Life Enhancement Now, Now, Now*

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This paper is a critical and creative commentary on the modernism/postmodernism debate in organisational analysis. It examines the influence of Nietzsche’s work on the study of organisations and provides an exposition of Nietzsche’s will to power, active and reactive forces and life enhancement. It argues that Nietzsche’s account of forces is more nuanced than it is often thought to be and that this is particularly relevant for rethinking either/or dichotomies in organisation studies. The paper develops a technico-affective history of the human that is a both/and relation in an expanded field of forces. The conclusion sets out the implications for what is termed an ontological turn for the human condition and for the study of organisations.

Introduction

‘I is an other’. So said Arthur Rimbaud, the French poet and explorer, who scandalised post-Commune Parisian society with his satirical and sarcastic poetry that revolted against bourgeois values, Christianity, conventional poetry and common sense visions of reality. From only three years of writing his work has been taken up by Surrealists in the mid-1920s and the 1968 student revolutionaries, attaining a cult status with his attacks on the corruption of established political orders and a creative method of ‘deranging the senses’ brought about by self-induced chaos through combinations of hunger, drugs, alcohol and pain.¹

In Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Gregory Bateson sets out the double-bind as a ‘no-win’ situation. Bateson gives the example of a Zen Buddhist master attempting to bring about enlightenment in a pupil. He holds a stick over the pupil’s head and says fiercely: “If you say this stick is real, I will strike you with it. If you say this stick is not real, I will strike you with it. If you say nothing, I will strike you with it. If you say nothing, I will strike you with it”. How does the pupil

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¹ See http://www.sunderland.ac.uk/~os0tmc/rimbaud/rimbmain.htm for an introduction to Rimbaud. See also Cooper’s (1976: 1004) reference to Rimbaud’s method of ‘induced disorder toward the self’.

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respond? The Zen pupil might take the stick from the master, a response that might be accepted by the master; others might be completely disoriented by the Zen master eventually displaying pathological responses like paranoia and schizophrenia or intensify their acquiescence to the Zen master. Bateson claims double-binds are a source of pathologies, but that if these “can be warded off or resisted, the total experience may promote creativity” (Bateson, 2000: 278).

What do Rimbaud and Bateson do for life enhancement? Some introductory remarks to situate this paper are useful. Bob Cooper and Gibson Burrell wrote an influential piece in *Organization Studies* in 1988 that included a substantial section on Friedrich Nietzsche. Their article and the others in a series of articles for *Organization Studies* on Derrida, Foucault and Habermas bequeathed a series of problematics and opened up the study of organisations to theorising across the social sciences and humanities. In writing this piece for *ephemera* I have sought to make explicit Cooper’s Nietzschean influence, made visible largely through Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze, by providing a reinvigorated exposition of key Nietzschean themes: the will to power, the movement between active and reactive forces and life enhancement. Indeed Cooper presages such concerns in the opening sentence of ‘The Open Field’ when he writes, “As social scientists, we are probably less attentive than we should be to the wavering balance between structure and process in understanding human action”. Similarly, in the recent ‘Assemblage Notes’, he says, “We are not good at thinking movement”. In writing this piece I have drawn inspiration from concerns that have sustained Cooper throughout his scholarly endeavours and particularly from ‘The Open Field’ published in *Human Relations* (Cooper, 1976) and ‘Assemblage Notes’ published as part of a two-volume collection on Cooper’s work edited by Robert Chia (Cooper, 1998). Throughout the paper I aim to stake out a critical and creative response to these pieces.

This paper is organised into four sections. In the first section my concern is to set out the practical requirement for the human of order and regularity. After I have established this I introduce Nietzsche’s three criteria for life enhancement and discuss how these criteria relate to his account of active and reactive forces. In the second section I describe Nietzsche’s description of active and reactive forces and introduce Cooper and Burrell’s (1988) Nietzschean inspired depiction of organisations. My claim is that Nietzsche’s account of active and reactive forces is more nuanced and sophisticated than it is often thought to be and this entails the claim that life enhancement cannot be simplistically equated with active forces and life denial with reactive forces. In order to rethink a tendency to dichotomise active and reactive forces I draw on May (1998) to argue that the mediation between active and reactive forces is a both/and rather than an either/or relation. The third section develops the arguments set out in section two and argues for an expanded field of forces as constitutive of the human. Here I draw on Beardsworth’s (1996, 1998, 2001) recent work and his delineation of a technico-affective history of the human. My aim here is to discern the proclivity to consider active force as pure force and reactive force as epiphenomenal as a dichotomy that posits an ahistorical field of a priori forces. My alternative conception of the human emerges out of a non-human technico-affective history that culminates in the ability to make promises through the deferral of force. In the final section I draw together ontological and epistemological implications for this technico-affective history – what I term an ontological turn – for individuals, organisations and cultures. My conclusion is
that active and reactive forces thought of as an expanded field of forces that is a 
both/and relation inaugurates an immense cultural adventure that opens the human to 
indeterminacy and creativity.

The Human Condition and Life Enhancement

For Nietzsche (*WP, BGE*) and Bergson (1962, see also Ansell Pearson, 1999; 2002) order and regularity are practical requirements of workaday human life rather than something that precedes or transcends life. It means that knowledge is “Nothing more than this: Something strange is to be reduced to something familiar…. Look, isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover under everything strange, unusual, and questionable something that no longer disturbs us?” (*BGE*, 355). Through order, prediction and identity humans become calculable and acquire the ability to act over time and space (see, for example, Porter 1995). And yet because the categories that render the world calculable through clear-cut identities come out of an ordering that does not precede the world Nietzsche describes this as “a misty shroud of delusion” that is a common sense realism (*BGE*, 58). Nietzsche describes this giving of form in terms of the will to power because it is this that imposes order on chaos and constitutes being. Similarly Bergson describes the emergence of consciousness as the product of selection such that consciousness or “cerebral interval” (Deleuze, 1988b: 24-25) occurs when particular aspects of the world are selected or ‘actualised’ and a new entity comes into being that is relevant to the human will. It is out of selection that a “zone of indetermination” (Bergson, 1991: 31) is created from which responses can take a variety of forms.

Life enhancement is the maximisation of three criteria, says Nietzsche: *power, sublimation of power and form creation* (May, 1998: 27-54). Nietzsche’s will to power is, as I alluded to above, the name for form giving, structure or organisation given to becoming (*GM*, II, 18). Here the ‘supreme will to power’ is the ability to mark becoming with the character of being. The sublimation or spiritualisation of power into knowledge is Nietzsche’s second criterion of life enhancement because it increases the ‘range and multiplicity’ at work in the human. Sublimation is the use of power for tasks that require ‘receptivity, attunement, and discipline of one’s senses and thoughts, rather than the crude, heedless eruptions of their raw ‘instinctual’ state” (May, 1998: 28).

