Archives and Power

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abstract

This contribution is an experiment in ‘intensive socio-analysis,’ as Manuel De Landa might have put it. Its impetus is derived from the observation of a quite incongruous relationship between archives. There is an odd discordance between the archive systems that structure digital material in online environments and the reorganization of national archives and libraries when faced with the challenge of digitization. The gradual appearance of this problematic relationship is regarded here as an expression of the increasing importance tied to archival functions in the age of informationalized labour. The analysis of this relationship employs the terminology of Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault. Because Gilles Deleuze commenced his book on Foucault by saying that “a new archivist has been appointed,” this text can assume the responsibility and the liberty of expounding the digital vicar of that urban clerk in the shape of Deleuze himself, reading Foucault. As a piece of contemporary archaeology, it is played out in a grey zone where theory and empirical knowledge are inseparable, where everything is real and where the digital is not simply the virtual but that which actualizes its powers to the archive.

The method of Foucault is always opposed to methods of interpretation. Don’t ever interpret, experiment.¹

Two Irreducible Sciences

National archives and libraries around the world experience major organizational challenges with respect to their current adaptation to electronic services. Practical tasks of maintaining a major digitized collection – such as registration, cataloguing, preservation and public accessibility – confront contemporary archives and libraries with a new and quite difficult situation, and have therefore also become subjects of increased academic interest.² But scholars of librarianship and archive sciences face the challenges of digitization not only within the institutional organization. They also recognize that digitally produced, reproduced, sampled and distributed material very


often escapes the existing strategies for archival acquisition and that a large part of our culture will therefore not be saved for tomorrow’s researchers.\textsuperscript{3} And the problem is not merely technological: the digital challenge that confront today’s archives are no less financial, spatial, juridical and in a sense, even ontological.

Now, even if the wealth of today’s scholarly work on digital libraries testifies to a highly complex and nuanced debate concerning these issues, it is to a researcher trained in a different field interesting to notice that there is a certain uniformity of direction in which these scholars target their inquiries. There are shared assumptions and collective agreements that seem neither dictated nor questioned but assumed as self-evident. It is as if a silent and quite powerful consensus aims towards a future goal where the archive is big enough, friendly enough and fast enough, both to house a steady increase of original and digitized artefacts and to provide these, instantaneously, to a global public. A recent realization of this collective dream has already been initiated by the Library of Congress: ‘The Global Gateway’ is the formation of a digital network of connected archives and libraries around the world, forming a kind of global super-archive with almost infinite hospitality to whatever needs for information may arise.\textsuperscript{4} The consistency of desires that informs these and similar projects might seem natural, but the cultural determinations that instruct that self-evidentness could and should perhaps be analyzed.

Although such an analysis will not be carried out here, it is nevertheless valuable to have noticed that this uniform desire does indeed exist, and that it has a certain influence on the formation of inquiries concerning the development of e-libraries and digitized archives. In this paper a quite different scenario will be sketched: one where the research production taking place within this realm of consentience is contrasted to another kind of science, an archaeology that for its object has a specific and limited set of cultural potentialities for producing knowledge – so called \textit{statements}. Within this scenario, the latter science is irreducible to the former. It will be suggested here that from the point of view of this archaeology of statements, the problems that arise with digitizing archives reflect upon the question of how knowledge is produced in a global information society.

The purpose of this exposition is therefore to describe the rationale and the structure of this science as well as its close affinity to the concerns and problems raised with the technological reorganization of libraries and archives in the age of digital informationalization. Two concrete examples may at this point be useful in order to shed some introducing light on the difference between those ‘two sciences.’

\textsuperscript{3} There are, however, a few exceptions to the general paralysis in front of preserving digital material. One such exception is the joint effort by the Center for Research Libraries, four American universities and the Mellon Foundation Funding to archive the documents and messages disseminated via www by different NGO’s. Cf. the announcement of the “Political Web Archiving Investigation” available at: http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/announce/show.cgi?ID=132143; See also the “Wayback Machine” available at http://www.archive.org.

\textsuperscript{4} The ‘Global Gateway’ and the ‘CDRS Global Reference Service’ of the Library of Congress are available at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/digiref/history.htm
For the archaeology that is advocated here the problems of digitizing archives are not accounted for with proper analyses of administrative structure, technological solutions, strategies of accommodating to user behaviour, etc. It is not enough to have located and described the objects that are affected by the reorganization, because more is at stake than what is perceived and understood. Archaeology believes that collective orders of perception and understanding as such are historically unstable, and that it is their changing forms that ought to be targeted and described. In order to explain these changes, archaeology speaks of a realm of power, whose constellation of forces determines what is historically knowable. Social institutions assume power to a larger or smaller extent. In this paper, it will be suggested that a contemporary observation of our historical formation of understanding and perception is archaeologically possible by investigating how archives, considered in the widest possible sense as a function, is able to rearticulate its relation to power when interacting with a new kind of material technology. The statements thus invented to enable such expressions do not necessarily originate from librarians, managers or archive scholars. In fact, they are not uttered by anyone but can be heard in the anonymous mumble where the self-evident speaks, in something similar to what Wittgenstein once called a ‘language game.’ Statements do not form sentences. Instead they form linguistic apparatuses that produce the possible ways in which knowledge may be formed in a specific social structure at a specific time.

A second example concerns the understanding of where in the social body digital technology operates. Common for an objective approach is the general argument that digital technology will do for human informationalization what the conveyor belt once did for industry. As Douglas Engelbart once said:

By ‘augmenting human intellect’ we mean increasing the capability of a man to approach a complex problem situation, to gain comprehension to suit his particular needs, and to derive solutions to problems.5

Technology is here considered as increasingly more powerful tools in the hands of the men that use them, develop them, and study them so as to improve the results of their labour with social, cultural or natural objects. The question is how to make technology most advantageous for this labour. The focus of attention in archaeology is aimed elsewhere: towards a realm where the apparatuses of knowability take shape. Here technology is in no one’s hands but understood more as an autonomous relay between an abstract field of force constellations and its immanent formation into apparatuses, or producers of knowledge. The task of technology is to enable actualizations of virtual potentialities. Since the formation of apparatuses are depending on the changing, irreducible relation between these two structures – knowledge and power – technology is thought of as a relay that mediates, but never equalizes the tension; technology is therefore constantly met with new demands. Hence, digital technology is not considered a recent step in the progression of history but a producer of a radically different social formation that, among other things, requires a reformulation of history itself; neither evolutionary causality nor dialectical historicism is able to account for the attention to

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simultaneous irreducibilities that characterize the formation of knowledge in the age of digitization.

Philosophers like Maurizio Lazzarato, Félix Guattari, Giorgio Agamben, Manuel de Landa and many others have in different ways formulated architectures of thought akin to archaeology in order to consider contemporary knowledge production with regards to technology and power. In their work they have marked a radical shift away from a modern, self-reflective order configured around symmetrical relationships such as identity and equality, towards a non-linear order that is attentive to the potentialities of irreducibility and difference. There is also a political agenda involved here as many of these thinkers argue that modern rationality, with its demand for completion and symmetry, is at least partly responsible for legitimating both violence and legal restrictions. The modern order of thought (if there is one) tendentiously excluded the realm of potentialities. Modernity has a hierarchization of value built into its system that corresponds to the necessity of purity and symmetry. Non-linear thinking attempts to substitute necessity for potentiality and in many cases it has assigned to the computer a potential capacity for affirming such an asymmetrical organization of social faculties; a capacity that exceeds the limits of technology reserved for the self-reflective, humanistic order as ostensibly defined by Kant, Marx or Freud. However, for the remainder of this present essay, an explicit argument for a non-linear understanding of the archive and digital technology will be exclusively retrieved from a specific philosophical meeting, that of Gilles Deleuze’s readings of his late friend and colleague Michel Foucault.

