Eventum Tantum: To Make the World Worthy of What Could Happen To It

Ole Fogh Kirkeby

abstract

In this article a theory of the event is presented which operates with three theoretical levels. The first level being beyond both ontology and epistemology, the other level presenting the internal tension between sense and non-sense, and the third level constructing an analytical figure of the zones of the event, the so-called ‘pentagon of the event’. The article also presents the Stoic distinction between pragma and tynchanon, between the level of sense, and the level of material causes. Finally it presents a distinction between constellations and installations, which forms a quasi-normative approach to the event. The ideas can be seen as an interpretation of Deleuze’s thoughts about the event, but also as an autonomous contribution to a systematic and detailed analysis of the event, transcending the thoughts of Deleuze.

Introduction

One can safely say, without a trace of exaggeration, that the event is the most important phenomenon, both to philosophy and to the social sciences today. However, not many modern philosophers, or Denker, besides Heidegger and Deleuze, both of whose opera has had an impact on the social sciences (Deleuze’s by far the most, and it has not reached its climax yet), have treated the event as an autonomous subject. Even the thoughts in The Logic of Sense, or in Leibniz and the Fold, which among the books of Deleuze come closest to the monographic intention, have not got a systematic character, when seen from an epistemological or ontological point of view. Deleuze does not create a consistent and comprehensive theory of the event – whether he might have wanted it at all, I cannot know.

When thinking about the event, questions like the following spring to mind: Does an event exist materially? Is an event an ontological entity? To what a degree are we able to create the event at the level of sense? Are we able to negotiate the sense of the event? How many levels and dimensions are we able to attribute to the event? What is the relation between an event and a context? How do we differ between the sense of the event, and the event of sense? Or there are even more profound questions like: Is the event beyond ontology? Is the event of immanence similar to an immanence of the event, with which we are unable to cope epistemologically?
During the last few years I have tried to develop a theory of the event, in which these questions are answered. In some ways I perceive my work as a strengthening of the theoretical approaches by Deleuze, even if it – at the most important points – differs from them. This is also the way it is presented in this context. Of course, Deleuze suggested interpretation, not advocacy, of his own work, and the following text is in line with such an approach.

**The non-aliud**

There is an ontological and epistemological practise of immense importance to our lives, the capacity to say: ‘This has happened!’ However, neither this wording, nor the conceptualisation of the event nor the reflective understanding of the event in which eventing itself is articulated, can be the proper ‘this’. The ‘cascades of actualisations’ in *What is Philosophy?*1 might simply bounce off the event, be untimely, or – since we, so at least it seems at this point in history, are denied the predicates ‘false’ and ‘true’ – without sufficient relevance, pragmatic impact, certainty, or even intensity. The act of affecting by the manifold aspects of the immediately present, the eventing force might not ‘fit’ the event that receives this version of the process of eventing, and which must accept it. And it might not be properly received by the attempt of this process of eventing to reflect on itself. This is the fatal incompatibility, the delicate crack, between effectuating and being deposited, between that which happens, and its articulation in the games of truth. This crack is the fissure between ‘the sense of the event’ and ‘the event of sense’.

If this crack is taken as a proto-ontological phenomenon, it goes beyond the ontological difference, because it defies the predicate of Being. The core of Being (*ousia*, essence) can never be Being (*einai*, ‘esse’) itself, in so far as this core is the event. This is exactly what makes the famous distinction of Heidegger – which he borrowed from Middle Age philosopher Bonaventura – misleading. In order to understand this fact, I have used the beautiful phrase by Nicolas Cusanus from his little ‘trialogue’, *De li non aliud*: “Non aliud non aliud est quam non aliud”: “The not other is nothing other than the Not-Other.”2 The event as a genuine phenomenon can in relation to time and place be conceived as *non-aliud*, as that which is beyond Sameness, and hence, beyond both the concept of identity, and beyond its negation. *Non-aliud* is a term in language, which defies any representational structure. It denotes that it can neither be defined by affirmation nor by negation.

Hence, the *non-aliud* could be a way to grasp the concept of an *absolute immanence*, a mode of existence, which implies no distinction between ‘outside’ and ‘inside’, between thinking and thought, and between subject and object in a process of time. The genuine event is a shape, which absorbs knowing into the known. From its absolute immanence follows the definition ‘that it has everything outside itself, except the knowledge of

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having everything outside itself.’ The event is totally dependent and totally autonomous, at the same time. It excludes a subject of knowledge, and hence the possibility of an ontology.

The eventum tantum, a concept used both by Heidegger and Deleuze, means ‘the great event’ or ‘so much of the event’. Non-aliud is the closest possible analogy, at an ontological and epistemological level, of the event, and of our relation to it. This concept transcends both ontology and epistemology. And this is, or ‘must be’, what Deleuze thinks about, when he writes that “the event is not what occurs (an accident), it is rather inside what occurs, the purely expressed. It signals and awaits us.”

Each component of the event is articulated or effectuated in an instant, and the event in the time that passes between these instants; but nothing happens within the virtuality that has only meanwhiles as components and an event as composite becoming. Nothing happens there, but everything becomes, so that the event has the privilege of beginning again when time is past.

The eventum tantum is the prototype of the event, the event that, in the most radical sense of the words, Never was, the event, which was Never. It is actually rather consequent to think the event as ‘Never’, because the event cannot be defined as a diastema, as ‘an in-between-in-time and space’, as a duration, without being thought as the moment beyond time; or better, as the moment in time, which creates the experience of time. The alternative is the Heideggerian ek-stasis, where the moment, the duration, is either thought as a passage between the past and the present, or as a sort of privileged point of reflection on the very flux of time in which it is absorbed. Both versions would amount to betrayals of the event, because the event is nothing but a mere duration beyond time. The event is totally empty, nothing happens at the core of the event, because it is beyond the time-structures presupposed by language.

