sphere, to a future. Capitalism is a closed system until – until the great moment of revolutionary change comes. Consequently, social activity is interpreted within the bounds imposed by this closure...Categories are understood as closed categories rather than as categories bursting with the explosive force of their own contradictions...Even more damaging, the theoretical subordination of subjectivity leads to the political subordination of the subject to the objective course of history and to those who claim to have a privileged understanding of that course. To be blind to fetishism is to take fetishised categories at face value...Nowhere has this been more disastrous...than in the assumption that the state could be seen as the centre point of social power...Certainty can only be on the other side, the side of domination. Our struggle is inherently and profoundly uncertain. This is because certainty is conceivable only on the basis of the reification of social relations...non-fetishised, self-determining social relations would not be law-bound. Revolutionary change cannot possibly be conceived as following a path of certainty, because certainty is the very negation of revolutionary change. Our struggle is against reification and therefore against certainty...Revolutionary politics (or better, anti-politics) is the explicit affirmation in all its infinite richness of all that which is denied...Dignity is the self-assertion of all those who are repressed and of that which is repressed, the affirmation of power-to in all its multiplicity and in all its unity.

Percentage of Americans who currently support this war: 72%
Percentage of Americans who believe Iraq attacked the World Trade Center: 51%
Percentage of Americans who cannot locate Iraq on a world map: 65%

I hereby transmit to the Congress proposed legislation to create a new Cabinet Department of Homeland Security...Our Nation faces a new and changing threat unlike any we have faced before – the global threat of terrorism...I propose the most extensive reorganization of the Federal Government since the 1940s by creating a new Department of Homeland Security. For the first time we would have a single Department whose primary mission is to secure our homeland...The Department of Homeland Security would make Americans safer because for the first time we would have one department dedicated to securing the homeland. One department would secure our borders, transportation sector, ports, and critical infrastructure. One department would analyze homeland security intelligence from multiple sources, synthesize it with a comprehensive assessment of America’s vulnerabilities, and take action to secure our highest risk facilities and systems. One department would coordinate communications with State and local governments, private industry, and the American people about threats and preparedness. One department would coordinate our efforts to secure the American people against bioterrorism and other weapons of mass destruction. One

department would help train and equip our first responders. One department would manage Federal emergency response activities.56

Much of the discussion of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay has focused on the question of the status of these individuals under international humanitarian law; most commentators insist...that in any case international human rights law applies to the treatment of the detainees by the US...this latter assertion is...contested by the US government, which argues that since Guantanamo Bay, although administered by the US, is not US territory, the obligations of the US under international rights law are not in play relative to its treatment of the detainees...Can a state avoid its international obligations by locating detention facilities outside its own territory?57

Yesterday, the Bush administration asserted sweeping new police powers over the American people. In a legal brief filed with a federal appellate court, the Department of Justice asserted that Yaser Esam Hamdi, who is an American citizen, can be held incommunicado on a military installation as an “enemy combatant.”...Timothy Lynch, director of the Cato Institute’s Project on Criminal Justice had the following comments on the issue: “The bottom line is that President Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft are attempting to suspend the ‘Great Writ’ of habeas corpus, which allows Americans to get into a court of law to challenge the legality of their arrest and to have their liberty restored if the court agrees that the arrest was unlawful. Without judicial review, the police can arrest people without warrants and jail people without trials. “The controversial ‘military order’ that Bush issued last November has, in effect, now been extended to American citizens--and the writ of habeas corpus is now under assault. President Bush seems to believe that his commander-in-chief power gives him the authority to ignore every other part of the Constitution when he deems it necessary...the judiciary should resist this power grab.”58

The EFF59 is pleased that at least some of the more severe changes in the surveillance of U.S. persons contained in the USAPA60 will expire on December 31, 2005 unless renewed by Congress. We are concerned, however, that there is no way for Congress to review how several of these key provisions have been implemented, since there is no reporting requirement to Congress about them and no requirements of reporting even to a judge about several others. Without the necessary information about how these broad new powers have been used, Congress will be unable to evaluate whether they have