Two Irreducible Archives

What, then – given these introductory remarks – can be made of the tense relation between today’s major archives and libraries and the implementation of digital technology, once the perspective of an archaeology is assumed?

A primary observation can be made: the motivation for these new electronic libraries and archives are only in a very limited sense dictated from a political ‘above.’ Instead, the anonymity of this motivation has often been expressed in reports of digitization projects by various reiterations of the phrase ‘it has to be done because it is happening.’

6 I am well aware that the use of the term ‘modern’ is inappropriate in this reduced sense. The sentence is not to be understood as a statement on modernity or modernism but merely as a provisional sketch of a tendential divide between two orders of thinking.


Thus, referring to Deleuze’s monograph on Foucault, it could well be argued that the anonymity of the ‘it’ that is happening indicates an influential source of power acting from elsewhere than the chief librarian’s office or the department of cultural affairs. The event ‘it’ is nothing but an indication of this strange new manner of speaking that at the same time produces the event of a new social knowability. Deleuze says of such an event that “it is the ‘One speaks;’ an anonymous murmur that takes different courses according to what corpus is considered. Here, one is enabled to extract statements from words, phrases and propositions which cannot be mixed up with them.”9 ‘It,’ then, testifies to the possibility of extracting new statements from the movements of a certain corpus of knowability. That which determines the regularity of appearance and the order of actualization of these statements is what Michel Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* called the ‘archive.’

The archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events. But the archive is also that which determines that all these things said do not accumulate endlessly in an amorphous mass, nor are they inscribed in an unbroken linearity, nor do they disappear at the mercy of chance external accidents; but they are grouped together in distinct figures, composed together in accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurred in accordance with specific regularities; that which determine that they do not withdraw at the same pace in time, but shine, as it were, like stars, some that seem close to us shining brightly from afar off, while others that are in fact close to us are already growing pale. The archive is not that which, despite its immediate escape, safeguards the event of the statement, and preserves, for future memories, its status as an escape; it is that which, at the very statement-event, and in that which embodies it, defines at the outset the system of its enunciability. Nor is the archive that which collects the dust of statements that have become inert once more, and which may make possible the miracle of their resurrection; it is that which defines the mode of occurrence of the statement-thing: it is the system of its functioning.10

Foucault’s concept of the archive can be defined as the historical *a priori* of what is possible to know discursively. As a concept it must not be mistaken for the proper name of institutions that stores records, artefacts or specimens. The concept ‘archive’ defines the sayable. Yet to Deleuze this definition in the *Archaeology* is either too restrictive or too indiscriminate to Foucault’s own thought as developed later: the stars that are mentioned above as a metaphor do not belong to the discursive but to a non-discursive order of knowledge. “What *The Archaeology* recognized, but still only described negatively, as non-discursive environments, is given its positive form in *Discipline and Punish*, a form that haunted the whole of Foucault’s work: the form of the visible, as opposed to the form of whatever can be articulated.”11 There are in fact two archives, two irreducible determinations of knowledge: the discursive, which determines knowledge in the form of language, and the non-discursive, which determines knowledge in the form of visuality. Pursuing the logic of this doubleness, Deleuze protests against another remark in the *Archaeology* that concerns its limitations: “it is

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11 Deleuze, *Foucault*. p. 32.
not possible for us to describe our own archive, since it is from within these rules that we speak,”12 Foucault says. Deleuze replies:

There is an archaeology of the present. Present or past, the visible is like the articulable: they are the object not of a phenomenology, but of an epistemology. What Foucault will reproach in *Madness and Civilization* is the desire to continue to invoke an experience lived as raw or savage, in the manner of the phenomenologists, or the eternal values of imagination, as in the case of Bachelard. But in fact there is nothing prior to knowledge, because knowledge, in Foucault’s new concept of it, is defined by the combinations of visible and articulable that are unique to each stratum or historical formulation.13

It is possible, then, to define a limit of the archives in terms of phenomenal appearance. Statements and visibilities do not appear to an intending subject as linguistic or visual phenomena. But the limit towards phenomenality should not be understood as a border around the archive, but rather as defining a certain phenomenal modality of actualizing linguistic and visual potentiality. Unaffected by this modality, and regardless of past or present formations, statements exist as ‘realities’ and may be recognized by the immanent appropriation by which they actualize the potentialities of that specific corpus that forms the whole of speakable knowledge.14 The same holds true for visibilities. In order to discover a statement among words, phrases or propositions, or a visibility among figurations of light, each expression must be considered with regards to how it produces the monadic wholeness of either of the two historically stratified archives. This can neither be determined from exemplarity nor from exceptionality.15

A statement is the precondition for linguistic articulation and a formation of language in which everything is said that can be said. It is a word or several words that are

14 For a comment on *appropriation* as a strategy to actualize potentialities in Heidegger’s and Deleuze’s philosophy, see Giorgio Agamben (1999) *Potentialities*. Stanford, Stanford University Press. The affinity between Heidigger’s notion of appropriation and Deleuze’s understanding of actualization (which I believe also accounts for his reading of Foucault) can be shown by reading two segments from Agamben. On page 202 one may read: “If what human beings must appropriate here is not a hidden thing but the very fact of hiddenness, Dasein’s very impropriety and facticity, then ‘to appropriate it’ can only be *to be properly improper*, to abandon oneself to the inappropriable. Withdrawal, *lēthē*, must come to thinking as such; facticity must show itself in its concealment and opacity.” And on page 225: “Thus liquidating the values of consciousness, Deleuze carries out the gesture of a philosopher who, despite Deleuze’s lack of fondness for him, is certainly closer to Deleuze than is any other representative of phenomenology in the twentieth century: Heidegger […]. For Dasein, with its Being-in-the-world, is certainly not to be understood as an indissoluble relation between a subject – a consciousness – and its world; and *alētheia*, whose center is ruled by darkness and *lēthē*, is the opposite of an intentional object or a world of pure ideas.”
15 Statements and visibilities are not parts of a whole in the sense that they would form blocks that in groups make up an apparatus and eventually the totality of an archive. With one visibility less, the visual archive would not be lacking; it would still be whole. Each statement and visibility produces the whole of what is speakable and visible at a given time. The language and the field of vision that they thus actualize are the linguistic and visual limit of what, at a given time, can be spoken and seen. Therefore the archives are wholes: in the sense of an order of statements or visibilities, it is irreducible to exemplarity, and the law that determines the appearance of statements and visibilities does not regulate their formation by means of exceptionality.
something more and other than signifiers or propositions: statements are positive, variable formations of language, arranging themselves not according to grammar but around singularities projected by hearths of power. Words that also are statements have the characteristic function of forming a serial multitude around a singularity. When the intensity of a hearth increases or decreases, or its force is shifted to another hearth, the corresponding singularities reorganize their statements and visibilities into new historical formations. Yet on the other hand, when the archive’s historical formation is changed, the strategies of power that legitimates knowledge are sometimes persuaded to restructure. Historical reorganizations of archives thus depend both on interior and exterior bifurcations among knowledge formations, as much as they depend on spontaneous changes in power.