It is obvious that only through creating a level of ontological and epistemological approach to the eventum tantum, which presses at the limit of thought, it is possible to escape the two classical traps of thinking the event: the trap of naturalism (historically shaped) and the trap of negotiation/consensus/sense-creation. Both versions makes the concept of ‘the other history’ impossible, and hence, it makes impossible the rebellion against the fact expressed by Nietzsche as the ‘law’ that the naming of the event is the prerogative of the victors. So, the first level of approaching the event is of such an abstract character that it transcends philosophical reflection itself, in which it is conceptualised. This is level-1, the eventum tantum as non-aliud.

However, even the most radical philosophical approach has to be able to criticise, it must have an affirmative dimension – which the concept of non-aliud does not have. Further, we have to develop a concept, which can serve as an antidote of sense to the ‘sense-making’ strategies of all the small and great self-established ‘event-makers’, and ‘event-certificationists’ of society and history. We need another level, and this is, to my opinion, the level on which Deleuze operates. We need to be able to speak of the event as sense beyond sense, as an active, creative centre in the middle of our lives, which we carry with us, and to which we are only able to relate by ‘guarding its secret’ – or to re-

4 What is Philosophy?, p.158.
phrase the Epictetus-Deleuzean maxim: ‘To prove worthy to the event’, or ‘To be strong enough to identify with the event.’ At that level there is a constant, hardly bearable tension, in the middle of our lives, between the sense of the event – hard to bear because it is forced on us, either by other people or, alas, by our own experience, and by our memories – and the event of sense.

Since, the event of sense always must be allocated to ‘yet another event’, there is an event of an immanent transcendent character, which is active in our life, but epistemologically inapproachable. It expresses a ‘positive self-reference’, it is not an ‘never-ending regression’, it is beyond time, and hence, not even the possible subject of a ‘transcendental’ reduction in the Kantian sense; but nevertheless it is certainly ‘there’ in some sense, not just as the quasi-object of a constructional effort. The eventum tantum at this level, level-2, I name the alma-event.

The alma-event is the ‘non-place’, the ouk-topos, of the event of sense. It is not a noumenon, not ein Ding an sich, because it is exactly not the silent and invisible guarantee of the possibility of the sense of the event. Rather, it is an ‘active nothing’, an echo of an endless ‘Never’ breaking into our lives. It is a thought without an object – as Hegel spoke about in The Encyclopaedia. Hence, it can only be thought chiastically (I shall evade the concept ‘dialectical’) in relation to the sense of the event, as its permanent negation, as its core and its background, at the very same time, as its imago in the realm of ‘non-sense’ – as Deleuze would say. The sense of the event would be called ‘the proto-event’. It lives a life between the ambiguous sense of processes, and the total reification as occurring in the capacity of a thing: ‘The second world war’, ‘a love affair’, etc. The gliding on the surface of tension between the proto-event and the alma-event is expressed by Deleuze as the shift from substantive to verb, and in the verb itself, from the indicative to the infinitive. To Deleuze, the alma-event is already anticipated – parascheué in the Stoic terminology of Epictetus – by the very transformation in phrasing from ‘he dies’ to ‘to die’. That is why Deleuze is able to anticipate the alma-event by saying – these already famous words:

Every event is like death, double and impersonal in its double. “It is the abyss of the present, the time without present with which I have no relation, towards which I am unable to project myself. For in it I do not die. I forfeit the power of dying. In this abyss they (“on”) die – they never cease to die, and they never succeed in dying.\(^5\)

Hence, to transform the proto-event, the fireworks of sense, to the level of the alma-event, to the realm of productive non-sense, is the task of philosophy. This transformation includes an ethos of the event. This ethos is shaped by the Stoic concept of parascheué, ‘anticipation’, the ability to assent to (synkatathasis) everything that happens. Epictetus phrased it with genial simplicity:

Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish, but wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life will be serene.\(^6\)

One could also say:

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5 The Logic of Sense, p.152.
6 Encheiridion, Paragraph 8.
There is a dignity of the event that has always been inseparable from philosophy as amor fati: being equal to the event, or becoming the offspring of one’s own events – “my wound existed before me, I was born to embody it”.

To summarise: There are two levels on which to approach the event:

Level-1: The eventum tantum as non-aliud is beyond the capacities of ontology and epistemology, we can only hint at it by analogy – being aware, of course, of the performative self-contradiction in the very use of language, since analogy presupposes both an ontology and epistemology.

Level-2 contains the tension between the sense of the event, the proto-event, and the event of sense, the alma-event. Since the alma-event is the core of every event, it is also the quasi-ontological topos or the chora of what Deleuze named ‘the virtual’. The real and the potential, on the other hand, using his terminology, belong to the realm of the proto-event.

**The Pentagon of the Event**

Now, the proto-event can be analytically systemised through the ‘elements’ or ‘zones of practise, experience and knowledge’ which constitute it, and is constituted by it. Thus, we can construct the pentagon of the event:

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| ((Non-aliud)) |
| (The alma-event) |
| The Body |
| The proto-event |
| *pragma* |
| corporeality |
| *tynchanon* |
| tóde-tí plasticity |
| space/place the Other |
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7 *What is Philosophy?*, p.159
It is definitive that we are in the event only as bodies, whether through immediate experience, through memory, or through thinking. The body yields us to the event in the capacities of passionate things. However, the body is itself a transcendental immanence. As the media through which the event of sense takes place, we cannot ‘get behind it’, neither through perception, nor through thought. This is due to the fact that the space of the event is totally immersed into sense. We cannot get behind sense through sense. We are only able to approach sense in the capacity of a palpable substance through the word, and through the sentence, i.e., through ‘the sense of the event’, through the ‘proto-event’. We are ‘evented’, so to speak, by the ‘event of sense’. The body is the door between the alma-event and the sense of the event, the proto-event. But in this capacity we cannot ascribe material or physical character to the body; it is the invisible medium of experience. However, it is neither, strictly speaking, identical to a transcendental ego in Husserl’s sense, nor to a ‘pre-reflective cogito’, in the sense of Merleau-Ponty. It is – so to speak – mere anonymity, an ‘incorporated transcendence’, i.e., ‘condescendence’, the point of intersection between immanence and transcendence. Hence, we have to speak about our body in another sense, too, namely as ‘corporality’. This is the body in the capacity of ‘sense-machine’, ‘a spiritual automaton’ in the words of both Spinoza and Leibniz. The body as the acting thing, as that which is able to co-merge with matter, is a living thing belonging to us, but also experienced by us, as something different from us, which is the stage of the event. Hence, through the door between the alma-event and the proto-event we are let by the body into our corporeal activeness, and in this capacity, as spiritual automata, we meet the other zones of the event:

The tóde-tí: the haecceitas, is the facticity of the material sphere. This mode of experience denotes the presentation of relations and processes as if they were things. Thus the tóde-tí expresses a form of experience, both the beginning of the experience of the event as a pre-personal/post-personal, semantic entity, because the event begins to become an identity by being experienced as ‘some thing’; and it is the distinct phenomena appearing inside the event. The tóde-tí, in the young Aristotle, is that which cannot be predicated of anything else, and hence, that which is immune to a final predication. It is the basic logic and ontological matter, that which cannot be reduced to anything else. We can use this concept to designate the uniqueness of the event, and the uniqueness of its phenomena. However, when the sense of the event is raised to the level of the proto-event in the capacity of ‘This has happened’, then the uniqueness is destroyed, while its spontaneity disappears, and the alma-event is slowly opening its abyss beneath sense – in the beginning just by letting us be aware of the general, non-unique, character of predicates.

The plasticity: the zone of the still indiscernible. It is constantly reproduced in the shape of the relation between figure and background. It is the oscillations between the known and the unidentifiable, a movement conducted by the word, and by the word as something older, wiser, and richer than the concept. So there must be a kind of passage, a gliding, from the tóde-tí, into sense-making, which cannot itself as a process be the subject of sense. In the language of Husserl, this passage cannot be an ‘intentional subject’. The tóde-tí passes into a constellation, but during this process there is a constant tension in relation to the zone of plasticity. At the level of this pre-conceptual passage the virtual and the actual are almost identical, i.e. there is a vast set of possible
worlds into which the tóde-ti seems to be able to be inscribed as its proper sense: “It is the virtual that is distinct from the actual, but a virtual that is no longer chaotic, that has become consistent or real on the plane of immanence that wrests it from the chaos.” 8 It is the right way to describe the tóde-ti and the plasticity as simultaneous processes, because the experience of ‘this-ness’ always creates a new background of plasticity.

The space/place: this zone consists of the permanent tension between space – chora, as something constituting the content of experience, the lines of movement, the possibilities of being – and the topos, as the identified place, the familiar, that which we must leave all the time in order to become the ones, who we probably could become. The tension of the ethos of the event is allocated here, because ethos also means the place of origin, which we, in the form of values, intentions, passions, and dreams, are carrying with us all the time.

The Other person: the other individuals can be seen as possible worlds meeting us in the arena of the event, each individual corporeality presenting a secret to us – coming from his body, from his transcendental immanence, through his unique transformation into a sediment, cultural and historical otherness.

The five elements of the event can be said to form a constellation at any point of time in the development of the event, and at any point in time of its interpretation in further events – of an action or interpretative character, or both.

Pragma and Tynchanon

Now, there are two dimensions in the event, the first one is incorporeal, the other is corporeal. The idea was founded by Stoic philosophy in which one distinguished the corporealia, i.e., the body, the material world, imagination, thought, and speech, from the incorporeal, the empty space, the void, time and sense.

The Stoics named the material dimension as a sum of processes, the coporealia, tynchanon; and they named the incorporeal realm, which encompassed that of sense, pragma. Tynchanon also means ‘object’ in the Greek, but in this context of the event, it means the level of causes, whether they are conceived of as a chaos, or as a more mechanistic, causal flow. Pragma has got many important senses in the Greek. It generally means ‘act’, ‘action’, or ‘object’. But in the Poetics of Aristotle it also means ‘action’, i.e. ‘plot’, and ‘sense’. The Stoics uses it to denote the phenomenon of ‘the sense of the event’.

It is important to realise that the Stoics did not think of any causal relation between tynchanon and pragma: they cannot be ascribed any causal theory of meaning. They thought that the two dimensions coexisted, both expressing the cosmic logos. It was the ethical task of any individual to unite them, and this was the core of their ethos of the event, because tynchanon followed the synektion aition, or series causarum – as

8 What is Philosophy?, p.156
Chrysippos named it – the both necessary and sufficient level of causes, the ‘iron hard laws of fate’. However, the Stoics in general did not subscribe to any determinism, they only accepted fate (heimarmené, fatum), and this means, that the attitude of the individual could be reconciled with a concept of personal freedom. The pike of this freedom was the ability to ‘prove worthy of the event’ by meeting everything which happened with exactly the same mental attitude, the eudymia, the happy and calm assent to your own destruction. It is no accident, of course, that Deleuze is so focused on Chrysippos in The Logic of Sense – also the concept of dividing the work into ‘series’ is a repetition of the way Chrysippos divided his enormous opus of which nothing is preserved, alas. Now, the problem is that mirrored from the level of tynchanon, the world of distinct phenomena, the tôde-ti, seems to have a rather firm identity – applying the concepts of causality and law both implies and demands that. But in the capacity of pragma the range of its possible articulations seems rather wide. Pragma and tynchanon present parallel lines which only seem to be able to meet when the tôde-ti crashes.

This figure of their possible interrelation reproduces the problem of Leibniz, manifested in the principle of the so-called ‘pre-established harmony’, because it is impossible to point to a direct causal relation between tynchanon and pragma, even if there must exist some kind of powerful limitations arising from tynchanon. There must be some pre-structured direction of the rails, even if the material dimension cannot be grasped as something which automatically transforms itself into sense, i.e., into language games. So, if the event is conceived solely at the pragma-level – which Deleuze is inclined to; “The event is sense itself, in so far as it is disengaged or distinguished from the states of affairs which produce it and in which it is actualised”9 – one reproduces the monadology of Leibniz. This line of thinking would by analogy conceive of the event as an immaterial entity without spatial extension, only defined by its properties and appetites. In every monad each state is the consequence of its former states, and it only relates to the realm of other monads through a more or less distinct perception of them. The pre-established harmony means that each monad reacts in the way it ought to react, if there had been a real, material mediated, causality among them. Invested with a teleological perspective, this thinking comes close to the idealism of Hegel.

