Would it be possible to comprehend contemporary Western societies without the individual? How many institutions, laws, and conventions would not appear utterly meaningless and senseless devoid of it? Doing away with the individual, "unthinking" its concept, type and name – erasing the individual’s entire history – seems to counter reason and common sense. It would probably take the disposition of a madman, an alchemist’s imagination, and a pataphysical squint to carry out such a dubious enterprise. Were anyone, for all that, to succeed we would most likely react with the same kind of loathing and dejection as the narrator in Poe’s story: “This old man, I said at length, is the type and the genius of deep crime. He refuses to be alone. He is the man of the crowd. It will be in vain to follow; for I shall learn no more of him, nor of his deeds” (Poe, 1996: 262). He refused to be alone, refused to be, or become, individual. A most repulsive felony. Imagination dead imagine. But let’s not get astray…

In reply to the question *Who comes after the subject?* Deleuze made his point clear: there is no use in waiting for a Who to come as a replacement for a particular concept. It is better to find or create the new functions that make the prevalent one inadequate, since “a concept does not die simply when one wants it to, but only when new functions and new fields [of thought] discharge it” (Deleuze, 1991: 94).

In this essay I will try to respond to a call from Heller and Wellbery (1986) in which they stress the need to rethink the concept of the individual; or the need, even, to constantly rethink it. ‘The individual’ has served, they maintain, as a paramount feature in the construction and development of Western societies for the last five centuries.1 In

* An earlier version of this text was presented at the *17th EGOS Colloquium*, Lyon, France, 5-7th July 2001.

1 Although, if we follow Morris’ (2000) arguments, we should perhaps add another four hundred years to the individual’s historical importance; the question of when the individual was discovered has been much disputed and will, I’m sure, remain unsettled.
the process, however, the individual has been under steady pressure, in perpetual crisis, and hence under incessant reconstruction.\(^2\) There seem to be no cause for disagreement on any of these instances, so what remains to be asked for are the functions and fields that pose the individual as a problem. And if there is a crisis it would, of course, be nothing but a crisis of thought itself. Hence, I will explore a potential rupture in thinking ‘the individual’.

Within my own field of business and management studies, processes of individualisation commonly result in (as well as them being an effect of) a joint praise, where a clear distinction between academic inquiry and business consultancy is often hard to make. In this context individualisation means empowerment and win-win situations. Workers and employees are to be empowered in the name and image of the entrepreneur, whereas consumers acquire their full potential by way of one-to-one relationships with companies. We are told that our societies bear the emblem of enterprise (Drucker, 1993) and that we ourselves, accordingly, are first and foremost leading entrepreneurial lives (Peters, 1999), attending, perhaps, a curriculum on the strategic development of individuals (Maccoby, 1988). In these circumstances, I suggest, crisis dwells, covert, waylaying in the realm of business ventures. Just the place for a Snark!\(^3\)

First exemplar of a new individual

September 1998. I had invited one of the major figures – an Icon\(^4\) – of the booming e-business to share his experiences of project management with one of my classes at the School of Business. He arrived at the lecture hall a few minutes late, wired to his mobile phone and engaged in conversation. He disconnected and turned to the expectant audience. “Minor crisis at the company”, he excused himself, “I’d better get back there within the hour, so let’s get started”.

In the following hour we learnt about his company (at that time perhaps Sweden’s most successful in their line of trade, at least in terms of increase in stock value, media attention, and attractiveness to venture capital) and how they had managed to get ahead of competition. My business students were intrigued, as they usually are by stories from the real world. But since he did not speak much about projects, my own notebook stayed blank. That is, until he wrapped things up by stating his credo: “What you must be fully aware of to make it in this trade is that we are now dealing with a new individual – a new consumer and a new employee. The new individuals do not take orders and mistrust authority. They are in charge of their own lives and make their own choices. They take crap from no one. You

\(^2\) Cf. Meyer (1986). For Meyer, reconstruction seems to consist of further socialisation in case of ‘explosive’ individuals, and improved means of individualisation in case of an excessively subjugating society.