One contemporary indication that such changes are happening is expressed with the mumble of ‘it is happening’ in reports of various digitization projects. It indicates that what has occurred during the past few decades, is a new stratification that allows, or rather demands a different formation of knowledge. As both speech and visuality are produced in this mumble, the task to describe it is quite difficult. But one can recognize the mumble in the extreme of our time’s knowledge formation: in the possibility of knowledge to consider itself as something different than a self. In Foucault’s archaeology, knowledge does not necessarily have a self, but a potentiality to actualize into different formations. And this, too, is the most remarkable feature of digital technology. Hence, the digitized archive does not gain its priority to illuminate our contemporary knowledge formations from sharing its proper name with Foucault’s concept but from its ability to cater for knowledge production without a proper notion of self. Today’s technological appropriation of archival functions in digital environments dissociates the archives’ classification system from its encyclopaedic logic and hence also from its hierarchical relation to catalogues and collections. The logic of digitized archives is not founded on the mirror-identity of ‘self’ but on a mobile exteriority with a capacity to spontaneously form new knowledge-strings. At its ont-epistemological limit, archival knowability is its relation to power as an ‘outerness’, rather than a reflectable self. Should a term be introduced in spite of Foucault’s explicit rejection, Deleuze would say that a new desire-assemblage has formed with the digital producibility of knowledge. A desire-assemblage, to Deleuze, is what performs the actualization of power relations: territorializing, deterritorializing and reterritorializing the strategies of power so as to affect the formability of a stratification of knowledge. It is to Deleuze what enables the conception of Foucault’s power as an immanent plane of consistency.

The digitized archive is therefore open for description on the level of its stratified statements and visibilities, what Deleuze calls its concrete machines. Hence, instead of defining national archives from their ‘selfhood’ (reflected either in an encyclopaedic logic, in their given assignment or in a vague idea of public serviceability), Deleuze argues that an institution is politically understandable only on the level of its formation of matter and function. “It is as if, finally, something new were emerging in the wake of

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Marx. It is as if a complicity about the State were finally broken.”17 “Even a ‘thing’ like a prison is seen as an environmental formation.”18 “Form here can have two meanings: it forms or organizes matter; or it forms and finalizes functions and gives them aim.”19 As such, an institution is determined not by its position within the state but by its appropriation, or integration of power. Foucault “does not write a history of institutions but the conditions governing their integration of different relations between forces, at the limits of a social field.”20 As concrete machines, institutions integrate other, abstract machines in a social factory that produces habits, objects, subjects and ideas. This is true for a very generous understanding of the word ‘institutions’. All social production is enabled by interlacings of concrete machines, or apparatuses. Their form and their ability to produce are determined according to a certain matrix for how they integrate force. Power, as the relation of forces, is a determining precondition for social production but it does not reside on its outside. The immanent relay from pure force to machine production is a social desire, and this may be objectified as technology. Following the radical change in today’s social desire, the concrete machines are changing what is possible to do, to say, to see, to put together and to know. For these machines, there is no delimited inside and outside: there is only a topology of higher or lower integrations of force relations.

Archives and the Nation

For archaeology, it is not a sufficient explanation to declare that institutions like libraries and archives are forced to change because their external (political, technological, social, economical) circumstances have been altered. Instead another model becomes increasingly suggestible: that with the globalized topology that characterises today’s desire-assemblage, the concrete machines of libraries and archives have intensified their integration of power to a degree that threatens the functionality of the library’s previous form. Such intensification is indicated by the increased proliferation of archival functions that arrive with the informationalization of labour.

It is arguable that an archival function such as the hospitality of classification systems21 is formalised into a statement of the digital age. As labour is increasingly informationalized, knowledge as remembered facts are less privileged than knowledge as a capacity to construct new relationships and connections. To know is not necessarily to have identified, once and for all, a place for something within a larger structure but to be able to find spaces that are hospitable to several incompatible and often mobile systems. To solve a problem is not necessarily to stabilize its inconceivability.

18 Ibid. p. 31.
19 Ibid. p. 33.
20 Ibid. p. 116.
21 Classification theorist S. R. Ranganathan has shown that hospitality is the dominant functional force of the modern classification system. Cf. S. R.Ranganathan (1951) *Philosophy of Library Classification*. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard.
Contrarily, a solution may be a transposition or a reorganization; or even what Foucault calls a problematization. For such solutions is needed an extreme archival hospitality as it is undoubtedly imperative to our knowledge formation that space will always be made available for further knowledge production. Hence slogans such as ‘lifelong learning’ and ‘virtual space’ are statements of today. Apart from being slogans and propositions they produce new formations of discursive knowledge. However, their mode of actualization is less intense than the problematization of ‘indefinite hospitality.’

Let’s say that Windows is a visibility. Neither as exclusively owned and distributed by Microsoft Inc., nor as the predecessor that operated on Apple Computers such as LISA and Macintosh, but Windows as the potentiality of forming a visual multitude. As a visibility, its affinity to the interface program that translates between MS DOS and various applications and documents is merely a matter of potentiality. Windows as a visibility does not appear – it is a quasi-spontaneous machine that organizes the unfoldings of materialities (texts, images, but also bodies). Windows does no longer actualize as a grid: its form is that of a bifurcation between regularities of spontaneous movements. Windows organizes the limits of a multitude’s ability of becoming different: any multitude’s variations of possible trajectories may at any moment be visually bifurcated into a new set of possible trajectories. (The work of contemporary artists such as Matthew Barney, Fabian Marcaccio and the Atlas Group create, quite explicitly, bodies and informations in bifurcating moments). Like ‘indefinite hospitality’ is a spatial concept referring to the unfolding of functionality, Windows – as the bifurcation of regularities – is a temporal concept referring to the speed of material becoming: the digital machine of visuality crystallises time, as Maurizio Lazzarato has recently put it.

The operational intensity of these statements in a digitized archive explains its undeterminable relation to a formal outside – and hence its decreased reflectibility in a self. This is the transformation of an ordinary archive into an ‘interarchive.’ Its functions and materialities merge online with all the archival functions and materialities that are already there: on the Internet, in the chat rooms, the newsgroups, the mailboxes,

22 “I am not looking for an alternative; you can’t find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by another people. You see, what I want to do is not a history of solutions, and that’s the reason why I don’t accept the word alternative. I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of problematiques.” Michel Foucault (1984) ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: an Overview of Work in Progress’, in Paul Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon, p. 343.


the FAQs, etc. Similarly, in a digital world it is hard to say what does and what does not have the form of an archive. It seems that the archive’s functions have already laid claims to the technological shape of that which to many archive scholars form the negative cause for the archives’ alteration: the global network organisation. But the archive does not have a negative relation to the global society: the archive’s hospitality was always potentially global and now the world steps into its digital formation of knowledge. The network society is no outside to the archive. To it, a national archive is an oxymoron. The relation between archive institutions and knowledge formations is better described as a plane of immanence, where the archive machines are increasingly becoming hotbeds for social activity.

National archives today experience the necessity to restructure with an acute sense of ambivalence because on the one hand, ‘it’ is happening, but on the other hand the traditional demand for completeness that structure the archives’ ideal notion of self-identity leaves them little alternative but to understand this event as a threat towards their bodies. The process of digitization is therefore considered an extension of the archives’ already existing functions and materials into digital shape. Unfortunately, this kind of extension is often merely prosthetic, something in line with an objectified notion of media. But the archive is not necessarily the collective memory of the nation and digital technology is not necessarily reducible to McLuhan’s general understanding of media. On the contrary, since our contemporary desire-assemblage has dramatically increased the actualizing capacity of archival machines, what has become increasingly intensified is these institutions’ social range of affectivity. Instead of adding digitized old and new services to an already existing body, believing that it enhances its already existing functions, digitizing archives should perhaps focus more intensely on their functional and material level. For instance, national libraries and archives could find themselves increasingly active as an educational institution, perhaps to a degree that at present time is generally held unthinkable.