The problem here could also be posed as the need to evade any kind of ‘symptomatology’. This is only possible, if we accept the pragma-level, the level of sense, and the definite predication of the event, as constitutive and effectuating in itself, i.e., as having causal power in relation to the level of tynchanon. This would not presuppose the vision of Prospero, that life is nothing but a dream, but instead pose the problem of that which Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics named deinótes, the force which transfers thought into action, theory into practise. The level of sense must be able to influence the level of the material. But the opposite must also be the case, even if we deny any direct causality. This means that we have got a very complicated structure of reciprocal causation here at the heart of the event. So, we have to accept also some kind of causality, and hence, a contrafinality of Otherness, of the unfamiliar and almost anti-human level of the series causarum; and we have to accept an element of sense-creation too. This paradox can only be solved in accordance with the concept of ‘the subject of knowledge’ with which we operate. The question of how to conceive of the subject is

focussed, if not definitely ‘solved’, through the concept of ‘constellation’. Now, the weakness of the thinking of Deleuze is, to my opinion, that he does not cope properly with these two dimensions of the event, *tynchanon* and *pragma*.

### Constellation and Installation

An example: When management, shop stewards and local line leaders meet as a result of a generally felt, and formally bottom-line-registered, malfunction of the organisation, this session, in the capacity of proto-event, might not be the proper one to suggest or create solutions of a proactive kind, solutions that would be able to promote processes of a sensitive organising. The same goes, of course, for the finite set of possible events of theorising upon this proto-event. They are nothing but aspects of this alma-event, the permanent secret of *eventing*, adding new proto-events in a linear time, proto-events of theorising on the proto-event, which not necessarily, though, in spite of their conjunctural character, intensifies abstraction. It is possible to imagine a point in time, in which the new proto-event of thought suddenly comes much closer to what one often experiences as the ‘primal event’ that presented the material of experience, but which is nothing but the alma-event in disguise. There was never a primal event, and that goes for every little banal event, as well as for the event of the universe.

The figure of thought, that the proto-event can never be traced back to a naturalistically caught event of sense but only is absorbed into the alma-event, means that there does not exist any original event whatsoever. On the other hand, this does not favour any concept of construction in relation to the event, even if the notion of sense as something negotiated or fought about seems to suggest itself. However, if we in some sense could be said to *create* the event, this could only mean that we choose an interpretation on behalf of an ethos of the event. A distinction could be relevant in order to distinguish between the event as a *constellation* on the one hand, and as an *installation* on the other. This should not be understood as an attempt to smuggle in some criterion of authenticity, quite the contrary, because we only relate ‘authentically’ to the event by transforming authenticity into *hetero-enticity*, into the capacity to relate to the event on the terms that it is the event which poses the possibilities of reproducing our inner feeling of a ‘sameness’ (*idem*). To take the event serious, is to revolt against the concept of the substantial and essential ‘I’ (*ipse*), and to substitute for it a process of becoming. This is the first maxim of Deleuze, and finely taught by him.

However, if the event is seen as a constellation, this must not be interpreted as something original. Instead it must be understood as the rule of contingency. But we must remember, that *contingere* originates in the two Greek words, *endechomenon* from Aristotle, meaning ‘that which is possible, but not necessary’; and *symbainein*, used by Aristotle too in the sense of ‘throw’, ‘that which occurs’. Combing the realm of the possible with that which occurs, Boëthius created the word ‘contingency’, thus giving us the conceptual instrument to understand ‘eventing’ as a process which we draw from the realm of the possible into the real or which we simply re-actualise, by choosing to adhere to its sense. This does, however, not come up to any management of meaning and not at all to ‘creation of meaning’. So, we can posit an opposition to the concept of
‘constellation’ on the analytical level, and speak about an ‘installation’ as the attitude towards the event that we are able to control its sense. Hence, if we begin with a crude distinction, a constellation shall appear as a non-strategic attitude towards the event, while installating is similar to event-making. This distinction is of great importance to business economics, because we are forced to develop a critical position towards the non-ethical instrumentalisations of the event, both in practise, and in narrative after-rationalisations.

Now, there is of course no way to make a strict distinction between a constellation and installation, because they are constantly intermixed. Every installation rests on constellations, and every constellation has, as far as is a part of social life, an installatory element, in so far people try to influence the event. We are also able to phrase this predicament as a post-dialectical tension between constellating and installating. A dialectics of reconciliation is impossible, because the process is not simultaneous with itself.

‘Installating’ itself is dualistic: There is an installation effectuated by Power (krasis, potestas), and an installation effectuated by Force (dynamis). The first one could be named ‘tragic’ because it wears the mask of ananké, and hence of death. Its practise is hierarchy, command, the mechanical assembling of people. This is the world of Marx, the battlefield of labour on which the cathedrals of the corporate dynasties were built during the last three hundred years, in the image of the army, and the labour mills of the paupers. ‘Power’ is the architect and strategist here, because the issue is the distribution of force, the managing of powers by generating constrained compromises between wills; the wicked rituals performed on the negotiations of wages and profits, the organisation as the prolonged arm of bare need. To distribute resources through a layer of justice imposed on violence, discipline and control, the micro-politics of libido dominandi – as Barthes speaks about. Both the market and authority of managers, in seemingly just settings of negotiating, impersonate this evil image of a first nature projected on to a second one, and hailed as mere utility, the pseudonym of profit. This is organising as always organisation. The machine constructed in the name of Power and its priests. The act of installing becomes installation, and hence, institution.