\(^3\) In Lewis Carroll’s famous poem we learn that a Snark is easily recognisable, since all Snarks are Snarks, except some that are Boojums.

\(^4\) Icon was also the name of his company.
have to design your business as well as your organisation in accordance with their dispositions otherwise they will leave you. This is the most significant change we are witnessing today. If you were born after 1968 you are a part of all this, you are the new individuals. Unfortunately I am a bit too old for that myself, but I can tell that most of you are in the right age for understanding these changes – the right age for winners.” Applause. As he left for headquarters and some crisis management, I started to realise I was old. Just a few years too old for making it.

When proclaiming the significance of ‘the individual’ there is, of course, not one but numerous concepts involved – a whole family of variable relationships (including the individual, individuality, subject, person, self, self-identity) – and hence a qualification is called for. ‘The individual’, old and new, is and has been functional and important in Western history above all as a figure of thought. Figures of thought are mediators, relays, navigators5 (not to be confused with categories of thought, whether universal or evolutionary, Kantian or Maussian). They operate in-between a plane of immanence of concepts and thought-out discourses, lines of argument, categorisations, and classifications (Cicero knew this) – in other words, they make concepts operative. A figure of thought embodies a bundle of concepts, or, rather, conceptual personae; Marx ‘Revolutionary’ (the absolute becoming of the all-sided individual) and Mill’s ‘Untouchable’ (consummation of the individual in elbowroom) go hand in hand by the same figure. Hence, the figure fits within Deleuze and Guattari’s formula: plane of immanence (the unthought or pre-philosophical plane)6 – concepts – conceptual personae – /figure of thought/ – plane of organisation (the outthought, enacted and institutionalised), all of which are related to an image7, a vision of a world and a people inhabiting it (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994). Like a plane of immanence, figures of thought are non-philosophical, but in a different sense. Figures are habitual. For instance, companies are generally organised as bureaucracies or as (intentionally) anti-bureaucratic enterprises – out of habit, solely out of habit.

To put up with the very strength of this mediator, this habitual figure of the individual, seems to demand a different habit – that is, if one wants to set off on a survey or exploration at all – a ‘Faustrollian’ habit, perhaps. In his ‘neo-scientific novel’ Jarry has Dr Faustroll escape the law by embarking on a journey where he “simply moves on at will to another time and/or place.”8 The good Doctor’s vehicle is a boat – which is a sieve9 – and he explains its supremacy for his crew of two (the lawman, now held

5 Cf. Asplund (1979) and Nemerov (1978) for discussions on the workings of a figure of thought.
6 A plane of immanence cannot be thought yet must be thought: “thought as such begins to exhibit snarls, squeals, stammers; it talks in tongues and screams, which leads it to create, or to try to [create concepts].” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 55)
7 This is where Marx and Mill parted most distinctly.
8 Cf. Shattuck (1996: xi)
9 For quite some time I have had the impression that both Deleuze and Guattari were of a pataphysical bent, and it is worth noting that they describe a plane of immanence as a kind of sieve: “The plane of immanence is like a section of chaos and acts like a sieve (1994: 42), and further on “every plane is not only interleaved but holed, letting through the fogs that surround it, and in which the philosopher
hostage; and the navigator, an imaginary baboon called Bosse-de-Nage). “I am all the more convinced of the excellence of my calculations and of its insubmersibility in that, as is my invariable habit, we shall not be navigating on water, but on dry land” (Jarry, 1996: 17). Faustroll’s impossible vessel is at the same time his plane of immanence. A sieve cannot float, yet it must and yet it does. Hence, he is led to create a new concept of the Journey. Or, rather, he revitalises the Lucretian concept of clinamen – the infinitesimal swerve, the drifting off-course – in Lord Kelvin’s persona. And aided by this renewed concept of travelling he is able to break away from the commanding figure of the Law, the Law of One mode of existence, of common sense, of One real world. Together the small crew visits fourteen islands in the vicinity of Paris, and each island is invented by Faustroll as to convey different affects and modes of existence. Such is his way of exploring and exploiting. Such is his envisioned world – “he welcomes and explores all forms of existence.” And since long, and out of invariable habit, he is guided by this peculiar figure of thought: pataphysics. Ha ha, said the baboon, and those where the only two human words that it knew. Ha ha, and nothing more.