Whatever such speculations might yield in the future, it remains that most national archives and libraries do not yet experience their functional intensification. Something of a conservatism maintains their digitization efforts on a somewhat restricted level with much respect for traditional formal limits. And yet their archival potentialities are increasingly tied to flows that disregard those traditional borders. It is therefore not the politicians’ demand for increased digitization that poses the major challenge for librarians and archivists, it is the realization that the heightened intimacy between a global knowledge order and archival functions effaces the limits of the modern national archive structure and in its stead demands non-negative strategies and new concepts (some are as provocative as ‘diagonal classification’ or the ‘fabulation of the catalogue’). In other words, the real challenge does not come from the decrees of a political government but from the ability to imagine how and what to change when selfhood is increasingly irrelevant.


Since knowledge formations are historically stratified, a formation is never fixed for eternity but articulated and determined by an historical *a priori* – itself determined by the mobile organisation of power. The modern historical *a priori* is anything but valid for all times. As Foucault showed in *The Order of Things*, History appeared as an *a priori* form for knowledge only at the beginning of the modern age in the late 18th century. However, its appearance did not follow causally from the collapse of Representation, the *a priori* of the previous stratification. Representation disintegrated because the forces that sustained its operability in the Classical age were overpowered by another constellation of forces. History, as a new social knowability, is not caused by the disintegration of Representation but came about as an “affirmation of an impossibility,” as Foucault says. This notion of affirming an impossibility suggests that virtualities beyond anyone’s knowledge may be spontaneously actualized if a radical change of power-strategies so desires. The discursive and the visual archives will then produce new objects, subjects and concepts and their historical stratifications, spaces and formations are altogether reorganized. Around 1800, History became an empty form with a new capacity to fit any self-reflective spirit.

This formation of History coincides with the appearance of the national archive that we know today as a public machine for storing all transactions, correspondences and produced or acquired artefacts of a nation state. As the global desire arguably challenges the modern functions of the nation state (notions of war, sovereignty, diplomacy, labour, etc.), the institutions tied to its operations are also changing. Hence, national archives are under all circumstances likely to transform their functions – or have their functionality transformed. This is not a consequence of the changed nation state, but again, of the new globalizing integration-structure of power. From its role as a closed mnemonic institution in the self-reflective order of the modern state, the archive machine has with the global network order gone into overdrive – as if the nation that ostensibly fostered it really hampered its productivity. Hospitality is no longer interiorization but externalisation.

Crucial for any political assessment of this transformation is a recognition that with new kinds of productivity follows new possible forms of control. The inactuality in the global era of what Foucault analyzed as the disciplinary order has perhaps been most clearly described in analyses of media and international conflict. The powers that sustain the global order of control over the network information society hinges upon fast and accurate retrieval of relevant information. Here, the modern model, consisting of

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29  Ibid. p. 246.
self-reflection of each social instance in a central organ, is far too slow. Instead, today’s control system employs a superficial and mobile network-archive to detect what movements are of potential risk. Thus a new correction system appears. Or in the words of James Der Derian: “overclassification and overcompartmentalization of information in the national security state can lead to a form of overdetermined decision-making with policy outcomes based on a surfeit of ‘deep,’ discrete sources that resist corrective feedback.”

In order to proceed towards an understanding of the possibilities and the limitations of the informationalized global society’s knowledge formation, a further extensive detour into Deleuze’s book on Foucault might prove a most productive exercise. It is also, at this point, an expressed hope that a closer reading of this exposition might help clarify some of the previously articulated suggestions and explanations.

The Relation Between the Two Archives

Of utmost importance to Deleuze with regards to Foucault’s philosophy are two things. First, that Foucault insists on the irreducibility of two formations of knowledge: knowledge as that which is sayable and knowledge as that which is visible; and second, that these are formations not of things said or seen but of conditions for speech and seeing. Foucault’s analysis is then for Deleuze always directed at these two mutually incompatible domains. These two archives are definable by the fact that they have form. And since they are the only domains of Foucault’s organization of faculties that are endowed with form, they are the only resource archaeology can have for empirical research. Hence what exists archaeologically are two historically stratified formations of positive knowabilities: one concerns what is sayable, and is expressed discursively through the statements of language as a whole; the other concerns orders of visibilities and is expressed non-discursively through organizations of light.

Even though these domains are irreducible, they tend to intersect: the two archives slide into each other, bump into each other or reject each other. So although Deleuze finds that there is an unbridgeable gulf between these two formations, they do make contact. (For example, in the modern age, the organization of the prison building is not entirely disconnected to the formal laws of the penal code; in the digital age, the visual hospitality is not dissociated from the perpetual production of more knowledge.) What is it that determines this tense relation? First, the discursive archive has a priority over the visual insofar as Foucault states that the discursive relation to the non-discursive is discursive. Second, and this follow from the first: while the statements of the discursive archive are spontaneous, the visibilities that populate the non-discursive archive are receptive. Statements determine the production of discursive knowledge; visibilities determine the knowledge of the environment in which discourse is produced. Third, both statements and visibilities are determined by the play of informal forces of

32 James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy. p. 33.
33 Deleuze, Foucault. p. 49.
power. A force is defined by its direction and amplitude, or in Deleuze’s terms, its function and matter. The function of the force makes it active, it affects other forces, while the matter of the force is reactive, it is what is affected. This forcefield is not above, under or beyond the stratified domains of knowledge, but immanent to them, on the same plane. But since the forces differ ontologically from the archives, they remain separated from the formal order of knowledge and reveal themselves only to an act of thinking. There is no concrete evidence of this power domain, but thought understands it as abstract.

In other words: although the archive complex is what determines what is knowable at a given time, it cannot determine its own act of determination and it does not know the history of its stratifications. There must be a different determinative order to account for it as knowledge. That it is impossible to know what determines the conditions for knowledge, just as it is impossible to see that which determines what is possible to see; this poses a challenge to thought. How, then – given the three principles for the relation between the two archives – is the complementary space between knowledge and power thinkable? And what problem does the relation between the sayable and the visible archives pose to this thought?

The perhaps most crucial work for Deleuze’s reading of Foucault, since it takes upon itself the responsibility to answer both of these questions, is Discipline and Punish from 1975. Since it is in this single volume that Deleuze finds Foucault engaged in the task of clarifying two of the perhaps most obscure aspects of his earlier work at the same time, it is important not to confuse them for each other. And Deleuze’s exposition of this issue demands careful reading. Even if the discursive realm is declared as being privileged over the visual, one must avoid a sneaking impression that, in Deleuze’s text on surveillance, it is visuality that in a more direct, or immediate way is related to power. Their common exteriority to the discursive archive should however not be taken as an advocacy for an ineffable immediacy: the Panopticon is not more directly an actualization of 19th century power-strategies than the penal code. Deleuze is instead occupied with the very different ways in which power and the visual archive respectively relate to the discursive archive. But even if these two relations are utterly different from each other it seems that they must be understood together, as woven into each other.