References to Nietzsche use the standard English abbreviations and refer to sections rather than page numbers: *TI* for ‘Twilight of the Idols’; *BGE* for ‘Beyond Good and Evil’; *EH* for ‘Ecce Homo’; *WP* for ‘The Will to Power’; *GS* for ‘The Gay Science’ and *GM* for ‘On the Genealogy of Morality’.

See Cooper (1976: 1010) for a brief description of Plato’s ‘flawed program’ that “separates the knower from the known … to give man control over nature (including himself) by developing the twin functions of intellection and reflection so that he could stand apart (a ‘thinking reed’) from the vivid flow of experience”.

For Nietzsche, ‘spirit’ is life and ‘spiritualisation’ is the movement from ‘spirit’ to ‘free spirit’. ‘Spirit’ designates the emergence and stabilisation of the nervous system as a whole, one not simply prior to, but engendering and always exceeding, towards greater complexity, the metaphysical
critical point here is that self-control and discipline is fundamental to ‘higher culture’ in so far as it ‘hones and refines’ power rather than simply suppresses. Here sublimation is life enhancing because it brings about the ability to “harness to creative end drives … whose violence might otherwise annihilate or paralyse us, and, moreover, to accommodate a great variety of opposing values…” (May, 1998: 29).

Nietzsche’s third criteria of life enhancement is the creation of new forms. By form creation Nietzsche does not mean arbitrary declarations but expressive actions that are conditional on and emerge out of willing the necessity of a particular history that is ‘what one is’. New forms come out of the freedom of willing the necessity of one’s past so that it can be overcome. Elsewhere, Nietzsche complicates the notion of ‘what one is’ with another key idea that to “Become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion of what one is” (EH, II, 9). Here then overcoming ‘what one is’ is premised on not being able to know fully ‘what one is’ – like the dream of delving into a filing cabinet to get a complete record of everything that has happened – before engaging with actual living. More than this, the human cannot know ‘what one is’ before experience and thus it is inevitably a performative past that is to be overcome with future forms. Hence for Deleuze and Guattari (1994) the proper task of philosophy, science and art is to create assemblages that are both for and against the chaos in oneself. Deleuze and Guattari’s pragmatics is itself based on a Nietzschean claim that the human imposes on chaos as much form and order as practical needs require for the present and on an attempt to “institute the chaos which creates” that gives rise to the unpredictable in the future. Here then there is the purposefulness of present practical needs that entails the constitution of necessary form of order in response to the human condition’s double-binds, but there is no other purpose behind or above this purposefulness than “instituting the chaos that creates”. It is a rhizomatics that explicates transformation through stratification and lines of flight. “Make a rhizome. But you don’t know what you can make a rhizome with, you don’t know which subterranean stem is going to make a rhizome, or enter a becoming, people your desert. So experiment” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 246).

May (1998: 13) suggests that for Nietzsche forming is an achievement rather than an intention and that this is critical as it undermines the dichotomy between will and effect, actor and action, as anthropocentric and an ‘atomistic need’. Even though in the following I argue for making the world into a creative, complexifying and problematising becoming that is constituted from the first instance by non-human agencies, it remains critical to be aware of what is at stake when attributing to Nietzsche the assumption that life enhancing values necessarily mean affirming how the world actually is in its most basic and universal sense – becoming – as the only source of value and creativity, and the assertion that human values that deny becoming – the ‘atomistic need’ for interpretation, for example – are necessarily a denial of life. In other words, the fact/value conflation that May (1998: 15-17) wants to problematise is divisions between ‘spirit’ and matter, consciousness and instinct, intelligence and affect, the brain and the stomach …. [it] is both a genealogical concept and a vector of re-evaluation….” (Beardsworth, 2001: 44, emphasis in original).
between reality as becoming and the affirmation of becoming as the only source of life enhancement. On this conflation of fact and value, May suggests that, firstly, falsification of the world as made up of enduring continuants, identities and structures is often essential to a *flourishing life* and that, most importantly, Nietzsche *only* opposes this falsification inasmuch as it results in an *impoverished life*. Secondly, the claim of falsification is complex because, despite the contingencies of identities and structures, such identities and structures must be willed as necessities so as to be overcome and enact the openness of the world. I return to these issues below but before doing this I introduce Nietzsche’s account of sovereign and reactive forces.

Sovereign and Reactive Force and Life Enhancement

Nietzsche’s First Essay in *On the Genealogy of Morals* “Good and Evil”, “Good and Bad” sets out the cultural battle between different modes of valuation: the noble against the slave, the spirit of Rome against the resentment spirit of Judea. “For Nietzsche, what is good is *originally* what is noble, that is, what discharges spontaneously, what is oriented towards the outside. The bad in this schema constitutes that which blocks the path of this *original* affirmation” (Beardsworth, 2001: 45, emphasis added). This original valuation of spontaneous discharge and interiorised delay is reinterpreted in the valuation ‘good and evil’ so that what is good in the original valuation – spontaneous discharge – becomes bad and evil, and what is bad – delayed discharge – becomes good. Here evil is defined as that which ignores the choice of whether to use its force, to discharge force, or not. Beardsworth writes that

> it is through this strategy of separation, and through the consequent concept of ‘choice’, that the Judaic re-evaluation imposes on activity the invitation to nonactivity and reactivity. The invitation is disguised under the new value system of an ‘agent’ free from, and responsible for its acts, that is, of a ‘subject’. (2001: 46)

The important point here is that the second evaluation is based on a different organisation of forces. In the first, noble or Roman valuation, what is good “moves from inside to outside, with little understanding, and need for understanding, of any limit between the two” (Beardsworth, 2001: 46). It means that what is bad is merely a secondary effect of what is good. In the second, slave or Judaic valuation, what is good is “what has sanctified the difference” between good and evil. This is an evaluation based on resentment in which what is evil is that which ignores the sanctified difference between good and evil. It is by invoking a subject that is responsible for its acts that the active forces of the strong, of spontaneous discharge outwards, yield to the reactive forces of the weak, reacting only to other internal forces. The world is henceforth split into active and reactive forces.