So, for the lightness of travelling, I have tried to make myself a suitable sieve-boat and to round up a series of different lands, or exemplars, in the neighbourhood of the figure under survey – and for each exemplar a mode of life. And for a crew . . . Snark hunters, solely Snark hunters.

A figure of thought may hold and combine more than one concept, but the former often ends up in combinations with its own kind as well. What Foucault (1994) demonstrates in *The Order of Things* is how the human sciences have been constituted and organised in accordance with its two prominent figures, Man and Individual (adding Society makes sociology). However, such arrangements are rarely peaceful or balanced. On the contrary, they are critical, they tend to break up, recombine, and create new fields for thought and practice. Figures of thought are effective and productive due to their certain vagueness, that is, their capacity to carry a mass of diverse, but adjacent, non-determinant concepts. Thus, their applicability and range of efficacy is next to infinite, but they may at times cart too much and tear apart from within.

### Second exemplar of a figure of thought

Peter Abelard – son of a knight, philosopher, theologian, logician, monk, husband and lover of Heloise – probably knew by heart what it meant to step out of tradition, to be faithful and yet one’s own master, in Medieval Christianity. At least, he prepared three components for a new conceptualisation of the individual (components: faith as own intention, faith in tension with Church, and in tension with kin) on such a presupposition (the unthought of his never completed concept, who laid it out is in danger of being the first to lose himself” (ibid: 51). The founder of pataphysics – the science of imaginary solutions – is, of course, Alfred Jarry.

10 Shattuck (1996: x).
And as he presented his rational analyses of faith and ethics through the unavoidable mediating figure of his time, the Individual-before-God, ‘Heloise’ – beloved, kin, conceptual persona – kept haunting his arguments, inserting an irresolvable, ‘pagan’, ambiguity into them. St Bernard disagreed on every point of Abelard’s rationale (it was not for man to reason with the Absolute), except on the centrality of ascertaining and strengthening a proper and true devotion for God’s individuals. Furthermore, he could not stand Abelard’s envisioned form of existence – the Lord’s earthly kingdom populated by pagan philosophers and lovers. For sure, Bernard was victorious in their fierce battle, whilst Peter had to face devastating disgrace and condemnation for sacrilege (which included the burning of his books and manuscripts). But at the same time this situation made visible a fissure in the dominant figure of thought; a significant moment in what Dumont (1985) has described as the transformation of the out-worldly human being, God’s individual. For Dumont, Abelard’s heresy was consummated four centuries later with Calvin: what matters are being in this world, the in-worldly existence of individuals. For short: the Individual.

Icon didn’t devise the concept of the new individual. Rather, he postulated or declared the incidence of a certain phenomena through an inevitable figure of thought (through a neo-liberalist filter, some would say, but figures mediate ideologies too). And by his rhetoric of novelty, the effect was of quantitative description. There have always been individuals, but the new individual is simply more individual than its precursors, and more distinctly chiselled than a fading generation of vague persons.