The installation effectuated by Force is first and foremost the guardian, ho phylax, of the state of Eros, the libido ordonans. Its aim is civilisation, then humanism, and in the end humanisation, i.e. enlightenment, paideia, life-long-learning, culture, competence, empowerment, human resources, self-development, a life adhering to principles. Force depicts Man as a corporate citizen, potentially of the world, and presents Man as the protagonist of a second nature contrasted to the first one. Organising here is a permanent attempt to build a Chinese wall against outer and inner nature. This demands a broad wall, where Man is able to stand safely: to walk as if there were a guardian angel, and not forced to keep in a lethal balance like Zarathustra’s walker on the tighttrope.

The onstostasis inside the chaos of Power is confronted with the taxis kai kosmos, the natural, unaggressive ordo of the Force, a security and a threat at the very same time. The machine of power confronts the organism of force, but the organism could be transformed into an advanced machine of repression through a strategy of security.
which is able to meet the master plan of a post-innocent and post-naïve, total and totalitarian care – ‘biopolitics’ in the language of Foucault and Deleuze.

The negation of power – which is not equal to Force – presents itself in phenomena like wildcat strikes, slow-down work, revolts against hierarchies, but also by working after the norm, by doing meticulously what was told. It represents itself as the obstinate and recalcitrant body. But Power could also disguise itself as docile body, as pupil, proselyte and as professor. Its basic gesture is that of Caliban, it performs as a believer, trying hard to know what his master told him to know, looking for every excuse to evade his own insight in knowledge as the bare function of power and self-deceit. Power takes on the face of Force, it practises a benevolent territorialisation in the name of the enlightened self-interest. It is devoted to a concept of utility in which is mixed the missionary’s desire for converts to control and for co-visionaries to rejoice hand in hand. It shall never take a ‘No!’ for a ‘No!’ To Power it just signals its faulty strategies of humanisation. The basic gesture of Power is reflective all-too-reflective, encompassing, all-encompassing. Force, on the contrary, works in silence, at the heart of the event, and if it succeeds, it breaks through in the organic shape of the constellation, exchanging the phantasmagoric, utopian setting, for real flesh. So far, it must suffice to present these ideal-types.

A constellation is in principle always disharmonic, non-dialectical, as well as dualistic and monistic at the very same time. Or, reciprocally, time is this tension between the dualistic and the monistic. A constellation is the only mode in which a subject can exist. A constellation is perhaps rhizomatic, but the rhizome only designates the contextual network, *peristasis*. We are, however, interested in *epi-stasis* and in *endo-stasis*, in the way in which the primary event (the event that is the subject of an event of sense of the proto-event) re-presents its whole rhizomatic network, and hence its virtual dimension, by condensating at the very same time sense *and* being inside yet a condensation...and so on. This movement is not conjunctive, it is both accumulative and dispersing. A constellation does not relate to a virtuality. It is the destruction of virtuality, and hence, of the figure of actualisation. It is like a black hole of astrophysics, it draws all energy, all intensity, all images, and all thoughts into its middle. It does not allow any lines of flight.

Might it be the chance of theory to be absorbed thus into the constellation in which the ‘This has happened’ as already-always, and never, is born? But something makes this picture complicated. This is not just because these two types of installations are folded into and onto each other, as are the Other and the Same in Plato, supplied by a triple infolding with the One. It is far more because their reciprocal *complicare/explicare*, their mutual mix, is folded into another cloth, in which, on which, and through which, they appear differently, almost changing places, borrowing endlessly from each other. This cloth is the event.
Deleuze’s Concept of the Event

There is a schism at the heart of Deleuze’s concept of the event. This is due to his equivocal relation to vitalism. A consequent vitalism would trace \textit{pragma} back to the level of \textit{tynchanon}, and even, in its mono-ontological form, conceive of \textit{pragma} as a form of \textit{tynchanon}. Actually this is also an aporia in the Stoic thinking itself, because their vitalism enforces them to think the world of phenomena to be a function of the so-called \textit{pneumatic tonos}, the creative tension in the cosmos.

In vitalism, and its more recent version, philosophical expressionism, the inherent idea is that experience and action are incorporating forces which grow naturally into concepts. However, already Plato showed it in the \textit{Theaetetus}, not just that conceptualisation might be off the mark, i.e., unproductive in relation to knowledge, but that \textit{aisthesis} itself, the acts of perception, produces phantasms, because of the ambiguity of perception. Plato here anticipates a just critique of Epicurus and of his five hundred years younger advocate, Lucretius, the hero of Deleuze in the appendices of \textit{The Logic of Sense} – may I remind of the implications of Wittgenstein’s celebrated hare-duck-image too.

This is the Achilles’ heel of vitalism. Because there must be a doubling, not only between the expression and the expressed, not only between the actualisation and the actualised, but between the \textit{eventing} as an effect at the \textit{tynchanon}-level, as a \textit{nisus}, as a flux of forces, as a stream of creative and destructive wills, and the \textit{eventing} of this eventing as event, i.e., the effect on the level of \textit{pragma}. There is a crack at the heart of the event itself, and certainly in the capacity of eventing, and a double crack, actually, that makes the self-identity, the mono-ontological performance of expression itself impossible. This is the crack between the alma-event and the proto-event.