Nietzsche is “perhaps the major influence on postmodern thought”, say Cooper and Burrell (1988: 99). It is Nietzsche’s exposition of active and reactive forces that they suggest is instructive for rethinking the study of organisations. Cooper and Burrell (1988: 92-3) trace the historical displacement of the “object of organizational analysis” from “a process in the continuing mastery of the social and physical environment” to “organization as a quasi-stable collection of things or properties”. From this, it is
possible to delineate two general ways of evaluating organisation that equate to active and reactive forces: “the one, automatic and autonomous in operation, defying logical closure; the other, calculative and utilitarian in intent, reassuring in its substance” (Cooper and Burrell, 1988: 93). This distinction between an active force as superior or a “kind of prime energizer” – that is, drives beyond direct control – from which human action emanates is counterposed to an inferior or reactive force that is representationalist and ‘talking about’ something. It is the human’s tendency to make the world thinkable, that is to say, a will to know that makes the world determinate and calculable, that Cooper and Burrell suggest is critical to Nietzsche’s philosophy. It is this will to know that is hidden with the emphasis on unity and consensus of modern thought. Hence Cooper and Burrell invoke the human condition as irreducibly contingent, as emerging out of difference. They do this by reclaiming Nietzsche’s distinction between active and reactive forces for the study of organisation. They (1988: 99) suggest that “For Nietzsche, the force of difference is the active, that which possesses power of self-transformation, i.e., self-reference; opposing it is the reactive, a form of action which is at once inferior to and dependent on the active”.

Active force is superior and constitutes the reactive which denies its origin in the active. Cooper and Burrell quote Deleuze (1983: 56) who writes “… it is characteristic of reactive forces to deny, from the start, the difference which constitutes them at the start, to invert the differential element from which they derive and give a deformed image of it”. It is with the inversion of the active and the reactive into representationalism that brings forth a search for “pure and ideal forms which pre-exist our profane everyday world”. Cooper and Burrell (1988: 101) continue that “[w]hat we find at the so-called origin of things is not a reassuring state of perfection, now lost but still reclaimable; instead there is disparity, difference and indeterminacy”. The modern’s claim of perfect origins is replaced with a postmodern “search for instabilities” that is a process of “differential contestation”. “Postmodern thought begins with the insight that all discourse suffers from an intrinsic reactivity”, according to Cooper and Burrell (1988: 104). The active is, conversely, the “essential priority of spontaneous, aggressive and expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and directions” (Deleuze, 1983: 41, quoted in Cooper and Burrell, 1988: 104). It is this ‘essential priority’ – that is, a priori forces – which Cooper and Burrell suggest “must be tamed, even denied, by the countervailing forces of the reactive which thus function remedially”. The implications for individuals, cultures and, in this instance, the study of organisations, of active and reactive forces are considerable and summed up by the often cited aphorism ‘from the organisation of production’ to the ‘production of organisation’. Emphasising the ‘production of organisation’ means that the ontological status of an organisation is reconfigured so that it is ‘a unity or coherence of forces’, that is to say, an immanent organisation of forces that attain more-or-less durable epistemological effects. The first move towards this, Cooper and Burrell (1988: 105) suggest, is the recognition that all organised activity is reactive and defensive and that active force is superior; this entails a “genealogy of system and organization [that] begins with the recognition that representations and structures derive from a more fundamental process of materiality and energy”. The second is to conceive of the human as a material flow and foreground indeterminacy and instability.
Nietzsche is similarly concerned with the general way in which values are evaluated and whether these arise in a sovereign/active/master or reactive/slave manner. The critical meaning of sovereign or master that I want to bring out here is a relationship to oneself and not a domination of others. Such a sovereign individual is, I suggest below, passive in the sense of acknowledging a contingent history but active in willing the necessity of this history so as to overcome its life denying functions. It denotes a strength of spirit that endures the truth of becoming through a creative suffering. In contrast, the slave always defines itself against something that is more powerful and higher as the cause of suffering. Slavish forces are aligned with the affirmation of being, with a weak spirit that cannot endure the truth of becoming. The question to which I now turn is how are the sovereign/master or reactive/slavish modes of valuing related to life enhancement? In the following I set out Nietzsche’s response to this question.

Evaluating Nietzsche’s three criteria – power, sublimation and the creation of forms – for life enhancement requires more than a simple denunciation or declaration of slavish or masterly values because different emphases on the three criteria will produce significantly different evaluations of values. May (1998) argues that Nietzsche does not condemn any value (such as organisation, pity, calculation, and so on,) outright but demands a more subtle approach that is concerned with the motives that values express in terms of their life enhancing functions. It is worth quoting May at some length on this:

First, there is, prima facie, no reason why any given value or, in general, any particular ethic, should not produce a high score by one criterion and a low score by another. Thus the ‘ascetic ideal’ generally scores highly in terms of power, highly in terms of sublimation, and poorly in terms of form-creation. Creators of states, on the other hand, score well in terms of power, badly in terms of intelligence, and well in terms of form-creation. Second, one cannot assess the performance of a value on any of these criteria in the abstract; one can only do so in relation to the features of a particular life or person, because values are conditions ‘for the preservation of a certain type of life’. Thus, a given value may enable one type of person to find power and enhance his life, while achieving the opposite for another. Third, any given value may also score differently depending on how life-enhancing are the functions it serves. Thus, pity is bad when, inter alia, it has the ‘insane’ aims of abolishing suffering – insane because suffering is inseparable from living, because suffering is in large part, both cause and effect of our growth in power and creativity and ‘sovereignty’. By contrast, pity is good when it has the ‘converse’ object: namely, those who resist suffering, those who cannot bear to be (or to witness others being) ‘broken, forged, torn, burnt, made incandescent, and purified’. (1998: 36-7)

The critical distinction between master and slave turns therefore on the third criteria of life enhancement, namely form creation, says Nietzsche. Yet even though form creation is masterly, the constitution of this comes out of slavish values of self-doubt. Here then what determines whether resentment, bad conscience and an ascetic ideal is

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5 I prefer the term ‘sovereign’ rather than ‘active’ as the word active is usually counterposed to passive. Two points are relevant to this usual association. Firstly, passivity is critical for ‘masters’ in submitting to the historical determination of the past that is willed as necessity. Secondly, ‘slaves’ are active in search of power.