Hence, one might stop to notice again that the discursive archive has a privileged position over the visual. This is true also for the forcefields of power with regards to the archives. But again, one must not forget that despite this discursive privilege, the two archives are irreducible to each other. This also goes for the field of forces with regards to the archives – but in a different way and for other reasons. In both cases, however, the two irreducible domains depend on each other for their existence. There would be no relations of power if they could not be actualized into statements and visibilities, and, likewise, there would be neither formal language nor perception if there were no forces to determine them. Therefore, speech and perception as two kinds of formal knowledge are mutually dependent, yet hierarchical and irreducible to each other. But then again: what Foucault is dealing with are statements and visibilities: not words, architectures or paintings, and neither as examples nor as exceptions.
A word is a statement only with regards to the singularity that determines its form. “A statement always represents an emission of singularities, of singular points distributed in a corresponding space. [...] What counts is the regularity of the statement: it represents not the average, but a curve. In effect, the statement should not join up with the emission of singularities that it presupposes, but with the shape of the curve that passes in its vicinity, or more generally with the rules of the field where they are distributed and reproduced.” Just like the statements in the discursive domain, the visibilities are shaped in configurations of lines and curves. From the classical age to the modern, the main visual formation alters its shape: from a spiral shell that revolves like a galaxy, determining a relative place for everything within an infinite horizon of representation, to a grid-like shape that is laid down from above in order that visual objects may appear by an act of confinement within the grid. The modern visual grid is not only corresponding to analysis; it is a shape that enables new things to come into the light. As the new, modern, historical a priori for visual knowledge allows new phenomena, it explodes the flat, axiomatic and representative space of the Classical age and discovers a structural depth dimension. This is a radical change. Deleuze once wrote in a review of The Order of Things: “All knowledge, since Foucault, unfolds in a characteristic ‘space’.” Foucault’s description of how those sick from the plague were ordered to the windows of their houses to be counted and seen, so that the disease could be disciplined under the grid that was laid down over the city is meant to show this grid as a spatial formation of visual knowability, a grid that also receives and organizes the prisoners in the Panopticon prison. As the grid is laid down, it cuts the spreading of the disease into segments just as it is supposed to cut criminals out of crime. New criminals and new diseases see the light and become describable.

Disciplinability of disease and crime with a grid is the visual means to protect life; and life is a wholly new concept of the 19th century. But before this visual disciplinability is possible, the concept of life must have been discursively isolated: natural history had to have become biology, analysis of wealth transformed into political economy and general grammar into philology. A discursive notion of self-reflection had to be

34 Ibid. p. 4. Translation modified.
35 “This spiral shell presents us with the entire cycle of representation: the gaze, the palette and brush, the canvas innocent of signs (these are the material tools of representation), the paintings, the reflections, the real man (the completed representation, but as it were freed from its illusory or truthful contents, which are juxtaposed to it); then the representation dissolves again: we can only see the frames, and the light that is flooding the pictures from outside, but that they, in return, must reconstitute in their own kind, as though it were coming from elsewhere, passing through the dark wooden frames. And we do, in fact, see this light on the painting, apparently welling out from the crack of the frame; and from there it moves over to touch the brow, the cheekbones, the eyes, the gaze of the painter, who is holding the palette in one hand and in the other a fine brush... And so the spiral is closed, or rather, by means of that light, is opened.” Foucault, The Order of Things. p. 11
38 “Man does not exist in the space of knowledge until after the moment has passed when the classical world of representation collapse in its turn, under the impact of non-representable and non-
formalized first, in order to then be transposed into the visual. Hence the human sciences inform the Panopticon. Yet as is the case with statements, the shape of visibilities is a configuration of lines in the vicinity of singularities emitted from power, but these visual forms are receptive rather than spontaneous. A visibility is a regularity of light comparable to a star constellation, whose visual lines do not follow between the millions of stars randomly but are chosen from the figures of mythological statements in the discursive field. The point is that discursive formations determine the relation between itself and the non-discursive by means of a selective principle.\(^{39}\) But why is the discursive selection necessary for the formation of a visual apparatus?

Part of the answer can be traced to what Deleuze calls “Foucault’s reaction towards phenomenology.”\(^{40}\) As has already been explained, neither statements nor visibilities are phenomena, as they do not appear to an intending subject or to a consciousness. (This reaction extends therefore also to a rejection of psychology and anthropology.\(^{41}\)) Hence Foucault has no more a need for an untamed, primary perception than for an oppositionary relationship between a perceiving subject and a perceived phenomenon, and his statements do not need the oppositionary relationship between a signifier and a signified. Man, subject, consciousness: these are all historically finite apparatuses of discursive practices that are necessary only within the specific order of stratification that appears at the beginning of the 19\(^{th}\) century. Now, in order to avoid both consciousness and perception as a first source or first principle of knowledge – and this is necessary for thinking the positive potency of knowledge – Foucault creates a state of knowledge without knower and known as fundamental prerequisites. Knowing is a state of its own, it needs no knower (no primary consciousness) and no known (no primary perception): there is only knowing, or rather a double formation of knowledge in the discursive archive and in the visual.\(^{42}\) What is formed as knowable in each formation is a multitude of positive apparatuses of sayables and visibilities distributed in stratifications. These moving strata are the historical elements of a formation. The two archives are stratified or sedimentary like tectonic plates in the ground, but only in the sense that the moving layers determine the historical readability; not in the sense that the deeper you dig the

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39 The selective principle is an ‘experiment’ of my own. Deleuze never explicitly mentions any such principle in his reading of Foucault (although it plays an important part in one of his accounts of Nietzsche); nevertheless it seems that such a principle must be extracted from what he calls the selection of material machines, which is the condition for technological assemblages – especially since this, in turn, is what justifies the battling problematics of visible and discursive formations. Cf. Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 39-40. This theme will be returned to at the end of my paper.

40 Deleuze, *Foucault*. p. 49.


further back in history you go. Rather, says Deleuze, the more mobile a *transversal* is drawn as a diagonal within the strata, the more connections are retrievable for reading. Only the statements can testify to these movements because language is a spontaneous form while light is receptive. Only the statements may affirm the impossible because it is only through language, or rather through the spontaneity of the statements, that hitherto unchartered diagrams of power may be discovered and described.

This construction earned Foucault a reputation for having a close, yet ambiguous relationship to structuralism, the perhaps hottest topic among French intellectuals in the 1960’s. It is as if the move away from phenomenology, anthropology, psychology and existentialism would inevitably lend him this reputation, and indeed, time and again Foucault both denounces and embraces it, and sometimes even questions its existence. However, Foucault’s stratified archives belong as little within structuralism as within phenomenology. One could suggest three reasons why. 1) As opposed to structuralistic psychoanalysis in the Lacanian sense, the archives are not, like Lacan’s unconsciousness, structured like a language: contrarily, the archives are formations that are conditional for anything that could be called a structure of language. 2) The archives consist of stratifications of apparatuses – condensations of statements or visibilities that are indivisible into miniature bits and pieces, into Lévi-Straussian mythemes or Saussurian phonemes or monemes. Analysis, as a scientific model, is one actualization of many possible stemming from the archive, but is not applicable for a wholesale comprehension of the archive itself. Archaeology does not divide and conquer. 3) There is not enough stability in the archive to locate an Althusserian meta-structure, an ideology, according to, or within which its movements would be regulated. The emphasis on movement calls for that aspect of the archaeology that is called the transversal and this is not regulating in the ideological sense.

If archaeology is neither a phenomenological, structuralistic, existentialistic nor a psychoanalytical philosophy, then what is it? To Deleuze it is neo-Kantian. Deleuze traces the statements’ role of being determining and the visibilities’ role of being determined yet irreducible to what determines it, to Kant’s revolutionary break with Descartes. “The form of determination (I think) does not rest on an undetermined element (I am), but rather on the form of a pure determinable element (space-time).”