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60 i.e. the USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act of 2001, [http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism_militias/20020925_patriot_act.html](http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism_militias/20020925_patriot_act.html).
been needed and how they have been used in order to make an informed decision about whether and how they should continue or whether they should be allowed to expire without renewal.\

Seven Iraqi families filed a lawsuit in Belgium Tuesday against ex-US president George Bush and three other US leaders for alleged crimes during the first Gulf War in 1991...The lawsuit cites George Bush, the father of the current president, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell and retired US Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, who led operation Desert Storm against Baghdad...Cheney was US defence secretary at the time of the first Gulf War, while Powell was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff...The action was brought under Belgium’s “universal competence” law, which allows legal proceedings against people accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, regardless of their nationality of location. The families who brought the action are either victims or relatives of victims of US bombing of a civilian shelter in Baghdad that killed 403 people on February 13, 1991.\

US corporations look set to single-handedly rebuild the health, education, transport and political systems of Iraq – with the UN and international aid agencies not getting a sniff of the £60 billion worth of contracts being dished out by the US government. As fat corporate cats lick their lips at the money to be made from building airports and modernising Iraqi telecommunications and oil wells, SchNEWS can reveal that this is indeed a war of liberation – liberating Iraq’s resources from Iraqis and handing them over to caring US companies. And what do you know – the reconstruction of Iraq will be awarded to a coalition of Bush’s closest cronies! Overseeing rebuilding and humanitarian relief (if Bush has his way) will be Jay Garner, a retired US general who is, incidentally, the president of an arms company! Garner, a firm supporter of the Israeli military, has spent the last few years building weapons systems now being used in the Iraq war. How handy! And then there’s Halliburton, the firm who’ll get the job of putting out oil fires and making emergency repairs to Iraq’s oil infrastructure, who oddly enough used to be run by US vice-president Dick Cheney. Cheney was chief executive of Halliburton until three years ago and still receives up to a million dollars a year from them. Union-busters Stevedoring Services of America have been handed the $4.8 million contract to run the port of Umm Qasr, while bidders for other contracts include Fluor, whose board includes a former director of the National Security Agency and deputy director of the CIA, and the Bechtel Group, whose boardroom boasts a former secretary of state and a former defence secretary! But where is all this money coming from, one may well ask? After being bombed back to the Stone Age by the non-coalition US forces, Iraq certainly won’t be able to cough up the money to pay the non-coalition US companies for its reconstruction. But here’s the most beautiful part of all – it’s the very people who Bush refuses to give a decent healthcare and education system to (i.e. the US taxpayer) that will line his mates’ pockets. A significant chunk of the money being paid to US firms to rebuild Iraq was made available by the Iraq war bill,


passed by Congress and giving Bush a $75 billion budget to wage war with taxpayers’ money. [And last week Richard] Perle decided to leave after revelations of a fairly huge conflict of interest – he is in line to receive $600,000 from bankrupt telecommunications company Global Crossing for helping it to ‘overcome Defence Department resistance’ to its proposed sale to a foreign company. The person he is being paid for persuading is none other than his old pal and a man he regularly advises, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld.

America is a special case...everything important that has happened or is happening takes the route of the American rhizone: the beatniks, the underground, bands and gangs...directions in America are different: the search for arborescence and the return to the Old World occur in the East. But there is the rhizomatic West with its Indians without ancestry, its ever-receding limit, its shifting and displaced frontiers...America reversed the directions: it put its Orient in the West, as if it were precisely in America that the earth came full circle; its West is the edge of the East. (India is not the intermediary between the Occident and the Orient...America is the pivot point and mechanism of reversal.)