6 Masters and slaves are both capable of the will to power and the sublimation of power (see May, 1998: 45-6 for more detail).
Life denying or an inducement to life enhancement is more productively thought of as the relative mixture of master and slave values and the relative ability to mobilise such values. May writes that:

Nietzsche interestingly suggests that slavish traits are crucial to motivating it [form creation] – especially to generating its variety and subtlety. For the slave’s feeling of vulnerability, the gnawing question mark he (in contrast to the master) places over his identity and power, and his restless dissatisfaction with his lot, can all provide decisive impetus to the highest realms of thought and art and self-mastery – in other words, to maximal life enhancement. He, unlike the master, is a painful problem to himself; and in his search for relief from the pain and for a solution to the problem he is driven to feats of thought, imagination, self-discipline, and artistry for which the self-assured master simply lacks comparable motivation. (1998: 46-7)

Sovereign individuals and cultures, Nietzsche says, are a composite or mixture of master and slave values such that neither alone can maximise life enhancement: “in all the higher and more mixed cultures there also appear attempts at mediation between two moralities … and at times they occur directly alongside each other … within a single soul” (BGE, 260). Here then it is not so much masters being coerced into slavish values because there is always, from the first instance, mediation between the masterly and slavish values. Masters require slavish values to produce the most powerful, sublimated expressions of form creation into knowledge and intelligence, says May (1998: 48, emphasis added), because slave values provide, firstly, something to overcome; secondly, slaves “themselves supply much of the motivation for that overcoming” through a will to be rid of self-doubt and resentfulness; thirdly, overcoming engenders abstract thought and discipline. Hence, May continues, without these three the creation of new forms would not occur as “‘the masters’ expression of power would … remain crude and unreflective”. It means, by implication, that to “be a malcontent one does not need to be ungifted, nor to be sovereign must one be one of nature’s talents” (May 1998).

My contention is that Nietzsche’s sovereign human cannot be equated with the depiction of a master discharging ‘raw’, original force in unabashed expression; this is something to which I return below. A sovereign form of life is rather the ongoing and never-ending “genuine battleground of opposed values” (GM, I, 16) against slavishness through the imposition of order on oneself through discipline. Reactive forces do not so much extirpate active forces but are simultaneously dependent on them for sublimation into knowledge and for the becoming of forces, that is to say, the becoming of becoming out of a technico-affective history (Brigham, 2001). The key point here is that discipline and self-control can be used for creativity and alertness and for suppressing and narrowing the range of sense of human experience.  

I desire for myself and for all who live, may live, without being tormented by a puritanical conscience, an ever-greater spiritualization and multiplication of the senses; indeed, we should be

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7 May (1998: 133) writes that “To put the matter in terms of power and sublimation, two of Nietzsche’s three criteria of life enhancement, we may say that power is both a measure of life enhancement and yet may also endanger it”. May’s point here is that power sublimated into civilisation and ‘higher culture’ may also be re-released in destructive forms like instrumental practices to specific ends.
grateful to the senses for their subtlety, plenitude, and power and offer them the best we have in the way of spirit. (WP, 820, quoted in May 1998: 28-9)

Here then Nietzsche’s concept of the human condition emerges out of an unfathomably complex history. The human is, critically, its history, or as I discuss in the next section, a technico-affective history. In relation to this at the beginning of the Second Essay in On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche poses the following: “To breed an animal which is able to make promises – is that not precisely the paradoxical task which nature has set herself with regard to humankind? is it not the real problem of humankind?” (GM, II, 1). Here it is the learning, training and life’s circumstances that “change us” (BGE, 231) that are explicit in Nietzsche’s genealogical project for thinking the human condition “with its expectation that if we see why we pursue the valuations, practices and assumptions that we do, the latter will either be confirmed – though perhaps ‘for other reasons than hitherto’ – or else undermined” (May, 1998: 18, italics in original). The genealogy of a particular human or history in general is indeed contingent (i.e., things could have been otherwise) but for those affected by them they are a necessity. Or put another way, “[t]hus, what may be contingent as one’s history [nature, nurture, life circumstances] is necessity as one’s fate; and only by maximally expressing – i.e., ‘willing’ – that necessity can one be free” (May, 1998: 22). Here a strong individual is a mixture of the passive and the active. Passive in the sense of submitting to the necessity of a technico-affective history and active in that this necessary history is willed so as to express configurations of power that it constructs (May, 1998: 25).

Why might this type of encounter with life be desirable? Deleuze and Guattari respond to the question ‘critique in the name of what?’ by submitting that the creation of concepts or form creation resonates with Bateson’s counteractualisation of the double-binds of human experience (Bateson, 2000: 206-12). For Bateson, double-binds are actualised to be countered – that is counteractualised with the creation of new forms – thus subverting the tendency toward mutually exclusive actions of either/or and to various human pathologies.9

8 Philosophy, art and science creates assemblages where chaos and order is a both/and relation. Here Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 203-4) describe what produces poetry: “people are constantly putting up an umbrella that shelters them and on the underside of which they draw a firmament and write their conventions and opinions. But poets, artists, make a slit in the umbrella, they tear open the firmament itself, to let in a bit of free and windy chaos and to frame in a sudden light a vision that appears…. The painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and neither does the writer write on a blank page; but the page or canvas is already covered with preexisting, preestablished clichés that it is first necessary to erase, to clean, to flatten, even to shred, so as to let in a breath of air from the chaos that brings us the vision”.

9 See Deleuze and Guattari’s later work (1988: 21-2) for an explicit acknowledgement of Bateson’s work and his use of the word ‘plateau’ in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a rhizome. (cf. Deleuze and Guattari’s (1984: 79) earlier collaboration for a more critical account of Bateson and the tendency of double-binds to intensify oedipal relations). For Deleuze and Guattari the either/or of an external relation of form-unform is an exclusive disjunction and an internal relation of both/and is an inclusive disjunction. See Cooper’s (1998: 157-61) discussion of the overlapping concerns of Bateson and Derrida (and albeit, in passing, Deleuze). He writes “Derrida’s différence is like Deleuze’s becoming … since it’s always deferred or ‘differed’ in space and time. But there’s always a
The Human Condition and Becoming

Beardsworth (2001) sets out the human condition as constituted by an *originary technics* and it is from this that he provides a novel approach to willing and to active and reactive forces. Like May, it is the dichotomy between active and reactive forces that Beardsworth wants to reorient. But critically for my purposes, Beardsworth adds to May’s willing of a contingent but necessary history an explicit account of willing as non-human from the first instance. Here willing is constituted through a technico-affective history of the human that is always imbricated with non-human forces.