Deleuze generally seems to see the event as twofold, but actually the event is threefold, having a level of \textit{pragma}, a level of \textit{tynchanon}, and a level of creative non-sense, the alma-event. The concepts of the Real, the Possible, The Virtual, and the Actual, have to be reinterpreted in this context. At a somewhat lower level of abstraction, this dichotomic concept of the event would answer to a radical constructivism, even if we accept the ‘virtual’ as almost as real as the actual; and even if we define the ‘real’ as the distinction between the virtual and the actual, \textit{not} initiated by the negative logic of an identity-creation through noematic processes of exclusion, approximating the truth-level of the possible as a diairetic authority. The alternative, however, the affirmative definition of the event, is impossible, both because of the causal crack between \textit{tynchanon} and \textit{pragma} which defies the expressive ontology of vitalism and because of the fact that the event is always subject to a positive regression. The infinite instantiation of the proto-event into the alma-event simply presents us to the fact that the event is beyond the figure of actualisation in the capacity of an actualisation of an ‘always’ and a ‘never’. It is ‘alnever’, a concept more fragile, more able to receive, more \textit{chora}-like, more defiant, than the \textit{omnitudo}, and closer to the real transformation of the \textit{plethora} or \textit{poikilia}, the \textit{omnitudo} or ‘the manifold’, into the \textit{pleroma} of St. Paul, into the abundance of becoming, in becoming.
This picture might seem to be one where earlier events are incubated into momentary proto-events through a causality of sense, i.e., of interpretation, until the outbreak of the diagnostically precise disease of sense, but this cannot be true, as far as we accept a mild pluralism of perspectives. There would be no real mechanism of interpreting, i.e., of defining, hence, and thus the picture would be one of strong ambiguity – a state very far from the state of the event as ‘This has happened’ or ‘This is what happened’. The material substance of this perspectivism cannot, however, rest in the demarcation line created by omni-sense or non-sense either. Thought, and hence, theory, seems ‘just another whore’ of sense added to the list in an infinite series of the adventures of a Don Juananía without finale.

It is important that we have to evade concepts like ‘actualising’ and ‘unfolding’ in order to grasp the true character of the constellation, unless a crack is implied herein, as Deleuze is careful to underline in Chapter Five of his book *Bergsonism*, what concerns the relation between the virtual and the actual – in strict opposition to the relation between the potential and the real:

The virtual, on the other hand, does not have to be realized, but rather actualised; and the rules of actualisation are not those of resemblance and limitation, but those of difference or divergence and of creation. … While the real is in the image and likeness of the possible that it realizes, the actual, on the other hand does not resemble the virtuality that it embodies…. the characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualised by being differentiated and is forced to differentiate itself, to create its lines of differentiation in order to be actualised.10

This is a very strict way to cut the link between vitalism and expressionism in the capacity of a figure of representing through repetition on another scale, to destroy the figure of a phenomenon which mirrors it essence – the arch-figure *metexis* and *parousia*, the triad of *phantasma*, *eidolon/eikon*, and *idea*, in Plato.

The possible is a false notion, the source of false problems. The real is supposed to resemble it…. In fact, it is not the real that resembles the possible, it is the possible that resembles the real, because it has been abstracted from the real once made, arbitrarily abstracted from the real like a sterile double. Hence we no longer understand anything either of the mechanism of difference or of the mechanism of understanding.11

and

The possible has no reality (although it may have an actuality); Conversely, the virtual is not actual, but as such possesses a reality. Here again Proust’s formula best defines the states of virtuality: real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.12

These famous lines could be interpreted in a way that casts a light on the concept of constellation. A constellation is a tension, the *pneumatic tonos* of the Stoics that manifests itself both at a vertical and horizontal level. Vertically the constellation means the intermingling, the chiasm, of the body as mind and flesh, as *sark* ‘corporeality’, with the event as the processing of the ‘This happened’ among the dimensions of

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11 *Bergsonism*, p.98.
12 *Bergsonism*, p.96.
pragma and tynchanon. It is a double subject, and hence it proves the basis of a process that can never create objects. The proto-event, the event in which the process of experiencing understanding, and understanding experience, takes place, has this vertical tension, a tension that can never be abolished. We could say that this is genuine actuality because it appears as tóde-tí, as facticity to perception, and as haecceitas to reflection, i.e. “but it has a shadowy and secret part that is continually subtracted from or added to its actualisation”\(^{13}\) (it has a part which lays in the shadow, or which is secret, and it never ceases to subtract or add). But this is only due to the fact that it itself casts this shadow.

In the language of Deleuze the event is the place and motor of sense, it is l’entre-temps or devenir, the ‘in-between’, or ‘becoming’.\(^{14}\) However, we cannot, like Deleuze sometimes seem to be inclined to, conceive of the event in the dimension of pragma, as mere sense, or as “possible worlds in the capacity of concepts.”\(^{15}\) And we also cannot accept the event as a genuine virtuality in which sense produces sense.

Everything happens in the event, and everything is changed. Deleuze’s neglect of the dimension of tynchanon, or, what seems to be neglect, anyhow, makes him rather blind to the fact that the level of sense transforms the material world on the plane of ‘This has happened’. Nothing can become at the genuine level of sense – the opposite would imply a proto-Hegelian figure of thought. Experience as movement inside pragma might replace itself in relation to the dynamics of tynchanon – not because we change our inner scenaria just by doing nothing, but because they change us by changing – but it has to release the ‘This is happening’ or ‘This is what happened’: it has to transform itself into the plane of the eventing in order to act. It has to become hand, foot, face, iron, paper, pen, in order to enter the realm of becoming. It has to be ‘That which happened’.

When I say that a vertical tension takes place between tynchanon and pragma, at the level of the ‘This has happened’, where tynchanon is identical to the vulnerability of the body, and pragma is identical to the immaterial integrity of the event, to that which the Stoic called the lekton, the only incorporeal level of sense – in opposition to the phantasma (imago), the mental image, and to the word as voice – it means that sense has material or physical effects. This is because the lekton in the capacity of the incorporeal dimension of sense creates effects through its incorporation into the corporeal, kata-physical phenomenon of voice, and into the choreographies of movement. Hence, pragma is always chiastically built into tynchanon, and their union appears as ‘This has happened’, as the always illusionary ‘that-ness’ of the proto-event. The price of being able to experience the ‘that-ness’ of the event is that it always hides a thought without an object at the level of the alma-event. Further, it creates thought, seeking a thinker, too.

It would be misleading to try to understand the ‘This has happened’ as a domain produced by the ‘affects’ in the Deleuzean sense: As dispositions with the power or

\(^{13}\) What is Philosophy?, p156.

\(^{14}\) What is Philosophy?, p.158.