Even if Foucault himself had invited to this comparison in the essay *What is Enlightenment?* this link between Foucault and Kant is one of the most daring moves on Deleuze’s part. But its ingenuity admits a description of the relation between the two

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43 Deleuze, *Foucault*. p. 60.
44 To a direct question on how he defines structuralism, Foucault once replied: “When you ask those who are filed under the title ‘structuralists’, if you were to ask Lévi-Strauss, or Lacan, or Althusser, or the linguists, etc., they would reply that they have nothing in common with each other, or very few things in common with each other. Structuralism is a category that exists for the others, for those who are not. It’s from the outside that one can say that so and so are the structuralists.” Foucault (2001) ‘Foucault répondre à Sartre.’ *Dits et écrits I*, p. 693. Author’s translation; Cf. also the final comments in the preface to the English translation of *The Order of Things*, p. xiv.
45 Deleuze, *Foucault*. p. 61.
archive-faculties without the dialectical type of priority that would reduce the visual realm to the discursive. If this irreducibility is what Foucault borrows from Kant, it is not, however, without restrictions. In Foucault, the archives concern real experience of the limits of what is possible and not every possible experience, and furthermore, these are located in stratified historical formations and not in a transcendental subject: Foucault’s a priori is historical. However, the neo-Kantian feature in Foucault inherits from understanding and sensuousness the spontaneity expressed by the discursive formations, and the receptivity of the visual.\(^{47}\) The relation between Foucault’s two archives may then be described, by way of Deleuze’s reference to the Kantian critique, as one where the discursive is determining since it, like the faculty of understanding for Kant, pronounces its judgements on the sensible – what for Foucault is the receptive domain of visuality. Furthermore, what is visible for Deleuze’s Foucault is irreducible to the discursive since the determinable form of the visible (il y a lumière – corresponding to space and time as the intuitive forms in Kant) is of a radically different order than the determining form (il y a langage – corresponding to the faculty of understanding). This division in Kant’s philosophy is bequeathed as the ‘Copernican’ turning away from Descartes, to whom the ‘I think’ could determine ‘I am’ since they both belonged to the same determinable order and the ‘I am’ was regarded as an undetermined proposition.

Deleuze reflects Foucault in Kant’s phenomenology and particularly in its realization that an order cannot determine itself without closing itself, and that therefore the form of determination, ‘I think,’ should not to be sought to correspond to that of an undetermined being, but to the pure possibility of determination given in a form of intuition: space and time. Kant showed that the problem of truth concerns the possibility of a conjunction between faculties of knowledge rather than the construction of an indubitable proposition from which to deduce a tree of knowledge. Foucault’s neo-Kantianism would, according to Deleuze, consist in taking up Kant’s organisation of determinations between irreducible faculties, yet to consider them not as belonging to a transcendental subject but to a historically changing reality’s two formations of knowledge, the sayable and the visible. Hence, truth for Foucault is not the conjunction between the two, but the dynamic disjunctions that produce and release new statements and visibilities. The precondition for truth is that the disjunctions between the sayable and the visible establish certain procedures as truth. This means that the principle of selection must therefore be brought into knowledge from another, determining order. Such a principle is a function of spontaneity, and hence, the principle of selection is also what determines the difference between the visible and the sayable. Selection comes ‘before’ any knowledge in the sense that it is part of producing it: a creative, positive and mobile producer of apparatuses. The relationship between the discursive and the visual archives is discursively problematic because the principle that determines it demands an originary bifurcation in order both for apparatuses to be produced\(^{48}\) and for power to become an act.\(^{49}\)

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47 Deleuze, Foucault. p. 60.
49 Ibid. p. 39.
The Relation Between Archives and Power

To Deleuze, this relation is a problem evoked by the question why, now that the visual and the discursive have been described in terms of faculties where one is determining the other’s determinable form, the discursive does not exhaust the visible. “How would the visible not slip away, as something eternally determinable, when statements can determine it \textit{ad infinitum}?\textsuperscript{50} Or in other words: what could explain the priority of the discursive while accounting for the fact that the visual remains as a determinable form? In order to answer this question, Deleuze returns again to Kant’s philosophy and specifically his need for a third instance that can mediate the irreconcilable relation between passive sensuousness and the active judgement of phenomena in the faculty of understanding. This mediating instance was for Kant the ‘mysterious’ realm of the imagination, or \textit{Einbildungskraft}, which, as a mediator schematizes, that is, lays the conditional bridge of ordering that is necessary for the faculty of understanding to judge phenomenal appearances and legislate in the interest of knowledge.\textsuperscript{51} There is a concealed play of words here that highlights the notion of a mysterious field of forces already at play in Kant, for it is this Kantian \textit{-kraft} that suggests the extra-archival relations as relations to power. Yet power, in the Foucauldian sense, does of course not account for a mysterious capacity within a transcendental subject to imagine and mediate a sensuous perception to a legislative, categorically based judgement. In Deleuze’s account, the immanent play of forces is \textit{what is integrated into knowledge}:

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid. p. 68.

\textsuperscript{51} In Kant’s \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}, the faculty of imagination synthesizes and schematizes so that through this activity, phenomena can be mediated from the receptive sensibility to the active faculty of legislative understanding. Deleuze describes this very clearly in his monograph on Kant: “We can now ask what the legislative understanding does with its concepts, or its unities of synthesis. It \textit{judges}: ‘The only use which the understanding can make of these is to judge by means of them’. We can also ask: What does the imagination do with its synthesis? According to Kant’s famous answer, it \textit{schematizes}. We should therefore not confuse synthesis and schema in the imagination. Schema presupposes synthesis. Synthesis is the determination of a certain space and a certain time by means of which diversity is related to the object in general, in conformity with the categories. But the schema is a spatio-temporal determination which itself corresponds to the category, everywhere and at all times: it does not consist in an image but \textit{in spatio-temporal relations which embody or realize relations which are in fact conceptual}. The schema of the imagination is the condition under which the legislative understanding makes judgements with its concepts, judgements which will serve as principles for all knowledge of the manifold. […] The fact that spatio-temporal relations can be adequate to conceptual relations (in spite of their difference in nature) is, Kant says, a deep mystery and a hidden art.” Gilles Deleuze (1984) \textit{Kant’s Critical Philosophy}, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. London: Athlone Press, pp. 17-18. The acts of synthesis in the faculties of understanding and imagination in Kant corresponds to the integrating battles between the visual and the discursive archives in Foucault that give way to the field of forces and the hearths of power that, like Kant’s schema’s realization of relations, produces statements and visibilities. Hence: “…in order to explain how passive sensibility accords with active understanding, Kant invokes the synthesis and the schematism of the imagination which is applicable \textit{a priori} to the forms of sensibility in conformity with concepts. But in this way the problem is merely shifted: for the imagination and the understanding themselves differ in nature, and the accord between these two active faculties is no less ‘mysterious’ (likewise the accord between understanding and reason.)” Ibid. This corresponds to the relation between the realm of power and knowledge. The distinctive characteristics of these two relationships in Foucault is what motivates a neo-Kantian architecture of Foucault’s archaeology according to Deleuze.
not as a bridge, but as problems. Power is ontologically other to knowledge, what Deleuze calls an outer. While the two archives are merely external to each other, power is an outerness that affects knowledge by emerging as new singularities around which statements and visualities are formed. Yet, for all its abstract quality, power is still a political question. It belongs to the modern objectification of a political economy to conceive of power as democratically concentrated in the focal point of self-reflection by which a nation’s sovereign legitimates the right to rule. But this is a mere objectification. Power itself does not belong to anyone, it is not reducible to anything, and the forces at play within power are not aimed at any things or objects, but solely at other forces. Therefore, it would be a mistake to conceive of power exclusively in the violent sense, as exercised upon an object or a people, or from a definable place. Deleuze insists that power is not owned, it is exercised – and exercised by the dominant as much as by the dominated forces, and solely upon other forces. Power is neither restrictive nor in itself oppressive.52