The 70th anniversary wasn’t noticed in the United States, and was barely reported in the corporate media. But the Germans remembered well that fateful day seventy years ago – February 27, 1933. They commemorated the anniversary by joining in demonstrations for peace that mobilized citizens all across the world. It started when the government, in the midst of a worldwide economic crisis, received reports of an imminent terrorist attack...But the warnings of investigators were ignored at the highest levels, in part because the government was distracted; the man who claimed to be the nation’s leader had not been elected by a majority vote and the majority of citizens claimed he had no right to the powers he coveted. He was a simpleton, some said, a cartoon character of a man. When an aide brought him word that the nation’s most prestigious building was ablaze, he...rushed to the scene and called a press conference... “This fire,” he said, his voice trembling with emotion, “is the beginning.” He used the occasion...to declare an all-out war on terrorism and its ideological sponsors, a people, he said, who traced their origins to the Middle East and found motivation for their evil deeds in their religion. Two weeks later, the first detention center for terrorists was built in Oranianberg to hold the first suspected allies of the infamous terrorist. In a national outburst of patriotism, the leader’s flag was everywhere, even printed large in newspapers suitable for window display. Within four weeks of the terrorist attack, the nation’s now-popular leader had pushed through legislation – in the name of combating terrorism and fighting the...
philosophy he said spawned it – that suspended constitutional guarantees of free speech, privacy, and habeas corpus. Police could now intercept mail and wiretap phones; suspected terrorists could be imprisoned without specific charges and without access to their lawyers; police could sneak into people’s homes without warrants if the cases involved terrorism. To get his patriotic “Decree on the Protection of People and State” passed over the objections of concerned legislators and civil libertarians, he agreed to put a 4-year sunset provision on it: if the national emergency provoked by the terrorist attack was over by then, the freedoms and rights would be returned to the people, and the police agencies would be re-restrained.... Immediately after passage of the anti-terrorism act, his federal police agencies stepped up their program of arresting suspicious persons and holding them without access to lawyers or courts...Citizens who protested the leader in public – and there were many – quickly found themselves confronting the newly empowered police’s batons, gas, and jail cells, or fenced off in protest zones safely out of earshot of the leader’s public speeches... Within the first months after that terrorist attack, at the suggestion of a political advisor, he brought a formerly obscure word into common usage. He wanted to stir a “racial pride” among his countrymen, so, instead of referring to the nation by its name, he began to refer to it as “The Homeland.”... Playing on this new nationalism, and exploiting a disagreement with the French over his increasing militarism, he argued that any international body that didn’t act first and foremost in the best interest of his own nation was neither relevant nor useful. He thus withdrew his country from the League Of Nations in October, 1933, and then negotiated a separate naval armaments agreement with Anthony Eden of The United Kingdom to create a worldwide military ruling elite. His propaganda minister orchestrated a campaign to ensure the people that he was a deeply religious man and that his motivations were rooted in Christianity...Every man in his rapidly growing army wore a belt buckle that declared “Gott Mit Uns” – God Is With Us – and most of them fervently believed it was true. Within a year of the terrorist attack, the nation’s leader determined that the various local police and federal agencies around the nation were lacking the clear communication and overall coordinated administration necessary to deal with the terrorist threat facing the nation, particularly those citizens who were of Middle Eastern ancestry and thus probably terrorist and communist sympathizers, and various troublesome “intellectuals” and “liberals.” He proposed a single new national agency to protect the security of the homeland, consolidating the actions of dozens of previously independent police, border, and investigative agencies under a single leader.... To consolidate his power, he concluded that government alone wasn’t enough. He reached out to industry and forged an alliance, bringing former executives of the nation’s largest corporations into high government positions...He built powerful alliances with industry; one corporate ally got the lucrative contract worth millions to build the first large-scale detention center for enemies of the state. Soon more would follow. Industry flourished. But after an interval of peace following the terrorist attack, voices of dissent again arose within and without the government...He needed a diversion, something to direct people away from the corporate cronyism being exposed in his own government, questions of his possibly illegitimate rise to power, and the oft-voiced concerns of civil libertarians about the people being held in detention without due process or access to attorneys or family. With his number two man – a master at manipulating the media – he began a campaign to convince the people of the nation that a small, limited war was necessary. Another nation was harboring many of the suspicious Middle Eastern people, and even though...
its connection with the terrorist who had set afire the nation’s most important building was tenuous at best, it held resources their nation badly needed if they were to have room to live and maintain their prosperity. He called a press conference and publicly delivered an ultimatum to the leader of the other nation, provoking an international uproar. He claimed the right to strike preemptively in self-defense, and nations across Europe – at first – denounced him for it, pointing out that it was a doctrine only claimed in the past by nations seeking worldwide empire...It took a few months, and intense international debate and lobbying with European nations, but, after he personally met with the leader of the United Kingdom, finally a deal was struck. After the military action began, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain told the nervous British people that giving in to this leader’s new first-strike doctrine would bring “peace for our time.” Thus Hitler annexed Austria in a lightning move, riding a wave of popular support as leaders so often do in times of war. The Austrian government was unseated and replaced by a new leadership friendly to Germany, and German corporations began to take over Austrian resources. In a speech responding to critics of the invasion, Hitler said, “Certain foreign newspapers have said that we fell on Austria with brutal methods...but when I crossed the former frontier there met me such a stream of love as I have never experienced. Not as tyrants have we come, but as liberators.”