Before I discuss this technico-affective history and willing in more detail I need to set out why Beardsworth considers the dichotomous demarcation of active and reactive forces problematic. Firstly, he states that the dichotomy between active and reactive means that the human is reduced to *dispositions of force or flow* and that, secondly, this field of flows remains an *a priori continuity*. Here it is not so much the forces that transform as the *relative organisation* of forces that changes. Thirdly, this reduction to flows lapses into new orthodoxy, that is, *metaphysics of force or energy* that risks losing the mediations so critical to the designation of these forces in the first instance – a designation of force that does not include cultural differentiations and thus is unable to provide an *historical account of force*. Fourthly, the conclusion from this is that the implication for overcoming the nihilism of reactive evaluation “is nothing but a question of re-organising the forces underlying the metaphysical re-evaluation of the noble valuation” such that “It is not a matter of inventing the new as such: the overhuman is already with us in this sense”, that is to say, there is no becoming of becoming (Beardsworth, 2001: 47). This is a critical point because it

risks being located by Nietzsche in a *move back* to the ‘original’ valuation, the original noble valuation. At such moments the active destruction of metaphysics (‘active nihilism’) becomes a pure regression to the fiction of spontaneous discharge. (Beardsworth, 2001: 47, emphasis in original)

This is a desire for a metaphysical purity of force – of forces prior to life – that constitutes not so much an overcoming of the human as simply an inversion of the Judaic schema of evaluation. Put in other words, overcoming the Judaic mode of evaluation is based on a return to an original and abstracted field of forces that is particularly problematic because it posits a fictional point in history of pure force. It inaugurates a *metaphysics of becoming that is pure force outside of all historical differentiations*, leaving the dichotomous relation between active and reactive forces intact.10 Following Beardsworth and May, I am interested in going beyond the sovereign

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10 Ansell Pearson (1999: 216-218) takes up the criticism that Deleuze and Guattari neglect the way in which the human is inscribed by meaning and memory and lose sight of the genealogical specificity.
and reactive conceived as a dichotomy. It is Nietzsche’s Second Essay in *On the Genealogy of Morals* that Beardsworth (2001: 48) turns to in order to develop an account of forces as “organisations of force [that] are immediately posited beyond biological, physiological and psychological force to include other types of force (notably technical)” This means that “these organisations [of force] are seen to form a mediated history of the organism in relation to its environment from which, precisely, distinctions like the physiological, the technical, the psychological, the social emerge in the first place”. Without this reconfiguration of Nietzsche, the risk is that an account of the discharge of pure force returns the human to a metaphysics of active force as pure force.

**Technics, Memory and the Ability to Promise**

In the following I draw on Beardsworth (1996, 1998, 2001) to introduce in more detail what is specific about human development. Beardsworth argues that was has to be rethought is the general poverty of debate surrounding the processes of hominisation. Currently, he claims, debate is delimited to four regressive and dogmatic claims. Firstly, cynical assertions that the last three hundred years of European history have been a mistake and should be exorcised. Secondly, fundamentalist claims that we must return to the human essence. Thirdly, the continued necessity of a dichotomization between the sciences and humanities, that is, a dichotomy between science’s disembodied chronological time in empty space and the humanities embodied time in inhabited space. Fourthly, attempts generalise and intensify a scientific worldview across all human experience. Rethinking this debate means examining the relations between science, culture and technics, says Beardsworth.

Latour (1987, 1993) has convincingly shown how science is constituted through technological devices and how a ‘purification process’ erases this technical mediation; Latour demonstrates that the human is bound up with an original technicity. Strum and Latour (1999) compare baboons with humans and claim that what is distinctive about the human and modern science is the replacing of a complexity of changing, often ambiguous behaviours, relations and meanings with a complicated array of simple, symbolic, and clear-cut items. It is, they suggest, “an enormous task of simplification.” This shift from what they denote as social complexity to social complication occurs through language, symbols and material objects. Thus to the extent that science can disavow its own constitution through technics, that is, that scientific work is inhabited by technics, it can maintain a claim on abstract chronological time and an evolutionary accumulation of knowledge. Beardsworth (1996) states that this is a metaphysical claim because it refuses to think about the relation between the human and technics for human
life. The example that Beardsworth (1996) quotes is from contemporary molecular biology:

[For] as soon as molecular biology makes possible a manipulation of the germen [genetic splicing, for example] through the intervention of the hand, the [genetic] program receives a lesson from experience. The law of life [evolution as slight variation] is thereby purely and simply suspended…. Molecular biology, in its technical actuality, makes the exit from the laws of evolution possible, or … only apparently; for one should in fact affirm that molecular biology reveals that the ‘laws of evolution’ have been suspended for a very long time – at least since the invention of man, that is, of technics, and that it is no longer possible to ignore this when this suspension is gaining an actuality that is radically new. (Stiegler, 1994: 272)

There are several important points in this passage. Firstly, the simplistic reduction of the human to a civilised animal is problematised because the human is constituted and transformed by an originary technics. This does not mean that the human can be understood in terms of a narrow ‘technological rationalism’ or tool-making capacity as “its should be made plain that many insects, birds and mammals had made far more radical innovations in the fabrications of containers” (Mumford, 1967: 5). As Ansell Pearson (1999: 216) claims, tools – or the non-discursive – only becomes important when it is taken up with “linguistic symbols, aesthetic designs and socially transmitted knowledge …. the ‘aboriginal field’ of human inventiveness lies not simply in the making of tools but in the refashioning of bodily organs”.11 Secondly, human ‘evolution’ is radicalised from the chronological transmission of past into the present with slight variation12 to a process of hominisation that is constitutively a technicisation. Evolution as gradual selection based on a chronological past is refigured into a discontinuous transformation constituted by technics. The disjunctures and disruptions of memory in terms of a constitutive technics can be conceived as dissipative assemblages13 (see also Clark 1997, Margulis 1993, for example). This is attempted by reworking the philosophy of life in Nietzsche and specifically Nietzsche’s writing on promises.

According to Nietzsche what marks out the human from other animals is the ability to make a promise.14 Beardsworth quotes Nietzsche’s (GM, II 1) statement that:

To breed an animal which is able to make promises – is not this the paradoxical task which nature has set herself with regard to humankind? is it not the real problem of humankind?

11 Technology from techne meaning composition/arts of mind and tools/practices.

12 Differences of degree, rather than kind, are crucial for Darwin’s theory that the law of heredity is slight variation. Contemporary molecular biology takes up this claim of slight variation with the estimation that human genetic material is only two per cent different from apes. Such claims provide continued credibility for the animality of the human and attempts to reduce the human to physico-chemicals (see Beardsworth, 1996).