Two recent and acknowledged scholarly studies contain attempts at conceptualising that which Icon merely stated. Castells (1996-97) and Sennett (1998) both start out by the classic sociological pairing of Individual and Society, just to claim that today these notions and their interrelation need to be reconsidered. Society, from its empirical outlook, does not appear in ways we are accustomed to. They point, in a sense, to a bypassing of its survival units (family, local community, corporation, nation-state), and a dissolving of a social habitus (including approved modes of belonging and caring). Both share a conviction that the most fundamental and critical effect of a coming new social and economic order is a loss of common ground. Flexible capitalism and the rise of a network society are described as abiding a logic of uprooting, which substitutes ‘traditional’ human conditions of relatively stable and accepted value-systems for a ‘new’ inhuman business enterprise of creative destruction. For Sennett this leads to a corrosion of character, while the consequence suggested by Castells is a void or gap between the Net and the Self; a void which is also a contested terrain, with Net and Self in bipolar opposition. On the one hand flexibility and network, global flows of information and capital, supported by purely instrumental values and asocial functionality; and on the other grounding and self-work, a grappling for meaning and identity-building. Both maintain that the Net is a veritable executioner of legitimate and institutionalised identities, providing nothing in its place but the most extreme versions

of exchangeability and individualisation – an uncommon ground, business as unusual. But when proceeding by the figures of Individual and Society, any crumbling away of the one must necessarily imply a simultaneous mouldering of the other. In the case of highly flexible and individualised network enterprises the paradoxical effect being that individuals may become less so. For Castells this would occur in a withdrawal to self, to self-containment, as the common ground for the essentially social individuals diminishes or is bypassed through the Net. And as their scaffoldings in society rust away Sennett’s individuals are drained even of self, constituting, as it were, a hollow people. More or less, then? Nietzsche: We are more than the individual. And less.

Third exemplar of an enterprising individual

Icon’s autobiography (Staël von Holstein, 1999) was published about a year after his lecture at the School of Business, just before things were starting to get rough for Internet consultancies. The narrative of Nothing Can Stop Us Now! reveals as its subject something like a synthesis of Maccoby’s (1988) ideal types of Innovator and Self-Developer. Here work is nothing but a process of individualisation; a stepping out of tradition, commonality, the average; a becoming of the thriving entrepreneur. And its product: the new individual. In ‘business literature’ (i.e. management and marketing) such idea(1)s are commonplace today. Often futuristic (but the future is always already present) in claims and predicaments these ideas ring the changes of a common theme: the branded individual (individualisation through positioning in a market-game of free agents; Peters, 1999); the liberated individual (through symmetrical enterprising one-to-one; Peppers and Rogers, 1993); and the creative, nomadic individual of ‘funky business’ (by means of de-normalisation; Nordström and Ridderstråle, 1999). Labour and consumption merge in the One work of becoming a totally fulfilled, whole individual – a distinguished entrepreneur of ones own life. A life, that is, as enterprise (Rose 1998, 1990; Leinberger and Tucker, 1991). Furthermore, self-work coincides with net-work since the envisioned world of the business present-futurists is tantamount to Castell’s Net – a world inhabited by hyper-functional ‘venturers’. But Nothing Can Stop Us Now! insists on something else as well, on another direction, another becoming, a different venture. The sole work of individualisation, of standing out, seems to be folded in a much less distinguishable, hazy occupation. In transcending the restraining and determinant conditions of social and professional inertia, Icon finds, or reinvents, himself in the open space of the Net. Broken loose. Free at last. Then there is another curb, limit, wall, partition. On a TV-documentary about the pros and cons of the Internet revolution Icon hinted at it. “How do you keep up with the frantic pace of your business?” the interviewer asked him. “With gastric ulcer, a permanent fear of heart attack, and a very understanding wife.”