\(^{15}\) What is Philosophy?, Chapter 2.
even intensity of thoughts, but without the discursive level. This would conceal an empiricism blind to the creative force-flux of the event as a reflective entity. These tuned states, the ‘affects’, are both the result of something coming from the outside, and something coming from within – this topological language is probably not totally just in relation to the epistemologically and ontologically anti-dualistic thought of Deleuze. However, he begs the question in using this term from Leibniz and Spinoza (they both use it in their way, of course), suggesting a causal framework between mind and matter. My point is that the ‘This has happened’ is beyond affects, and, hence, beyond ‘disposition’, beyond its German source (from Heidegger), die Gestimmtheit. We have to conceive of it as a ‘snapshot’, or as a passage for all senses, but especially for sight, because voice is everywhere, as a passage, or a hole, produced, when the always moving tapes, with their endless quantity of holes – the holes of the ‘now’ (the tapes of pragma and tynchanon) – create a common hole, opening to both sides. But this does not mean that the ‘This has happened’ is a place from where there could be a view simultaneously in both directions. Bohr’s principle of complementarity, as corroborated by the Aspect-experiment, also counts here. There is no experience, however flash-like, without an influence on the content of experience.

There is no mutual rhythm, and nothing happens synchronously, between the always-moving dimensions of tynchanon and pragma. Because in the dimension of tynchanon, the constellation appears as an installation by some level of ‘nature’; and in the dimension of pragma, the installation appears as constellation, as a product unharmed by construction. Hence, what concerns the former, anarchy will be grasped as law; and what concerns the latter, structure will be seen as opportunities for free construction.

The Event in the Light of Organising

From the application to the concept of organising these thoughts could effectuate that we are forced to understand the very process of organising as that, which produces the fatum, the installation of the seemingly unchangeable. The ‘eternal return’ in Deleuze must be re-interpreted as the contrafinality, the tissue of heimarmené, of fate, and organising seen, then, as a civilisation process with no da capo, no chance of repetition even with a difference. It is only one part of the truth that “The event is immaterial, incorporeal, invisible: pure reserve.”16

The tragedy of organising does not lay in the will of the individual to repeat the unbearable, but in the failure of the will, both to know itself properly, and to realise itself through the wanted ‘cascade of actualisations’. The problem is not just that we do not posses ourselves, and hence that we must become the ones who we are – to paraphrase Ernst Bloch – but it is that we are unable not to become the ones, who we are not. We cannot endure the permanent negation of the real by a merciless potentiality. But the lines of flight are illusions of an ideal will that cannot break out of its dream.

16 What is Philosophy?, p.156.
If the proto-event draws on the dimension of an unactualised actuality, we could interpret the dimension of virtuality as the endless series (the ‘series’ of The Logic of Sense) of earlier events, in this very moment being drawn into the web of the proto-event, the event in which the game is played exactly now between the sense of the event and the event of sense. This is the event in which we, without the power to know, are reproducing old organisations through new effortless efforts of organising. This is a parade, this horizontal processing of any earlier event within the heart of the proto-event by hand of a taxis that never transforms into an ontostatics, but stays an epi-stasis, or an endo-stasis, leading the virtuality of the earlier event into the new world of the momentary proto-event, the ‘spotlight of chora’, by an understanding in which the difference between these two events are celebrated by reflection as catches of new identities. This is the proud illusion of organising.

The tension at this horizontal level is the tension inside both the individual and fragmented experience itself, a tension between experience as ex-perience, as memory, and experience as perception. The event shall never relieve this tension, only preserve it as a movement fading away slowly, or being abruptly broken by the epiphania of the non-sense of the alma-event. This means that organising presents itself as a peculiar kind of presence, a presence that is always displaced: the constellation is displaced by its appearance as installation. The claim of inherence, and especially of an immanence coloured by its lack of transcendence, which the mono-dyadic character of the proto-event displays, is displaced through a strategic reflectivity that transforms living presence, the duratio, the periferontes in Epicurus,17 into the ‘dead time’, into the past as the future’s phantasms of the past, and the past’s phantasms of the future. In this capacity organising is a way to construct a presence as the passage and path between the past and the future. But organising is not an event per se, it is a tension inside an event between the proto-event and the series of former events. Organising is like a play that seeks a playwright, a singing that seeks a song. Thus it is not precise in stating, even if of course it is right, almost a truism, that “The splendour and the magnificence of the event is sense.”18 The important message is almost cancelled by this dichotomical phrasing:

No doubt, the event is not only made up from inseparable variations, it is itself inseparable from the state of affairs, bodies, and lived reality in which it is actualised or brought about. But we can also say the converse: the state of affairs is no more separable from the event that nonetheless goes beyond its actualisation in every aspect.19

The thoughts that I have presented here, with the emphasis on the triadic figure (pragma, tynchanon, alma-event), imply that organising as eventing has to be subject to an event, the alma-event, which in itself is not-accessible by analysis, i.e. as an application of reflective thought to itself. However, there are other levels of approach. The question is whether the proto-event could be seen as containing the act of theory, i.e. if the duratio could be a place of a reflective practise that breaks out of pragma as

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18 Logic of Sense, p.149.
19 What is Philosophy?, p.159.
'This has happened'? Or it could also be phrased in this way: Is theory always an installation or could it stay at the level of the constellation, i.e. could it stand out (ek-stasis) in the tension? Theory can only be a constellation if it itself is beyond the status of the object, but still a subject of an attempt at objectification.

Deleuze is not clear here, especially not in *Difference and Repetition*. At the same time he has a vitalistic notion of thought, on the other hand an almost voluntaristic. He seems to imagine a path from a pre-conceptual, chaotic dimension of life, from the *spatium* of intensities, consisting of monadic series without hierarchies, but with ‘crowned anarchies’ and ‘nomadic distributions’.²⁰ It is the idea of Deleuze that thought, and hence, theory, emerges out of this *spatium* through three quasi-ontological mechanisms: quantification, qualification, and total determination – the last one is the principle of potentiality. The stage is one of a multiple ratio beyond the mechanisms of representation and genuinely creative.