13 Assemblage translated from the French agencement. It can also be translated as arrangement or organisation.

14 See Patton (1993: 144-161) for a discussion of power and promises in Hobbes and Nietzsche.
The human is distinguished in that it may make promises, meaning the ability to *defer the discharge of one’s force to a future time and place*. For Nietzsche the act of promising is predicated on the *calculability* and *repeatability made possible by technics*. The act of promising is the memory of the delay of force: it is the will’s memory that suspends immediacy, says (Beardsworth, 2001). Nietzsche writes:

> And precisely this necessarily forgetful animal, in whom forgetting is a strength, representing a form of *robust* health, has bred for himself a counter drive, memory, with the help of which forgetfulness is suspended in certain cases, – namely in those cases where a promise is to be made: consequently, it is by means a passive inability to be rid of an impression once it has made its impact, nor is it just indigestion caused by giving your word on some occasion and finding you cannot cope, instead it is an *active desire* not to let go, a desire to keep on desiring what has been, on some occasion, desired, really it is the *will’s memory*: so that a world of strange new things, circumstances and even acts of will may be placed quite safely between the original ‘I will’, ‘I shall do’ and the actual discharge of the will, its act, without breaking this long chain of will. But what a lot of preconditions there are for this! In order to have some degree of control over the future, man must first have learned to distinguish between what happens by accident and what by design, to think causally, to view the future as the present and anticipate it, to grasp with certainty what is end and what is means, in all, to be able to calculate, compute – and before he can do this, man himself will really have to become *reliable, regular and automatic* [notwendig], even in his own self-image, so that he, as someone making a promise is, is answerable for his own future!… That is precisely what constitutes the long history of the origins of responsibility. (*GM*, II, 1-2)

This passage is remarkable because it invokes the human as constituted by the practices that make the world calculable, orderly and necessary. Contrary to the First Essay’s spontaneous and instinctive affirmation of force, here it is the *decentred deferral of force that constitutes the human* – the time between ‘I will’ and the actual discharge of the will. From the first, then, the suggestion is that the human is based on deferral and this means that the human can never be a purely active force. Moving beyond the notion of a pure active force means that this dichotomising fiction of pure forces is replaced with the human *will as the historical result of the organisation of force that is beyond a priori designation* (Beardsworth, 2001: 50). This means that categories that in *The Will to Power* Nietzsche often wishes to describe as secondary phenomena, as useless fictions in the realm of Judaic resentment, need rather to be located with the *very* formation of the human will in relation to a non-human technico-affective history. Beardsworth, in a crucial section, writes:

> Since this formation marks the process of humanisation as such (there is no human organism without the differentiations of memory), categories that emerge within it cannot be either simply ‘active’ or ‘reactive’. Thus, the categories against which Nietzsche sets much of his thinking – causality, finality, purpose, the subjectivity of the will – are the result of a long process that designates the human as such and therefore designates them as also active. (2001: 50)

Here subjectivity is denoted ‘as also active’ because there are no unmediated instinctual forces that reactive culture straightforwardly ‘leaves behind’ and because subjectivity gives rise to new mixtures of active and reactive. Here it is forces “that are not initially human but which, through historical formation, have entered into relation with the forces that make up the human” (Ansell Pearson, 1999: 221). It is from this argument about the process of *hominisation* that Beardsworth argues that the active and reactive cannot be simply and dualistically pitted against each other. This *process of hominisation is the effect of a series of forces* – human and non-human, discursive and material – that constitute subjectivity and responsibility. This means that human
subjectivity is not a useless fiction rather what is a fiction is that the human is ahistorical. The recasting that this invokes is that it is only from a series of preconditions that make the human determinate and determined that the indeterminate and creative emerge in the first instance. To recap this critical point, this means that the human cannot be thought of purely in terms of self-preservation or in terms of the discharge of active forces that prefigure the human because what is original to human survival is always already non-human. And, critically, as I have already argued, to say that the human emerges from technics means that there is no essential logic to the process of life and this means that the human is opened up to chance and contingency.

Beardsworth orients these series of preconditions or forces to mnemotechnics. Nietzsche asks how would it be possible to create a human with memory given its “partly flighty mind, attuned only to the passing moment…?”. Nietzsche introduces mnemonics – the arts and practices of memory that is a mnemotechnics – to answer this question:

To be answerable for oneself, and proudly too, and therefore have the right to say 'yes' to oneself – is, as I said, a ripe fruit, but also a late fruit: -- how long must this fruit have hung, bitter and sour, on the tree!… ‘How do you give a memory to an animal, man? How do you impress something on this partly dull, partly idiotic, inattentive mind, this personification of forgetfulness, so that it will stick!’… This age-old question was not resolved with gentle solutions and methods, as can be imagined; perhaps there is nothing more terrible and strange in man’s pre-history than his technique of mnemonics. ‘A thing must be burnt in so that it stays in the memory’ – that is a proposition from the oldest … psychology on earth. (GM, II, 3)

Here it is deferral made possible by mnemotechnics that is the very possibility of human life. This disciplining of the human, taken up, after Foucault (1987), across the human sciences, has made discussion of issues such as freedom or autonomy somewhat unfashionable for the last two decades. Foucault is surely right that the human is the historical product of various disciplinary apparatus that provides for the potential for remote control (Cooper 1992), but yet this does not convey the paradoxical quality of discipline that leaves the human open because of its original technicity (see also Watson 1998). It is a “widening of the energetic account of concepts in terms of affects into one that includes technical forces”, says (Beardsworth, 2001: 52). Here, firstly, the relation between affect and technics changes and cannot be reduced to pure affect without missing the historical. The human is rather the effect of a “vast spiral” that is “enlarging out more widely and through instances of deferral and differentiation like technics, language and social institutions to those organisms whose digestive systems can promise” (Beardsworth, 2001: 53). Secondly, to say that the human is organised by technics does not presuppose that a will or the ability to promise will be formed. Rather such a will or ability comes out of the history of mnemotechnics as variously decentred, dissipative and dynamic (Beardsworth, 2001); this means that prior to being active or reactive the human “emerges from this technico-affective history of cruelty and interiorisation”. Thus any attempt to demarcate the history of delayed discharge or interiorisation to reactive forces can be understood as an attempt to separate the historical as technics from the psychological and physiological, and to impoverish the work of a multiplicity of forces. Beardsworth’s conclusion for how Nietzsche might be received in a contemporary context
is at one and the same time, first, the analysis of everything in terms of force and, second, the analysis of this very force in terms of a historically differentiated, changing and expanding complex of forces, in which no particular force or analysis of force predominates. (2001: 53, emphasis added)

This is an immanent method that is concerned with the genealogical, technical and ethical and with the way in which a transvaluation of values comes from within this expanded multiplicity of forces. Beardsworth suggests that rather than a return to the ‘natural’ or premodern beneath civilising processes the human subject is the very condition of one who goes through and beyond the distinctions of pure force and artificial constraint. Nietzsche does not therefore reject the possibility of calculation, instead what is critical is the function to which calculatory practices are employed. In other words, for Nietzsche, what is crucial is whether an approach to calculation is reached through sovereign or reactive values and what purpose calculation serves, that is to say, whether it is life enhancing or life denying. To the extent that slavish values are dominant and lead to technical-industrial cultures based on utilitarian assumptions, Nietzsche would consider these life denying. For example, a forest might be used for producing wood pulp and through calculatory practices it could be managed so as to maximise output yields (see Cooper, 1998: 108-10). Here actions are valued according to those to whom they are useful – maximum wood output, in this instance – and premised on a reactive metaphysics of permanence and ‘atomistic’, instrumental need. Alternatively, the forest might be thought of as an assemblage, with heterogeneous uses – some known, some unknown. Here forest as assemblage is premised on life enhancing activity that transforms the relation between the inside – forest – and the outside – environment. For example, the forest as protection for a village from falling rocks (if it is close to mountains), as part of a sewage dispersal and recycling system, as a recreation area, as a welcoming environment for rare species and even for wood pulp production. Here calculations would still be made, contracts agreed and forest services provided for a variety of uses but ‘forest’ and its use is premised on an ontology of becoming that is always in tension with a workaday sense of current knowing. Brown et al (1998) describe an ontology of becoming as ontological relativism that is always

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15 Cooper (1976: 1010) writes that the power of an ontology of being – the Platonic system – “was that it was a specific end just as much as it was a specific tool. That end was the law or principle, the essence beyond change”.