Although it is immanently present, power does not strictly belong to the domain of knowledge; understanding it is therefore a matter of thinking. The main difference between knowledge and power is that the archives and their apparatuses are formal while the fields of forces and their diagrams are informal. This is why the structure of the relation between the two formal archives cannot be directly transposed to the relation between the archives and power.53 Even though the dimension of power has a similar priority over the archives as the discursive archive has over the visual, spontaneity and receptivity in the realm of power have a very different meaning than in the realm of knowledge. Here it is a question of how the play of active and reactive forces within the horizon of power creates densities, raised intensities, verily hearths of power. These mutable hotbeds or power-zones are what secure, organize and even produce the selective structure of the relationship between the twin forms of knowledge. But power is not stratified like the archive: it is purely superficial. Hence the relations

52 Foucault’s rejection of Marxist political leftism has its background in Nietzschean ontology. Deleuze lists six Marxist postulates concerning the nature of power that Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* quite simply abandons. These postulates say: 1. That power is the property of a ruling class. 2. That power is located within the State apparatus. 3. That the power incarnated in the State is subordinated to a means of production which works like an infrastructure. 4. That the power is an essence that characterizes those who own it, and who are separated from those onto whom it is exercised. 5. That power is exercised through violence or ideology, and is primarily oppressive. 6. That the State power can be expressed as a law that can be understood either as a peace-condition that controls other, disruptive forces, or as a result of war. Against these six postulates, Deleuze argues that 1. Power is less a property than a strategy and is exercised before it is owned. 2. The State is a result of a specific constellation of hearths of power that enables it to appear; the disciplinary society is not a State apparatus but a type of power that permeates all institutions and apparatuses. 3. Economic power is not divided into super- and substructure that affect each other in a pyramidically shaped organization. Power is distributed on a field of immanence where it congests and spreads out in hearths and series. 4. Power has neither essence nor attributes; it is an operative relation passing through the dominant as much as the dominated singularities. 5. Rather than operating through ideology or as violence, which is power exercised on an object, power is operating on other powers, actions upon actions. Power produces reality before it oppresses. 6. Law is rather a distribution of, than the opposition to, illegalities. Law is neither the result of war nor a condition of peace but is war itself, the exercise of a strategy. Cf. Deleuze, *Foucault*, pp. 25-30.

53 Ibid. p. 73.
between forces are differently organized than those between statements or visibilities in the archives.

Rather than a threefold spatial organisation that is subject to interdimensional variation, as is characteristic for the apparatuses of the archives, the forces have no other being than a relative variability. As the diagrams of force have no form, but are purely material and functional, their relations are on the one hand quite simple: they depend on a force’s ability to affect and its susceptibility to be affected. Though on the other hand it is quite complex: a relation of forces are actions and reactions involving not an object, but other forces, and is therefore expressible only as a group of variables, different modalities or directions of affecting action: it may for instance enable, enforce, provide for, disrupt or simplify another set of forces at the same time or successively and to various degrees. Deleuze says that the ability to affect is the function of the force, and the susceptibility to be affected is the matter of the force. These are the double abilities that define a diagram; the two coordinates of a map over social structures such as power affects their becoming. Hence the map, or the diagram is less to be considered a description or a representation than a productive, abstract machine. When archives formalize, it is the intensities within these two formless coordinates – function and matter – that are transposed into the domain of knowledge. The reason why this transposition is necessary is that the order of knowledge would not be able to compose new apparatuses had it not been determined by sheer power that is other than itself; a wholly different order, yet immanently permeating its own.

Now, returning to the question above, (why the visual archive is not exhausted by the discursive) the answer is found in the different modes of producing discursive and visual apparatuses. For the two archives to maintain their relation, and keep from running out of determinable variations between the visible and the sayable, the formalization of force into statements and visibilities must be conceived of as something else than an origin of knowledge or an invention: for Deleuze it may start with a bifurcation of force-relations – for example caused by an increased problematization of a desire-assemblage. This assemblage redirects the spontaneous order of force-relations and determines their new flows and congestions. Formalization of forces on the discursive side begins with a concentration of new hearths that become integrated as singularities, and which, by a repetitious tracing of their forces’ active functionality forms a multiplicity of formal statements. On the visual side, it consists of the appropriation of reactive matter, which is shaped into visibilities by the selective

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54 This is a theme that due to lack of space is undeveloped in this essay. The three spatial determinations are very early in Foucault defined by Deleuze as the collateral space, formed by a neighbourhood of statements; the correlative space that is formed by a statement and the concepts, objects and subjects that it produces and finally the complementary space which is external and relates these two earlier spaces to extra-archival formations. Manuel De Landa has recently explicated these Deleuzian spaces as a space of variable dimensionality, influenced by Riemann’s geometry: “…the population of multiplicities would be dimensionally heterogeneous. Given that the plane of consistency must assemble multiplicities together by their differences, this ‘plane’ cannot be conceived as a two-dimensional surface but as a space of variable dimensionality, capable of bringing a dimensionally diverse population into coexistence.” Manuel De Landa (2002) Intensive Science, Virtual Philosophy. New York: Continuum, p. 112.

55 Deleuze, Foucault. pp. 71-72.
principle. Repetitiously traced, the diagrams thus actualise into concrete machines: apparatuses in the double domains of knowledge.

The diagram is no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography that is coextensive with the whole social field. It is an abstract machine. It is defined by its informal functions and matter and ignores every distinction of form between content and expression, between a discursive formation and a non-discursive formation. It is a machine that is almost blind and mute, even though it makes others see and speak.\textsuperscript{56}

The diagram does not have the formal qualities of the apparatuses it produces: there is no formal curve binding its multiplicities together and it has no determinable being; it is extremely, and exclusively creative. What it creates are new types of realities, new problem-zones for truth.

Lastly, every diagram is intersocial and in constant becoming. It never functions in order to represent a pre-existing world but produces a new kind of reality. It is neither the subject of history, nor does it survey history. It makes history by unmaking preceding realities and significations, constituting as many points of emergence or creativity as unexpected conjunctions or improbable continuums. It doubles history with a becoming.\textsuperscript{57}

How is this production of truth organised? This is not, and Deleuze points this out on a couple of occasions, a reiteration of the Marxist sub- and superstructure model, but a logic of production that follows what he calls an ‘immanent causality’. The immanence demands that the forces are not ‘outside’ the archives, but saturates them through and through, neither inside nor outside. The ‘causal’ productive relationship between diagrams and apparatuses is not, then, one of cause and effect, but of virtualities becoming actualized. Hence, this production does not have a history of successive beings but is itself a new creation of history doubled with its own becoming.