To deal with those who dissented from his policies, at the advice of his politically savvy advisors, he and his handmaiden in the press began a campaign to equate him and his policies with patriotism and the nation itself...In times of war, they said, there could be only “one people, one nation, and one commander-in-chief” (“Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuhrer”), and so his advocates in the media began a nationwide campaign charging that critics of his policies were attacking the nation itself. Those questioning him were labeled “anti-German” or “not good Germans,” and it was suggested they were aiding the enemies of the state by failing in the patriotic necessity of supporting the nation’s valiant men in uniform... Nonetheless, once the “small war” annexation of Austria was successfully and quickly completed, and peace returned, voices of opposition were again raised in the Homeland. The almost-daily release of news bulletins about the dangers of terrorist communist cells wasn’t enough to rouse the populace and totally suppress dissent. A full-out war was necessary to divert public attention from the growing rumbles within the country about disappearing dissidents; violence against liberals,...; and the epidemic of crony capitalism that was producing empires of wealth in the corporate sector but threatening the middle class’s way of life.

A year later, to the week, Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia; the nation was now fully at war, and all internal dissent was suppressed in the name of national security.67

Frodo has failed: Bush has the ring.68

I am finally ready to admit what for months I have kept hidden: I am terrified. I am more scared than I have ever been in my adult life. For weeks now I have felt a new kind of free-floating terror at what has been unfolding, as the Bush administration has

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67 Hartmann, T. ‘When Democracy Failed: the Warnings of History’, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Democracy_America/WhenDemocracyFailed.htm, 16 March 2003 (permission is granted for reprint in print, email, blog, or web media so long as this credit is attached).

68 Slogan on a placard at the stop the war protest in Brighton, 20 March 2003 (personal notes).
made it clear that nothing would derail its mad rush to war.... This fear I feel is not just of power-run-amok but of an empire with the most destructive military capacity that has ever existed – an empire with thermobaric bombs and cruise missiles, cluster bombs and nuclear “bunker busters.” No matter how hard the government works to try to keep us from seeing the results of those weapons – and no matter how much the news media cooperate in that project – we understand how many civilians could die under the onslaught of these horrific weapons. They can censor the pictures, but not our imaginations. This fear I feel is not just of the unchecked power of the United States but of the fact that Bush and his advisers seem to think they understand their own power and can control it. It is the arrogance of virtually unlimited power married to lifelong privilege. It is hubris, and in a nuclear world there is no sin that is potentially more deadly. This is the fear that I feel, that I think so many of us feel. The Bush administration wants us to be afraid, but remain quiet about it. Our power will come not from denying the fear but in confronting, and overcoming, it. So, we must speak of it, not to scare others but to bring us closer together. Our only hope against the fear is in each other, in our organizing, in our resistance. And if we can confront our fears, we can confront this empire...

To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life’s but a walking shadow; a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.

Emotion is the chief source of all becoming conscious. There can be no transforming of darkness into light and of apathy into movement without emotion.

the author

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