16 Assemblage is “understood as partial, dispersed, fragile, tentative…. It’s the continuous movement of parts in a restless flux in which the separate identities of the parts give way to a mutual coming and going, uniting and separating; and in which identities as self-contained units simply resemble, seem, feign, pretend [and dependent upon] half of a whole that is the same as the other half. Semi is divided same-ness…. Sameness here is clearly not a property of individual parts but more like an originary matrix or source…. It’s the kind of unlimited source that Michel Foucault called similitude, by which he meant the directionless, the indefinite… All this is curiously like Whitehead’s mutuality with its betweenness that is mute, mutable and motile…. While space and time may be non-distinguishable – ‘invisible and nameless’ in similitude, they curiously, can only be approached by being separated. This is the double function of the seam: it separates and joins at the same time” (Cooper, 1998: 110-11, emphasis in original).
mediated by an *epistemological realism*. Here an ontological relativism presages continual movement or becoming that is “affirmed as within and ultimately carrying off the real. Hence there is an affirmation that things can and will always be different from how they are grasped in their current actuality” (Brown *et al*, 1998: 83). This is what I term the *ontological turn* for the human sciences.

**Free Spirits**

In this concluding section I want to elaborate on the *ontological turn* introduced above. To do this I return to the character of the *negative capability* described in ‘The Open Field’. For Deleuze and Guattari the ordering of chaos in oneself, the dance of things in tension, is a negative capability that is becoming – a becoming that invokes Cooper’s ‘open field’, Foucault’s ‘similitude’ and Whitehead’s ‘mutuality’. The implication here is that “right management of our world begins with right management of ourselves. Is this learnable?”, posits Cooper (1976: 1014).

The human condition that I have set out above is one that presupposes the organisation of time, memory and promising *and* transforms time, memory and promises overflowing this expanded field of forces. For Beardsworth (2001) and May (1998) this means that periods of history, such as the Enlightenment, should not be considered a mistake to be exorcised but are retained as “a necessary part of the history of life … and as a necessary part of life, they are a precondition of their own overcoming” (Beardsworth, 2001: 55-56). Henceforth the opposition between becoming and being is not made obsolete but rather returned to a particular history within an expanded energetics that is a condition for life and the transvaluation/overcoming of practical, workaday assumptions of reality. The implication is that life enhancing values come out of a technico-affective history that is willed and recollected as a necessity of a contingent history. This is I think a critical insight but it is also a potential problem as it

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17 See also Latour’s (1993) amodern constitution. Taken seriously, Latour’s constitution would inaugurate a new society, a different nature, establish novel facts and reconstruct reality with new assemblages. Here then the human condition changes with society, science and nature. Echoing this, Marcuse (1969: 45, 31) writes “the imagination, sustained by the achievements of science, could turn its productive power to the radical reconstruction of experience and the universe of experience” so that the “rational transformation of the world could then lead to a reality formed by an aesthetic sensibility of man”. Brown *et al* (1998: 82-3) argue that “In advancing a ‘relativist ontology’ we are placing the assemblages of relations at the centre of the analysis, with the implication that the real owes its certain, ordered nature to the unfinished, unstable ‘hybrid’ patterns-in-production of materials and texts which labour within it. It is here that the notion of ‘presencing practices’ deserves emphasis. Unfinished organizings take on the character of stable entities via the mediation of practices which order, stabilize and moreover ensure the repetition of the appearance of certain meaningful patterns…. Presencing practices are a way of making the world ‘visible’ in stable, orderly fashion, thereby providing the conditions of ‘articulability’, for speaking about the world in particular ways”. See Deleuze (1994) for a detailed elaboration of Plato’s logic of original, copy and simulacra.

18 Similarly, analysis of organisations can be retained for present purposes despite the injunction that organisation is act of ‘simple location’ (Chia, 1998).
suggests “that if that history happens to determine, in an individual or a culture (such as ours), precisely the moral values which Nietzsche opposes, then he seems, perversely, to demand that we should ‘will’, rather than repudiate, those very values” (May, 1998: 22). Like the creative solutions to Bateson’s double-binds, the seeming paradox of willing reactive values can be figured into a creative encounter whereby the only way of overcoming is through living through and beyond such values so that their life denying effects become overwhelmingly apparent, thus serving as the basis of their own overcoming.

From an expanded multiplicity of technico-affective forces, the relation between the organisation of forces and the re-evaluation of the production of forces is one of mediation. This is an important point because it means that active or reactive forces are not forgotten but understood as historical and reflective mediations rather than absolute distinctions. It is, to use Cooper and Burrell’s (1988) terms, concerned with the mediation of the organisation of production and the production of organisation (see also Burrell, 2001: 25-26). Once the technico-affective history of the human and the overhuman are understood as inseparable then the organisation of production and the production of organisation cannot be separated either. It is through the mediation of forces understood as through a technico-affective history rather than the breaking down of forces into a priori dichotomies such as active or reactive that the forces producing organisation exceed the organisation of production. Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) describe forces as ‘machinic’ in order that forces are not taken to be an essential essence: here ‘machinic’ denotes the becoming of becoming of forces. This is, I suggest, an empowering sense of the indeterminacy of relations, non-human from the first instance, that emerges from within an expanded field of forces.