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12 The title of his autobiography, my translation.
13 In a peculiar way this theme, well rehearsed and repeated, conjures up a typical version of Nietzsche’s atypical individual.
Just days after Icon had delivered his speech to my class, a friend of mine gave this stealthy limitation a more elaborate expression: “I have the most tremendous job you can imagine. About a year ago I got appointed Head of R&D. It’s my dream. Great challenge. And great pay too. Very rewarding in every respect. You know, full autonomy, almost at least, and full responsibility of course. I was totally in to it. Focused. I used to be low on self-esteem, as you may recall, but now I grew. I was the king of the world. Ha! I worked a hell of a lot of course, but not as much as others I know of. My family wasn’t too pleased with that part, I can tell you, although they really enjoyed me being so inspired and cheerful. Well, a month ago I snapped. I hit the wall. I thought I’d caught a really serious flu, so a colleague drove me home. Next thing I know I’m at my parents place, in my old room, my old bed. I stayed there for more than week. Just laying there, like a vegetable, a foetus. They fed me like a nestling. Eventually I got out of bed to see my doctor and a shrink too. ‘Burnout’ they said. What the fuck is that anyway? ‘You should have seen the signs, listened to your body’. What was there to see or hear? Whatever it was I feel kind of cleansed. I’m reborn, not in a religious sense, but you know, like a new human being. Anyway, I’m back at work again, but I’m not going back there again. Easier said than done, I know.”

As has been pointed out, the question of when the individual was discovered, or when human beings found their individuality, is a controversial one. Was it in ancient Greece, early Christianity, amongst Medieval Schoolmen, or in the Italian Renaissance? Or is the individual, if anything, an invention, the latest creation (Nietzsche, 1978), or the effect of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1980)? Or is it rather non-localisable, outside history, an a priori of existence, a given entity? According to Luhmann, however, any further attempts at conceptualising or forming notions of the individual and its individuality are since long rendered futile. After Kant, he maintains, the individual has become appointed as a standard, both empirical and transcendental, “as the subject of the world. Experiencing the world, the individual could claim to have a transcendental source of certainty within himself. He could set out to realize himself by realizing the world within himself […] The Individual as the subject? This cannot be surpassed” (Luhmann, 1986: 317-318). When the individual becomes subject there is nothing to add. And since the individual is, in a sense, unthinkable, the only ways to move forward are by its ideological offspring (individualism) or by its subjective relatives (the ‘I’, the ‘Self’). For the latter course one could, for example, assert that having individual experiences, and experiences of oneself as a “specific individual” (Mead, 1965), are presupposed occurrences – pre-philosophical – in G.H. Mead’s thinking. They institute a plane of immanence on which Mead creates his concept of the self (the individuals of the plane and of the figure are still by no means identical).

Although expressing it in a more radical vein, Nietzsche too found a dead-end for the individual after Kant. With the language, methods and interests of positive science the rule of individual = subject ends in the numbed equation of individual = standard, average, type. Always recognisable, identifiable, measurable, it becomes a lifeless

14 A supposedly Western individual, that is.
quantity (Nietzsche, 1997). Thus, when spoken in a ‘positive’ tongue the individual is betrayed, bereft of its individuality, of life, and turned into a meagre type: ‘the individual’. To Nietzsche, an individual was something else, something more and less than a type: atypical, incomparable, immeasurable, excessive, incomprehensible. The courses of the two versions are entwined, though, as they outlive each other, live over and beyond without coinciding (Hamacher, 1986). Yet we always run the risk of “treating ourselves like rigid, invariable, single individuals” (Nietzsche, 1986: §618). This is because the type makes the most commanding figure of thought, but as they grow ever more firm and authoritative, types also tend to become frail and infested with foibles. And just like Abelard found a weak spot in the Individual-before-God, Nietzsche too reached for a suitable battering ram. “In morality” [of life, not of universals or the transcendent], he writes, “man treats himself not as an ‘individuum’, but as a ‘dividuum’” (ibid: §57). A dividual as individual: a division of the singular, dividing the division, individual dividual.15 This instance should not, in any case, be mistaken for Durkheim’s Homo Duplex, human being as duality – individual organism and socialised person.

**Fourth exemplar of a dividual in other work**

Stevenson offers the most beautiful expression of dividual life in Henry Jekyll’s full statement of his case.