The now rather well known distinction in *Difference and Repetition* between ‘differenTiation’ and ‘differenCiation’, the first one with a ‘t’, the other one with a ‘c’, mirrors two separate dimensions of sense. The first one converges to non-sense. In it the pre-semantic substance of meaning rules, the *noema* as a pre-cogital ‘feeling for meaning’, the ‘passive synthesis’ – Deleuze names it ‘the symbol’ – of the virtual indifferentiated, i.e., without a definite place in relation to a language game, however, at the same time not a realm of indistinct phenomena, not indifferentiated. This first part of the dyad is objective reality of sense as virtuality, as the hypothetic relation between the star fog of a thought, and its actualisation as mental picture, and as discursive wording. As Deleuze puts it: “The virtual is difference at the heart of ideas.”²¹ Opposite this pre-individual individuation, this sphere of itinerant and flowing ‘semes’ in which thought is anticipated through a vague manifold of dispositional intensities in the capacities of endless series, Deleuze places the dimension of a pronounced semantics, a positive presentation of the phenomena as singularities to human experience. This last dimension is named ‘differenCiation’, i.e. with a ‘C’. However at the level of differenTiation ideas are distinct, though obscure; at the level of differenCiation, they are both clear, and distinct: the concept has grown into the word.

Thus, Deleuze must either adhere to a dualism, however vague:

> The distinction is not *between* the imaginary and the real, but between the event as such and the corporeal state of affairs which incites it about or in which it is actualized.²²

Or he must accept actualisation as realisation, i.e., the classical figure of emanation, no matter its physicalist dress. As we are already told he chooses both by stating that the transition from the pre-semantic level to the semantic level entails a mechanism, which defies the duplication, the mirroring, the (despised) figure of representation, because actualisation of the virtual contains no figure of resemblance. However, he prevents himself from thinking the opposite movement, because of his inclination towards the

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²¹ *Difference and Repetition*, p.279.
²² *Difference and Repetition*, p.279.
figure of emanation, namely, the movement from *pragma* to *tynchanon*, from the level of sense to the level of matter. We must meet this line of thought through two lines of argumentation, which have already been presented:

A. The first one reproduces the quasi-metaphysical, but strict logic of Plato, Plotinus and Nicolaus Cusanus. Cusanus’ genial proposition ‘*non aliud non aliud est quam non aliud*’, (the not Other is nothing but the Not-other), the logo of his last work from 1460,\(^{23}\) gives us the possibility to phrase the internal relation between the proto-event and the series of events inscribed through perception and experience/memory by defining it as the knowledge through which everything is posed as Otherness except this thought itself (of everything as identical to Otherness). This is the paradox of absolute immanence: it has to admit only its possession of its own thought. This figure of reflectivity is, of course, practical too. It is a reflectivity inherent in the *possus*, in the ‘I can’, or, what Cusanus names *possest* (In his *Trialogue of Possest*) with a neologism: ‘Doing-Is’, as the prerogative of the almighty God.

This *diaphora*, this fundamental *differentia*, places thinking as the original activity of passing from the proto-event to the alma-event, from sense to non-sense. But this denotes a thinking without a subject, an all-comprehensive *noesis noeseos*, or *cogito cogitans*, the thinking of itself by thought, which, at the same time, is a *cogito cogitandum*, a thought that ought to be thought. This is the patho-ethological aspect of the possible identity between thinking and being. From this perspective thinking is a genuine constellation, always united with practise, always forced into a teleological reception of the series of events, in which the alma-event plays the part as the always-post-actualised Absolute Being of Mr. Hegel, but a Being with a limp, with a wilful shadow; the caricature of the ‘blind spot’ of another great-minor Hegelian, Mr. Luhmann.

The shadow of the event is passion, the *amor fati*. Passion, reveals the patho-ethological character of the alma-event, and hence of any event. Passion reveals the *modus operandi* of *tynchanon*, the *series causarum*, the *synektikon aition*, in Chrysippos, of the *causa perfecta et principalis* in Cicero, the immanent cause of both the being and the facticity of any phenomenon, the identity of Being and Essence – the defiance of Heidegger’s ontological difference – the iron-hard laws of a deterministic realm of practise which has not yet actualised itself as fate. This patho-ethological sense of the alma-event is the real mode of the event: In the language of Epictetus, it is the *parascheué*, the state of being prepared in order to give assent without resentment. In Deleuze’s re-phrasing of Chrysippos and Epictetus, it means to be worthy of what happens to you. This idea goes back to the most important concept in all ethical theory of Hellenistic philosophy, to the *ta ef hemin*, the *actiones in nostra potestate*, to the demarcation between that which is in our power, and that which is not. It is the patho-ethological challenging of Doing and Is, succumbed and suffered as Doing-Is; the tragic and happy obligation to become.

B. Thus, we must stand out to the tension between the *parascheue*, the attitude of anticipation and suffering, *and* the defiance of the *katascheué*, the ‘apparatus’ in the

\(^{23}\) op. cit.
terminology of Plato. We are obliged to act in relation to that which actually is in our power. This claim poses the question whether there is a ‘constellative installation’, whether it is possible to install in accordance with life?

This is the game between ananké and heimarmené, between necessity and fate. It is certainly the chora of organising, too. In being constellated as omnitudinal mind-bodies, as incorporated akatonomasta, as the place between flesh and thought, as unnamed centres of incalculable actions, we are able to install just in the in-between, through the intermezzo, in the crack between the installationary practises which can be ascribed to the Power and to Force.

Installation is an in-fight with the katascheué, with the intermingling of the powerful appara of the Other and the Same, in order to set the middle marsh free. We have to change the world in the name of the unnameable, i.e., in approaching, yes, even handling, the event and its inherent zones in our capacity of bodies, which are corporeal hostages of the reality. This is the real organising.

To be equal to the event, this is the image of uniting theory and practise: through the passionless passion of parascheué, of being ready and prepared to give assent (synkatathasis in the Stoics) to reality by creating it.

And Deleuze for the last time:

Either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to you.24

But to be worthy of what happens to you, is to be equal to the event, not just by enduring it, but by being its motor of transformation. Organising is to make the world worthy of what could happen to it. This is also the place for theory.

the author


E-mail: ofk.lpf@cbs.dk

24 The Logic of Sense, p.149.