Ansell Pearson (1999: 214-24) remarks that what is particular about capitalist society is that capitalism is anti-genealogical and anti-memory as it “no longer needs to write in bare flesh or to create a memory for the human”. But as Ansell Pearson (1999: 220) continues “while capitalism may to a certain extent be the ‘master’ of surplus value and its distribution, it does not dominate the flows from which surplus value derives”. It means, he continues, that “the articulation of machinic subjectivity within the movements of capitalist production is rhizomatic, coming from multiple directions and exceeding the utilitarian and productivist logics of capital in unpredictable and incalculable directions”. It is from this that the “overhuman signals not the death or disappearance of the human and something more than a simple change of concept; in short, it signals the arrival of a new form of life that is neither God nor man – ‘and which, it is hoped, will not prove worse than its previous two forms’” (Deleuze, 1988b: 132, in Ansell Pearson, 1999: 221). An implication of this for those researching organisations is that description and analysis of the human, technologies and organisations can be retained whilst simultaneously maintaining their transvaluation, that is to say, forces producing organisation are shape-shifted by the organisation of production which itself is defined by and overcoming its own technico-affective history of forces. Beardsworth (2001: 64) claims that this vital recognition invokes an immense cultural adventure that anticipates a future: the irreducible becoming of cultural, natural, technical and historical forces of the human. This is, I suggest, Nietzsche’s idea of the free spirit:
A free spirit is a person who has an enlarged sense of the self’s relation to its *Umwelt* [environment] through recognising the intrinsic relation between the sensuous and the rational. In the experience of this recognition a free spirit becomes less appropriating, more abounding in energy. A ‘free spirit’ comes, in other words, from knowing where spirit comes from in the first place, how it evolves and what forces are in play behind our conceptual determinations of the world. (Beardsworth, 2001: 43)

Here a free spirit “is no mindless psychotic or eroded subjectivity … but a massively complex assortment of infinitely adaptable dissipative-structures, provided by a life of richly varied and disciplined structural-couplings with the physical and social environment” (Watson, 1998: 14). Put simply, the untrained encounter with chaos is rarely productive, liberating or creative: Bergson, Nietzsche and Deleuze were great philosophers *because* of their training and what this discipline allowed them to create; this is the conclusion that Deleuze and Guattari (1994) come to in their final collaborative book. Similarly, for Ansell Pearson (1999), since the human is responsible for “even the stars and animal life” – the human is the “eternal custodian of the machines of the universe”, say Deleuze and Guattari (1984: 4) – the critical and creative task – which for Deleuze the human continues to enjoy a privileged status as the overhuman – is to “make history” by “unmaking preceding realities and configurations” and produce “unexpected conjunctions” and “improbable continuums”. Here the human “doubles history with a sense of continual evolution” (Deleuze, 1988a: 35). The technico-affective assemblages of the human are not the disavowal of history and politics but a creative reconfiguration of them that opens a technico-affective history to a “supple and transversal network of novel alliances that is always perpendicular to the vertical structure of established and official history” (Ansell Pearson, 1999: 223). Here issues relating to the human condition become creative through the critical concepts of assemblage, discourse and technics.

The human cannot be adequately conceived as purely reactive but rather emerges from mediated technico-affective assemblages that are the condition for rethinking the human condition. For Nietzsche choosing depends not on a ‘free will’ as a primary cause but on a ‘strong will’ (*BGE*, 21). This ‘strong will’ should not be taken as evoking total liberation above ‘man and mountains’, from tradition and all pre-existing sense, on the basis that it is arbitrary. It means instead affirming the technico-affective assemblages of the human as not the antithesis of freedom but a precondition of it in the first instance. To deny this genealogy of the human – “the whole single line of humanity up to himself”, Nietzsche says (*TI*, 33) – would not only be bound to failure but would most importantly deny the constitution of the human through temporality and suffering. Thus a ‘freedom of the will’ that expresses the necessity of the technico-affective history of the human for its own overcoming is the condition for developing a self-discipline of ‘promising’, *living on and through* with ‘great suffering’ and becoming self-responsible (*GM*, II, 2). These claims might also be made for the study of...

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19 “It is never the case that that there is *either* constraint or freedom: the logic of otherability and betweenness insists on the *simultaneity*… Assemblage affirms the complex interdependence between the constrained and the unconstrained, *between* the predictable and the unpredictable” (Cooper, 1998: 118).
organisation: neither the forces producing organisation nor the organisation of production precede each other in either direction. Rather “their space of mutual determination is created in the process … [and these] terms are radically unstable mutually defining instances. It is this space that is active and pregnant with the future” (Beardsworth, 2001: 55, emphasis in original). It is a space of invention through and beyond distinctions that retains its particular history as a condition of its eventual overcoming.

The response to the double-bind of the human condition for Cooper, with inspiration from Bergson, Bateson, Deleuze, Nietzsche and others, is to create. Here creativity becomes a form of concept producing critique when productive critique does not work within a logic of reversal or binary opposition of either/or but affirm relations of both/and. This is the both/and of the event where relations of becoming and being are inseparable; they ‘inhere and subsist’ as virtual and actual, although they are not identical. For Deleuze and Guattari (1988, 1994) this is critique without deliverance because it does not set out to liberate the human as something that has been held enslaved. It is because of the claims of representationalism, that is to say, that form and order returns to the Same, that Deleuze and Guattari’s pragmatics is so powerful for reanimating critique. If as Nietzsche says we must have chaos in ourselves so as to give birth to dancing stars, then dancing stars will not be repetitions of the Same in a Platonic sense, but a repetition that is a becoming through and beyond a technico-affective history. This becoming is the negative capability that Cooper (1976: 1009-10) writes about as “the putting of oneself among uncertainties and staying there…. Out of this swirl of indeterminacy, a creation delivers itself in its own wisdom and needs no pulling”. The ability to make a promise through a constitutive technics might therefore be most usefully thought of as not the resolution of tensions inherent in the human condition but as approaching the double-binds of the human condition: the impossibility of knowing the chaos in oneself and the necessity of making things knowable and ordered. Here technics is anthropomorphic in the sense of anthropos meaning of human shape and morphos meaning to give shape.

I have argued that the relation between willing, active and reactive forces and life enhancement comes out of the human’s technico-affective history. From this account of the human condition I set out an ontological turn and the implications for such a turn for the human sciences and for organisation studies. I have claimed that a dichotomy between active and reactive force culminates in an either/or relation: either an inability to create new forms through madness or the repetition of the Same through acquiescence to common sense representationalism. In both instances the capacity to produce durable ordering effects and the ability to make promises is undermined. Promising becomes impossible for those who have stepped into madness because of a lack of order and regularity. Similarly, those who are obedient only to a logic of representation are unable to fulfil promises because of an inability to respond creatively to the contingencies of any activity. Responding to this predicament is the critical and creative task that characterises Bob Cooper’s intellectual work over the last twenty-five years: writing about concepts that stake out an encounter with the chaos in ourselves and our tendencies to be slavish to conformity. Remaining in paradoxical and unsettling assemblages of both/and we must have a little chaos in ourselves, those rhizomatic little ‘dancing stars’, as Nietzsche says, but not abandon sublimated knowledge. Despite
double-binds, the creative movement and mixture of *both/and* is to be fought for with an ontological turn.

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