I thus drew steadily nearer to that truth by whose partial discovery I have been doomed to such a dreadful shipwreck: that man is not truly one, but truly two. I say two, because the state of my own knowledge does not pass beyond that point. Others will follow, others will outstrip me on the same lines; and I hazard the guess that man will be ultimately known for a mere polity of multifarious, incongruous and independent denizens. (Stevenson, 1994: 70)

Tormented by a conflict of social position and desire (duplexity), ‘he’ came, with the aid of a certain potion, upon the singular stature of Edward Hyde. “He, I say – I cannot say, I” (ibid: 84) A dividual is “that point” one may come upon, but not pass. Yet, it is the outstripping too. It is not a doubling, or a stabilising bipolarity, but an endless to divide. Limiting and passing. Points and lines. Wall and wrecking-ball. Stevenson wrought the Captain’s straightjacket, more and less.

Just like Jekyll, the Captain of Strindberg’s play, The Father, is a man of many roles and positions: officer, husband, father, host, alchemist . . . As Strindberg’s drama unfolds, however, the span of positions diminishes, and all converge in a single focal point. A doubt of fatherhood turns into obsession as he engages in the One work of becoming father – father of daughters, of officers, of husbandry, of fathers. But, for him, the father-individual is a fatal becoming since its reversal is blocked. In the play’s finale he is captured, wholly individualised – rigid, single and invariable – in a straightjacket. Life abandons him, burnt-out, no more and no

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15 Cf. Deleuze (1995). In this text, Deleuze uses the term dividual analogous to Foucault’s individual; the latter being a power effect of discipline, the former of control. That is, in quite a different sense than what I am trying to convey here.
less than duplex. And there is no return or escape. This cutting-off of alternate routes comes forth in a previous scene when the Captain accuses his wife of obstructing his mineralogical studies of planet Jupiter. His wife, Laura, retorts: “I was acting from kindness. You were neglecting your duties for this work.” In Strindberg’s Swedish, though, the second sentence reads like “… du försummade din tjänst för det andra arbetet” – you were neglecting your duties for the other work. Translations divert, just as the Captain did. The respected officer had inclinations for some dubious enterprise now aborted. It was not the termination of studies, however, nor the straightjacket that effected a breakdown, but the work of becoming fully individual. Other work is not alchemy, not a desirable hobby, nor a duplication of work, or working extra. Other work is diversion and defocusing, work’s clinamen or off-course. A stray-work that cannot be done and yet is carried out constantly. A mass of work, out of which our habits have us say: now this is work, a fine piece of achievement, a stimulating hobby, a dull but good day’s practice, a pointless drag; but that (we can barely even say that) is something . . . else, elsewhere. A dividual in other work, then, is an imaginary navigator-baboon sitting on one’s shoulders, saying ha ha in any conceivable language. It is not laughter, “ha ha is a ditched gap in a wall at the end of a garden path, an armed pit or military well into which chrome steel bridges may collapse.” And all lines are open for becoming individual dividual. More and less a life.

I look up, reach over my head, fumble, and stumble – where is my companion now? Cicero: Abiit, excessit, evasit, erupit.

Is the individual unthinkable today, as Luhmann suggests? And are the only ways to proceed by the individual’s offspring and relatives? The latter route is the one taken by Rose (1998, 1990). He has set out to show how the 20th century was converted into a century of the self. Aided, supported and directed by psychology (and other ‘psy’s’) humans have turned toward and become immersed in themselves. The business literature, referred to above, also play’s a crucial part in this transformation, with the call of workplaces and job centres being “Become whole, become what you want, become yourself: the individual is to become, as it were, an entrepreneur of itself” (Rose, 1998: 158). We are, in a sense, obliged to be ourselves, or, rather, more than what we already are. And we should constantly work on our growth, choose it, burn for