Deleuze explains how this production, or actualization has three different modes. The first kind of production is a spontaneous actualization proper of the multitudes of an abstract machine, effectuated by the formless multitudes themselves. Such spontaneous actualization determines the principle of selection. Secondly, the formal apparatuses of knowledge can integrate diagrams as subjects under its order of knowledge, as for example prisoners into prisons, children into schools, etc; this second mode of production, integration initiated by the archives, always aims at a global integration, or a homogenization of power. The third mode of production is a differentiation, or a bifurcation proper. The spontaneous actualization and the homogenizing integration can only take place, Deleuze writes, if multiplicities diverge into different paths, whereby the third mode of production also determines how they divide into, for example, oppositions and hierarchies. Moreover, it is because of this differentiating mode of production that active and reactive forces split up into two different kinds of formation, into the visible and the sayable, the non-discursive and the discursive.

Since it is the active functions that are divided to become statements due to their ability to affect, and the reactive matter that becomes visibilities due to its susceptibility to be

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. p. 34. Translation modified.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. p. 35. Translation modified.
affected, a gulf appears from the moment of their formalization. Even if the tension of this gulf can be increased or decreased, it can never be equalized. There would be no knowledge without power, since power conditions the relation between the two archives, and there would be no way for power to be actualized had there not been archives to integrate them into formal existence. This interdependence between archives and power is what motivates the inexhaustibility of the visual archive. Abstract machines produce concrete machines by way of differentiation and repetition. But what can be said about the principle of selection since it is what discursively determines the formation of visibilities? It is found to operate on another, technological threshold.

The abstract machines of power and the concrete machines of the two archives: these are all social before they are technological. Or, says Deleuze, one could also say that there is a ‘human technology’ prior to a material technology. Material technologies, on the other hand, can be exemplified with the Panopticon prison model, reinforced concrete or the computer. “No doubt the latter [material technology] develops its effects within the whole social field; but in order for it to be even possible, the tools or material machines have to be chosen first of all by a diagram and taken up by assemblages.”58 A new machine or a tool is selected as a composite in an assemblage by the diagram directly, and is then integrated as a more or less crucial part of an apparatus. For Deleuze, these assemblages function as coefficients for the actualization of the diagram; they determine to what extent an apparatus is relevant for the social field. It is in this sense that the principle of selection determine the ‘problematics’ of the dynamic relations between the visual and the discursive archive. The more an assemblage manages to actualize the diagram, the more does its technological functions and materialities permeate social practice. In this way, it is explainable how a technology can play a minor role for a longer period of time and then suddenly become an entire factory of statements and visibilities once a diagram has selected it as part of an assemblage with an increased coefficient rate to actualize that diagram.

Each assemblage therefore actualizes the diagram’s composition to a higher or lower degree. Equally, the same assemblage can be more or less capable of actualization in different social fields. The higher a degree of actualization, the more does its apparatus determine the social environment, the more permeating is its technology, and hence, the more variations does it implement onto other apparatuses. If the medical and punitive institutions are of particular interest for an archaeological investigation of the 19th and early 20th centuries, this is mainly because the assemblages of their apparatuses actualized that diagram to an extremely high degree.

The Mode of Actualization within Digital Libraries and Archives

It is in this sense that it was previously suggested, as a working hypothesis, that digitizing archives and libraries are institutions today whose assemblages to a very high degree actualize our diagram. When the apparatuses of hospitality, already functioning within modern library classification, had the opportunity to reassemble with the

58 Ibid. p. 39.
technology of digital calculability, a completely new assemblage appeared. Not as an
invention in the ordinary sense: that is, as a new tool for solving a difficult problem, but
as a new machine for apparatic production and actualization of the virtual potentialities
of the new diagram. The extent to which the new technology is able to change our
knowledge formation is comparable to how internalization, as a new function, managed
to produce modern schools, hospitals and prisons.

The most commonly used metaphor today for expressing this new formation and how it
differs from the previous is probably the ‘network.’ As a proper name for a social
formation that expresses itself as able to route communication, transactions and all sorts
of affective mediations along paths that are independent of centralized, hierarchical
structures, this expression articulates also our desire for mobility and flexibility. The
tendency among archive scholars, by contrast, expresses a desire towards an increase of
spatial volume and temporal fragmentation. The archive is intended to be big, fast and
friendly enough to house such mobility. This is why it can be said that its function of
hospitality is still interpreted in traditional terms. The archives want to internalize
outside bodies by adding technological augmentations to its own. This is because their
interpretation of the digital environment has the disadvantage of not being able to affirm
the productive forces of our social diagram. Instead it inserts objections and hindrances,
as if the mobility that is part of our global knowledge production poses a threat to the
archive’s identity.

This contemporary desire to include the mobility, instead of affirming it, is comparable
to the well-known amusement – at any time – of considering the confusion in bygone
days of what to do with new technologies. Today we must laugh at ourselves. Because it
seems that the diagram has selected material machines for its actualization that are more
productive than the social formation of knowledge. Now, such situations have a
tendency to become politically dangerous. What has been referred to as a digital
prosthesis: the idea of augmenting existing functions and materials by adding new
digital services to an already existing body, is the result of an imagination whose
powers are today not as strong as they once were. What must instead be analyzed first is
what the assemblage of a digital library can do, what its limits are, and then how the
institution can affirm the capacities of the concrete and material machines thus
produced.

This paper is not the place to carry out such an analysis, but it may conclude by
mentioning a few possible ideas. Gilles Deleuze once described the new social
formation as a society of control.59 In a short, famous article named after this formation
he points out that while in the modern era of discipline one always had to start over
again, in the society of control one is never finished with anything. Discussing the
implications of this in an interview with Antonio Negri, Deleuze then suggested that
“one can imagine that education will be a less and less closed environment,
distinguished from professional environments as from other closed environments, but
that both of these will disappear to the benefit of a terrible, permanent formation where
continuous control is exercised over gymnasium teachers or university staff. One tries to

minuit, p. 240-247.
make us believe in a school reform, but it’s liquidation. In a control regime, one is never finished with anything." What is here referred to as ‘the liquidation’ of the school is not, of course, the end of education but, paradoxically its re-organization according to a new conditional power-strategy. If, as has been suggested above, education may become a new function of libraries and archives, then this must be understood in the sense of an affirmation of movement and flexibility. To not affirm it, but to add the techno-gadgets onto its existing body is dangerous – not because it perverts the body, but because such an extensive addition tends to create a new permanent control mechanism if appropriated within any institutional framework. If associated instead with an archive that affirms the abilities of our diagram it could enable an interdisciplinarity that would deserve its name, like a computer virus. This does neither imply education in front of computer screens, nor classroom education in libraries but a didactic model that emphasises archival hospitality in the sense of a mobile transversal that is connecting, disconnecting and reconnecting discrete and irreconcilable strings of knowledge. The participant of such hospitality is neither inside nor outside the library or the archive, but a mobile figure that maintains the openness of the bifurcations between a multitude of apparatuses. Hence the foundation of knowledge is no longer the complete accountability of neither a synthetic a priori, nor speculative dialectics, but the problematic and creative relations between what is sayable and what is visible at a given time.

What perhaps ought to be changed is what Kant once referred to as the architectonics of knowledge. Or rather, since this alteration arguably already has taken place, what ought to be changed is the attitude towards its new capacities. Since archives and libraries are in a prime position to affirm the ability of this ‘network’ structure by actualizing the potentialities of what it can do, current research of these institution’s relation to digitization had better depart from an analysis of this architectonics than of how to enhance their traditional form by adapting to a new technology. Because only by thinking the relation between these institutions and the social production of knowledge is it possible to find a form where their potentialities are affirmed. Then, and only then, would archives and libraries know how to participate in the knowledge formation of the 21st century.

the author

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