17 This is part of Dr Faustroll’s analysis of Bosse-de-Nage’s monosyllabic uttering (Jarry, 1996:76).
18 It should come as no surprise that today there is a remedy on sale for dividuals. Individual or dividual, the choice is ours! Cf. Optimum Self, http://www.optimumself.com/individualartikel (visited 2002-03-01).
19 “He departed, withdrew, rushed off, broke away.”
20 The effect of this inwardness being what Lasch (1978) has called the culture of narcissism. The new individual could be described as a highly expansive version of Lasch’ narcissist.
21 Cf. Gordon (1986) for a very similar point on proper conduct, especially pp. 314-315.
and be burnt by it (this is the proper meaning of being branded). But we are still in the guise of individuals, rather than selves. The new individuals are forever more than they used to be. They are not well-rounded but expansive. Current discourses and practices of enterprise produce, or command, an ever-expanding individual with one sole occupation – the work of perpetual self-fulfilment. And when proponents of a new economic order, a ‘new economy’, announce the return or liberation of the individual, they essentially point, not to its emancipation or reappearance (as if the individual had been missing, or had not been free enough), but to an image of the world: the Net populated by Entrepreneurs; the latter being an attempt at obliterating the worker and the consumer, its greatest danger.

Will the individual as figure of thought hold for this image, with its exclusion of a duplex worker/consumer? Or will it crack (but how could anyone tell, since this figures mediating powers would have us deny such an occurrence for ages)? Are the Net and the Entrepreneur the functions that will fracture the individual by strengthening it (the typification of the atypical), and hence open up a passage for new planes, concepts, figures, and envisioned worlds? Were there to be such a passage, it would certainly be a suitable working space for another craftsman: “the middle-man, the undertaker constantly grasping for the in-between-being, the intermezzo: the entre-preneur (from the Latin inter, between, andprehendere, to seize, grasp, capture)” (Bay and Bäckius, 2000: 79). Consumer and worker might even partake in a cracking up from the inside, in committing a breach, as revitalised concepts or by a final rattle. “And now, horror of horrors! it is the “workman” himself who has become dangerous; the whole world is swarming with “dangerous individuals”, and behind them follows the danger of dangers – the individuum!” (Nietzsche, 1997: §173). The individuum . . . which for Nietzsche is also a dividuum, a stealthy, clandestine entre-preneur. Ha ha – wall and wrecking-ball.

Fifth exemplar of Chance

Neither individual nor self, just a gardener caring for plants, trees, and flowers. Chance carries no papers, has no record and hence no typical existence. He changes at the speed of a dial on the remote control. He is the man on TV; the man on TV is he. In the Old Man’s garden, “Chance could start to wander, never knowing whether he was going forward or backward, unsure whether he was ahead or behind his previous steps.”22 But as the Old Man dies and Chance is forced to leave his house for the outside world, he too gets directions in life. Strolling behind and ahead of himself he is a moving potentiality, pure chance. And it so happens that a minor accident arrests his walk, and he ends up being cared for by a nobility of industry. The Rand’s name him (Chance, the gardener) Chauncey Gardiner – he is individualised. They admire and become overwhelmed by his gardening wisdom – he is attributed an innovator-self destined to revitalise the political scene by means of a vivid garden imagery. Chauncey appears as a saviour, a creative destructor of American politics, a full-fledged entrepreneur in an inert economy, an astonishing TV-star. He is the ideal type of the

22 All quotations for this exemplar are, of course, from Jerzy Kosinski’s Being There.
Innovator/Self-Developer. Everybody wants him – he is the perfect individual. Branded, liberated, and funky. But then there is a crisis. As some dark-suits gang up in running Chauncey for president, Chance becomes “bewildered. He reflected and saw the withered image of Chauncey Gardiner: it was cut by the stroke of a stick through a stagnant pool of rainwater. His own image was gone as well.” He steps outside the enormous house of Rand’s and into their garden. “Not a thought lifted itself from Chance’s brain. Peace filled his chest.” Calmly wandering ahead and behind.

Chance too would be a crisis of the individual, a splinter in a well-known figure of thought. A rupture, and a healing, and a breaking. He is a dividual individual, an entrepreneur with a monkey on his shoulders, content with doing other work as well, ready to welcome and explore all forms of existence. Just like Faustroll.

As the horrid hunt is coming to a close, the crew’s wavering voices disclose:

*For the Snark was a Boojum, you see.*

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**references**


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